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1) Abstract and Declarations. 
Abstract. 
This thesis is about the Chinese approach to the joint problems of 
flood control and regional development in the River Huang basin, and 
the major influences from which that approach has resulted. Throughout 
Chinese history, the River Huang has been notorious for the suffering 
it has brought in devastating floods two years out of three. In these 
floods thousands have died, crops have been ruined and whole villages 
buried up to the eaves. Meanwhile, the surrounding land usually 
suffered severe drought but, largely owing to the danger of initiating 
further flooding, use of the River Huang for irrigation was extemely 
limited. 
The root of the River Huang problem is its extreme sediment load, 
unrivalled amongst the large rivers of the world. About one quarter 
of the 1.6 milliard tonnes which enter the lower reaches each year 
is deposited there, continuously raising the bed level between its 
protective dykes. Thus, the river is raised by several metres above 
the densely populated North China Plain across which it flows like a 
giant aquaduct. Any breach in the dykes during one of the large and 
transient Summer flood peaks, therefore, would cause extensive damage 
to property and a terrible loss of life. Meanwhile, the severe erosion 
of the loess plateau in the river's middle reaches, which gives rise 
to this extraordinary silt load, also has rendered the locality one 
of the poorest in China. In the past thousand, or so, years, the loess 
plateau has lost much of its vegetation cover, the climatic constraints, 
in any case severe, have worsened and the terrain has become dissected 
to an extreme degree. 
Work since the end of the civil war has made remarkable progress in 
the face of these severe natural conditions. There has been no 
largescale Summer flood along the lower reaches, much work on the 
techniques and application of soil and water conservation has been 
undertaken, and many specific advances have been made. It has not 
all been plain sailing and a considerable proportion of this 
experience has been gained by way of expensive lessons. The Chinese 
experience, therefore, has much of value to offer the rest of the world. 
This thesis goes some way towards furthering the communication of that 
experience. Technical detail is given where possible, especially with 
regard to the effects of the Sanmenxia reservoir on the delicate fluvial 
and alluvial balance of the River Huang, the comprehensive use of soil 
and water control measures as adapted to the various regions of the 
loess plateau, and the techniques which have been developed to put the 
silt and water of various sizes of flood peak to good use. Social, 
political and economic questions are also addressed, particularly 
with regard to questions of technological scale, technology transfer 
and the balance between industry and agriculture in development. 
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work contained therein is my own. 
I further declare that except where specifically indicated to the 
contrary all opinion expressed herein is my own and in particular 
may not be taken necessarily as representing that of any Chinese 
organisation, group or individual. 
Paul Mosely 
	 27 August 1982 
The Copyright for this thesis belongs to Paul Nosely. 
2) Acknowledgments. 
A great deal of help has been given by various people in the 
preparation of this thesis. I am sincerely grateful for all of it. In 
addition, I should like to pay special tribute to the following, who 
have each expended considerable amounts of time and effort on my 
behalf. They are mentioned in chronological order. 
My research supervisor, Mr. Harold Dickinson (Edinburgh University), 
who not only guided my work and provided much valuable comment 
thereupon, but who also gave considerable help in dealing with the 
various university rules and regulations and who was instrumental 
in obtaining permission for me to study in China. 
My Chinese teachers, Dr. John Chinnery (Edinburgh University) and Miss 
Chen Jingzu (Ealing College), without whose thorough language training 
my stay in China would have been far less valuable. 
The British Council and the British Embassy in Beijing, who went to 
considerable effort on my behalf, especially after my arrival in 
Beijing, to secure permission for major parts of this study to take 
place. It was largely through their strenuous efforts that I became 
the first British student in recent times to be allowed to undertake 
individual technical postgraduate research in China. 
Professors Qian Ning, Xia Zhenhuan, Huang Wanli, Associate Professor 
Zhang Ren and Lecturer Wang Shiqiang, of the Department of Hydraulic 
Engineering, Qinghua University, Beijing. The efforts of these 
gentlemen are especially appreciated, for, not only did they facilitate 
my joining existing postgraduate courses at the university, but they 
gave many extra hours-in tutoring and in correcting and commenting upon 
two draft copies of the thesis. They provided various data and spent 
much time explaining its meaning to me. It was through them that my 
fieldtrip was arranged and my various requests to other authorities 
in China were channelled, and it was they who added tact to my 
expression of insistence on certain points. Our cultures are very 
different and, particularly in the early part of my stay, I must, 
unwittingly, have given offence more than once. This was always met, 
on their part, with tolerance, courtesy and good will. I am extremely 
grateful, therefore, not only for the extent of their help, but also 
for the kind and friendly way in which it was given, to one who must 
have seemed brash and ungrateful, by comparison. 
The Chinese Ministry of Water Conservancy, the RHWCC, the Chinese 
Academy of Sciences and the various Hydroelectric Power and Water 
Conservancy Bureaux of Shaanxi and He'nan, all of whom provided 
hospitality and a very useful contribution to my field trip. 
The Great Britain - China Centre, the Universities China Committee and 
my parents, for the financial aid without which my position would have 
been untenable after the standard British Government grant ran out. 
My father, Jean Foster and Diane Foster for their considerable help 
with the particularly gruelling tasks of typing and proof-reading. 




1) Abstract and Declarations i 
2) Acknowledgements iii 
3) Contents iv 
4) List of Tables vi 
5) List of Figures viii 
6) Note on Units X 
7) List of Abbreviations xii 
8) List of Dynasties Xiii 
9) Introduction xiv 
Chapter One 	General Description of the River Huang Basin 1 
 Position and Course of the River Huang 1 
 The Climate of the River Huang Basin 12 
 Hydrology of the River Huang 15 
 The Loess of the Middle Reaches 26 
 Soil Erosion 33 
 Problems of the Development of the 
Loess Plateau 35 
 Sedimentation Problems in the 
River Huang Basin 38 
 History of Drought and Flood in 
the River Huang Basin 45 
 Irrigation in the River Huang Basin 49 
 Historical Ecology of the River Huang Basin 53 
Notes to Chapter One 	 58 
Chapter Two 	The Evolution of River Huang Development Concepts 62 
Historical Flood Control Tactics 	 62 
Early 20th Century Proposals for the 
River Huang Basin 	 66 
Policy in the Immediate Post-War Period 	73 
The Multiple Purpose Plan of 1955 	 76 
Preliminary Design of the Sariinenxia Project 	82 
Alternative Proposals 	 87 
Notes to Chapter Two 	 93 
Chapter Three Walking a Tortuous Route 	 96 
Estimates and Unknowns 	 97 
Acceptance of the Modified Soviet 
Design and the Beginning of Doubt 	 101 
The Slow Progress of Soil and Water 
Conservation Work and Loess Plateau 
Development 	 115 




The Reconstructions 	 144 
The Effects of the Reconstructions 
and Some Wider Implications 	 154 
Discussion 	 196 
Notes to Chapter Three 	 210 
Chapter Four 	Direct Advances 	 219 
Scope of Research Related to the 
River Huang 	 219 
Silt and Water Resources Put to Use 	 230 
Comprehensive Control and Development 244 
Notes to Chapter Four 	 262 
Chapter Five 	Present Situation and Future Plans 	 264 
Extent and Outcome of Work to Date 	 264 
The Debate and Future Prospects for 
Loess Plateau Development 	 301 
Prospects and Diverse Opinions on 
the Future of the Lower River Huang 	 319 
Notes to Chapter Five 	 345 
Chapter Six 	Summary, Conclusions and Prognosis 	 350 
Summary 	 350 
Conclusions 	 362 
Prognosis 365 
Notes to Chapter Six 	 371 
Bibliography 	 372 
V 
4) List of Tables. 
Number Title Page 
1-1 The Slope of the R. Huang 3 
1-2 Climatic Features 13 
1-3 Mainstream and tributary runoff coefficients 16 
1-4 Source of R. Huang silt, by region (1965-1974) 18 
1-5 Main floodpeak source areas and their influence 
on deposition and scouring (1952-1960 and 1969-1978) 20 
1-6 Average annual oncoming water and sediment discharge, 
July 1950 to June 1960. 23 
1-7 Relative areas of main channel and floodplains 24 
1-8 Soil and water losses in the central R. Huang area 28 
1-9 Heavily silted large rivers of the world 39 
1-10 Tributary sediment loads 40 
1-11 Sediment of the mainstream reservoirs 40 
2-1 Changes to the specifications for the Sanmenxia 
reservoir 83 
3-1 Silt load of the R. Huang over 19 years 116 
3-2 Details of Sanmenxia dam discharge facilities 149 
3-3 Tongguan bed level, 	1960-1978 173 
3-4 Data from Tongguan for 1964 and 1967 floodpeaks 177 
3-5 Effect of reconstructions on sediment 
accumulation and discharge, Sanrnenxia 1961-1974 181 
3-6 Changes in lower reaches' flood carrying 
capacity, 	1960-1964 186 
3-7 Loss of flood carrying capacity (1958-1973) 188 
3-8 Deposition and erosion in the Sanmenxia 
reservoir and the lower R. Huang, 1960-1972 189 
3-9 Seasonal variation in the water, silt 
deposition and erosion of the lower R. Huang, 
July 1966 to June 1972 189 
4-1 Selected sedimentation research 
organisations of China 225 
4-2 Basic data for three irrigation districts 
on the Guanzhong Plain 232 
4-3 Oncoming water and sediment conditions for 
the three schemes 232 
4-4 The three districts' 	transportation and use 
of heavily silted water 233 
4-5 Effects of various conservation measures in 
Nianzhuang Gully 252 
5-1 Sources of pollution 	 - 289 
5-2 Mainstream and tributary pollution levels 290 
5-3 Effectiveness of comprehensive control in 
reducing soil and water losses in small catchments 293 
5-4 Effectiveness of soil and water conservation in 
reducing floods and sediment of medium sized 
catchments 293 
Vi 
List of Tables (Continued) 
Number 	Title 	 I 	 Page 
5-5 	Economic data for various small catchments 	 296 
5-6 Total grain yields of eighteen Counties in Gansu 	296 
5-7 	Shaanxi Province R. Huang catchment soil and 
water conservation data 	 298 
5-8 	Basic data for four of the suggested transfer 
schemes 	 326 
VII 
5) List of Figures. 
Number Title Page 
1-1 Position and course of the R. Huang 2 
1-2 Major tributaries and important places 4 
1-3 The Tongguan Confluence 6 
1-4 Satellite false colour image of the 
Tongguan Confluence 7 
1-5 Some features of the lower R. Huang 10 
1-6 Average annual precipitation 14 
1-7 Mean discharge at selected places 17 
1-8 Grain size distribution curves at Huayuankou 24 
1-9 Geographical features 27 
1-10 The gullied plateau region 29 
1-11 The gullied hillock region 29 
1-12 Sink hole and cavern in loess 32 
1-13 Variation of particle size and sediment 
yield modulus 34 
1-14 Pump rotors worn by si-lt 42 
1-15 Historical courses of the R. Huang 46 
2-1 Damsites identified in the 	1955 plan 78 
3-1 Flood damage in Jiuyuan Gully in 1977 134 
3-2 Sanmenxia reservoir sedimentation in 1961 139 
3-3 Sedimentation in the lower R. Wei in 1961 and 1962 141 
3-4 The reconstructions of the Sanmenxia dam 145 
3-5 Section through sluice section of the Sanmenxia dam 147 
3-6 Discharge curves 149 
3-7 The Sanmenxia dam 1979 and 1980 151 
3-8 Areas to be flooded under various water levels 156 
3-9 Worksites, Shanzhou, and Sanmenxia City 161 
3-10 Sanmenxia City buildings 164 
3-11 The ruins of Shanzhou and the Frog Pagoda 167 
3-12 The original Sanrnenxia gorge 168 
3-13 R. Wei bed adjustments, 	1964 172 
3-14 R. Wei bed adjustments, 	1967 to 1969 174 
3-15 Position of R. Wei deposition end point, 	1961 to 1973 175 
) 
- 
fl _epos... ..-io 	 LuILenx1a 178 
3-17 Loss and recovery of Sanrnenxia reservoir capacity 182 
3-18 Sanmenxia reservoir capacity vs. level 182 
3-19 Effect of hydraulic exchange on suspended 
load composition 184 
3-20 Sediment composition at Huayuankou, 1960 and 1961 184 
3-21 Changes in channel morphology in the upper 
section of the lower R. Huang, 	1960 to 1963 185 
3-22 Deposition and erosion in the lower R. Huang 188 
3-23 Changes in the coarseness of the bed 
material at Huayuankou 190 
3-24 The planned Weishan project for Dongping Lake, 
about 1960 192 
3-25 Sanmenxia reservoir regulation, Winter 1976 to 1977 198 
VIII 
List of Figures (Continued) 
Number 	Title 
3-26 	Flood frequencies at Shanzhou 
3-27 Scouring of Sanrnenxia reservoir deposits under 
different discharge conditions 
3-28 	Data for the uses of Sanmenxia reservoir 
4-1 	Major tributary and mainstream stations in the 
runoff and sediment gauging network for the 
whole R. Huang basin 
4-2 	Gauging stations in the R. Huang basin, 1949-1976 
4-3 Sketch of the Luohui scheme 
4-4 	Dyke building methods old and new 
4-5 Bench terraces under construction and completed 
4-6 	Reverse-slope terraces 
4-7 Nianzhuang Gully 1980 
4-8 	Longzhou Brigade comprehensive control scheme 
4-9 Comprehensive control scheme 
5-1 	Changes in the flood season water level for 
discharge Ql000 m 3 s 1 at Luokou 
5-2 	Production dykes, villages, and river control works 
on the R. Huang floodplains near Sunkou 
5-3 	The Longyang Gorge 
5-4 The Liujiaxia darn 
5-5 	The Yanguoxia power station 
5-6 The Bapanxia power station 
5-7 	The Qingtongxia multiple purpose project 
5-8 The Sanshenggong diversion head-gate 
5-9 	The Tianqiao power station 
5-10 Variation of sediment and arsenic 
concentrations along the river 
5-11 	Economic regions of the central R. Huang area 
5-12 Four general routes for the Northward Transfer 
of Southern Waters, as identified before 1960 
5-13 	Recent proposals for interbasin transfers by the 





























6) Note on Units. 
The following basic units are used throughout this thesis: 
m metre °C degree Celsius 
ha hectare % per cent 
1 litre ppm parts per million 
g gramme ,4 (ren) person 
t tonne (tou) head (of cattle) 
s second ? (zhj) head (of rabbit) 
h hour (yang) sheep 
d day (Yuan) Chinese currency unit 
yr year £ Pound Sterling 
W Watt 
Powers are indicated using indices, multiple factors of ten are 
shown using the following, complementary, systems: 
Factor 10 12 106 3 10 2 	10 
Prefix tera giga mega kilo hecto deca 
Symbol T G M k h 	da 
Factor 10_i io_2 10 io 6 io 9 	10 
Prefix deci centi milli micro nano Pico 
Symbol d c m r n 	p 
The following combinations of the above units appear in the text: 
m s metres per second 
-1 
m yr metres per year 
2 , 	-1 
m /\ square metres per person 
ha 
K 
hectares per person 
ha yr' hectares per year 
km  yr 1 square kilometres per year 
3 M s cubic metres per second 
m3 yr 1 cubic metres per year 
m3 
 
1 ha- cubic metres per hectare 
mg 1 milligrammes per litre 
kg . A. kilogrammes per person 
kg ha -  per hectare 
m 3 kg kilogrammes per cubic metre 
t A. tonnes per person 
t d -  per day 
X 
Note on Units (Continued) 
t yr 1 tonnes per year 
t ha tonnes per hectare 
t ha 	A. -1 tonnes per hectare per person 
ha- 1 yr 1 tonnes per hectare per year 
t km-  tonnes per square kilometre 
t km-  yr tonnes per square kilometre per year 
t m- 3 tonnes per cubic metre 
GW h gigawatt hours 
TW h yr terawatt hours per year 
,L 	d man days 




 people per square kilometre 
ha sheep per hectare 
M-2 sheep per square kilometre 
A.' Yuan per person 
yr 1 Yuan per person per year 
I Y kg- Yuan per kilogramme 
£ Pounds Sterling per person 
xi 
7) List of Abbreviations. 
CB Current Background, US Consulate, Hong Kong. 
CSHE Chinese Society of Hydraulic Engineering. 
ECMM Extracts from China Mainland Magazines, US Consulate, 
Hong Kong. 
GLF Great Leap Forward. 
JPRS Joint Publications Research Service, US Department 
of Commerce, Washington, DC, USA. 
QUSRL Qinghua University Sediment Research Laboratory. 
RHHI River Huang Hydrotechnical Institute. 
RHMRS%.CSG River Huang Middle Reaches Soil and Water Conservation 
Comprehensive Surveying Group. 
RHSRCG River Huang Sediment Research Coordinating Group. 
RHWCC River Huang Water Conservancy Commission. 
SCMP Survey of China Mainland Press, US Consulate, Hong Kong. 
SECPWC Supreme Economic Council Public Works Commission. 
SPCO Sarimenxia Project Conference Office. 
SPRCN Survey of Peoples Republic of China Magazines, US 
Consulate, Hong Kong. 
SRIHEWL Shaanxi Research Institute of Hydraulic Engineering 
Waterways Laboratory. 
USA United States of America. 
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. 
WCHPRI Water Conservation and Hydroelectric Power Research 
Institute. 
WDPLCMBRC Weinan District People's Luohui Canal Management 
Bureau Revolutionary Committee. 
WDSRNB Weinan District Sanmenxia Reservoir Management Bureau. 
WIHEE Wuhan Institute of Hydraulic and Electrical Engineering. 
XINHUA Xinhua (New China) News Agency. 
xii 
8) List of Dynasties. 
Dynasty 	 Sub-period 
	
















Republic of China 
Peoples Republic 
of China 
C. 21st Century BC 
c. 16th Century BC 
c. 16th Century BC 
c. 11th Century BC 






































Zhou 	 Western Zhou 
Eastern Zhou 



























to 771 BC 
to 256 BC 
to 476 BC 
to 207 BC 

































Source: Beijing Foriegn Languages Institute, A Chinese English 
Dictionary, Shangwu Press, Beijing, 1980, p. 972. 
XIII 
9) Introduction. 
i) The Subject Matter and the Scope of the Study. 
This thesis is about the Chinese approach to the joint problems of 
flood control and regional development in the River Huang basin, and 
the major influences from which that approach has resulted. In the 
correct amount, water not only holds the potential for new benefits, 
but is the very lifeline upon which man depends. Yet, too little 
water continues to be a major problem in many parts of the world, and, 
likewise, too much frequently brings extensive suffering. Thus, the 
control and use of water resources is of the utmost importance to 
mankind. How, though, is this to be realised? Identifiable 
constraints exist of technical, political, social and economic kinds; 
and the combined effect of their respective influences is sufficiently 
varied, under the many different circumstances obtaining throughout 
the world, not just to allow, but to require, a multitude of different 
approaches. The study of which this thesis is the synthesis, sought 
to investigate the example of one such problem; one which is 
particularly noteworthy for the extreme nature of the many 
constraints encountered. It is also an attempt to discover the 
extent to which the various approaches, which have been tried so far, 
have succeeded or have themselves been modified in the process. 
China's River Huang is extreme in several ways. It is the world's 
most heavily silted large river, both in terms of the sediment load, 
and of the sediment concentration. Its basin suffers a lack of 
water most of the year but, in the Summer months, the Lower reaches 
are threatened by transient flood peaks. Throughout history, the 
precious water contained in these flood peaks, has either flowed 
to the sea unused, or has spread over large areas of the flat 
North China Plain, laying crops to ruin and causing the deaths of 
thousands of people, by drowning or in consequent famines. It is 
for this havoc that the River Huang is notorious throughout 
history and the world, and for which it has earned itself the 
epithet "China's Sorrow" (47I (' 	). 
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The River Huang's importance in history is not limited, however, to 
its propensity for the joint disasters of flood and drought. It is 
within its drainage area that the earliest human remains from China 
have been found, and where the Capital of China has been situated for 
the major part of history. Moreover, the North China Plain, although 
not part of the river's drainage area, nevertheless, has close links 
with the river in Chinese culture. For these reasons, amongst others, 
the River Huang basin is also known as the "Cradle of Chinese 
Culture"( ét 
If the technical problem is both extreme and important, so, in recent 
years, have been many other - factors. After a long feudal history, 
China, in any case a poor country, was wracked by half a Century of 
civil war and a number of floods of the R. Huang. This has been 
followed, after about ten years of recovery, by nearly twenty years 
of internal political chaos and external ostracism. 	Meanwhile, the 
pressures of a rapidly increasing population have lain emphasis on 
the need to control and exploit the R. Huang. Furthermore, for 
reasons which the following seeks, in part, to elucidate, some more 
extreme aspects of the general approach to these problems proved to 
be expensively in error. 
In this thesis the pertinent facts are first set out in a clear and 
concise way. It is important to understand fully both the problem 
under discussion and the various events which have taken place. 
Technical details are supplied where possible, so that the reader 
may make his or her own judgement. Answers are sought to the 
question; what are the problems of the R. Huang and what has been 
tried to overcome them? Secondly, the reader's attention is drawn 
to a number of general questions, of which the R. Huang and its 
regulation may provide an example, or upon which they may bear 
relation. What can happen when a large dam is built across a river? 
What are the particular constraints imposed by heavily silted 
rivers? How readily may technology be transfered from one country 
to another? How important to a developing country is agriculture, in 
comparison to industry? How important is indigenous experience in 
comparison with that gained abroad? On what scale should solutions be 
sought? 
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Thirdly, a number of the above questions have a political content, 
and this thesis gives an account of how various decisions were taken 
and what influences on the decision makers there might have been. 
The value of the technical considerations is enhanced when it is 
recognised that river basin development has a political aspect, and 
the juxtaposition of this, with technical considerations provides a 
more complete picture of what took place, and why. 
Fourthly, current opinion on the problem, and the approaches made 
to understand and resolve it, are described. What advances have 
been made, what lessons learnt? In particular, what has the Chinese 
experience, in tackling this extreme example of river basin develop-
ment, to offer those tackling similar problems elsewhere? 
Thus, the scope of this thesis is broad and, as demanded by the nature 
of river basins, cuts across the traditional academic boundaries. 
The technical questions will be of interest to engineers in general 
and to civil and hydraulic engineers in particular. The account of 
the problems caused by reservoir sedimentation will be of interest 
not only to sedimentologists, but to anyone concerned with reservoir 
design, construction or maintenance in arid areas where river silt 
loads are high. 
It rapidly becomes apparent that the root of the R. Huang problem 
is its silt, and a major part of this thesis is concerned with the 
problems involved in trying to reduce the silt load of the river at 
source. Soil and water conservation measures, though, are important 
not only to the regulation of the river but, to an even greater 
extent, they are important to the development of the locality. As 
with river control along the lower reaches, the questions raised are 
not limited to technical ones. 
Therefore, whilst the specific approaches to soil and water conser -
vation will be of interest to agriculturalists and engineers alike, 
the discussion needs to be much broader, and economists and planners, 
for example, should be able to find matter of interest therein. 
Politicians, too, will find much here which falls within their field 
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of concern. The questions range from how conflicts of interest 
between upstream and downstream water users are tackled, through 
policies for evacuees from an area to be flooded by a new reservoir, 
to the unique struggle of China to determine its own political 
identity. This is illustrated both by the split with the Soviet 
Union and the anarchy of the Cultural Revolution. In all these 
matters, sinologists, too, will find that this thesis has relevance 
to their field of study. Finally, the example of the Chinese 
experience, should be of general interest to anyone concerned with 
development problems in the third world, for it provides an example 
of one approach to a fundamental problem, from which both good and 
bad lessons may be drawn. 
The two main topics covered by this study, the regulation of the 
lower R. Huang and the development of the loess plateau, from where 
the river's heavy silt load comes, are, by their nature, open ended. 
Certain policies have been tried and subsequently modified but, 
since the work is far from complete, assessment of their future, 
overall, success is somewhat speculative. This.thesis does,however, 
attempt to provide the basis for such a speculative prognosis. 
Furthermore, specific questions are dealt with in depth. In 
particular, the numerous effects, extending both upstream and 
downstream, of the Sarimenxia reservoir, upon the delicate fluvial 
and alluvial balance of the R. Huang, are dealt with at length and 
with some technical detail. The uniquely Chinese mix of natural, 
social, political, economic and technical factors which have led to 
slow progress in soil and water conservation, are also a major point 
of attention, as are the reasons behind certain cruxial decisions 
affecting the past and future approaches to the many problems of the 
R. Huang basin. Detailed descriptions of certain advances, both 
technical and administrative, are also given. 
Nevertheless, to go into all of these questions fully would require 
a study several fold larger than the present, and limitations to its 
scope have had to be imposed. Irrigation and hydroelectric power 
within :the basin are described, but are not dealt with in a 
comprehensive manner. Similarly, it is acknowledged that reservoir 
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sedimentation affects all the structures so far built across the 
mainstream and tributaries, but detailed discussion is restricted to 
Sanmenxia reservoir, the most notorious and serious example. The 
much debated schemes for interbasin transfers of water are discussed 
at slightly greater length than those topics just mentioned, but 
what could be sufficient material for a thesis on that subject alone, 
has necessarily had to be reduced to the proportion fitting its 
minor role within the whole question of the R. Huang basin development. 
Where discussion of certain topics is limited, they are, however, 
mentioned, and it is intended that this thesis should provide 
sufficiently detailed accounts, on a firm technical basis, to 
stimulate and facilitate their further research by others. 
ii) Previous Related Studies. 
Very little has been published, with a sound technical basis, or of 
comprehensive scope, in fields related to the R. Huang, and hardly 
any of that is in English. In the English speaking world, therefore, 
the problems of the world's most heavily silted large river 
constitute an important gap in our knowledge, one which this thesis 
goes some way towards filling. One reason for the lack of our 
knowledge has been the corresponding lack of published information 
in China itself. Comprehensive studies begat only in the last 
Century and, whereas, prior to the end of the Civil War they were 
necessarily limited, thereafter, for many years, they were 
unnecessarily secret. 
A number of papers on various specific aspects of the R. Huang basin 
are to be found, dating from the end of the last Century onwards. 
Their interest, though, lies more in their historical, than their 
technical, content, the latter being either insufficient or no 
longer so relevant. Their individual scope is very limited, but 
together they do make informative background reading. The proposals 
of Freeman, 1922, for the regulation of the lower R. Huang, for 
example, may be taken with the report of Lowdermilk, 1930, on the 
denudation of the loess plateau, and of Todd, 1935 and 1936, on the 
subjects of the Salachi irrigation scheme and the repair of the 
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R. Huang dykes after a breach, respectively, to form a general view 
of the state of hydraulic affairs in China during the Civil 1khr years. 
Similarly, in Chinese, the collected works of Li Yizhi, 1956, provides 
a view of contemporary thinking. 
There is only one early work, however, which presents any comprehensive 
appraisal, in English, of the various problems of the R. Huang basin. 
Furthermore, only eight of the twelve planned reports by the Supreme 
Economic Council Public Works Commission, ever reached publication 
(SECPWC, Eds., 1947). These reports describe and discuss in detail 
the problems and some of the solutions proposed at that time. 
Although they are comprehensive, their big shortcoming is that they 
are based largely on insufficient data. This is because of the 
relatively new and small nature of the collecting network at that time. 
Records generally went back only a few years, and only two full-size 
hydrological stations, at Shanzhou and Luokou, respectively, had been 
in operation between 1919 and 1933 In any case, whilst these reports 
provide a good review of the R. Huang's problems and the approaches 
under consideration at that time, there is, of course, no way in 
which they could be expected to bear close relation to the discussion 
of, for example,'the later political events which form a part of the 
present thesis. 
Since the end of the Civil 1r a number of books have been published, 
in Chinese, concerning specific problems which bear relation to the 
R. Huang. This thesis makes use of them along with the technical 
papers mentioned in the next section of this introduction. It is 
more apposite to mention here, however, that they are almost wholly 
concerned with narrow technical aspects, and not with an overall 
view. Furthermore, they differ in nature from this study in the 
important respect that this is an outsider's view and, therefore, the 
terms of reference will be different. The one exception is, perhaps, 
Deng Zihui, 1955, published in both Chinese and English, which is an 
overall report on the river's problems and the approach about to be 
embarked upon, at that time. Even this, though, is relevant mainly 
as a historical account of what was thought possible and desirable 
then, and lacks the experience gained in the twenty seven, or so, 
years since elapsed. 
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Foreign studies on this subject are very few. Generally, where the 
R. Huang has been studied, it has been as part of a thesis which 
concentrates on some other matter. Erisman, 1967, for example, makes 
a cursury study of the problems of the lower R. Huang, as cart of 
his project to determine the optimum level of investment for the 
diversion of river flow to irrigation on the North China Plafn. 
Nickum, 1974, likewise, is not dealing with the problems of the 
R. Huang as such, in his extremely thorough thesis on the Commune 
system, although much of his work is in the related field of water 
resource development. 
Two studies do deal specifically with the problems of the R. Huang. 
Mitchell, 1961, though, deals mainly with irrigation and the 
prospective benefits to that which the Sanmenxia reservoir and 
interbasin transfer schemes might bring. In addition to being limited 
in scope, therefore, it is now also out of date, since, as the 
present thesis describes, the Sarimenxia reservoir has undergone a 
significant reconstruction, severely curtailing its usage, and the 
interbasin transfer schemes have been shelved. 
The study by Greer, 1975, should be considered at a little greater 
length, since it is the only other study to deal comprehensively 
with the question, and to describe the reconstruction of the Sanmenxia 
project. The first four Chapters of his thesis address very much the 
same questions as are dealt with in the present thesis. Creer's 
point of emphasis, though, is more towards the philosophical basis 
of river basin management and, consequently, his discussion of the 
basic problems, centres more on organisational matters, whilst not 
being as detailed on technical ones. Likewise, whereas in the present 
study, the review of historical responses to the R. Huang's problems 
is more or less confined to technical considerations, Greer expands 
into the analogous and contemporary debates between legalism and 
confucianism. Yet, it is the latter halves of the two works where 
the divergence of approach is most marked. Greer, writing about 
eight years ago, was unable to obtain access to much information 
concerning the period after 1960, and was therefore constrained to 
rely upon news reports. China, at that time was in the throws of the 
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Cultural Revolution, and these circumstances are, together, reflected 
somewhat in Creer's concentration on the relative merits of 
technological or socialogical solutions to problems, and of 
centralised or decentralised organisational. units. The present 
study, on the other hand, continues, with technical detail, the 
description of the problems encountered in the sixties and seventies, 
and then goes on to discuss the advances also made in that period, the 
status of the work, and its prospects for the future. 
iii) The Sources used. 
This thesis uses predominantly Chinese sources. They may be divided 
into three broad categories, namely; articles and books of general 
interest, written for the layman; technical books, journals and 
papers; and the notes made during nearly two years of study in China. 
Chinese newspaper articles also fall roughly into the first two 
categories, above, since news items tend to be quite general in 
nature, whereas articles making a specific technical argument tend to 
be written by those actually involved in the work. 
There would appear to be no practical purpose, for the British side, 
of the inter-library loan agreements between Britain and China. Requests 
such as the author of this study made, through that system, for 
technical papers mentioned in the Chinese press, were met with no 
response; not even the courtesy of a refusal. Similar problems face 
scholars who wish to subscribe to Chinese journals, Subscriptions are 
available to a number of journals, for example, Zhongguo Shuili 
(Chinese Water Conservancy), but for a full-ranging discussion one 
really has to consult a wider selection. Regrettably, these are 
subject to all sorts of restriction. The journal Nisha Yanjiu 
(Sediment Research), for example, is freely available in China, and 
may be taken or sent out of the Country but,owing to difficulties 
with printing, will not be available for foreign subscription for 
about two more years. As an attempt to overcome this setback, some 
foreign experts, selected by the editors, receive complementary 
copies as and when available. The magazine, Renmin Huanghe (People's 
R. Huang), however, is marked 'For Internal Circulation only'and, 
although foreigners may, on occasion, succeed in subscribing to it 
inside China, it is likely to be impounded by the customs should one 
try to take or send it abroad. Similarly, the book Reservoir 
Sedimentation, written jointly by the Shaanxi Research Institute of 
Hydraulic Engineering Waterways Laboratory (SRIHEWL) and the Qinghua 
University Sediment Research Laboratory (QUSRL) was made available 
to the author only as QUSRL teaching material and may not normally 
be taken out of China. Other reports, for example, Selected Reports 
on R. Huang Sediment Research, published by the R. Huang Sediment 
Research Coordinating Group (RHSRCG, Eds., 1975), are marked 'Internal 
Document' and are available only inside China, and with special 
permission. Much of the material in these articles has been 
re-written and published openly by the Chinese Soèiety of Hydraulic 
Engineering (CSHE, Eds., 1980), but the originals contain much more 
technical detail,.and also provide a historical perspective, since 
they were written nearer the time of the events to which they relate. 
Finally, there is the systematic data collated and published annually 
by the RHWCC, which remains firmly closed to foreign eyes. 
It is the technical books, journals and papers consulted in this way, 
which are the backbone of the present thesis. Nevertheless, there 
are three shortcomings which should be mentioned. The papers 
themselves were drawn up by different organisations, and are 
therefore1 sometimes inconsistant; the information is not always as 
complete as one would like; and they often claim an unrealistic 
degree of accuracy. Generally speaking, though, they are taken to 
be sufficiently reliable for the purpose to which they are put here. 
The book Reservoir Sedimentation and the magazine Renmin Huanghe were 
the most useful sources of this category. 
The news items and books of general interest contain much useful 
information, but it is wrapped up in rhetoric, does not give its 
basis, and is often incomplete. Considerable effort is required to 
sift out the useful facts from the rest. The reliability of these 
sources is also much more variable. Statistics issued during the 
periods of the Great Leap Forward (1958) and the Cultural Revolution 
(1966 to 1976) are particularly dubious. Those from other periods, 
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however, seem more consistent, and the book Ten Thousand Li Course of 
the R. Huang, by the R. Huang Water Conservancy Commission (RHWCC, 
Eds., 1979), is the major source of this category. 
Similar arguments apply to the books and news releases in English or 
American. In this case further care is needed to weed out errors of 
translation. Examples include the unit, mu (0.067 ha) being given 
directly as hectares, and one milliard (los ) being given as one 
billion (1012).  The only major source in English to have been used 
here, is SECPWC, Eds., 1947, and that is subject to the limitations 
mentioned in the previous section of this introduction. 
iv) The Structure of the Thesis. 
This thesis has six Chapters.. The first Chapter, divided into ten 
Sections, describes the R. Huang basin andsets out, in some detail, 
the various problems to be found there, and their importance to the 
rest of China. The technical constraints imposed by nature upon the 
basin are given first, and they are then considered in a wider, 
historical context, so as to include their influence on Chinese 
culture and the Chinese people. 
The second and third Chapters take a chronological look at man's 
attempts to change some of the natural characteristics of the basin, 
in particular, to stop flood damage. Chapter Two juxtaposes the 
various proposals throughout. history, ending with the 1955 Multiple 
Purpose Plan, and the various arguments which surrounded some of its 
details. The first two Chapters together, then, describe the problem 
and the approach to be taken in dealing with it, and point out the 
ways in which the chosen approach was seen in its historical 
context. 
The third Chapter, whilst continuing with the chronological account 
of Chapter Two, expands the timescale significantly, to look at the 
period since the announcement. of the Multiple Purpose Plan. Its 
point of emphasis is also concentrated on the key project within that 
plan, the Sanmenxia reservoir, An assessment is made of the 
assumptions upon which it was based, and the reasons for its 
construction, when so many questions were still unanswered, are 
discussed. The effects of the construction of the reservoir upon 
the river, the surrounding land, and the people who lived there, are 
described and reasons are given to explain why it was thought 
necessary to abandon the original design and operational regime, and 
subsequently, to re-build the dam to allow the reservoir to be 
operated in a different way. The various effects of these changes 
are also assessed. The discussion of the assumptions upon which the 
original design has been based, includes a lengthy section on the 
factors which gave rise to slow progress in soil and water conser- 
vation on the loess plateau. Chapter Three ends with a discussion on 
the adoption of the original, erronious design, in juxtaposition with 
the design and operational regime which subsequently replaced it. An 
attempt is made to draw lessons from the debacle. 
Not everything that took place in that period was a failure, however, 
and Chapter Four looks at the advances which have come about as a 
direct consequence of work on the R. Huang. Many of these advances 
are empirical, and the description therefore takes the form of 
examples. 
The fifth Chapter presents an overall assessment of the work done in 
the R. Huang basin since the end of the civil war, not confined 
to the regulètion of the lower reaches. It then describes the two 
major issues concerning the R. Huang which are currently under 
debate s This, in effect, is a description of the various Chinese 
view points on how the work of regulation and development of the 
R. Huang should proceed in the light of the experiences, both 
positive and negative, of the past thirty odd years. 
In the sixth Chapter, the material presented in this thesis is 
summarised and discussed. The lessons of the Chinese experience are 
assessed and a prognosis is made about the future direction of the 
work, with particular regard to the debates outlined in Chapter Five. 
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Chapter One 
General Description of the River Huang Basin. 
1) Position and Course of the River Huang. 
The River Huang rises over 4800 m above sea level, as the 
Yueguconglie stream, East of Mt. Yaladaze, in Qinghai Province in 
the Bayan Kala mountains of the Central Asian Plateau, It flows 
some 5460 km through Qinghai, Gansu, Ningxia, Inner Mongolia, Shaanxi, 
Shanxi, He'nan, and Shandong, before discharging into the Bo sea, at 
a point East of Ji'nan, Shandong. ( , ) Although its annual runoff of 
43,200 x 10 m is only one twentieth that of the R. Changjiang, or 
1.9 7e that of the whole country, it is China's second largest river. 
Its drainage area is 752,400 1cm 2 , which includes some 40 tributaries 
with catchments over 3000 km  and which contains 20 x i0 6 ha of 
arable land and supports a population of over 110 x 10 6,  
(Figures 1-1 and 1-2. Table 1-1). 
i) The Upper Reaches, 
The upper reaches are taken to be the 3470 km stretch above Hekouzhen 
in Inner Mongolia, where the river drops 3840 m and drains about 
400,000 km2 . (3) Of this some 265,000 1cm2 of the Qinghai-Gansu high-
lands above Longyang Gorge near Guide, Qinghai, form the river's 
headwaters. This region is generally above 4000 m, and even in the 
river valleys, is nowhere below 2000 
From LongyarLg Gorge to Qingtong Gorge, in Ningxia, the river drops 
1300 m through a series of twenty gorges, which occupy over 40 7 of 
the 918 km stretch and which account for half the estimated 26,5 GW 
power generation potential of the whole river. (5) Just within the 
loess covered area, this region has many small basins and plains 
between the gorges and situated in one of them is Lanzhou, Capital 
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Figure 1-1 POSITION AND COURSE OF THE RIVER HUANG 







Ave. Slope 	(%) 
Source to Lake Eling 150 05 0.136 
Lake Elin.g to Lake Zhaling 249 130 0.052 
Lake Zhaling to Guide 960 1,680 0.175 
Guide to Lanzhou 382 850 0.226 
Lanzhou to Yinchuan 348 524 0.151 
Yinchuan to Baotou 560 71 0.0127 
Baotou to Longinn 829 630 0.076 
Longmen to Tongguan 133 59 0.044 
Tonggtzan to &ia.nzhou 86 16 0.0186 
Shanzhou to )ngjin 195 171 0.088 
?ngjin to Dongbatou 222 49 0.022 
Dongbatou to Luokou 341 45 0.013 
Luokou to Mouth 245 20 0.008 
Source: LlUDongsheng, et al, 1964, page 2. 
Note: These figures differ from those given in the text, which are 
drawn from other sources. The differences are small, and this table 
is included to give a consistent general view of the changes in 
the slope of the river alog its course. Shanzhou is situated some 
20 km upstream of the dam of the Sanmenxia reservoir. 
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FIGURE 1-2 MAJOR TRIBUTARIES AND IMPORTANT PLACES 
The River Huang then makes a diversion in a great loop Northwards 
through Ningxia to Hekouzhen, in Inner Mongolia, forming as it does 
so the Eastern and Northern boundaries of the E'erdousi (Ordos) 
Plateau. This is a very, flat plateau about 1000 m above sea level, 
covering 130,000 km2 , though not all of it is drained by the River 
Huang, whose catchment in this 867 km stretch is 107,000 km 2 
The river has a very gentle slope here (total drop about 120 m) and 
silt may be deposited and some flooding may occur similar in nature 
to, but far less serious than, that of the lower reaches. 
ii) The Middle Reaches: 
iia) Hekouzhen to Tongguan: 
The 1210 lan stretch from Hekouzhen to.Taohuayü, near Zhengzhou, 
Capital of He'nan Province, comprises the R Hangs middle reach. 
About 27 km downstream of Hekouzhen the river turns Southwards and 
enters a series of deep rocky gorges which form also the border 
between Shanxi and Shaanxi. 
In the 725 km stretch from Hekouzhen to Longmen (otherwise called 
Yumenkou) the river drops 610 m and receives many silt-laden 
tributaries from the loess region either side; on average, one 
every kilometre along the mainstream. 
Below Longmen the river widens, to as much as 15 km in places and in 
the next 130 km stretch to Tongguan, it drops about 50 in and is 
joined by three major tributaries, the rivers Fen, Beiluo and Wei 
I 
%/#7  
iib) The Tongguan Confluence. 
Just above Tongguan is the confluence of the Huang, Wei and Beiluo 
rivers. This confluence, where the river Huang makes a sharp East-
ward turn, is worthy of being singled out for extra attention, since 
it plays a special role in the problems to be discussed in Chapter 3, 
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FIGURE 1-4 	SATELLITE FALSE COLOUR IMAGE 
OF THE TONGGUAN CONFLUENCE 
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The R. Huang just above the confluence is some 10 kin wide, but its 
Eastern outlet is less than one kilometre wide. (10) Thus whenever 
one or more of the rivers is in spate the flooded area increases. 
It is marshy here and the river channels are liable to change their 
position. Indeed, the Beiluo river at one time flowed into the 
River Huang directly, rather than via the River Wei as at present, 
a 10 kin Eastward shift of the River Huang in the past 30 years. (11) 
The gradients of the three rivers, Huang, Wei and Beiluo, just above 
the confluence are 0.035 70, 0.01 % and 0.022 % respectively. (12) 
When the R. Huang is in spate, it is not uncommon for its waters to 
sweep Westwards, flooding the mouths of the Wei and Beiluo rivers. 
Under such circumstances silt may be deposited there which would 
change the slope of the tributaries' lowest reaches, hindering or 
even blocking the flow until such time as a flood should occur in 
them to wash Out the deposits. In any case, it should be noted that 
the bed level at Tongguan is the local datum for the fluvial and 
alluvial processes in the lower Wei and Beiluo rivers and plays an 
important role in determining such factors as their flood carrying 
capacity and whether their beds are scoured, deposited upon, or 
remain.in equilibrium. (13) 
iic) Tongguan to Taohuayu: 
Below Tongguan the R. Huang flows for the next 113 kin between loess 
bluffs 20 m to 60 m high, and varying in separation between 1 kin and 
6 kin, to the site of the famous Sarirnenxia, or Three Gates Gorge. 
This stretch drops about 45 m and now forms the main part of the 
Sanmenxia Reservoir, which has the shape of a deep main channel 
between floodplains, within the original loess bluffs. 
(14) 
 The bed 
at present can be divided into upper and lower sections. The upper 
section exhibits a delta deposition pattern with a top slope of 
between 0.014 7, and 0.015 7, during the low water season, whilst in 
the flood season scouring is restored and the bed slope is between 
0.0227. and 0.02374 The lower section, for about 62 kin to the dam, 
is more or less in equilibrium, with a bedsbope of between 0.016 % 
and 0,018 7,. The slope of the floodplains will vary with the 
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discharge of the most recent overbank flood; at present it is 
0.012 7, after the flood of 1967.(l5) 
Below the dam there is first a 160 m drop through 150 kin of rocky 
gorges up to 600 m high and generally about 250 m apart, interspersed 
with small alluvial floodplains, until, at Mengjin in He'nan the 
loess bluffs on the Northern bank suddenly recede, become 
discontinuous and low (10 m to 40 m). The Southern bank continues 
to be formed by loess bluffs about 125 m high, but the Northern bank 
is formed by levees. The drop in the last 92 kin to Taohuayu is 25 m. 
The river itself is usually about 3 kin broad and the floodplains are 
not high. In this section the R. Huang is joined by three tributaries, 
the Yi. Luo and Qin rivers. (16) 
iii) The Lower Reaches: 
The lower reaches comprise the 700 km to 800 kin stretch across the 
North China Plain from Taohuayu to the mouth. It is wide in the 
upper part and narrow lower down. For all but about 100 km in 
Shandong province, where the Southern bank is formed by hills, both 
banks are continuously lined by a total of 1340 kin of main flood 
protection dykes and the river flows across the plain, raised by 
deposition within the dykes to about 4 in (10 m in places) above 
the surrounding land, like a giant aqueduct. The total drop is 
95 m. There are three distinct sections of the lower reaches. (17) 
(Figure 1-5) 
iiia) Taohuayu to Caocun. 
The first section of the lower reaches has the appearance of a broad 
braided stream. The dykes are between 5 km and 20 km apart and the 
river consists of a main channel 1 kin to 3 kin wide between extensive 
floodplains. In places, smaller 'production dykes' have been built 
within the main dykes to protect cultivation on the floodplains. 
The main channel is choked with sand bars and is divided into many 
interwoven streams. The main watercourse is forever shifting and 
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FIGURE 1-5 	SOME FEATURES OF THE LOWER RIVER HUANG SOURCE: Note 16 
For this reason the term'wandering stream' has been adopted to 
denote both its braided and shifting characteristics. The constant 
wandering of the water course poses a threat to the dykes. The 
river has alternate zones of divergence and convergence. In the 
former, the main channel can migrate freely, but in the latter it is 
confined by protruding cliffs, erosion-resistant shorelines or bank 
protection works. (19) 
iiib) Caocun to Taochengpu. 
This 146 km stretch forms a transitional reach from.a wandering to 
a meandering pattern. The main dykes are about 5 km apart and the 
water course is fairly stable. Apart from the main dykes, there is 
a secondary set, whose total separation is about 35 km and parts of 
the area between the two sets along the Northern bank have been 
designated as flood detention areas. Similar use has been made of 
the Dongping lake on the Southern bank' in the region of Taochengpu. 
It is through this lake that the lower reaches' only significant 
tributary, the R. Wen, makes its entry. 
iiic) Taochengpu to the Estuary. 
In the lower section, to Lujiawuzi the channel contracts to between 
0.5 km and 2.0 lan and systematic bends develop. No loops form, 
however, as the bends are too closely controlled by bank protection 
works. The meandering coefficient is 1.2. (20) 
The last 50 km to the sea is considered to be the Estuary region. 
Some'1200 x 10 6  t of seditherit enter the estuary each year, of which 
two thirds are deposited in the delta area and along the coastlines. 
At present the estuary delta is about 2220 km2 and this is increasing 
at a rate of about 50 km  yr', whilst the coastline is extending by 
1.4 km yr'. The upper parts of the estuary have been stabilised, 
but in the lower 25 lan, the river is allowed to wander freely over 
its delta, in an attempt to slow down the rate at which the lower 
reaches' slope is decreasing. (21) 
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2) The Climate of the River Huang Basin. 
For the most part the R. Huang basin lies in arid and semi-arid 
territory whose climate is controlled by the Mongolian and Pacific 
anticyclones. Winter is dominated by its Mongolian anticyclones and 
is characterised by several cold Northerly waves in which the 
temperature may drop by 10 0 C in 24 hours and there may be dust 
storms accompanied by slight rain or snowfall. The frequency of 
storms, and their intensity, increase in the Spring as the influence 
of the Pacific anticyclones develops and cold fronts sweep from 
West to East. In Summer the warm maritime airtnass surges in and the 
whole basin falls within the scope of the continental depression, 
with pressure down to 752 mm. Winds are Southerly and moist and 
when they meet cold Northerly air flows, precipitation results. In 
the middle reaches this often occurs as very violent rain or hail 
storms. In the Autumn, as the low pressure troughs recede, more 
moderate rainfall occurs as the cold Northerly fronts are obstructed 
by high ground. 
The general climatological features are shown in Table 1-2, and of 
particular note is the uneven distribution and large variation. 
Annual temperature variation for example, is about 300  C, and in 
1934 at Xi'an it was 57.7 ° C (-12.5 0 C to 45.2 0 Q. Precipitation 
varies from about 150 nun in the Great Loop region to 750 mm in the 
Southeast (Figure 1-6) but its seasonal variation is even more 
extreme. Of the total precipitation, 70 7, falls in June, July and 
August, and less than 5 7. between December and February. The storms 
which frequent the middle reaches in Summer may be so violent that, 
in extreme cases, between 160 nun and 300 nun can fall in a single 
day. The annual variability is between 100 7. and 125 7. at the 
Southern margin, rising to over 150 7. in the Northwest, which renders 
the rainfall of the area unpredictable and this is a major factor in 
the difficulties faced by the inhabitants of the region. Evaporation 
is very high, being greater than rainfall in the middle and lower 
reaches. In recent years the frost-free period has also become 
unstable. (23) 
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TABLE 1 -2 	CLIMATIC FEATURES 
PLACE 





(mm) Annual January July 
• Headwaters * -16,0 -8.0 250.0 
lining * -.6.4 18.3 376 
Lanzhou 9.5 -6.5 22.8 337.6 1883.9 
Yinchuan 8.7 -9.1 23.8 182.7 1432.8 
Baotou * -14.1 22.2 409.5 1409.0 
Huhhot 6.6 -12.8 23.4 392.2 1631.7 
Taiyuan 10.1 -7,7 25.2 382.2 1770.6 
Suid.e 10.0 -86 24.8 441.9 1816.0 
Yan'an 9.3 -6.2 22.9 597.1 1513.2 
Tianshui 1110 -3.5 22.4 481.2 1479.3 
Baoji 13,0 -0.6 25.1 754.0 1398.1 
X1'an 14,0 -0.5 27.1 330.1 1420.0 
Tongguan * -2.4 26.9 471.1 1423.4 
Shanzhou * 0.5 28.2 545.2 1249.4 
Lijin * -3.2 27.6 487.5 1410.3 
Sources; LIU Dongsheng, et al., 1964, page 4. *GR Charles Z. 
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FIGURE 1-6 	AVERAGE ANNUAL PRECIPITATION SOURCE: Note 22 
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3) Hydrology of River Huang basin. 
Runoff. 
Owing to high evaporation rates and the extreme permeability of the 
loess which covers most of the region, runoff in the middle reaches 
of the R. Huang and its tributaries is very low (Table 1-3). In 
the lower reaches the reason is different, namely that for the main 
part the river runs above the level of the surrounding land and 
receives little water as runoff therefrom. 
Discharge. 
The mean discharge at selected stations along the R. Huang is shown 
in Figure 1-7. It may be seen that over 50 7 comes from the area 
above Lanzhou, which accounts for less than 30 7 of the drainage 
area. This is very important during the Winter and early Spring, 
when hardly any rainfall occurs in the lower and middle reaches, 
since there the discharge follows very closely the rainfall, and 
varies in the same seasonal way. By the same token, whilst the 
upper reaches contribute a not insignificant flow during the 
Sumer months, it is from the tributaries of the middle reaches that 
the large and transient flood peaks come which so trouble the lower 
reaches. (Chapter 5). 
Sources of River Huang Flood Peaks and Silt. 
Above Hekouzhen in Inner Mongolia there is a little over 100 x 
10  
t 
Of silt in a little over 20 x 10 m3 of water, thus it is basically 
clear. Yet by Mengjin these figures are increased by about 
1.5 x 10 9 t and 20 x . 9 3 10 m respectively. Thus,in general terms it 
can be seen that the source of R. Huang silt is the loess plateau of 
the middle reaches. A more detailed presentation of the data for 
the source of R. Huang silt is given in Table 1-4, and with reference 
to Figure 1-13, will demonstrate that the sediment of the rivers 
Wei, Fen and Jing (except its tributary, the Malian) will be 
predominately fine, whilst that of the tributaries between Hekouzhen 
and Longrnen, and the rivers Beiluo and Malian, will be coarser. 
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TABLE 1 -3 MAINSTREAM AND TRIBUTARY 
RUNOFF COEFFICIENTS 










Huang Lanzhou 161 340 179 47.35 
: 
Baotou 65 280 215 23.21 
Shanzhou 58 405 347 14.32 
Luokou 63 415 352 15.18 
Wei Huaxian 91 430 339 21.16 
Beiluo Zhuangtou 21 380 359 5.53 
Jin,g Zhangjiashan 43 410 367 10.49 
Pen Hejin 58 410 352 14.15 
Yiluo Heishiguan 170 550 380 30.91 
Source: LIU Dongsheng, et al., 1964, page 2. 
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ALL SIZES DIA. d<0,025rnrr DIA.d>0,05mir 
CATCHMENT AMOUNT 
PROPORTION OF AMOUNT PROPORTION OF AMOUNT PROPORTION OF 
(tx1O)..... TOTAL 	(%) (tx106) TOTAL 	(%) (t x106) TOTAL 	(%) 
Inner Mongolia Below Hekouzhen 15600 134 8.10 29 5.52 91 13.30 
Shanxi N. W. Shanxi 30500 259 15.60 83 15.90 115 15.60 
R. Fen Basin 38700 26 1.56 11 200 8 1.13 
Sub-total 69200 , 	 285 17.30 94 18.00 123 16.70 
Shaanxi Ynlin District 47400 419 25.30 95 18.20 252 34.40 
Yan'an District 35400 232 14.00 64 13.20 104 14.20 
Guanzhong 35500 40 2.40 9 1.67 20 2,79 
Sub-total 118300 691 41.70 168 32.00 376 51.60 
Gansu Within R. Jing Basin 37100 240 14.50 94 18,00 64 8.80 
Within R. Wei Basin 26200 180 10.90 86 16.50 37 5.08 
Sub-total 63300 420 25.40 180 34.50 101 13.80 
Hekouzhen to Tongguan 	(Sum of above) 266400 1531 92.50 470 90.00 693 94.67 
River Huang Basin Above Hekouzhen 386000 124 7.50 52 10.00 39 5,33 
Grand Total 652400 1655_ 1 	100 522 100 732 100 
'Long, Hua, He, Zhuan'* Total 667900 1613 528 665 
Difference 15500 -42 6 -67 
Source: CONG Shiyang, XIONG Guishu, 1980. page 44. 
*The sedimeni yield of the upper and m _iddle reaches is generally taken as the sum of the sediment loads 
at the Longmen, Huaxian, Hejin, and Zhuantou stations (abbreviated as shown), and is given for reference. 
Waters from the areas above Hekouzhen or below Sanmenxia (notably the 
Rivers Yi, Luo and Qin) will be relatively clear. It may further be 
seen that 80 7, of the sediment from these regions (74 7, of the 
sediment from all regions) comes from a smaller area, 130,000 1cm2 , 
and 50 7, (46.5 7, of sediment from all regions) comes from just 
58,000 km 2 . For coarse silts (Diameter >0.05 mm), the corresponding 
areas are 110,000 km  and 43,000 1cm2 , respectively. 
An analysis of rainfall and R. Huang discharge and sedimentation data 
has been made and has shown that there are six main different 
circumstances which give rise to flood peaks in the lower R. Huang. (26) 
They are 
Light rain over the whole middle reaches area. 
Fairly large floods from the coarse sediment area, little 
or no floods from the clear water source areas. 
Medium floods from the coarse sediment source area 
supplemented from the clear water source areas. 
Simultaneous large floods from the coarse sediment area, 
the fine sediment source area and the clear water areas. 
Principally from the clear water areas, with some from 
the coarse sediment source areas. 
Mainly from the fine sediment source areas. 
The results of the analysis are presented in Table 1-5. These were 
analysed in conjunction with flood data for the lower R. Huang and 
the following observations were made 
Floods from groups i) and vi) (above) give rise to only 
slight deposition in the lower R. Huang. 
Floods from group ii) are created by concentrated storms 
and though their hydrograph has a high peak, the amount 
of water brought down is small. In the lower R. Huang 
the hydrograph becomes flatter, because of channel 
storage, and the flood plains are not inundated. Very 
serious channel deposition results from these floods, 




TABLE 	MAIN FL000PEAK SOURCE AREAS AND THEIR INFLUENCE 
1-5 ON DEPOSITION AND SCOURING (1952-1960AND 1969-1978) 
FL000PEAK 	SOURCE No. of 1i Fopi 
Floodpeuk Proportion of 'Sun k Proportion of 	'San, Rate of Deposition 	or Proportion 
Characteristics Hei, Xiuo '* Water HeLXiao' 	Silt scouring (-) in the ofDepos0 
AREA(S) )cctj'r- of atHivankou ______ Discharge From * * Discharge From Lower Reaches ( tx10 3 	d1) 
)rScour. 
Numbers 	(i) to (vi) 	refer 	to 
•ences Total Various Tnbutaries 
(%) 
Various 	Tributaries 
Above 	ciaCUn  Below 	Whole of 
Attributubk. 
to Source 
floocipeak source area groups' (kg  T 	1j-  fff 	f7 f 	jj 	j•ff j7 
Lower 
Guocun Aishun  Aishan Reaches 
Area 
identified 	in the text . 
(I) 	Light Rain 	Over 	the 	Whole 
MidrllpRparhpc Arn 7 _____ 68 3680 - 00216 299 - 223 - 26-817-1  37 - 596 - 342 - 56 - 3790 64 -41+1 3413 40 
(ii) Fairly Large From Coarse Areas 13 126 683010-0 516 268 608 181 63 12 122' 159 03 26200 3490 1310 31000 1 	59 
Medium From Course 	Areas 22 214 4280 00360 460 333 148 85 5•6 970 17 0-91 5150 670 -370 51+50 13-6 SuDolemented FromClenr Areas 
Large From Coarse 	Fine, and 
Clear Areas SimulaneousIy - 10 - - 97 - - 11742 - 00131 237 - 242 - 261 - 228 - 3-0 - 722 - 30 - 5-i - 13130 8560 -2710 1899 282 - - 
 All Three  6 55 47500-0110 56-8 9-9 21 11-3 102 40-0 232 16 -1480 256-4420 -1666 19 
3 
-i Above Hekouzhen and From 39 46200-0093 64-610-8 26 7 4.r 131 52- ' 42-' 2-8 2503 -671 -1078 751 0-4 Mou 	ns South or R. nft 
29 y Abo ve Hekouzhen and From 3 35200-0094 57-2 4-6 18-6 150 15-9 35-4 14-1 3•4 1253 -976 - 874 - 	597 -0-1 
" 
Rjyprs '(I 	Nih 	rind ()in  
Mountains South orRWei and 
ivers is sisoo•oioz 30 - 1,10 - 2  40.7 172 B-i 26 - 044. 1 61 -381 -301-111S -1797 -1+6 
--90 
Do Above HeIuzhen 13 126 38300-0113 758 99 10-2 35 19-2 - 56-0 8-3 0-3 615 - 130 -464 21 - 1-2 
Mountains South of R.Wei 1 10 49200-0074 41-7 1-3 635 5-8 7-0 9-4 39-2 0-2 2050 B601-2880 20 00 >? i 
; 
Rivers 	Yi, Luo, and Qin 5 
E3-9 
 54000-0119 33511-2. 78 38-5 
- 
73 490 9-2155 -2144 387 -570 -2327 -1-6 - - 

















6150 1441 -535 7056 
Source: QIANing, WANG Keqin, YM Linde, FU Renshou, 1980, page 58. 	- 
*Oncoming water and silt for the lower reaches are taken as the sum of those measured at Sanmenxia, 
Heishiguan, and Xiaod.ong stations, abbreviated as shown. 
**Tributaries arranged in groups: I, above Hekouzhen; II, between Hekouzhen and Longmen, R. Malian, and 
R. Beiluo (course sediment areas); III, R. Pen, upper R. Wei, H, Ji ngn .1ns tream and tributaries except 
R. Malian (fine sediment areas), and mountain tributaries South of R. Wei; IV, R. Yi, R. Luo, and R. Qin. 
Shandong province. 
Floods of group iii) cause moderate channel deposition. 
The floods of the fourth group have the highest discharge 
and generally cause the floodplains to be inundated. 
However, although deposition resulting from these floods 
is second only to those of group ii), accounting for 28.2 7 
of the deposition recorded, most of it occurs on the 
flood plains of the upper two stretches, which, in effect, 
deepens the main channel there and improves its flood 
carrying capacity, whilst in the lower stretch in Shandong, 
scouring occurs, which is also beneficial. 
Floods of group v) are the most common and generally lead 
to scouring of the bed, sometimes over the entire stretch 
to Shandong. However, this is slight and exerts only a 
restraining effect on the general accretion of the lower 
R. Huang. 
The study of the source of R. Huang silt has shown that there is a 
very close correlation indeed between soil erosion and R. Huang 
sediment. The amount of silt entering small tributaries was found 
to equal the amount of soil lost from the catchment area, and the 
larger tributaries and R. Huang mainstream were found to be in long 
term equilibrium. Thus it is concluded that the delivery ratio of 
sediment to the R. Huang is close to unity. 
The sediment content of the R. Huan as is the case for its water 
discharge, thus follows closely the seasonal variation in rainfall 
over the loess plateau. In the Summer months July to October, 
58.5 7. of the annual discharge carries 83.8 7. of the annual sedimcnt 
load. (27) 
iv) Fluvial Processes of the Lower River Huang. 
The lower R. Huang is aggrading at a rate of about 0.07 m yr, with 
the main channel and fboodplains essentially rising in parallel. (28) 
The deposition is caused mainly by particles coarser than 0.05 mm., 
over 350 x 
10  
t of which enter the lower reaches each year and 
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between 50 7. and 60 7. of which are deposited. (Table 1-6, Figure 1-8). 
Furthermore, although 87.6 7. of the fine particles which enter the 
lower reaches are subsequently discharged into the sea, they can still 
have a marked effect upon the balance of deposition and scouring 
therein, as will now be explained. (29) 
In rivers with fairly clear water, the sediment discharge rate, Q 5 
is uniquely determined by the water discharge, Q, according to the 
relation, Q = KQ where K is a constant, and for the lower R. Huang 
in times of clear water flow, the exponent, a, is about 2. Yet when 
heavily silted waters come down, the relationship between the 
sediment and water discharge becomes more complicated. The éediment 
discharge can vary by an order of magnitude for the same flow 
conditions, and only by introducing the oncoming silt concentration 
can a more definite relation be found. It is Q = KQaSub, where Su 
is the oncoming concentration and, for the lower R. Huang, a + b = 2 
and l.lad2 ; 0.8<bc0.9. Thus, the greater the oncoming sediment 
load, the greater the sediment discharge. This is the so-called 
"more come - more go" law of the lower R. Huang. There is a point, 
as the sediment concentration increases, at which deposition abruptly 
gives way to high intensity erosion. This point, and the degree of 
erosion, depend upon the proportion of very fine particles in the 
sediment (<0.01 mm) but for the lower R. Hüang it usually occurs 
at around 400 kg m-3  . Hyperconcentrations of this type do not occur 
very often and this type of main channel erosion is frequently 
limited to the upper part of the lower reaches. At Mengjin the 
R. Huang slope is about 0.035 0/, at Caocun it is between 0.015 % and 
0.02 7., and at the mouth it is about 0.01 7, and even where 
hyperconcentrations do occur, there is often deposition in the lower 
stretch, owing to the more gentle slope. 
Owing to cultivation, the roughness of the floodplains is considerably 
higher than that of the main channel, and whilst the flow velocity 
over both is highly variable, the former is usually only between 
25 7. and 50 7. that of the latter. A typical value for the main 
channel velocity at Huayuankou would be 2 ms - 1 to 3 ma 1 for a 
discharge of about 5000 m 3 a4 to 7000 m3 51•(3Ø)  Thus, ihen the 
TABLE AVERAGE ANNUAL ONCOMING WATER 
1-6 	AND SEDIMENT LOADS, AND SEDIMENT 
DISCHARGE, JULY 1950 TO JUNE 1960 
Water 
Volume 























Luin (t x  106) (t x10 6 ) (%) x 10 6) % Xiao - (t 	x106) 
0025 970 540 51 850 64'3 69 178 876 
0025h 00S 461 257 21 312 236 128 331 677 
48300 46300 
005 364 203 14 160 121 190 491 44-0 
TotaL 1795 100 86 1322 100 37 100 737 
Source: QTJSRL, 1981, p. 2. 
San, Hei, Xiao, refers to oncoming conditions for the lower reaches, 
see note to Table 1-5. 
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FIGURE 	GRAIN SIZE DISTRIBUTION 
1-8 CURVES AT HUAYUANKO 
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Sources: QtJSRL, Eds., undated mimio, page 56. *MAI Qiaowei, ZHAO 
Yean, PAN Xiandi, 1980, page 4. 
Note: QTJSRL curves for 29 July, 1959. MAI, et al. curve date not 
specified. 
TABLE 	RELATIVE AREAS OF MAIN 
1-7 CHANNEL AND FL000PLAINS (km 2 ) 
Location Tiexie to :Hra]cou Gaocun to Aishan to Total 
Huayuankou to Gaocun Aishan Lii in 
Floodplains 183 867 457 541 2048 I Main Channel 606 857 360 173 1996 Whole River 789 1724 817 714 4044 Channel 
Source: Q1AN lUng, and ZHANG Ren, 1982, table 2. 
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floodplains are inundated, deposition may occur on them simultaneously 
with scouring of the main channel. This, and the variations in 
deposition and scouring according to the oncoming water and silt 
conditions, in the long term ensures an even distribution of 
sediment over the floodplain and in the main channel. Since they 
occupy roughly equal areas, (Table 1-7), they are rising in parallel. 
Apart from straightforward scouring of the lower reaches by large 
volume floods, particularly clear floods, or hyperconcentrated floods, 
moderate floods, provided that they cover the floodplains, can also 
do much to remove silt from the main channel above Gaocun. As 
mentioned above, there are alternative divergent and convergent 
stretches here. In the divergent parts the waters spread over the 
floodplains and will deposit some of their silt load. Clearer, they 
return to the main channel in a convergent zone and proceed to pick 
up silt therefrom. At the next divergent zone, part of this will be 
deposited upon the floodplains, as before. Thus, by repetition, 
main channel flow sediment concentration will diminish and erosion 
may extend over long distances. 
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The Loess of the Middle Reaches. 
The 'debate on the development policy of the middle reaches (Chapter 
has been complicated by ambiguity over what constitutes the area 
in question. For many years, the whole of the great loop, from 
Longyang Gorge to Taohuayu was considered to be the middle reach 1(31) 
and, indeed, it makes a very convenient geographical region, bounded 
as it is by the Yin mountains to the North, the Qin mountains to the 
South, the Taihang mountains to the East and the Helan mountains and 
Qinghai-Xizang plateau to the West (Figure 1-9). Whilst for hydro-
logical reasons it is usual to consider the middle reaches to 
comprise the stretch from Hekouzhen to Taohuayu, for other purposes 
the geographical region as a whole is still often referred to as the 
"Middle Reaches" or the "Loess Plateau", though the latter actually 
only occupies about half of the area and some of it is drained by the 
upper reaches. 
This larger region is 607,000 km 
2 
 in area and has many different 
land forms, which suffer varying degrees of erosion (Table 1-8). 
Whilst each part has its problems, we are concerned here only with 
the loess-covered regions, since it is these which contribute' the 
major part of the silt to the R. Huang. The term 'loess plateau' 
will therefore be used hereafter to denote those loess-covered parts 
whose sediment yield modulus exceeds 5000 t km-2 yr', an area of 
approximately 280,000 km 2 , distributed in a broad band running 
Southwest to Northeast, from Eastern Gansu to Northern Shaanxi and 
Northwestern Shanxi. 
1) Topography. 
Seventy per cent of the loess plateau lies between 1000 rn and 2000 m 
above sea level and the whole region is still rising very slowly. 
It has two main land forms. In the Southern part there is a region 
of 52,000 lan which resembles a plateau, its surface being flat, but 
cut up by many steep-sided gullies. The loess is thick, gully 
erosion is serious, and the gullies, which are well defined, occupy 
between 40 7 and 60 % of the surface area (Figure 1-10). In the 
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TABLE 	SOIL AND WATER LOSSES IN 
1-8 THE CENTRAL*  R.HUANG AREA 











HILLOCK PLATEAU MOUNT- BORO- GRASS- 
REGION REGION AINS ERLANE LANDS LrJ. - PLAIN 
AREA 247 52 116 19 18 38 26 91 607 
AREA OF SOIL AND 238 49 86 17 13 9 17 0 429 WATER LOSSES 
- - - - 
Source: RHWCC, Eds., 1959, page 200. 
*The area described in the text, often loosely referred to as the 
middle reaches, but strictly much larger. 
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FIGURE 1-10 THE GULLIED PLATEAU REGION 
photo: About 100 km North of Xi'an, 30 July 1980. 	 (PM) 
[FIGURE 1-11 THE GULUED HILLOCK REGION 
Photo: About 5 km from Yan'an, 25 July 1980. 	 (FM 
r. 
Northern part, 247,000 km in area, both gully and sheet erosion have 
been so serious that the land has become criss-crossed by gullies and 
cut up into an array of small round hillocks, resembling tray upon 
tray of bread rolls (Figure 1-11). On average, gullies occupy about 
four kilometres per square kilometre. The above two regions are 
known as the 'gullied plateau' and 'gullied hillock' regions, 
respectively. 
Plant Cover. 
Natural vegetation throughout the region has suffered, over a long 
period, very severe destruction owing to such factors as ill-suited 
land use, overgrazing, and wanton felling of trees for fuel or for 
war. After the revolution, extant natural vegetation fell roughly 
into two districts, with a boundary line running through Xing and 
Lishi counties in Shanxi, Yanchang and Zhidan counties in Shaanxi 
and Qingyang and Pingliang counties in Gansu, as in Figure 1-9. To 
the South and East of this line, dense coniferous forests grew on 
mountains and mixed forests grew.on isolated hills, but one estimate 
gives this area as only t2  7 of the loess plateau". (33) 
 On the 
loess plateau itself, though, most hilltops had been opened up to 
agriculture and, apart from isolated instances of man-made forest, 
the only natural vegetation was semi-arid type grasses to be found 
along gully floors. Most of the gullied hillock region to the North 
and West of the boundary lay bare, natural vegetation was very 
scattered and what little existed comprised those drought and cold 
resistant plants with strong propagation properties which were to be 
found on wasteland on or gully edges. 
Loess Soil. 
Loess is a fine, loose, wind-deposited yellow soil, rich in minerals. 
Usually unstratified and lacking granual structure, it relies for 
cohesion upon calcium carbonate which, however, disperses readily in 
water, rendering the loess highly susceptible to (water) erosion. (34) 
On a larger scale, it is riddled with holes left by the roots of 
previous vegetation and underground cleavages have created large 
30 
columnar voids (Figure 1-12), 
Loess has a porosity of about 50 7. and, owing to capillary action, 
can hold about 250 truii to 300 rrn of effective moisture (the equivalent 
rainfall) in the top two metres. It is very fertile, containing 
0.8 kg to 1.5 kg of nitrates, 1.5 kg of phosphates and 20 kg of 









FIGURE 1-12 SINK HOLE AND CAVERN IN LOESS 
Photo: Chunhua County, Shaanxi, 19 July 1980. 	 (PM) 
32 
5) Soil Erosion. 
Over the region as a whole, an average of 3700 t km- 
2 
 of loess are 
lost each year, rising to as much as 25,000 t km- 2 (Figure  1-13), 
which has been described as the loss of "more rich earth than all 
the fertilizer that the whole country could produce or import". (36) 
Some erosion is by wind, notably along the Southern edge of the 
E'erduosi plateau, where Northerly winds blow away the finer 
particles, leaving sand dunes. The Maowusu desert, for example, is 
expanding Southwards into Yulin county at a rate of about 
13 km 
2 
 yr. (37) As another result, the loess soil becomes finer in 
the Southern areas. The distribution of average grain size is also 
shown in Figure 1-13. 
However, erosion is mainly caused by the action of water, occuring 
as sheet erosion, gully extension, sink holes (Figure 1-12), soil 
creep and riverbank carving. It follows closely the variations in 
rainfall and the resultant silt is carried immediately into the 
R. Huang, from whose silt load it can be concluded that some 80 7 of 
soil loss occurs in the three months July, August and September, 
when 50 % of the annual rainfall occurs, In August, 40 7 of the 
annual silt flow occurs in 20 7 of the annual runoff.  
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FIGURE 	VARIATION OF PARTICLE SIZE 
1-13 AND SEDIMENT YIELD MODULUS 
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6) Problems of the Development of the Loess Plateau. 
Quite apart from the problems created by silt in the R. Huang and 
its tributaries (Section 7), many years of erosion have rendered 
this one of the poorest regions of China. A report from 1958 
contains figures for 1955 over an area of 432,000 km  comprising 
those parts of Shanxi, Shaanxi, Gansu and Ningxia within the R. Huang 
catchment, which may be taken to demonstrate the size of the 
problem. (39) 
In the report, the total population of 29,010,000.1,. gives an average 
density of 67,k km- 
2. 
 The national average density is 62.5,k km- 2 
about the same, but if the population is compared to cultivated land, 
then the figures are 215 A. km- 
2 
 and 543 A. km 2 , respectively. 22.8 7. 
of the land has been opened to cultivation, compared with 11.5 % for 
the country as a whole. On average, each agricultural worker is 
responsible for 0.4 ha, compared to 0.21 ha nationally. The region's 
production of wheat, miscellaneous grains, and cotton account for 
13.9,% q 6.8 7. and 10.1 70 respectively, of the national output. The 
average food provision (268.2 kg &) approaches that of the 
national average (284.4 kg J 1 ), but whereas the cultivated land 
accounts for 8.9 % of the national total, staple foodstuffs yield is 
only 4.5 % of the national yield. The national average unit yield 
is 1500 kg ha but in this region it is 885 kg ha 	of :the 
region's 983,000 km 2 of cultivated land, only 7.5 % is irrigated, 
the rest depends on the unpredictable rainfall. There is an average 
of 123.6 	(the national average is 76.5 km 2 ) and each 
labouring animal has to deal with 2.2 ha. Forests account for only 
2.8 7.. of the area,and are mainly scattered. 
However, these figures include such populous and fertile regions as 
the Guanzhong Plain, which, in the report, has a population density 
of 335 A km' 2 where 74 7. of the land is opened to cultivation and 
each agricultural worker has an average of 0.15 ha, On the Loess 
.plateau, the conditions are far more stringent. Between 1950 and 
1955, in North Shaanxi for instance, where the population density 
is 29 ), km 2 , the average unit grain yield is 546 kg ha 	in Yan'an 
35 
district and 285 kg ha 	in Suide and Yulin districts, In extreme 
cases in some parts of Shanxi, each labouring animal has to work 
6.7 ha. Sheep rearing is important. In Suide and Yulin districts 
in 1954 there were 250 	
km-2.' 
The gradual impoverishment of conditions as one goes Northwards is 
illustrated in the report by a comparison between Yan'an and Yulin 
districts in Shaanxi. Although Yulin has a greater population 
density than Yan'an (35 A krn 2 and 23 , 	-2 respectively) a greater 
proportion of the available land has been opened up (17.8 7. and 
10.5 7. respectively) resulting in almost identical ratios of 
agricultural workers per unit of tilled land (0.57 ha 	and 
0.6 ha ,A...T  respectively). The number of domestic animals 'is about 
the same in both districts, but in Yulin there is a higher proportion 
of sheep. Yet, in the period in question (1950-1955) Yan'an has been 
able, each year, to export foodgrain. In 1954 this amounted to 
11 7. of the district's total yield, and export continued even in the 
severe drought year of 1955. Meanwhile, in Suide (Yulin) the total 
yield halved between 1951 and 1953, and had fallen again, by a third 
of the 1953 amount, by 1955, during which year 100 x 
10  
kg of 
foodgrain had to be imported to North Shaanxi and Northwest Shanxi. 
The loss of vegetation has long been recognized as the main reason 
for the lack of fuel, fodder and fertilizer and it is also held 
responsible for the instability of the climate which is the ultimate 
cause of the region's poverty. Spring droughts and Autumn torrents 
have become common features, the droughts being especially severe. 
As the report puts it, 
"Take Shanxi for example, during the period of the first 
five-year plan, it suffered two droughts and one deluge. 
Adding together the areas affected 2 over the five-year 
period gives a total of 47,000 lan7 , which is equal to 
the present day cultivated area of Shanxi. Thus out of 
five year's bitter toil by the masses, one can be 
reckoned to have been wasted. 
The principal contradiction manifests itself as the practice of 
shifting cultivation. The potency of land that has been opened to 
cultivation diminishes as fertilizer is insufficient and as the 
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upper layers, which contain organic matter, are washed away by 
storms. When hilltop forests in the region are first opened up to 
tilling, yQ.lds of 1875 kg ha 	are obtained, but this falls to less 
than 750 kg ha in a few years. 
(40) 
 The peasants are forced to 
open up an even larger area of land in order to maintain their total 
yield. Then, as more land is opened, so the climate becomes less 
stable and yields fall even more rapidly. Furthermore, with a larger 
area to look after, the peasant cannot pay such full attention to all 
his crops, and poor management further reduces yields and increases 
the severity of soil and water losses. Eventually, some areas are 
left to fall into total neglect, creating the vast area of barren 
hilltops which characLrises the greater part of the loess plateau. 
Meanwhile the peasants' livelihood cannot be guaranteed; the climate 
becomes forever less stable and fertilizer, fodder and fuel ever more 
scarce. There is no option for the peasant but to close the vicious 
circle by opening up more land. 
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7) Sedimentation Problems in the River Huang Basin. 
The highest recorded silt content of a Huang river tributary is 
1500 kg 	and those above 1000 kg m- 3  are quite common. (41) This  
is unmatched by any river of the world. From Table 1-9 it can be 
seen that there are 13 large rivers in the world whose annual 
suspended load exceeds 100 x 
10  
t. The R. Huang has the highest, 
followed by the Ganges and the Brabmaputra. Yet, in terms of 
drainage area and water discharge, the R. Huang is of very moderate 
proportions. Furthermore, of the ten tributaries shown in Table 
1-10, there are eight whose annual suspended load exceeds 100 x 1o 6 t. 
In terms of sediment concentration, only the Colorado River (USA) 
approaches either the R. Huang or its tributaries. Moreover, like 
precipitation, sediment concentrations vary greatly both seasonally 
and - year by year. For example, the maximum annual silt load in the 
R. Huang was 3910 x 106  t (1933) whilst the minimum was 488 x 106  t 
(1928). The maximum recorded mainstream concentration is 919 kg m- 3 
The sediment load in five to ten days can be between 50 7. and 90 % 
of the total annual load, whilst in the Winter months January to 
March, the average concentration is only some 2 kg m 3 to 4 kg m. (42) 
i) Loss of reservoir capacity. 
Chinese engineers view the problem of silted-up reservoirs with 
great seriousness and the problem in the R. Huang valley is indeed 




capacity of 192 reservoirs each over 1 x 106 
m  had been lost by the 
end of 1973. On average, 30 x 106 
m  are being lost annually and 43 
reservoirs have already been completely filled. Most of these 
reservoirs have been in operation for less than 20 years. In recent 
years there has been an increase in the storage capacity of 
3 6 3 	 6 	-1 
reservoirs over 1 x 10 in of 260 x 10 in yr , but about a third 
of this amount, 80 x 106  m3 yr, has been lost from existing 
.. 
reservoirs. In Shanxi 700 x .10 6 3 in of the 43 large and medium sized 
reservoirs built before 1958 (total capacity 2230 x 
10  
in3) had been 
lost by the end of 1974. It is estimated that the annual loss of 
50 x 106 
m  
is equivalent to Y 7 x 
10  
(1 2 x 106  at 1981 exchange 
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TABLE 	HEAVILY SILTED LARGE RIVERS 













(kg 6 3 ) 
Huang China 752 43 1640 37.60 
Colorado USA 637 5 135 27.50 
Liao China 166 6 41 6.86 
Ganges India, 955 371 1451 3.92 Bangladesh 
Missouri USA 1370 616 218 3.54 
Indus Pakistan 969 175 435 2.49 
Brabmaputra India, 666 384 726 1.89 Bangladesh 
Nile Egypt, Sudan 2978 89 111 1.25 
Red Vietnam 119 123 130 1.06 
Irrawaddy Burma 430 427 299 0.70 
Mississippi USA 3220 561 312 0.56 
Cbangjiang China 1807 921 478 0.54 
Ikong Laos, Tailand, 795 348 170 0.49 Kampuchea, Vietnam 
Xijiang China 355 253 69 0.35 
Don USSR 422 28 6 0.23 
Niger Nigeria 1112 180 40 0.22 
W.Gerrnany, Austria, 
Danube Czechoslovakia, 1165 200 28 0.14 Hungary, Yugoslavia, 
Bulgaria, Romania 
Volga USSR 1500 250 25 0.11 
Amazon Brasil 5770 5710 363 0.06 
Congo Zaire 3700 1400 70 0.05 
W.Germany, 
Rhine Netherlands, Prance, 362 800 3 0,04 
Switzerland 
Sources: QIAN Ning, DAI Dingzhong, 1980, page 20. SRI}IEWL, et al., 
Eds., 19799 p.  2. 
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TABLE 1 -10 	TRIBUTARY SEDIMENT LOADS 
RIVER STATION RUNOFF 


















(t krñ 2 y(1 ) 
Huang Shanzhou 42640 1600 38.: 590 2330 
Zuli Q,ingyuan 169 83 493 5600 
Huarigfu Huangfu 197 61 312 1480 19200 
Kuye Werijiachuan 795 138 174 1500 11800 
Wuding Chuarikou 1555 210 135 1290 7700 
Qingjian Yanchuan 163 51 313 1150 14700 
Yan Ganyuyi 251 65 258 1210 11000 
Pen Hejin 1831 41 22 286 1100 
Beiluo Zhuantou 965 106 110 1190 4200 
Jing Zhangjiashan 1738 271 156 1040 6400 
Wei Xia.nyang 6012 201 33 4000 
Source: SR.IHEW'L, et al., Ms., 19799 p. 10 
TABLE 	SEDIMENTATION OF THE 
1 - 11 MAINSTREAM RESERVOIRS 
RE 	V SER DIR 
DRAINAGE 
AREA 

















Liujiaxia 181700 147 5720 1968-1978 580 10.1 
Yanguoxia 182800 57 220 1961-1978 160 72.7 
Bapanxia 204700 43 49 1975-1977 18 35.7 
Qingtongxia 285000 42.7 620 1966-1977 485 78.2 
Intake 
Sanshenggong 314000 Gate 80 1961-1977 40 50.0 
Type 
Tianqiao 388000 42 68 1976-1978 7.5 11.0 
Sanmenxia 688421 106 9640 1960-1978 3760* 39.0 
Source: QIAN Ning, ])Al Dingzhong, 1980, page 24. 
*At water level of 335m. 
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rate) of their construction costs alone. Similar examples can be 
found from Gansu, Inner Mongolia, Qinghai, Ningxia and Shandong. (43) 
The case. for the seven.mainstream dams along the R. Huang is shown 
in Table 1-11. The case of Sanrnenxia is discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 3. 
Backwater deposition. 
The most notorious case of danger resulting from reservoir backwater 
deposition is that which followed the alteration of the fluvial 
conditions of the lower R. Wei during the period immediately after 
impounding at Sanmenxia (Chapter 3). Another exmple may be given 
from Zhenziliang reservoir in the Yanbei district of Shanxi, where, 
in ten years, the backwater deposition extended 3 km and compensation 
payments made, after repeated upstream inundations so caused, amount 
so far to 1.8 times the original capital investment. (44) 
Wear and Tear. 
Before Liujiaxia reservoir, just upstream, began impounding, 
inspection' and repair work lasting between 30 and 40 days had to be 
made annually at Yanguoxia power station on the R. Huang, 80 7. of 
which dealt with mechanical erosion. In 1964, the trash racks 
collapsed under water' pressure as a consequence of blocking. 
Repairs and other losses amounted to Y 30 x 1o 6 ( 8.6 x 106). 
90 7 of the mineral content of R. Huang silt is quartz, both hard 
and abrasive, and Figure 1-14 shows the pumps out for repair at the 
Mangshan irrigation scheme on the lower R. Huang near HuaYuankou. (45) 
Lower River Huang Dyke Protection Problems. 
The North China Plain is the vast (250,000 1cm 2 ) alluvial wedge of 
the R. Huang, which flows across its apex at Mengjin, to the sea, 
with the land on either side of the dykes sloping gently away 
(gradient = 0.02 	It is an extraordinarIly flat plain, and 
one tenth (100 x 10 A. ) of China's population and 15.8 7 
(170,000 1cm2 ) of its cultivated land are on it. Thus, should the 
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Lim 
I FIGURE 1-14 PUMP ROTORS WORN BY SILT 
Photo: Mangshan Pumping Station, near Huayuankou, on the lower (PM 
R. Huang, 9 August 1980. After about 1000 hr the pump radius ( about 
500 mm ) is reduced bylOmm. After 3500 hr the rotor may be worn 
right through. 
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river break its dykes, a very large area would be flooded and the 
loss of life and property would be enormous. Flood prevention is 
seen as the first priority of R. Huang control work.' 
There are three types of dyke breaching which may occur on the 
lower R. Huang. Firstly, overtopping the dykes when the flood 
discharge capacity is insufficient. Heavy deposition has necessitated 
constant maintenance of the dyke system and, three times since the 
Civil War, the raising of its height; furthermore, whilst the flood 
carrying capacity varies with time and position along the river 
course, dangerous reductions may occur. For example, the water 
level at Huayuankou for a discharge of 5000 tn 3 	in 1973 was 
higher than that for 22,300 m 3 s ' in 1958. The narrow reaches in 
Shandong are where this type of breach is most likely. (47) 
The second type of breach is by bursting, when the dykes give way 
owing to seepage or piping under the pressure of a persistant high 
water level. Attention also has to be paid to prevent animals from 
weakening the structure of the dykes by burrowing therein. 
The third and most common type of danger is that which occurs during 
the receding stage of the flood, when the flow suddenty takes a 
different-path and attacks the dyke at a sharp angle. This is very 
critical in the reach above Gaocun, which has long been the point 
of emphasis in R. Huang flood iprevention work. 
v) Ice-jam Floods in the Lower Reaches. 
Mention of this phenomenon ±5 made here, despite its not being a 
consequence of the sediment of the R. Huang, because it would seem 
appropriate to discuss it alongside the other sources of dyke breach. 
The problem also occurs, but to a lesser extent, in the North-bound 
part of the Great Loop, in the vicinity of Ningxia. The details' 
below refer only to its effects in the Lower Reaches. 
From Gaocun, where it crosses the 35' N. parallel of latitude, the 
lower R. Huang proceeds steadily Northeastwards to the mouth, which 
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is at the 38th degree. Generally, between 50 kin and 700 km of the 
lower reach is covered by ice from mid January to the last week of 
February, but the upstream, Soiitherly, part tends to freeze later 
and thaw earlier, by a factor of about 10 days. The ice cover above 
Gaocun is about 0.1 in thick, but at the mouth, its thickness is 
usually about 0.35 m. When the river freezes over, only a limited 
amount of water may flow beneath the ice cover and the excess water 
collects and freezes in the widei channel upstream of Caocun. 
When the upper section thaws, this water may suddenly be released, 
causing a small, flood peak which cannot pass through the section 
below and thus may overflow the dykes. The more serious cause of 
danger, though, is the successive jamming of ice floes set free as 
the upper section begins to thaw, which restrict further the flow 
of water. It may be noted that flood peaks arising from ice jams 
appear to travel back upstream from the point of constriction. Ice 
floes also present the threat of mechanical damage to the dykes. (48) 
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8) History of Drought and Flood in the River Huang Basin. 
i) Drought. 
Owing to the generally arid nature of the basin and the seasonal 
rainfall characteristics, a shortage of water is the rule rather 
than the exception. Any prolonged drought is very serious but, 
unfortunately, quite common, In the 3710 years from 1766 BC to 
1944 AD, recorded instances of drought number 1070. During the 267 
years of the Qing dynasty there were. 201 such instances. Drought 
may occur over a very large area 
thereby making the migration to 
largely futile. From 1877 AD to 
drought occurred, extending over 
during which 13 x 
10  A. died of 
and affect several, provinces, 
ther provinces of those affected, 
1879 AD three consecutive years of 
Shanxi, Hebei, He'nan and Shandong, 
starvation, Similar phenomena have 
continued to occur well into the twentieth century. (49) 
ii) Natural Floods. 
The floods of the R. Huang are a common feature of over 4000 years 
of recorded Chinese history. Incomplete records mention over 
1500 instances of dyke breaching or overtopping, including 27 
changes of course in the 2500, or so, years since the Spring and 
Autumn period (770 BC to 475 AD). These would be equivalent to two 
breaches every three years and a change of course once a century. (50) 
Whilst most parts of the North China Plain have borne the course of 
the R. Huang at some time, there have been but four general routes 
to the sea. (Figure 1-15) and four major estuary points : 
Along the extreme Northern edge of the alluvial cone to 
join the R. Hai at Tianjin. 
More or less along its present course following the 
Northern edge of the Tai hills in Shandong. 
Southwards, following parts of some R. Huai tributaries, 
and on to the Huang Sea. 
Joining both the R. Huai and the Changjiang, flowing into 
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It may be noted that after a change in course, the mouth might be 
situated up to 1000 km from its original position. 
Virtually the whole of the North China Plain is susceptible to 
R. Huang floods and one characteristic of such inundations is the 
large area covered and the shallow depth of the floodwaters. 
Contemporary reports say that the flood of 1887 AD inundated a 
strip between 30 km and 80 kin wide and 25,000 km  in area; about 
half the size of Scotland. At the breach which caused this flood, 
the riverbed was 1.2 in above the surrounding countryside and the 
average flood depth was 0.75 m, though in the region of the break, 
a gully had been cut 20 m, or so, deep. On this occasion, 3000 
large villages were flooded or destroyed and the loss of life was 
estimated at 7 x 1o6 	 Owing to this shallow and extensive 
characteristic, the seriousness of a given flood can also depend 
upon its timing, for should it occur just before harvesting, a crop 
is lain to ruin, whereas should it occur just after harvest, then 
a useful layer of most fertile silt is deposited ready for the next 
crop. 
iii) Man-made Floods. 
The use of floodwaters in battle is another occurance common 
throughout Chinese history, especially on the North China Plain, 
there being records of such üse:dating back to the Spring and 
Autumn Period. (52) 
There were several ways in which floods were so used : 
1) By taking advantage of naturally occuring floods. 
ii) By building reservoirs sited where they would block 
communications. 
iii)By breaching the dykes of elevated rivers (Most examples 
of this type concern the R. Huang during the Warring 
States period, 475 BC to 221 BC). 
By building weirs to raise the water level, and then 
releasing it to flood prescribed areas below. 
By building weirs below cities so that the backwaters 
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would extend to encroach thereupon. 
One example of the ingenuity employed by these methods comes from 
480 AD, when Yuan Chongzu built a dyke which caused the R. Feishui 
to rise and surround three sides of the city of Shouchun, which he 
hoped to protect. On the far side of the dyke he built a small city-
like battlement and sent several thousand people there to guard it. 
Around this battlement he dug a deep and narrow trench. When the 
enemy, Wei, troops arrived, they attacked the small battlement, 
whereupon Yuan Chongzu ordered the dyke to be breached, which flooded 
the trench and all the troops within. Thus was Shouchun saved. 
Although the period of most frequent use of water for waging battle 
was in the Wei, Jin and Northern and Southern dynastic periods 
(220 AD to 581 AD), there is no record of the deliberate breaching 
of the R. Huang at that time, nor are there very many accounts of 
other rivers being used then in that manner. This has been taken 
to suggest that the dyke systerrs at that time were fragmentary and 
were seldom called upon actually to hold flood waters in check. 
Yet, it is, indeed, the use of this method along the R. Huang which 
is most notorious. For example, during the Warring States period, 
it was used by Chu to attack Wei in 359 BC, by Qi and Wei to attack 
Zhou in 322 BC, by Zhou to attack Wei in 281 BC, and by Qin to attack 
Wei in 225 BC. In 1234 AD the Mongols broke the dyke near Kaifeng, 
as in 1642 AD, in the Ming dynasty, did the governor of He'nan in 
order to put down a peasant army which held the city in sQ.ge. It 
has been claimed that 340,000 of its 370,000 inhabitants died in 
that flood. It has been rumoured that the last change in course 
(Beginning in 1851 AD) was made either by the Taipings as their 
rebellion approached Beijing, or by the Imperialists who opposed 
them. (53) 
 Finally, in 1938, Nationalist Generalissimo Jiang Jieshi 
(Chiang Kai-Shek) ordered the blasting of the Southern R. Huang dyke 
at Huayuankou to cover his flight from the Japanese invaders. An 
area of 53,000 km 2 was affected and 890,000 A died. It has been 
claimed that his subsequent purpose in returning the river to its 
original course in 1947 was to drown the liberated areas therein. (54) 
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9) Irrigation in the River Huang Basin. 
A comprehensive review of the development of irrigation throughout 
the R. Huang basin is beyond the scope of this study. Nevertheless, 
inasmuch as on the l-oess plateau, irrigation promotes the development 
of soil and water conservation work, whilst along the lower R. Huang 
and on the Cuanzhong Plain, its own development is restricted by 
silt which results from the limited efficiency of soil and water 
conservation work, a general review may be helpful to give a 
perspective where irrigation is mentioned in Chapters 3 and 4. 
Large scale irrigation works were in existence in China as early as 
the Warring States period. Subsequently., there have been alternate 
periods of activity and neglect, the most active periods being the 
Han, Tang, Qing. and Mao dynasties. The methods used in the 
R. Huang basin before 1949 generally relied upon favourable 
topographical conditions, for no reservoir of appreciable capacity 
was built for irrigation, and the principal construction was a single 
headgate for river diversion, sometimes coupled with a low weir. 55) 
With the exception of the larger-scale schemes mentioned below, 
irrigation was very poorly developed; in the whole of N. Shaanxi, for 
example, only 1120 ha were irrigated, by small-scale means. Wells 
were to be found scattered in different localities in river valleys, 
where the water table was high, but until recent times, there was 
no high-lift pumped irrigation, as is needed on the loess plateau, 
though along rivers and canals, various devices were used to raise 
water a few metres. Wooden waterwheels, for example, were common in 
Gansu, in 1947, where a total of 6700 ha. - were servédby 360 such 
wheels, whose maximum lift was 18 m. 
The most significant irrigation schemes, though, were the ancient 
ones to be found on alluvial plains and desert areas along the 
mainstream, and in the Wei, Jing and Beiluo river valleys on the 
Guanzhong Plain though,by the end of the Civil War, they had fallen 
into disrepair. There was no large scale irrigation using the water 
of the lower R. Huang, because it was feared that any small error in 
constructing a tdivesion work would result ivi d.isa.sterous accidents. 
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At Hegangkou, near Kaifeng, diversion gates were built in the 
Southern dyke, but were abandoned. In Shandong, some syphon projects 
had been tried near Ji'nan, but found to be of I.imited.capacity and 
the silt deposits were not as uniform as had been hoped. 
In recent years many advances have been made in small scale irrigation, 
not only on the loess plateau, (Chapter 4), but also on the North 
China Plain, though the latter is not considered strictly to be part 
of the R. Huang basin. Reparations, improved maintenance and new 
techniques have enabled the major irrigation areas, not only to be 
brought back into full use after having degenerated during the Civil 
War years, but also to be etended or made more effective. These 
schemes are as follow: 
Ningxia Plain. 
Irrigation on the alluvial plain along the R. Huang in Ningxia has 
a history of over 2000 years. Its total area is over 17,000 1cm 2 , 
and is divided into two districts by the Qingtong gorge multipurpose 
project. To the South (Upstream) are the Zhongning and Zhongwei 
Plains, whose collective irrigated area of 39,000 ha is known as the 
Ningwei Plain. To the North is the Yinwu Plain, made up of the 
Yinchuan and Wuzhong irrigation districts, whose total irrigated 
area is 151,000 ha. (56) 
Hetao. 
Also known as Houtao, this plain in Inner Mongolia just at the 
Northernmost point of the R. Huangs Great Loop, as it turns East-
wards, is made up alternately of cultivated land, grassland and 
barren beachiands, covered with R. Huang alluvial deposits, but it 
is very susceptible to alkalisation. Its irrigated area is at 
present 387,000 ha. (57) 
Tumochuan. 
At the site of the failed Salachi irrigation scheme of the Nation- 
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alists, just upstream of the Southward turn of the R. Huang at 
Hekouzhen, some 113,000 ha of the originally planned 130,000 ha 
irrigated area is now in operation. (58) 
Guanzhong Plain. 
The Guanzhong Plain, 52,990 km  in area, as a whole is drained by 
the R. Wei, of which the rivers Jing and Beiluo are two large 
tributaries. This plain has throughout history been renowned for 
its fertility and it is the site of many ancient schemes, such as 
the Zhaolaoyu system, in Fuping county, where floodwaters have been 
drawn for over 2300 years from the R. Shunyang for irrigation and 
warping. The three major schemes at present in operation are all 
based upon ancient schemes at the same sites. They are the Jinghui 
(R. Jing), the Luohui (R. Beiluo) and the Baojixia (R. Wei) schemes, 
and their respective areas of irrigation are 86,000 ha, 49,300 ha 
and 200,000 ha. The latter is really the sum of two R. Wei schemes 
of 129,300 ha and 70,700 ha, above and below Baoji Gorge, respectively. 
The regional importance of the Guanzhong Plain should be emphasised. 
The centre of Chinese culture over many centuries (Section 10), this 
region today retains a position of utmost agricultural and strategic 
importance. Not only is it the site of Xi'an, the Capital of Shaanxi 
province and an important industrial centre, but the plain, itself 
only accounting for 28 % of the area of Shaanxi province, contains 
53 7 of its arable land and produces 70 7 and 90 7 of its cereals 
and cotton, respectively. (59) 
Others. 
Various other tributary schemes have also been developed, such as 
the R. Fen reservoir, which irrigates 66,700 ha in Shanxi, but the 
more interesting recent development is along the lower reaches, 
where the People's Victory Canal now irrigates 40,000 ha and where 
other, similar, schemes and the use of such methods as syphoning 
(Chapter 4) are now claimed to irrigate a total of 106  ha (including 




claimed that the total irrigated area has increased from 8000 kin 2 
just after the Civil War, to 44,700 km  in 1979.(60) 
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10) Historical Ecology of the River Huang Basin. 
The Cradle of Chinese Culture. 
The R. Huangl is known as the Cradle of Chinese Culture because it 
was within the confines of its drainage area that the earliest 
records of Neolithic settlement have been found. Yet, it was not on 
the vast and troubled alluvial plains that Chinese culture began, but 
on the loess plateau above the various tributaries of the R. Huang's 
middle reaches and along the R. Wei, on the Guanzhong Plain. So the 
birth of China owes relatively little to the R. Huang, as it was only 
much later that people began farming alongside the lowerreaches, 
and the earliest agricultural system was characterised by its 
freedom from the influence of the flood Plain. (61) 
Early Environment. 
Although the environment of the prehistoric loess highland was 
generally harsh, there were also many favourable characteristics. 
Loess is unusually homogenous and the grass cover then was not as 
dense as in other steppe regions. Wooden digging implements could 
be more easily used here than on the alluvial wedge where patches of 
pebbles, gravels and conglomerates were to be found. Furthermore, 
being little weathered, this soil retained much of its fertility 
despite the lack of moisture. The natural vegetation was of steppe-
type grasslands with forests limited to the hilltops. 
History of Man. 
The earliest records of Human activity are the fossils unearthed at 
Lantian County in Shaanxi which date back some 500,000 to 600,000 
years. Little is known, though, of any culture before the Yang-Shao 
of some 5000 to 6000 years ago, which exhibited weaving, livestock 
breeding, pottery and the use of cellars to store grain. Historic 
times in China begin with the Shang dynasty (16th to 11th Century BC) 
during which, settlement of the alluvial plains began. 
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When China was unified for the first time by Emperor Qin Shi in 
221 BC it was on the Guanzhong Plain that he established his Capital, 
near the site of present day Xi'an, called Xianyang. Over the next 
thousand or so years, to the end of the Tang, this has been the 
approximate sit of the Capital of China for eleven dynasties. (62) 
iv) Ancient Crops. 
The main crop in ancient times was millet, which was indigenous to 
China and has been cultivated since the fifth millenium BC. Sorghum 
was also indigenous but, apparently, the varieties which occurred 
naturally were not suitable for cultivation, since only after the 
Mongol conquest did sorghum begin to be grown extensively in China. 
Of all the cereal plants, these two are the best suited to arid 
conditions. Wheat and barley were latecomers to Chinese agriculture; 
wheat arrived first, in about 1300 BC and barley somewhat later. 
These two plants are not naturally suited to semi-arid conditions, 
coming as they do from areas of winter rains in Southwest Asia, and 
they, therefore, proved hard to grow. Nevertheless, they were still 
grown, even without irrigation, which was not introduced until about 
600 BC. Soybean, whilst indigenous in the lolands, was not used by 
ancient societies on the loess plateau. It was probably first 
domesticated in about the eleventh Century BC, towards the end of 
the Shang dynasty. It may be noted that soybean requires three 
times as much water as millet (S,Italjca) to produce the same amount 
of solid material, excluding the roots. 
Surprisingly, rice dates back to at least 3000 BC in Shaanxi. In 
ancient times it was not irrigated and the seeds were broadcast, not 
sown. Transplanting did not begin until the second Century AD. (63) 
v) Population. 
By 1850 AD China was the most productive agricultural area in the 
world, but its population was also rising rapidly. For many years 
it had remained fairly constant, being 60 x l061(. in 2 AD and 
52 x 106 /& in 742 AD, but by 1661 AD it had reached 108 x 10 
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and had begun to rise more rapidly, so that by 1743 AD it was 
150 x io 6 A . Although these figures are not directly comparable, 
owing to marked changes in the political size of China from dynasty 
to dynasty, the trend is nevertheless clear; for by 1851 AD, in the 
same dynastic period (Qing dynasty) as the figure of 150 x 
for 1743 AD, there were nearly two and a half times as many people, 
423 x 10 ,( . In 1953 AD the population was 602 x io6J.. 	in 
, 1975 AD it was 800 x 10 6 A , and the present day population is 
estimated at over 1000 x 1o6 4 
Since the Civil War, China's population policy has had three main 
stages. In the first stage, from 1949 to 1957, population control 
was advocated on the grounds that the birthrate was increasing and 
the death rate declining, and the increase in population was more 
rapid than the development of the national economy, which could lead 
to unemployment. From the late fifties the policy was reversed, on 
the grounds that a higher population is equivalent to a larger 
workforce, and therefore would stimulate production, and the 
accumulation of investment capital. The third stage, since the mid-
seventies, consists of a return to the advocacy of population 
control. (65) Some strict measures have been adopted, but the rapid 
growth of the last thirty years has led to renewed pressure being 
placed on the productivity of the land, especially on the North China 
Plain, where cultivation of the floodplains of the R. Huang to the 
detriment of flood prevention had any-way long been carried out, (66) In 
earlier times the construction of inner dykes to protect these crops 
against lesser floods, would contribute to the neglect of the outer 
dykes, such that no proper defence was left against the rarer large 
floods. Even now, this practice, though discouraged, cannot success-
fully be stopped (Chapter 5), The pressures of population also 
contributed to the denudation of the :loess plateau, as shown below. 
vi) Denudation of the Loess Plateau. 
The destruction of the plant cover of the less plateau is a 
relatively recent event. According to Wang Huandou, 1978, historical 
records state that in the Qin dynasty (221 BC to 207 BC), General 
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Meng Tian commanded 300,000 troops garrisoned in what is now one of 
the most severely eroded regions of N. Shaanxi and S. Inner Mongolia, 
centred around Yulin County, and that they got their provisions 
locally. (67)  This is taken as evidence of the abundance of the 
region at that time s Records from the Western Han dynasty (206 BC 
to 24 AD), for the same region, state that there, 'livestock is the 
most abundant on earth'. It is also the site of one of the six most 
famous horse-rearing centres of the time, Tianfengyuan, situated in 
present-day Shenmu County, Shaanxi. 
In 413 AD the Huns built the city of Tongwan at what is now Jingbian 
County in N. Shaanxi, and are reported to have chosen it for its 
rich vegetation, clear streams and natural beauty. In August, 1977 9  
a warehouse built at that time was found to contain Pine, Cypress, 
Thuja órienta].is and Cedar, presumably grown locally. The existence 
of primordial sand beneath the ruins of Tongwan is taken as evidence 
that sand was there before the town was built, but that originally 
it was protected by rich vegetation, whereas the removal of -this 
cover led to the impoverishment seen today. Even in the Tang dynasty 
(618 AD to 907 AD) it was an agricultural region, but by 994 AD, in 
the Song dynasty, Tongwan was annulled, and was already 'deeply in 
the desert'. 
Many lakes w1-iich were formerly to be found in N. Shaanxi have since 
dried up, mainly since the Tang dynasty. Similarly, before that time, 
the R. Wuding, one of the major sources of the coarse silts of the 
R. Huang today, is reported to have been a clear stream. Furthermore, 
historical records show the elimination of several species of animal 
from the region, such as Tiger, Bear and Monkey. 
The ability of the local climate to support forestry was demonstrated 
at the turn of the century by the survival of temple forests dotted 
all over the region, and was given as evidence that the loss of 
vegetation was due to factors other than some general meteorological 
change. This would be borne out by recent experience, where forests 
and grasslands, once re-established, have again become self-sustaining, 
though in the early stages problems are posed by the lack of water. 
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Such climatic changes as have taken place, are seen as one of the 
consequences of denudation, rather than one of the causes. (68) 
Food production is the main reason, but not the only one, why man 
has cleared the vegetation. Forests have been burned annually in 
all parts of China to scare away wild animals, wood has been cut 
for building materials, especially for reconstruction after 
rebellions, and crop litter or shrubs on the gully slopes, which 
might otherwise have slowed erosion, have carefully been collected 
for fuel. 
In addition to the practice of shifting cultivation, the ancient 
custom of dividing lands amongst successive heirs also contributed 
to the neglect of large areas of land. The point would be reached 
where an individual's share was too small to be delineated on the 
ground, and the heirs would then become joint owners; but, their 
individual interest would not be sufficient to cover conservation. 
Since these problems do not end with local impoverishment, but 
extend to the far-away alluvial plains as well, the need for 
community rather than private concern is well illustrated here. 
As Lowdermilk put it as long ago as 1930, 
"The free play of individual interest is a cheriskA 
privilege of many peoples; but China has demonstrated that 
the unwise exercise of that privilege decreases the aggregate 
productivity of a land, as the needs are auumented by an 
increasing population". (69) 
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Chapter Two 
he Evolution of River Huang Development Concepts. 
1) Historical Flood Control Tactics. 
The first stories of attempts to control the R. Huang are inter-
mingled even with the creation myth; Da Yu made land and river out 
of the great confusion. The story goes that after the first 
legendary flood, in 2297 BC, the mythological emperor Yao sent one 
Comrade Gun to control the waters. He built "walls" nine ren high 
around settlements, as flood protection, but failed in nine years to 
accomplish his task. He was executed, yet was held in great esteem, 
and his son, Da Yu was ordered to succeed him. Da Yu spent four 
years surveying, and then set about controlling the whole of the 
lower reaches. He "directed" the flow as far as Julu County, Hebei, 
then led it into nine other contemporary rivers on the North China 
Plain before rejoining to enter the Bo sea. Thus his principal 
method was by dividing the stream, but this, supposedly, was supp-
lemented by dykes. It is said that thereafter there was no change 
in the course until 602 BC, though there was often serious flooding. (1) 
By the Qin (221 BC to 207 BC) and Han (206 BC to 220 AD) dynasties, 
protection from the floods of the river Huang had already begun to 
move to the river itself. There is some uncertainty as to the exact 
date for the first flood protection levees along the lower R. Huang, 
but the consensus of opinion indicates that they began to be used 
A I/.7 	ni' - 	 . did widely t1iir4rc tht warring States 	 .o anu  
not become unified until China itself was unified under the first 
Qin emperor. 
Towards the end of the Western Han dynasty (about the time of Christ) 
there existed three main schools of thought, which debate shows that 
the causes of R. Huang disasters were being sought in an attempt to 
find the correct policy. 
The first school of thought, represented by Feng Qin, considered that 
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before the river Tunshi, a branch of the lower R. Huang, became 
blocked with R. Huang deposits, it had served to take excess waters 
to the sea and had prevented R. Huang disasters. Thus, he 
advocated dredging the river Tunshi to restore its flood discharge 
capacity. (2) 
The second school of thought is represented by Jia Rang, who, in 
8 BC, put forward three alternative proposals. (3) The first proposal 
was to remove the people who inhabited the wide floodplains within 
the main dykes which, in those days, were about 25 km apart. These 
people had constructed smaller inner dykes to protect their new land 
and Jia Rang considered that this unnatural constriction was the 
cause of so many dyke breaches. He wanted, therefore, to return 
this land to the river. Should this be unattainable, his second 
alternative was to divide the lower R. Huang into a number of smaller 
streams. Although this might not be so effective a flood-prevention 
measure as his first proposal, it had the advantage of making 
R. Huang water and silt available for irrigation and warping over a 
wide area. The third alternative, which he considered a waste of 
effort and money, was to continue to repair the dykes and to 
increase their height and width when necessary. This was the method 
adopted by the powers that were. In 11 AD the lower R. Huang changed 
its course again. 
The third main school of thought may be represented by Zhang Rong. 
He considered that there was too much silt in the lower R. Huang, 
but that a deep channel could be cut and the silt washed out to sea, 
were it not for irrigation upstream taking all the water. He 
therefore proposed putting an end to upstream water use. 
In 69 AD, Wang Jing and Wang Wu organised several hundred thousand 
people to control the river and repair an irrigation canal. (4)  One 
record says that over 500 km of dykes were constructed, and that 
sluice gates were placed "at a distance of 5 km". The next major 
change of river course was in 955 AD and Wang Jing became famous as 
the man responsible for over 800 years of hydraulic peace along the 
lower R. Huang. In recent years this story has been brought into 
question. (5) Firstly, although there was no change of course, there 
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were many, instances of dyke breaches and inundations which became 
more frequent in later years; secondly, "sluice gates at a distance 
of 5 kin" and "Wang Jing's river control method", which had been 
taken to indicate some elaborate means of directing floodwaters on 
to the floodplains and back again, have also been interpreted more 
simply as the use of two intakes to the Bian Irrigation Canal (no 
longer in existence), separated by 5 km in order to overcome the 
problems of drawing water from an ever-shifting channel such as the 
lower R. Huang. Some Comrades go so far as to suggest that Wang 
Jing was really mainly concerned with this irrigation scheme and 
that only the Southern bank of the R Huang was properly protected 
by levees; Thirdly, many additional factors have been proposed to 
explain the relative stability of the R. Huang at that time, namely 
that the river had taken the shortest possible route to the sea, 
and had a steeper slope than before, that dyke repair work was done 
better than previously, that there were fewer storms or droughts in 
the middle reaches during that period and that agriculture was 
secondary to animal husbandry on the loss plateau. This last factor 
has been vigorously advocated by proponents of a return to husbandry 
in the recent debate on development policy for the loess plateau. 
(Chapter 5). 
Whilst Wang Jing undoubtedly made acontribution by putting R. Huang 
water and silt resources to good use on the North China Plain, it is 
unclear what sort of contribution he made to river control. 
Furthermore, his efforts, like those before him, were confined to 
the lower reaches. 
In the Ming dynasty (1368 to 1644) one Pan Jixun devoted -most of his 
life (1521 to 1595) to the regulation of the R. Huang. (6) His 
principle was radically different from those before, in that he 
would build narrow inner dykes to confine the flow, scour the bed 
and thus increase the flood discharge capacity. In case of accidents, 
which he thought could not be avoided, owing to the increased erosive 
power of the confined stream and the frailty of earthen dykes, he 
called for a set of outer dykes to contain floodwaters. Between the 
two sets of dykes, transverse dykes were to be built to hinder the 
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flow and cause deposition, thus stabilising the area which we 
would now regard as the floodplains. In case an extraordinarily 
large flood should occur, he proposed stone spillways at intervals 
along the outer dykes, to lead the waters into specially designated 
areas. 
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2) Early 20th Century Proposals for the River Huang Basin. 
The proposals of the first half of the twentieth Century fall mainly 
into three categories. (7) Firstly, there were those who continued to 
concentrate mainly upon flood control by engineering works along the 
lower reaches to conduct the silt to the sea. John Freeman, former 
president of the American Society of Civil Engineers, suggested, in 
1922, that the lower reach be confined into a straighter and narrower 
channel, about 0.55 km wide, maintained by spur dykes 0.8 km apart, 
within the old dykes. 
(8) 
 In this he was supported by the German 
engineer, Otto Franzius, who further advocated that the land between 
the two sets of dykes be built up and consolidated by warping. In 
1923, Freeman requested another German engineer, Dr. Hubert Engels, 
to carry out hydraulic model tests on the arrangements of the 
proposed spur dykes, after which Engels put forward his own, 
differing view, namely that better main channel stability and 
deeper scouring could be brought about by maintaining wide flood-
plains and distant dykes. Following further tests requested by the 
Chinese government in 1932 and 1934, respectively, Engels made the 
following proposals: 
That the original dykes be raised to guard against 
extraordinary floods. 
That the mean water channel be stabilised by proper 
engineering works. 
That spur dykes be built at designated positions. 
That measures be taken to prevent erosion of the flood-
plains. (9) 
The second category of proposal, was for those which emphasised 
control of the middle and upper reaches. Again there were two 
schools of thought, the first of which can be represented by Wan Jin, 
who advocated forestry as the solution to the problem of the lower 
R. Huang. He held that forestry would improve soil structure and 
increase the plant cover index, both of which would retain soil and 
water upstream and thus eliminate disasters further down. Amongst 
the proposals emphasising first controlling the loess plateau there 
is even a spurious reference to a suggestion to cover the whole of 
the loess area in concrete, although it is anonymous. (10) 
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The second school of thought can be represented by Cheng Fulong, 
who was opposed to forestry, but advocated instead, the building of 
precipitation dams on the loess plateau, and collectivisation of the 
land to end the practice of shifting cultivation. He claimed - that 
his proposals were unique in that they used nature instead of 
opposing it. Furthermore, he claimed that his measures were simple, 
cheap and effective. 
The third category of proposal was for comprehensive development of 
the whole of the R. Huang Basin. The first exponent of a whole-basin 
approach was former Chairman of the R. Huang Commission, Li Yjzhi 
(otherwise known as Li Xie), who, like his colleagues Shen Yi and 
Zhang Hanying, studied engineering in the West and went on to a 
distinguished career in China. (11) Li thought that between five and 
ten years' investigation would be needed before a comprehensive plan 
could be formulated. Meanwhile the lower reaches were to be 
protected by maintenance work on the dykes. The investigation 
would include: 
More hydrological observation stations and impryved 
equipment therein. 
A survey of the 'whole drainage basin. 
An investigation of soil and silts throughout the basin. 
The establishment of a large-scale hydraulic laboratory 
at Ji'nan and full scale tests on a suitable portion of 
the river near Ji'nan or Kaifeng. 
Erosion control experiments at selected sites in Shanxi 
and Shaanxi. 
Li regarded flood control to be most important, but advocated the 
development of navigation, irrigation and water power where compatible. 
His proposals of 1934 emphasised silt precipitation dams in gullies, 
and large flood detention reservoirs in the various tributaries of 
the middle reaches. He did not make an appraisal of biological 
control measures. As for damming the mainstream,, at Sanmenxia or 
elsewhere, ':he reserved judgement until further data were at hand. 
His proposals for engineering works downstream were to provide, in 
accordance with Engels' findings, a stabilized channel (of the same 
design capacity as the combined outlets of the various proposed 
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detention reservoirs) and broad floodplains. Li died in 1938, before 
any of these plans could be enacted. 
From 1934 to 1944, the Oriental Research Institute of Japan made 
comprehensive studies of R. Huang basin development, but these 
differed from Chinese efforts in that their point of emphasis was 
lain upon hydroelectric power and navigation rather than flood 
control. (12) Two alternative plans were drawn up for a series of 
hydroelectric power stations in the middle reaches, one of which 
included an 86 m high dam at Sarimenxia, in Hetnan,  some 113 km 
downstream of Tongguan, which would have a capacity of about 
40,000 x 
10  
m3 , generate a maximum of 1.123 x 
10  
kW, and reduce 
the design flood of 30,000 m 3 s 	by a third. Navigation was 
planned on a larger scale than other contemporary proposals; the 
river was to be made navigable for small steamboats between Mengjin 
and Ji'nan. The Grand Canal was to be improved, the stretch of the 
R. Huang from the Grand Canal (at Lake Dongping) to Mengjin was to 
be canalised, a canal was to be constructed connecting the R. Huang 
to the R. Xiaoqing and th.en to a new sea harbour in Laizhou Bay, and 
a new canal was to join the R. Wei ( 	) in He'nan to the R. Huang, 
making the whole stretch from Huayuankou to Tianjin navigable. A 
total of 25,050 km2 was to be irrigated. Flood control depended, 
after the effects of the Sanmenxia retention reservoir, upon channel 
storage, a detention area between the two Northern sets of dykes 
from Gaocun to Taochengpu, •and, below Ji'nan, the diversion of some 
5000 m3 
l 
 into the R. Tuhai. Dyke maintenance was proposed for 
the whole of the lower reaches. 
In May 1946, the R. Huang Water Conservancy Commission (RHWCC) 
completed its "Project for Regulation of the Lower. River Huang. " (13) 
Although the R. Huang had changed course in 1938, planning work 
proceeded on the assumption that it would be returned to its old 
course, as was indeed done in 1947. The Commission's plan was based, 
it was claimed, upon the work of Li and Engels. Whilst soil 
conservation and afforestation were to be encouraged, both for local 
benefits and their action in reducing the silt load of the lower 
R. Huang, it was thought that a very long period would be needed 
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before any signficant improvement would be seen. (14)  Furthermore, 
flood detention reservoirs such as those proposed by Li, received 
only qualified approval, since it was held that deposition usually 
occurs as the flood peak falls and that such dams would increase 
the silt concentrations in that, latter, part of the flood, with the 
net result of increasing downstream deposition. Thus, the plan of 
1946 emphasised broad floodplains as suggested by Engels, and the 
regulation of the lower R. Huang such that floodpeaks and silt could 
be reduced by channel storage and safely conducted to the sea. The 
lower R. Huang would then be seen to be in equilibrium. Extraordinary 
floods would be reduced by a spillway and flood detention basin 
beside the South bank of the R. Huang at Huayuankou, constructed from 
part of the area flooded when the dyke was blasted there in 1938. 
In addition to the specific proposals outlined above, the RHWCC 
expressed its opinion on other, more general proposals. Silt 
precipitation water storage dams were thought worthwhile, especially 
in the larger tributaries where they were expected to have very long 
lives, but particular attention was drawn to the criticism levelled 
by the National Conservancy Board's American adviser, a Mr. Barrett, 
of the Japanese plan for a storage dam at Saninenxia or anywhere in 
the various gorges below Shanzhou, which might, he warned, impede 
navigation, waste a lot of money and cause the loss of a damsite, 
unless proper expeJnents and design work were done first. 
Nevertheless, a design for a detention reservoir at Shanzhou was 
discussed as a possible alternative to the proposed detention basin 
at Huayuankou. Irrigation and warping were advocated strongly, in 
general terms, and the Japanese proposals for the development of 
navigation were supported. However, power generation was confined 
to the middle and upper reaches of both the mainstream and tributaries. 
No site below the Hekou Falls (near Longmen) on the mainstream was 
discussed with regard to hydroelectric power generation. 
The opinion of several other American Engineers was sought. (15)  They 
were given the title of River Huang Consulting Board, were furnished 
with the data so far available to the RHC and made a one-month 
inspection tour to various parts of the R. Huang basin in December 
69 
1946. The ensuing report, submitted by Messrs. Reybold, Growden 
and Savage presented a definite plan for flood control, some very 
general remarks on irrigation, hydropower and navigation, and more 
specific comments upon the Japanese plan, and soil and water 
conservation. With regard to flood control, the Americans suggested 
a reservoir above Mengjin, and a stable channel to conduct silt and 
water to the sea. 
They strongly criticised the Japanese plan for a reservoir at 
Sanmenxia because a large area of arable land would be flooded and, 
not being a gorge-type reservoir, it would be difficult to desilt 
and would have, therefore, a short life. As an alternative, they 
proposed a 170 m high dam with large capacity outlets at the bottom, 
about 110 km downstream from Sanmenxia, at Balihutong, which would 
create a gorge-type reservoir extending to Tongguan. Such a dam 
would have ample capacity to control the maximum flood, would 
control the storing and release of silt and could generate a large 
amount of power. Since it would be desilted each year, it would 
have an indefinite lifesPan. (16) Similarly, the lower - reaches would 
remain stable until the coastline had extended so far as to render 
the riverbed slope inadequate to prevent siltation. This would be 
"a very long time." In acknowledgement that the choice of damsite 
had been based on but a brief aerial inspection, (a fact over which 
propagandists had a field-day in later years), it was suggested that 
the performance of both the proposed dam and the lower river channel, 
which was to be that already designed by the R. Huang Commission, 
should be subjected to model testing at the Experimental Laboratory 
of the Mississippi River Commission, in the USA. In the meantime ; 
the dykes were to be raised and the channel stabilised. Geological 
surveys were to be carried out and it was recommended that several 
types of dam be designed for each of the three most promising 
damsites, and comparative studies made. Soil and water conservation 
should, suggested the Americans, be carried out with the utmost vigour, 
though despite the "moderate" success of several small-scale 
experiments, their impression was that hundreds of years would be 
required to treat the area completely, and that, whilst all such work 
is beneficial, it could not be relied upon as 'a solution to the 
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R. Huang silt problem. (17) 
 On the other hand they were of the opinion 
that complete control of the silt could be acheived by the 
construction of high dams, with large capacity bed sluices on the 
R. Huang mainstream and tributaries, in conjunction with a deep 
channel across the alluvial delta. Furthermore, once controlled 
the silt could be used for warping inland and land reclamation along 
the coastline. 
Another American to partake of the one-month inspection tour, was 
Mr. John S. Cotton, Adviser to the Public Works Commission and 
Chief Engineer of the Chinese National Hydroelectric Engineering 
Bureau. He was asked to draw up a report on the investigation and 
planning work for the development of the R. Huang basin, and, when 
completed, he attached his own comments on the R. Huang roblem. (18) 
He placed flood control above all else, then came irrigation and 
reclamation, then power, and lastly navigation. Flood control by 
some means or other should be achieved at once, but, whereas, control 
by detention or retardation reservoirs would be desirable, Cotton 
had grave doubts as to their performance, especially on the equilibrium 
of the river channel downstream, owing to the unusually high silt 
concentrations involved. He believed that the only permanent 
solution to the R. Huang problem lay in soil and water conservation, 
and he emphasised this by calling for an immediate start to such 
work on a large scale. 
To discharge the silt and water into the sea would be a waste of 
natural resources, he thought, and whilst a duplication of effort 
should also be avoided, a scheme to ensure flood protection by a 
combination of the existing dykes and some new reservoirs or silt-
traps was not to be ruled out. He differed with his colleagues over 
the difficulty of soil and water conservation work, in that he 
thought that complete control was attainable by changing farming 
practices and relying on nature to heal its wounds. However, he 
visuali.'ed that over 50 years would be required. Specifically his 
plan had two stages. 
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The first stage comprised large scale soil and water conservation 
work on the loess plateau, combined with widespread warping of 
alkaline lands on the North China Plain, whilst relying on dyke. 
maintenance for flood control. This would take over 50 years, which 
time would be used for investigation and planning. As an aid to 
flood control, large scale silt-trapping dams would be provided near 
the mouths of the various R. Wei tributaries, and at Longmen and one 
other place along the mainstream. In the upper reaches large 
reservoirs would be built for power generation and to regulate the 
river discharge for flood control. In the second stage, the siLt-
trapping reservoirs would cease their role in flood prevention, being 
full, but would provide large areas of fertile land and runoff power 
generation, whilst soil and water conservation work would have taken 
care of the silt problem. Thereafter - and Cotton emphasises that 
it is "absolutely essential" that it be done last 
(19)- 
 a regulating 
reservoir could be built at Sarnnenxia, for flood control and 
irrigation. 
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3) Policy in the Immediate Post-War Period. 
During the Civil War no large-scale programme could be drawn up, 
but local efforts were made in the liberated areas. The R. Huang 
dykes were repaired for the return of the mainstream to its original 
course in 1947, during each flood season they were manned in order 
to prevent breaches, and in 1949 they held firm during a flood 
crest which exceeded 10,000 m 3 s for 90 hours (maximum 16,300 m 3 s- 1 
at Shanzhou) despite the 430 leaks which had to be repaired. (20) 
However, in the rest of China there was widespread flooding and 
thus, the need for repairs to the existing dykes, both of other 
rivers and the R. Huang, and the absence, of sufficient hydrological 
data, compelled the first year of the new order, to be spent on 
flood protection in general and dyke repairs in particular. 
Nevertheless, outline plans for the R. Huang were drawn up, and the 
policy was first to prevent floods by defensive measures along the 
lower reaches whilst carrying out surveying and research work, and 
then to formulate a comprehensive solution to the joint problems of 
flood control and the development of the R. Huang's natural 
resources. (21) 
The basic needs of flood control were met in two ways. Firstly, 
engineering works; The area between the old Northern dykes and the 
present main dykes along parts of the reach from Gaocun to Taochengpu 
was designated a flood diversion area known as the Beijin flood 
diversion area, and a 1500 m spillway capable of diverting 5400 ill 3 S 
was constructed for it at Shitouzhuang in the Summer of 1951. In the 
Autuutn of the same year a 200 m spiliway. was constructed along the 
Southern bank at Lijin, just above the estuary region, to allow 
1000 m3 s to be diverted in case of flood during the Spring thaw. 
The Dongping Lake also served as a natural detention basin and this 
3 -1, 
was extended to be capable of absorbing 3000 m s • Together with 
a policy of broad floodplains as suggested by Engels, channel storage 
and dyke reparations these measures were claimed, by 1952, to be 
able to protect against a flood peak of 23,000 in3 s- 
1 
 at Shanzhou. 
The second method was through mass organizations, to prepare 
emergency materials and to man the dykes during the passage of flood 
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crests. For example, in the Spring of 1954, 8000 peasants in He'nan 
and 58,000 in Shandong carried out preparatory work, and over 
250,000 m3 of stone, 700,000 wooden poles and "large quantities" of 
rope, sacks and wire were made ready beside the dykes there. (22) 
In much the same way that basic flood prevention work was begun 
immediately, so the first steps towards exploiting the river were 
also taken without waiting for the completion of the surveying and 
planning work. In March, 1951 work began on a 50 lan main canal which 
was to irrigate 15,000 ha as the first stage of the People's Victory 
Canal project. It began operation on 12th April 1952 and subsequently 
was extended to join the River Wei (Il ), in 1953, thus making 
R. Huang water and navigation available, via the R. Wei and the 
Grand Canal, to Tianjin, and, by 1955, to irrigate 37,000 ha. 
Renovation work on existing irrigation schemes was begun at once; in 
the Houtao Irrigation District of Inner Mongolia, for example, a 
new headgate was begun in May 1950 and completed in May 1952. The 
irrigated area was gradually increased from 96,000 ha to 133,000 ha 
as canals were restored. Local soil and water conservation efforts 
were made, but these were very small, pending planning by the results 
of the surveys. In Shaanxi and Gansu, by the end of 1954, for 
example, 1000 km  of farmland had been treated, 2300 km  had been 
afforested and over 9000 check dams had been built. (23) 
Surveying work was indeed on a large scale. In 1950, there were 33 
hydrological stations and 66 rainfall stations, and these increased 
in number by averages of 40 and 76, respectively, each year in the 
first decade. - (Chant- v L,  Meanwhile between 19 1 I QL1 	 LVUU 1 
in 30 teams reconnoitred 420,000 km2 of the basin, and 21,000 lan of 
river courses. A further 1000 ,(. geological surveying contingent 
carried out topographical surveys of 33,000 lan 2  including 5200 lan 2  
of precision levelling and triangulation-controlled surveys. Several 
dozen damsites underwent geological survey. 
(24) 
The general approach to more comprehensive basin development can be 
inferred from an article by Zhang Hanying, Vice-Minister of Water 
Conservancy, published in September 1952, in which he writes, 
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"During the last three years, the People's Government has been 
making surveys of the main river and its tributaries in order 
to draw up a comprehensive project for the regulation of the 
whole R. Huang water system. It is thought that the key to 
the problem lies in building dams and reservoirs on the 
middle reaches of the river 
In 1952, China asked the Government of the Soviet Union for a group 
of Soviet experts to help draw up an overall plan for the R. Huang. 
In April, Comrades Waguolinge and Geluogeluoweiqi paid a visit to 
Sanmenxia and recommended that detailed surveys be carried out there. 
In June 1953, a R. Huang research group was set up including 
representatives of the Ministries of Water Conservancy and Fuel 
Industry with over 100 technical personnel, to analyse data- and to 
work with the Soviet experts. 
(26) 
 In January 1954, a team of seven 
Soviet experts led by Comrade A.A. Koroliev arrived. They considered 
that enough data had been gathered and recommended that a whole basin 
plan be drawn up as soon as possible. The R. Huang research group 
was expanded to become the R. Huang Planning Commission and work on 
the report was begun. Meanwhile a team of Soviet and Chinese experts 
set off on a four month inspection of the R. Huang basin from the 
estuary to Liujiaxia, spending a whole day at Sanmenxia. At the 
end of the inspection tour, Sanmenxia was recommended as the site 
for the key reservoir, and alternative sites at Mangshan and 
Zhichuan were rejected as being poor geologically, expensive, and 
unable to be used comprehensively. In helping to draw up the whole 
basin plan (China'sfirst ever), the Soviet team answered over two 
hundred questions, corrected the first draft, and wrote the 
conclusions. In October, 1954, the "River Huang Technical and 
Economic Report" was completed and, based on this, after gaining the 
approval of the State Planning Commission, the State Council and the 
Party Central Committee, the Multiple Purpose Plan for Permanently 
Controlling the River Huang and Exploiting its Resources was 
officially adopted by the First National People's Congress at its 
Second Session, on 30 July, 1955. 
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4) The Multiple-Purpose Plan of 1955. 
This plan comprised two parts; a long term Comprehensive Plan to 
bring about complete control of the whole basin and the development 
of its resources, and a more specific First Phase Plan for those 
items requiring immediate attention. (27) 
The Comprehensive Plan, was in outline only. It gave the general 
principles which subsequent planning and works would follow, but the 
sites and number of engineering works were to be decided later. 
Furthermore, whereas a good precis of contemporary methods of soil 
and water conservation was given and much was made of their role 
within the plan, no detail was given on how they were to be applied, 
nor by whom, other than several calls for the support of all sections 
of society. Nevertheless, it was asserted that the overall plan was 
"sound on basic content and principle." (28) 
The stated aims were to control floods permanently, to check soil and 
water loss, eliminate drought, and to make full use of the river's 
water resources for irrigation, power generation and navigation, 
thus to promote the development of agriculture, industry and transport. 
The method was to be to control and use water and silt in the middle 
reaches rather than to shift them. This was to be done in two ways; 
firstly, a series of dams and reservoirs on the mainstream and 
tributaries, the purpose of which was stated to be, to, 
"Conserve soil and water, prevent flooding, regulate the 
volume of water, develop irrigation and navigation, and, 
what's more important to give us plenty of cheap 
power. "(29) 
Secondly, by soil and water conservation, principally in Gansu, 
Shaanxi and Shanxi. Reporting on this plan to the second session of 
the First People's Congress, Vice Premier Deng Zihui said, 
"It goes without saying that reservoirs and hydroelectric 
power stations cannot be built along the main river tributaries 
by depending upon handicraft technique, nor can soil and water 
conservation work be done on a large scale by depending upon 
the efforts of individual peasants. What is needed here is 
modern scientific technology, large state investments, the 
support of the masses, and all-round co-operation between 
government and people, workers and peasants." (30) 
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The Comprehensive Plan divided the river mainstream into five 
sections, to be dealt with according to their respective character-
istics. The section of many gorges, between Longyang Gorge and 
Qingtong Gorge, was to emphasise the production of hydroelectric 
power and irrigation., The gentle stretch between Qingtong Gorge and 
Hekouzhen would be provided with reservoirs to further irrigation and 
navigation. From Hekouzhen to Longmen, the many gorges would be 
used for runoff electrical generation, but only once regulation of 
the river discharge had been acheived by the completion of the 
large reservoirs further upstream. The gorges in the stretch from 
Shanzhou to Taohuayu were seen as the key to flood control, and 
another source of electrical power. In the gentle lower reach,. 
structures would be built to aid irrigation and navigation. 
Altogether a "staircase" of 19 reservoirs in the .upper reach, 25 in 
the middle reach and 2 in the 1pwerLreach was envisaged. (Figure 2-1). 
Subsequently more sites were added (Chapter 3 9 Section 4 9 vii). 
Beside the mainstream, the tributaries would also receive attention. 
Reservoirs would be built, mainly as silt-traps, but with a few 
(unspecified) having multiple functions. These silt-traps were seen 
as temporary measures to protect the mainstream dams and to reduce 
the silt of the lower reaches whilst awaiting the sufficient effects 
of soil and water conservation. Meanwhile, though, it was pointed 
out that the tributary reservoirs themselves would require that soil 
and water conservation work should make a rapid start if they were 
not to fill up too quickly. (32) 
Although no more than an out1ne, the Comprehensive Plan went as far 
as deciding the key to the whole project, which would be a 
36 0 000 x 10 6 3 m reservoir at Sanmenxia, and its attendant tributary 
projects imrnédjátely above and below. The dam at Sanmenxia would be 
90 m high and the water level behind it would be 350 m above a datum, 
approximately at sea level. The lake so formed would cover an area 
of 1500 km and extend beyond the Tongguan confluence along all three 
rivers but not confined to their former banks. Some 600,000 ,( would 
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FIGURE 21 DAMSITES IDENTIFIED IN THE 1955 PLAN SOURCES: Note 31 
The Comprehensive Plan would, in about 50 years, achieve its stated 
aims thus: The Sanrnenxia reservoir and reservoirs along the Yi, Luo 
and Qin tributaries could together reduce the maximum discharge 




 , which could safely be 
dealt with. Similarly, of the various reservoirs in the upper 
reaches, one at Liujiaxia could reduce the discharge of the gentle 
part of the upper reaches to 5000 m 3 	The Saninenxia reservoir 
would be protected by upstream tributary reservoirs, which would 
themselves be protected by soil and water conservation work in their 
respective catchments. All of these reservoirs would gradually silt 
up and the period envisaged for this to happen would be about fifty 
years. Nevertheless, by that time soil and water conservation work 
would be complete, as would the other mainstream reservoirs, the 
lower reaches would, carrying clean water, cut a stable channel, and 
the water and silt system of the entire basin would be under control. 
The Economic and Technical Report had estimated that the R. Huang's 
silt load would be reduced by 50 7 in 1967, and 75 7 within about 
fifty years. Deng Zihui confidently predicted, 
"As for difficulties that may arise in power generation, 
irrigation and navigation as a result of the silting up of 
the reservoir, they will be comparatively easy to deal with". (34) 
Meanwhile, the 46 mainstream dams could produce 23 x 1o 6 kW of 
electrical power, to be supplemented by smaller tributary hydropower 
stations; the multiple purpose projects in the gorge sections and 
the special reservoirs on the gentle sections would together increase 
the irrigated area to 77,000 kin 2 , which was estimated to be 65 7 of 
the basin's needs; navigation requirements would be met by making 
the whole stretch from the mouth to Lanzhou navigable by 500 t 
barges. There would also be a substantial increase in the outputs 
of agriculture, silviculture- and animal husbandry on the less 
plateau. A passing reference was made to the possibility later of 
supplementing the - water resources of the R. Huang basin by transfers 
from others, but no detail was included in the plan. 
The First Phase Plan, announced simultaneously with the Comprehensive 
Plan, comprised those proposals to be carried out within twelve years, 
before 1967. They included entrusting Chief Design Engineer Comrade 
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Koroliev, of the Leningrad Hydropower Design Annex of the Soviet 
Ministry of Power Stations, with the design of the Sanmeaxia 
reservoir and power station. The proposed water head of 70 m would 
have an installed generation capacity of 1 GW, the water level in 
the first period would be 335.5 m and 215,000,&. would have to be 
resettled. The low water season flow could be supplemented to 
500 m3 s for irrigation and navigation. Work would begin in 
1957 and be completed in 1961. Another multipurpose project at 
Liujiaxia, above Lanzhou, would be constructed which would have a 
107 m head, an installed capacity of 1 GW, and would be capable of 
3-]. 
increasing low season flow to 465 m s . 27,000,. would have to 
be moved. For flood control below Sarzrnenxia, one or more reservoirs 
on each of the Rivers Yi, Luo and Qin would be completed before 1964. 
The river was to be made navigable in two sections, 703 km from the 
mouth to Taohuayu, and 843 km from Qingshuihe to Yinchuan, For 
irrigation, reservoirs would be built at Qingtongxia Sanshenggong and 
Taohuayu. In all 20,000 
km  of land would be newly irrigated in 
various parts of the basin and 8000 km  would benefit from the 
improvement of existing works. As for tributary dams, it was proposed, 
"...to build first of all five reservoirs at suitable sites 
along the Rivers Jing, Hulu, Beiluo, Wuding and Yan, and 
another five smaller reservoirs on suitable smaller - 
tributaries." (35) 
It was also proposed to build two multiple purpose tributary projects, 
on the rivers Fen and Ba, respectively. Soil and water conservation 
work to be completed in the First Phase Plan included, 
1) Improved cultivation methods on 85,000 km 2 of orchards, 
and the enclosure and withdrawal of farming from 7300 km 2 
of steep slopes; 
New terraces on 18,700 km 2 o slopes, ditch terrace 
9300 km2 , build banks around 9800 km2 of fields, bank along 
contours on 11,300 km 2 and dig dust-pan storage ponds on 
240 km2 of slopes; 
Afforest 14,000 km2 , have 470 km2 of nurseries, and 
enclose 24,400 kn?for natural afforestation; 
Dig 37,000 small water sumps, build storage ponds 
totalling 20 x 106 m3 , 16,000 small dams across ditches by 
roads, 215,000 gully head protection works, 638,000 check 
dams, 79,000 silt-precipitation dams, irrigate 3173 km 2 by 
small projects, warp 667 km2 , build 300 earthen gully dams and 
repair 4300 km of roads. I, (36) 
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Adding up the various areas given accounts, almost exactly, for 
every square kilometre of the loess plateau 
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5) Preliminary Design of the SanmenxiaProject. 
The R. Huang Technical and Economic Report formed, and, it is 
claimed still forms, the conceptual basis for the development of 
the R. Huang basin. (37) The Soviet team returned in February 1955, 
to examine geological data pertaining to Sarimenxia, in order to 
draw up the preliminary design. They also suggested the next stage 
of surveying work and gained an understanding of damsites on 
tributaries having a large influence of the R. Huang; the Rivers 
Jing, Beiluo, Wei, Yi, Luo and Qin. In the Summer of 1956 they came 
a third time and proposed the main points of the preliminary design, 
gained an understanding of the position and geology of the worksite, 
the present circumstances and future prospects of Zhengzhou, Luoyang 
and Wan with respect to electricity supply, and surveyed typical 
measures for soil and water conservation on the loess plateau. It 
was on their fourth visit, beginning in February 1957, that the 
preliminary design was formally proposed, although the plans had been 
handed over the previous December, and the Leningrad Hydroelectric 
Design Annex of the Soviet Ministry of Power Stations undertook tb 
design the Sanmenxia project, with Koroli'ev as Chief Engineer in 
charge, and a team of 1000 A. • (38) 
In the course of drawing up the Preliminary Design, some changes had 
been made to the specifications of the Sanxnenxia Project. Yet, it 
remained a storage reservoir, and other aspects of the planned 
"staircase" were not involved, so the changes, though significant, 
do not represent an alternative proposal. These changes had been 
debated and agreed by t1 Chinese State Council in April 1956. The 
twenty one Soviet experts who came in 1957, were asked to give 
details of their calculations under four headings: Water resources, 
Water Conservancy, Electrical Engineering and Civil Engineering. 
The Chinese experts were to discuss them in four groups and the 
Soviet experts were to answer questions at the concluding session of 
their meetings. (39) 
The Preliminary Design differed from that envisaged in the R. Huang 
Technical and Economic Report, in the points shown in Table 2-1. 
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TABLE 	CHANGES TO THE SPECIFICATIONS 





Normal High Water Level (m above datum) 350 360 
Total Reservoir Capacity (Mm 3 ) 36000 64700 
Area to be Flooded (km2 ) 1500 2300 
Number of Evacuees 584000 890000 
I'.ximum Water Discharge (in3 	1) 8000 6000 
Irrigated Area in the First Period (km 2 ) 13000 26000 
Installed Generation Capacity (NW) 1000 1100 
Annual Energy Output (GW h) 4600 6000 
Investment (9 x 106 	x 1o6J) 1220 (349.7 1600 (4577 
Sources: CHENG Xuemin, 1957. SHEN Chonggang, 1957. 
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Much debate ensued over the design details and was still going on 
when work officially began, on 13 April 1957. (40)  Indeed, evacuation 
had begun the year before, and heavy machinery from the Soviet 
Union, Eastern Europe and Japan, had, along with over. 600 engineers and 
technicians, been gathering at the site in preparation. Details of 
the Soviet design and the thinking behind it are given below, and 
those of alternative proposals in section 6. 
The requirements of the Sanmenxia Project, according to the 
R. Huang Technical and Economic Report, were: 
Regulate floods, lower the volume of water discharged to 
the lower reaches such that the dykes are never again 
breached. 
Satisfy the expanding needs of irrigation along the 
lower reaches. 
Satisfy the expanding IndcjStrial, Agricultural and 
Residential needs for electricity. 
Provide for navigation by regulating the water stage 
above and below the dam. 
Guarantee Industrial and Residential water supplies. (41) 
As the Soviet advisers saw it, a reservoir at Sanmenxia would 
control 684,000 km  of the R. Huang Basin, but below it 43,000 kin 2 
would still not be controlled and would require reservoirs on the 
Rivers Yi, Luo and Qin, to be designed by the RHWCC. The original 
specification allowing 8000 m3 s- 
1 
 to be discharged into the lower 
reaches was based on a flood peak of that size which had been safely 
conducted to the sea in 1949. For the Preliminary Design, though, 
this was believed to be too risky in the Shandong reach, and, so, 
was reduced to 6000 in3 4• To provide the storage necessary to 
reduce a 1000 year flood of 35,000 in3 s 1 , to 6000 m3 
s, 
 would 
require reservoir capacity of 7200 x 10 m3 . Furthermore, if large 
floods were simultaneously to occur on the Rivers Yi, Luo, Qin and 
Huang, this 6000 in3 S 
1 
 would, when combined with the waters from 
the other three tributaries, be excessive, and it would be desired 
to close the discharge gates at Sanmenxia for seven days. This 
3 would require another 2800 x 10 6  in of reservoir capacity. Thus 
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basic flood control would require a total retention capacity of 
10 9 000 x 10 6  m3 . 
The following new assumptions were made: 
As soil and water conservation progressed, so the silt 
load of the R. Huang would be reduced by 20 7. by 1967 and 
50 7. in 50 years' time. 
20 7. of the silt entering the reservoir would be discharged 
to the lower reaches. 
It was then calculated that 35,000 x 
10  
m3 of reservoir capacity 
would have to be provided to store silt over 50 years. Together, 
flood prevention and silt detention would require 45,000 x-10 in 3 , 
which corresponds to a normal water level of about 354 m above 
datum, (42) 
In addition, calculations on power generation gave the most efficient 
water level as between 364 m and 368 in, but this would require 
flooding an area in excess of 2700 km 
2 
 the evacuation of over a
1. 
million A. , and the possible encroachment of a raised water table 
at Wan. Therefore, it was agreed with the Chinese, to fix the 
normal high water level at 360 m, giving a total capacity of 
64 9 000 x 
10  
m3 (R. Huang above Tongguan, 21,000 x 106  m3 , R. Wei 
63 	 63 22 9 000 x 10 in , and reservoir area below Tongguan, 22,000 x 10 in 
flooding an area of 2300 km 2 and necessitating the evacuation of 
890 9 000 A. . With this additional reservoir capacity, it was claimed 
that comprehensive use of the reservoir could be guaranteed for 50 
years and flood control for 80 years. (43) 
In order to alleviate the problem of moving so many people, it was 
suggested that: 
The construction time be extended by one or two years. 
The generator sets be gradually installed according to 
the requirements of industry etc., 
The normal high water level start at 345 in and be raised 
according to the rate of deposition, the requirements of 
generation and irrigation, and the practicality of moving 
the evacuees. (It may be noticed that a similar provision, 
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to begin with a water level of 335.5 ra, had been 
included in the First Phase Plan). 
As for the design of the dam itself, the Soviet advisers proposed 
that the left hand side should comprise a 124 rn long sluicing 
section with 12 deep sluices 3.5 m x 6.0 m, at a height of 320 m 




under a water level of 350 m and 6000 rn 3 s- 
I 
 under 360 m. Reserve 
3 
discharge capacity of 2000 ms 
-1 
 wouldbe provided by two 11 m x 
13 m spillways near the top of the dam. Another 1500 m3 
s 	
could 
pass through the turbines. During construction, sixteen 3.5 m x 6.3 m 
bottom sluices would be provided at 280 m to allow the river to pass 
unhindered, but they would be sealed thereafter. (44) 
6) Alternative Proposals. 
After these proposals had been discussed in the meetings of February 
1957, some Chinese were not satisfied, principally about the 
enormous cost of the project and the large area of prime agricultural 
land to be lost. A number of opinions were discussed at a special 
meeting of over 50 Chinese specialists from government, universities 
and colleges, held by the.. Ministry of Water Conservancy. (45)  Amongst 
these opinions, one type can be said to differ in concept from the 
Soviet plan, since it proposed not to have a storage reservoir at 
All, but instead to build a smaller, flood attenuation reservoir, 
designed to avoid, as far as possible, a loss of capacity through 
deposition. The main proponents of this alternative type of scheme 
were Comrades Ye Yongyi and Wen Shanzhong. Comrade Ye's arguments 
were as follow :(46) 
-1 	. 3 To reduce a thousand-year flood (35,000 m 3  s ) to 6000 m s
- l
and 
to be able to close off the flow at Sanmenxia should a simultaneous 
flood occur in the lower tributaries would require a reservoir 
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capacity of 10,000 x 10 m . Assuming that bottom sluices be 
provided at 280 m, of sufficient capacity to discharge 6000 m 3 s 
under a water stage of 310 m, and noticing that at Tongguan, the 
water levelwhich corresponds to a discharge of 6000 m 3 s 	is 325 m, 
it should be expected that for a discharge of 6000 m 3  s
-1
the whole 
silt load of the river would enter the gorge section of the reservoir 
area below Tongguan and all but the coarsest grains, which would be 
deposited. in the reservoir backwater at the 310 m level, would be 
carried beyond the dam to the lower reaches. For flows above 
6000 m 3 s- 1 , the dam would interfere with the flow and cause the 
water level to rise. At the 320 m level, all the silt would still 
enter the gorge section, but since the water in the reservoir would 
be comparatively deep, deposition would occur in the backwaters just 
below Tongguan. For water stages in excess of 320 m, the backwaters 
would extend beyond Tongguan and 75 7, (an assumption based on the 
distribution of the grain size of R. Huang silt) of silt would be 
deposited there and 25 7 would be carried into the gorge section. 
As high flood peaks recede, a main channel would be scoured, but the 
capacity lost to the formation of floodplains would be irrecoverable. 
87 
Future flood peaks not exceeding 6000 m 3 s-. 1 (and therefore not 
covering the floodplains) would, if not at once, then successively, 
scour the main channel back to its original level, thus conserving 
the main channel reservoir capacity. The original reservoir capacity 
between the water levels 310 m and 320 m 	
6 3 
s 1800 x 10 m , and 
assuming that half of this would be lost in the formation of flood-
plains, only 900 x 106  m3 would be left as regulation capacity. 
Using 38 years' records, it was found that 6000 m 3 s was exceeded 
on only 86 days, and the main channel regulation capacity could 
have been exceeded only in the extra large floods of 1933, 1943 and 
1944. Calculations based on the above assumptions show that 
26 x 1o 6 t.yr would accumulate on the floodplains, on average. To 
be on the safe side, it was postulated, hypothetically, that one 
100 yr and one 1000 yr flood had also occuréd. Thus 110 x 
10  
t yr ' 
could be expected to accumulate during the flood season. To this 
must be added 220 x 106 t yr which would be deposited when the 
reservoir is being used in a water storage mode during the rest of 
the year. Together this is equivalent to 25 7 of the annual silt 
load. 
Accepting the Soviet predictions for the efficiency of soil and 
water conservation, and assuming a density of 1.2 t rn 3 , the above 
calculations predict that after 50 years 9400 x 10 6 3 m would be 
deposited. In order at that time still to be able to protect 
against a 1000 yr flood, an original capacity of 
(10,000 x 10  + 9400 x 10) 19,400 x 10  m3 would be required. This 
is equivalent to a water level of 342 m, (348 m for 10,000 yr flood). 
Therefore the dam should be built to a height of 350 m and the 
sluices placed at 280 m. 
Comrade Wen suggested several schemes similar to that of Comrade Ye. 
In one, for example, he would set the water level at about 336 m to 
337 m and make the corresponding original capacity of 11,000 x 10 m 3 
to 12,000 x 106  m3 last 20 years, by doing without water storage 
(and the consequent deposition) in the Winter. In an earlier 
scheme, he had suggested that all Winter deposits could in Spring be 
[:1] 
successfully flushed away . (47) 
These schemes satisfied the needs of flood control, whilst obviating 
the loss of so much arable land, and saving on construction and 
other costs. Comrade Ye calculated that his scheme would save 
40 x 106  (L 11,4 x 106)  on concrete alone, whilst Comrade Wen 
claimed more specifically that under his scheme 70,000 A. fewer 
would have to be evacuated, and 1700 km  of land and Y 750 x 
10  
(L 214 x 106)  would be saved in all. 
Yet, both schemes forsook many of the potential benefits of the 
proposed storage reservoir. Under Comrade Wen's scheme, between 
io,000 
km  
and 13,000 km  could be irrigated in Shandong, but North 
and East He'nan would have to rely more upon underground water 
sources. Under Comrade Ye's scheme, 27,500 km 2 could be irrigated 
between November and June whilst Summer irrigation would have to 
depend upon rainfall and wells. Navigation would not be provided 
in either scheme, other than on the irrigation canals. Power 
generation capacity would be restricted to between 150 MW and 300 MW 
by way of runoff generation at Sanmenxia, which would have to be 
subordinate to silt discharging, and, therefore, would also be 
intermittent during the Summer months. It was suggested that this 
could be supplemented by hydropower stations, such as at Balihutong, 
or by thermal power stations, the region being rich in coal. 
Critics of these schemes outnumbered their supporters considerably. 
Amongst them, the Soviets denied that deposits substantially could 
be flushed out and therefore insisted that a large storage reservoir 
was needed, or it would fill up in 16 years under normal conditions 
or one year if there be a large flood. (48) They also claimed that 
silty waters could not be used for irrigation, so there could be 
no Summer irrigation, and that the cost of thermal power stations 
would be excessive by comparison. Furthermore, the silt flushed 
out from the reservoir would cause the lower reaches to continue to 
rise, again harming flood prevention. 
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Comrades Ye and Wen answered by contesting the need for large scale 
benefits. As Comrade Wén put it, there were four alternatives for 
achieving the aims of comprehensive use: 
	
1) 	Co-ordinated projects at Heishanxia, Sanmenxia and 
Balihu tong. 
Co-ordinated projects at Heishanxia and Balihutong. 
One multipurpose project at Sanrnenxia, but gradually 
raising the water level. 
A project at Sarirnenxia, in which the level would be 
raised according to the deposition, followed by the 
construction of a hydropower station at Balihutong. (49) 
Comrade Wen said that as far as flood control and irrigation of 
15,000 km  was concerned, there was no difference amongst the four 
schemes, but that there we obvious differences when it came to 
evacuation and electricity generation. Owing to alkalisation 
problems, irrigation would not be able to expand to the predicted 
27,000 I= by 1967. The Soviet comrades: complaint that silty water 
cannot be drawn for irrigation would apply equally to their own 
scheme, he said, because beyond a few hundred metres below the dam, 
the clear waters will have picked up silt in concentrations of 
several tens of kilogrammes per cubic metre. Similarly there would 
be no need before 1967 for all the generating capacity proposed at 
Sanxnenxia, and thereafter hydropower stations would be built at 
Balihutong and Renjiadui, so really much of the capacity of Sarimenxia 
would have been built just to act as a standby. 
Comrade Ye pointed out that 75 7 of silt at present entering the 
lower reaches was safely carried to the sea. Even with silt 
discharging, only about 75 7. of the silt entering the reservoir could 
enter the lower reaches, therfore it should all be safely carried 
to the sea, or at least, deposition would be very slow. Irrigation 
canal intakes could use such methods as settling ponds, built on the 
floodplains, to derive clear water. Anyway, between July and October, 
only a few hundred cubic metresper second of water would be needed 
for irrigation, whereas natural flow was 2000 m 3 s- 
1 
 to 3000 m3 s'. 
To store all the silt in this quantity of water, just to get a few 
hundred cubic metres per second of clear water, would be unreasonable. 
Even though, because of the high silt content, the People's Victory 
Canal irrigation scheme can only use water for nine days during 
August, yields do not drop because in August over 60 m of rain falls. 
The canal system for the proposed 27,000 kin 2 of irrigation could not 
be prepared within those ten years, and even if it were, only those 
few hundred cubic metres per second would be taken from the R. Huang. 
Rather than fill up Sanmenxia to provide that much clear water, why 
not put the silt to use by warping outside the R. Huang dykes? The 
150 MW to 200 MW generating capacity at Sanmenxia which he (Comrade 
Ye) proposed, would, he said, be quite enough for the short term. 
Thereafter another 300 MW could be got in the periods of the third 
and fourth five year plans, by building a dam at Balihutong. After 
1972, it would be possible, depending on the effectiveness of soil 
and water conservation, either to increase the generation capacity 
at Sanrnenxia, or to build other new stations at sites such as 
Xiaolangdi. (50) 
Professor Huang Wanli of Qinghua University brought into question 
the postulate that a reduction in soil erosion on the loess plateau 
would give rise to a corresponding reduction in the silt content of 
the R. Huang. (51)  If clear water were to collect in the tributaries 
on the loess plateau, he suggested, then it would pick up silt from 
the various tributary and mainstream bed,, By the time the waters 
reached Sanmenxia, they would be as muddy as ever. Now everybody 
was opposed to allowing silt to accumulate in the lower reaches, so 
why let it do so in a reservoir? Professor Huang went on to deplore 
the attitude, "A dam solves 10,000 problems, no silt , a clear river," 
and feared that silt accumulating in the backwaters of the reservoir 
would eventually cause flooding upstream and that clear water 
discharged from Sanmeaxia might attack the floodplains or dykes as 
had happened previously below the Cuanting Reservoir (R. Yongding), 
hampering flood prevention work. In conclusion, Professor Huang 
advocated that the bottom sluices be left after construction so that 
silt could pass unhindered through the dam. From July to September, 
the whole reservoir capacity should be used uniquely for flood 
prevention. In the other months it should be used for irrigation. 
91 
All the above points, and more, were discussed repeatedly in the 
late fifties, Eventually it was decided to'-build the dam to the 
Soviet design, but modified to have an initial height of 350 m, to 
have an initial high water level of 340 in, and to lower the twelve 
deep sluices by 20 m, to a level of 300 in. It is said that the 
Soviet engineers so vehemently opposed these changes, that a 
compromise had to be found whereby the official blueprints would 
still show the original heights, despite the changes. (52) The 
Soviets were not going to be held responsible for what they saw as 
errors on the part of their Chinese counterparts. 
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Chapter Three 
Walking a Tortuous Route 	 1 •s* 
The Sanxnenxia reservoir project turned out to be so greatly in 
error that it had to undergo extensive reconstruction even before it 
was fully commissioned. The prevalent view is as follows: 
"Owing to insufficient knowledge of the natural laws of the 
R. Huang and the laws of China's socialist construction, 
over optimistic estimates, of the speed and efficiency of 
soil and water conservation, and in particular, insufficient 
appraisal of the objective situation in China, where the 
population is large and land is scarce, and where it is 
impermissible to exchange large areas of plain-land for 
greater reservoir capacity, the Sanmenxia project failed to 
attain the expected goals. " (1) 
Other writers refer to inadequate attention being paid to the 
sedimentation problem and to the goals for multipurpose development 
being set too high. Others still, like to emphasise the positive 
aspects, saying that they had taken a tortuous route for which 
Sanmnenxia had exacted 'study fees', but that a great deal had been 
learned in the process. (2) 
This chapter is intended to show the reasons for the failure of the 
project, and the process by which new experience was gained, and 
the present solutions, or attempts thereat, developed. 
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1) Estimates and Unknowns. 
The description in Chapter 2 of some of the opinions held in 1957 by 
engineers concerned with R. Huang control, contains several references 
to estimates, sometimes disputed, on the basis of which the various 
proposals were based. These estimates were, in many cases, based 
upon assumptions, and often alternative estimates were put forward, 
based upon different assumptions. The purpose of an assumption is to 
substitute for an unknown quantity, and it is illuminating to consider 
the limitations of the knowledge at the disposal of those faced with 
the task of deciding how best to bring the R. Huang under control., in 
the late fifties. This section, therefore, comprises a list of some 
of the unknown quantities and estimates used in deciding to adopt 
the modified Soviet design. Subsequent sections will show how 
accurate or otherwise the estimates were. 
i) Estimates concerning the future silt content of the River Huang. 
Several different estimates were put forward for the reduction likely 
to occur in the silt content of the R. Huang, consequent upon the 
development of soil and water conservation on the loess plateau. 
The RHWCC made estimates, based upon extrapolations from the data 
obtained from several soil and water conservation testing stations, 
that the silt content would fall by 40 7 by 1967 and by 78 7. after 
50 years. However, figures put forward by the Soviet experts from 
the Leningrad Hydropower Design Annex, that the silt content would 
fall by 20 7. by 1967 and 50 7. after 50 years, were adopted so as to 
provide a safety margin. It should be mentioned though, that apart 
from the assumptions on which the various estimates of the efficiency 
of soil and water conservation work were based, there is also the 
implied assumption that the silt picked up by the clear water from 
tributary beds would be of negligable amount in the long run. 
Soil and water conservation work should also give rise to a reduction 
in-surface runoff, and hence, river discharge. The Soviet National 
Hydrologic Institute claimed that no appreciable reduction would 
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occur, whereas the Soviet Geographical Research Institute estimated a 
reduction of 5000 x 10  m3 yr4 by 1967 and 10,000 x 10  m3 yr 
after 50 years. This question, in June 1957, was left open to await 
research, (4) 
Although the distribution of grain size in the silt of the R. Huang 
was studied carefully in order to estimate the amount and distribution 
of silts within the proposed reservoir area, no detailed ana lys i s 
had been done, by 1957, of the source of the various sized silt 
grains. It was assumed therefore, that for soil and water 
conservation to have any marked effect upon the R. Huang, it must be 
carried out all over the loess plateau, there being little distinction 
between the various regions other than the severity of erosion, 
ii) Estimates concerning deposition within the reservoir area. 
A very significant assumption made in adopting the Soviet design was 
that the Soviet engineers were correct in their assertion that, 
"As is confirmed by the experience of various nations 
worldwide in reservoir usage, it is impossible in 
practice to flush out silt already deposited in the 
reservoir area.. -.all that you get is a narrow channel 
accompanied near-the sluices by a funnel-shaped hole.,., 
the amount thus dischargeable is tiny compared to the 
amount deposited,,,,, so only suspended: matter can be 
discharged." (5) 
How much of that suspended load could be discharged was another much 
disputed estimate. It was assumed that a delta would form in Summer 
in the R. Huang mainstream above Tongguan, and a density current 
would occur in the R. Huang mainstream above and below Tongguan. 
This density current would be capable of reaching the dam and then 
rising to the deep sluices (20 m above the bed according to the 
modified design) and discharging 20 '1. of the total annual silt load. 
This assumes that a density current would be capable of turning 
sharply and passing through the sudden restriction of the Tongguan 
confluence. It was acknowledged that the density current might flow 
the other way, and cause deposition in the lower R. Wei, but the only 
comment on this was that it would be "complicated". Similarly, 
deposition in the R. Wei for other reasons, and deposition below 
Tongguan are recognised but. - not assessed. (6) 
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As for the volume occupied by the deposits, to 1957, silts from the 
floodplains of the R. Huang or from the Guanting reservoir on the 
R. Yongding had not been available to) the Soviet experts, and 
so the assumption was used that deposits of fine silts (<0.01 mm) 
would weigh 0.9 t m 3 , and coarse silts would weigh 1.2 t m 3.(7) 
Upstream effects. 
Retrogressive backwater deposition is mentioned by some opponents of 
the Soviet design. But their point is not answered, so it may be 
concluded that, in adopting the modified Soviet design, the assumption 
was that it would not give rise to any serious effect. (8) 
Downstream effects. 
It was assumed that to discharge clear water from Sanmenxia to the 
lower reaches could only have-good effects on the channel, and that 
irrigation depended upon it, since silty water would not be useable.. 
It was further assumed that to discharge silty water would lead to 
channel deposition such that eventually flood protection would fail. 
These assumptions were all challenged, but apparently upheld. (9) 
In addition it was assumed that there were suitable reservoir sites 
to be found on the rivers Yi. Luo and Qin, since flood prevention 
would depend on their water retention. 
The Need of a Multipurpose Project. 
It is of particular interest to note the assumptions made concerning 
the desirability, or otherwise, of having one large project to solve 
a whole series of present and future problems, as opposed to tackling 
immediate, and local, problems first and future, and distant, problems 
in a step by step fashion. Quite apart from the conclusion, based 
upon the above technical assumptions, that only a large storage 
reservoir would be capable of controlling R. Huang flOOds, it was 
assumed to be desirable to provide for the maximisation of the other 
multipurpose benefits as an end in itself. Indeed, multipurpose use 
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was included in the original terms of reference for the project. 
One of the major objections to the alternative proposals, for a 
flood-retardation reservoir at Sanmenxia, was their apparent 
failure to provide multipurpose benefits on a comparable scale. (10) 
It was assumed to be desirable to provide for such benefits, even 
though they would not be needed for some time, as can be seen, for 
example, by the plan to reduce the burden of moving and resettling 
so many people, by gradually raising the water level of the reservoir 
according to the evolving needs of the region for power and irrigation. 
Perhaps the more significant assumption here is that the provision 
of these multipurpose benefits would, in the future, be of greater 
relevance to China's development than the land which would have to 
be lost. That is, it is worthwhile to lose land to pay for water 
and electricity, and that Chinas development strategy must give a 
high proportionate emphasis to industry rather than to agriculture 
100 
2) Acceptance of the Modified Soviet Design and the Beginning of 
Doubt. 
With so much in dispute or left to asumption, it may seem a little 
mprudentto.have begun work strictly according to the original plan, 
on 13 April 1957. There are two issues to be considered here. 
Firstly, there is the giving in 1957 of instructions to proceed with 
the modified Soviet design and, secondly, there is the failure to 
make any other change until after the darn had been completed and 
severe problems encountered. In subsequent sections, it is intended 
to demonstrate that the failure of the Sanmenxia project was more a 
failure to relinquish a dream than a failure to predict technical 
problems. To begin, the factors likely to have influenced those 
decisions must be considered, 
i) Desirability of the Project. 
The Sanmenxia Project held out the promise of removing a scourge, 
notorious throughout history and, at the same time, of transforming 
the region into the industrial and agricultural base of the New 
China. Furthermore, the successful completion, albeit with Soviet 
assistance, of such 'a project, would provide a much needed boost to 
the national pride of a China politically isolated from much of the 
rest of the world. To quote from Vice Premier Deng Zihüi's 1955 
report, 
"Ever since ancient times the Chinese people have 
longed to harness the R. Huang and turn it to good 
use,,,.. Only now, under the People's Democracy in 
the era of Mao Zedong, can their dreams - and much 
morethanthe1xreams - come -true. Three Americans... 
whom the Guotnindang government invited to China as 
advisers in 1946.,..., still believed that 'hundreds 
of years will be required to treat the entire area,' 
This reminds one of a saying current in the Zhou 
dynasty: 'Life is too short to see the river run 
clear,' Yet we need only a few decades, not several 
centuries, until we see results from water and soil 
conservation work in the entire loess region. 
Furthermore, in six years, when the Sanmeaxia reservoir 
is completed, we shall be seeing practically clear 
water in the lower R. Huang. It will not be long before 
all the deputies here and the people of the whole 
country see the day when the age-old dream comes true - 
when the R. Huang runs clear." (11) 
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Since its conception in the early fifties, this scheme had repeatedly 
been held to be capable of realising that dream. It would not seem 
unreasonable to suggest that having lived in hope and belief in that 
currently unchallenged ability for several years, those charged with 
this decision might be predisposed towards confusing the desired 
outcome, with the possible outcomes. 
ii) Relations with the Soviet Union and its Experts. 
In view of China's political isolation in the fifties and its 
concurrent overt friendship with the Soviet Union, it is not unnatural 
to wonder how this close relationship was likely to have influenced 
the choice of reservoir design. Similarly, in view of the subsequent 
rift which appeared openly between the two powers from 1960 onwards, 
the motives of the USSR in helping China in this way are open to 
question. 
Dealing with the latter point first, the evidence would seem to 
indicate that Soviet aid, though granted for political motives, was 
carried out conscientiously and to the best abilities of the Soviet 
experts concerned. Similarly, although the services of these experts 
were unilaterally and permanently withdrawn by the Soviet Government 
in July and August 1960 in order (unsuccessfully) to exert political 
pressure on the Chinese Government to toe the Soviet line, there is 
no suggestion whatever that they were used by the Soviets in any 
other way to exert pressure. To all appearances, the Soviet experts 
were allowed to work without political interference from their own 
government, and their way of working was regarded as satisfactory by 
the Chinese. For example, in 1964, four years after the withdrawal 
of the experts, the Chinese said of them, 
"The overwhelming majority of them was hard working and 
helpful to China's socialist construction. We have always 
highly appreciated their conscientious work, and still miss 
them to this day. "(12) 
More specifically, Chinese engineers, concerned today with R. Huang 
control, are at pains to emphasise that the members of the Leningrad 
Hydropower Design Annex assigned to this project gave "genuine, 
friendly help." Problems only arose because they did not have highly 
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silted rivers in the USSR, and both sides lacked experience. (13) 
In assessing the possible influence of China's friendship with the 
Soviet Union on the choice of reservoir design, a change in attitude, 
in the late fifties and early sixties on behalf of the Chinese 
towards the Soviet experience, is discernable. 
However, it is not easy to discover the extent to which this change 
was politically motivated. The changes of attitude which took place 
would have had their effects after 1957, after the decision to 
continue had been taken, and are, therefore, more suited for 
discussion in section iv. Here, consideration is restricted to the 
earlier period. 
Following the Declaration of the People's Republic on 1 October 1949, 
and the signing of the 30-year "Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, 
Alliance and Mutual Assistance" early the following year, China set 
about the establishment of new industries and the organisation of 
science, along Soviet lines. Meanwhile, although in absolute 
financial terms, Soviet aid was modest, it must have been of great 
value in the first five years. The major capital projects built 
with Soviet assistance, by the admission of both the Soviet Union 
and China, laid "the primary foundations of modern industry and 
technology. " (14) Thus the great and positive impact of Soviet 
assistance is not in question. 
What is important though, is the question of the relevance of Soviet 
and Chinese experience, respective1y,with respect to Chinese needs, 
and the degree of -. - reliability of the former, in the Chinese context, 
as seen by the Chinese decision-makers. There is little doubt that 
in the early fifties, Soviet engineering and technology was well in 
advance of that of the Chinese in many respects. It would seem 
reasonable that this be acknowledged, but it 4s also very possible 
that its constant repetition gave the illusion that it was infallible. 
What is the evidence to support such a suggestion? 
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In the first instance there is the repetition itself. "Learn from 
the Soviet Union" was a common slogan in the early fifties. (15) 
Almost every reference to the Soviet Union included the adjective 
"advanced", and nearly every progress report made reference to its 
beneficial influence.. For example, in forestry, 
"The Socialist Soviet Union is the only country in the 
world where a shelter-belt afforestation programme of 
similar magnitude has been successfully carried out. 
Nothing of the sort is possible in any capitalist 
country. "(16) 
in irrigation, 
"The adoption of advanced Soviet experience and economy 
in the use of water have already had the most beneficial 
effects." (17) 
in farming technique, 
"Many farms and more advanced peasants have improved 
their farming technique and adopted the advanced 
experience of the Soviet Union." (18) 
in water conservancy, 
"The use of advanced experience accumulated in China 
and from the Soviet Union, given by Soviet experts, has 
greatly improved working efficiency and increased the 
speed at which these projects have been carried out. (19) 
and on the R. Huang itself, 
"... and with the aid of Soviet experience, we are 
confident that we shall wipe out once and for all the 
last remnants of the river's threat." (20) 
The official view of Soviet aid was that it was very useful, but not 
the be all and end all, 
"We advocate the study of the scientific and technical 
experiences of the Soviet Union, because Soviet water 
conservancy science and technique are amongst the most 
advanced in the world, whilst Soviet aid to us is 
impartial, unselfish and without reservation. During 
the past few years, our gigantic achievements in water 
conservancy construction have practically been: 
inseparable from Soviet Aid. At the same time it must 
also be pointed out that there are also many good things 
in the science and technique of the capitalist countries; 
they are worthy of our study, because technique is devoid 
of class nature, and will serve whichever party controls 
it", (21) 
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Yet, perhaps inevitably, Soviet experience did come to carry with it 
the image of the man in the white coat, he who is right because he 
is "scientific". In some instances, the Soviet expert was used to 
build up the image of greatness or of competance as required, 
"The new scheme which has now been published is the 
result of six years' work by surveyors, geologists, 
architects, hydrologists and experts of many kinds, 
including a group of top-level engineers from the 
Soviet Union". (22) 
In one case this was extended, by inference, to give the Soviet 
Union credit where it was not strictly due, 
"The way we propose to take is the way the Soviet Union 
took to harness and exploit its rivers - that is, to 
adopt a comprehensive, multiple-purpose plan". (23) 
Similarly, mistakes could be blamed on a failure fully to grasp the 
said Soviet experience, 
"We did not learn the advanced experience of the Soviet 
Union systematically and penetratingly, and some 
technical cadres were still inclined to a subjective 
style of work divorced from actual conditions". (24) 
Thus it was not surprising to find, in the late fifties, complaints 
and warnings concerning the acceptance of this imagery. As one 
Soviet press agency later complained, the Chinese leadrship had 
proclaimed the slogan, 
"Struggle against blind faith in established technical 
standards and regulations and in foreign experience", 
which "In view of the •..... large number of 'Soviet 
specialists in China", they concluded to be, "in essence 
directed against the Soviet specialists and against 
Soviet scientific and technical experience". (25) 
Finally, the extent to which this image influenced the acceptance of 
Soviet ideas can be judged. from an article which appeared in 
November 1957, just after the decision to proceed at Sanmenxia had 
been reached, 
"The Soviet experts gave us great enlightenment on the 
concept of designing. They pointed out the purpose of 
multi-purpose use of rivers, that is, to use the minimum 
funds to satisfy the maximum needs of the national 
economic development. They told us that we must not 
confine our view to the interests of a given department 
or a given target, but should consider how to meet the 
maximum interests of all departments from the political, 
economic and technical Points-6fview. (25) 
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The inference from this is that their advice was taken. 
iii) Timing and Decision-making Process. 
In December 1956, when the blueprints of the Preliminary Design were 
handed over, the starting date had already been fixed for April 1957 
and certain preliminary steps had already been made, in that some 
people had been evacuated and some heavy machinery had been ordered. 
It is not unreasonable, therefore, to suggest that it was generally 
assumed that the Chinese State Council would approve the plans and 
work would proceed. It was in no way expected that there would be 
any serious challenge to them. Furthermore, although the number of 
questions raised was indeed sufficient for the State Council to order 
special meetings of Chinese technical experts to furnish advice, it 
would seem that, in the view of the State Council, the basic idea of 
having a reservoir at Sanmenxia was not in question, and that, hopefully, 
these outstanding questions could soon be resolved. Given that a 
dam of some sort or other was to be built at Sanmenxia, then it was 
not such a sign of imprudence that work should begin on time. After 
all, it may have been argued that the first stage of the work, 
blasting away rocks and laying foundations, would take some time and 
would not seriously be affected by any modification to the reservoir 
silt discharging criteria. Yet, as we shall see, this feeling that 
there would always be time for modification, was an important 
influence upon the decision to proceed. 
At the special meetings of June 1957, opening the debate on the 
design of the Sanmenxia reservoir, Vice Minister Zhang Hanying, of 
the Ministry of Water Conservancy, asked the collected assembly to 
consider three points: 
Should the plan for a reservoir at Sanmenxia be based 
upon considerations of comprehensive use, or simply 
upon flood control? 
If comprehensive use be considered, should the power 
output be appropriately reduced? 
If the original design outline be bascially agreed, but 
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with a lower water level in the first stage, should the 
structural design further be changed (such as by lowering 
the silt discharge sluices).? (27) 
The decision reached has already been described in Chapter 2, but 
the reasoning behind it remains to be given. 
The official summary of the meetings begins by pointing out that of 
the three aspects of R. Huang control, that is, soil and water 
conservation, channel regulation in the lower reaches and the 
building of a reservoir, only the latter would provide rapid results. 
It was recognised that, owing to sedimentation, the safe flood 
capacity of the river's lower reaches was falling and flood prevention 
was seen as a requirement of the utmost urgency. Meanwhile, under 
the conditions of rapid industrial and agricultural development 
current in China, the use of the R. Huang's water resources, using a 
reservoir, was asserted to be another important need. 
At the meeting, "The overwhelming majority of the Comrades present 
consider Sanrnenxia to be the most suitable site to satisfy these 
requirements, and should be chosen as the first period project." (28) 
It is worthwhile to quote extensively the argument as put, since it 
reveals more than technical points, 
"It possesses the following outstanding conditions: 
The position of Sarimenxia is suitable, it can control 
a fairly large catchment area (93 	of' the wholebasin). 
Simultaneously, it has a fairly large reservoir capacity 
which can undertake the requirements of flood regulation; 
The Sanmenxia reservoir capacity is large and can 
guarantee the requirements raised by the various depart-
ments in developing the national economy, such as farm-
land irrigation, hydroelectric power, and improving the 
river channel; 
The geology of the Sanmenx±a valley is excellent and 
has the conditior6 for building a high dam. Also, the 
valley is narrow and so construction costs will be low; 
The reservoir capacity is large and,whilst at present 
we need to trap silt which is harmful to the lower 
reaches, it can maintain a fairly long life and provide 
upstream soil and water conservation work an abundant and 
reliable time. 
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"However, the conference recognised that to build the 
Sanxnenxia project would at the present time also have 
disadvantages: 
Since the reservoir capacity is large, the area 
inundated will be large, and many people will have to 
move. In particular, at the present in China, where 
arable land is lacking, it is even more problematic to 
flood such land -and move people; 
Problems may arise during the period when soil and 
water conservation upstream is in the process of gradually 
taking effect and regulation of the channel downstream 
has still to be completed. Silt deposition could occur 
in the reservoir backwaters such that the floodwater 
level of the R. Wei would rise, possibly causing flooding 
or saturation of the backwater district. This needs more 
detailed research to be done. Meanwhile, owing to flood-
water regulation, fairly clear water will be sdischatg-erd 
and the time taken by floods to pass will be extended. 
Rapid erosion could thus occur in the lower reaches and, 
in the period just following completion of the reservoir, 
when clear water will first be released, the bed will be 
unstable and flood prevention could deteriorate or 
encounter new problems. Strict attention and suitable 
measures will be needed. 
"At present it is still difficult to estimate the life 
of Sanmenxia reservoir, because the reduction in oncoming 
silt and water, following conservation upstream, and the 
time required for conservation to show effect, have still 
not been calculated, and the density of the sediment etc., 
is still being researched. Thus, from a purely technical 
point of view, it would seem somewhat better to wait until 
fairly clear results have been received from scientific 
research, and then to build the Sanmenxia reservoir; Yet, 
from the viewpoint of flood control, it is a requirement 
of the utmost urgency to use the reservoir first to 
regulate floods. Whilst the flood discharge from 1951 to 
1956 was not so large and no breach occurred, there was 
nevertheless severe deposition which will continue 
hereafter and raise daily the threat of a change in the 
river's course. Meanwhile, soil and water conservation 
cannot completely come into play in a short time, so the 
threat of inundation must be reduced by sacrificing a 
part of the reservoir's storage capacity in exchange for 
the necessary time. Therefore, even if the above few 
problems, in regulating the R. Huang continue to require 
further research and analysis, before reliable and 
accurate figures may be achieved, the Sanrnenxia project 
should still be built at once to fulfill the present 
urgent flood control task. 
"Requirements exist with regard to developing water 
conservancy and meeting the needs of various parts of the 
national economy, be they irrigation, hydroelectricity, 
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or navigation. The Sanmenxia reservoir can attain the 
above goal of comprehensive use whilst still satisying 
flood prevention. This should be borne in mind. 
"A reservoir would stop the breaches of the R. Huang's 
lower reaches, eliminate the threat of inundation from 
the 80 million residents along its two banks, and develop 
its water resources. Owing to the factors mentioned 
above, it would be very difficult to attain similar 
results, in a short time, by any other means. The 
losses'due to reservoir flooding cannot be avoided,' 
but they may be balanced against the benefits to the 
great majority of the people, and to carry out evacuation 
from a few places upstream is a measure we are obliged 
to adopt. Nevertheless, the number of evacuees and the 
flooded area should be reduced, as far as is possible, 
whilst ensuring that the reservoir can resolve the flood 
problem without shortening its own life, and can still 
achieve comprehensive benefits. Meanwhile, in the first 
period of use, the problems should be reduced, by 
raising the stored water level gradually, so as to 
extend the period for evacuation. Mobilisation work to 
evacuate the reservoir residents should be well prepared 
and, as far as possible, should respect the local 
residents' wishes and provide suitable arrangements. 
"Thus, the overwhelming majority of Comrades all along 
considered that to build the Sanmenxia reservoir now 
is an urgent requirement. As for the problems of soil 
and water conservation, reservoir deposition and 
regulation of the channel downstream, etc., the State 
Council is requested to instruct the relevant departments 
to organise their strength and get moving to solve them 
quickly. "(29) 
The picture which emerges from the above is clear. On being faced 
with alternative proposals, the State Council asked for technical 
advice. The experts, in debating the various alternatives, acknow-
ledged large areas of uncertainty, for which the protagonists of 
each scheme substituted their respective assumptions. These 
assumptions concerned not only the occurence of given phenomena, but 
also their extent and their relative importance. The acceptance, or 
otherwise, of a given assumption is an act of belief, albeit possibly 
based upon experience. In this case the experts had to accept or 
reject whole sets of assumptions involving many different disciplines, 
so the element of belief played a greater role. Under these 
circumstances it is not difficult to understand how it was that, 
despite the very accurate predictions of disaster from some Comrades, 
the modified Soviet plan was sanctioned. 
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iv) Whilst Under Construction. 
As the dam construction proceeded towards completion, China was 
roused into its first post-war frenzy of activity and political 
chaos, known as the Great Leap Forward (GLF). This began in 1957, 
reached its climax in 1958, and would have had two, noticeably 
contradictory, types of effect on the Sanmenxia project: to strengthen 
the hold of the dream, upon which its selection had depended, and to 
undermine some of the illusions which contributed to that dream. 
In the rush of enthusiasm which typified this period, noted for its 
slogan, "More, Better, Faster, Cheaper", there would have been a 
tendency to display little patience for careful research and little 
tolerance of dissenting voices. Meanwhile, a propaganda campaign 
was under way to assure the people of their great progress. Therefore, 
to call a halt to one of the greatest projects, would really have been 
a politically risky business. To plod on carefully even, would not 
have shown the correct "revolutionary spirit" and, indeed, it was 
announced on 13 March 1958, that the dam at Sanmenxia was to be 
completed by 1960, a year ahead of schedule, and that electricity 
would begin to be generated on 1 April 1961, six months early. (30) 
In the meantime, there were other problems which demanded attention. 
In 1958 there occurred the most critical flood peaks on the lower 
R. Huang since the disastrous floods of 1933, during which over 
18,000 ,( had perished and which had been caused by a flood discharge 
of 22,000 m3 s 1 . In 1958, the maximum discharge was 22,300 m 3 s 1 
and although there was no reported dyke breach, two large leaks 
and 32 cases of piping had to be dealt with. In addition, supplementary 
dykes between 1 m and 1.5 m high had to be added on top of the 
main dykes and around Lake Dongping, into which a total of 700 x i0 6 in3 
of water was diverted. In places the water rose above the original 
dyke tops, and part of the trunk line railway bridge at Nangshan 
collapsed. 
(31)  An official statement said that the R. Huang, - 
"was brought to its knees in the face of political 
leadership and the masses' redoubled efforts in the Great 
Leap Forward". (32) 
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The fact remains, though, that it was a very dangerous situation which 
must have increased pressure for something to be done at Sanmenxia. 
A special meeting to sum up the experiences of these flood peaks 
held in August 1958, noted that, 
" s ... by next year, the dam of the multipurpose Sanrnenxia 
Project .... would begin to hold back water. When 
completed the project would be big enough to contain the 
total average annual flow from its upper reaches. "(33) 
The first part of this optimistic statement actually referred to the 
coffer dam which would divert the river during construction. The 
extent to which this could retard the flow during flood peaks is not 
known. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to believe that in the prevail-
ing psychological climate, there would have had to have been some 
very strong arguments indeed for any change to be made in the chosen 
course of action. 
Another factor likely to have prevented early recognition of the 
extent of the problems to be encountered, was the fragmented nature 
of the distribution of work amongst the various research or 
administrative organs concerned. As one engineer put it, 
"Premier Zhou Enlai was very concerned about it. Upon 
his return from India, he suggested that model tests be 
carried out. Consequently, in 1958, a model 1 km long 
of the proposed reservoir, was constructed at Wugong, 
and another model was made, at Zhengzhou, of the Huayuankou 
reach. At Wugong we discovered the backwater deposition and 
the density current failure, but still we did not discover 
the seriousness of the reservoir sedimentation. Why? Because 
we were using previous estimates for the efficiency of soil 
and water conservation and considered that there would not 
be too great a problem. We failed to take fully enough. 
into account the overall situation, partly because the 
divison of labour was too fine; for example, I had never 
seen the loess plateau and had no reason to question the 
figures for sediment yield given to me by the R. Huang 
Conservancy Commission. (34) 
Yet, although this and other such pieces of evidence may have been 
too scattered for their meaning to have been recognised quickly, it 
is nonetheless true that a body of evidence was coming into being 
which, when brought together, would be able to contribute to a 
reappraisal of the whole project. Furthermore, political and other 
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changes would have caused some changes in the way in which large 
technical projects and foreign experience were regarded, in relation 
to China and its needs. Examples are the 'Two Legs' policy, the 
split with the Soviet Union, and the 'Three Hard Years'. 
The policy of 'Walking on Two Legs' was, in effect, a call for a more 
comprehensive economic development. It was first mentioned in the 
communique issued, in December 1958, by the 6th Plenary Session of 
the Party Central Committee, which stated, 
"The development of our national economy by leaps and 
bounds in 1958 has proven the correctness of the whole 
group of policies laid down by the Party; the policy of 
simultaneous development of industry and agriculture.....; 
the policy of simultaneous development of heavy and light 
industries;.....; the policy of simultaneous development 
of national and local industries; the policy of simult-
aneous development of large enterprises and medium and 
small enterprises, the policy of simultaneously employed 
modern and indigenous methods of production, and the 
policy of combining centralised leadership with a full-
scale mass movement in industry - in a word, the policy 
of walking on two legs rather than dragging along on one 
or one and a half legs....... I, (35) 
On the one leg, the government took upon itself the large, the 
heavy, the national and the centralised and, it is assumed, performed 
its tasks to its own satisfaction whilst, on the other leg, the 
small, light, local, indigenous and mass were encouraged by a 
worthy press campaign. Thus, intentionally or otherwise, people's 
thoughts would have been directed away from grandiose schemes and they 
would perhaps have been a little more ready to accept making the 
Sanmenxia project more modest, by relying, for example, on local 
schemes for well irrigation. 
After such a vicious split as subsequently occurred between the 
Soviet Union and China, the latter would not have had to consider 
whether or not it would give offence to challenge the Soviet design. 
It could be said that the split might have influenced the decision to 
rebuild the Sanmenxia reservoir, but it was not important in comparison 
with the occurrences preceding it. The way the Chinese Government 
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wished to encourage independent assessment of technical standards and 
foreign experience has already been noted and, indeed, as early as 
1957 an article appeared in the Renmin Ribao entitled "Several 
Questions Needing Attention in Commissioning Abroad for the Design 
of Water Conservancy Projects" which, in essence, contained five 
complaints about having asked the Soviets to design the Sanmenxia 
project, 
"i) Foreigners should not be asked to design what could 
be designed by Chinese. China had sufficient experience, 
gained from earlier projects, to design large-scale water 
conservancy projects. 
Where possible, foreign experts should be invited to 
China. Many more people would benefit from doing design 
work in China, led by a foreign specialist, than could 
be sent to watch the design procedure abroad. Only two 
Chinese had participated in the design of the Sanmenxia 
reservoir at the Leningrad Institute. 
In commissioning design work abroad, it is necessary 
first to establish clearly the basis of foreign experience. 
Chinese experience in designing water conservancy projects 
was unique, whilst foreign experience often was 
inapplicable to China. The Sanmenxia project had many 
unique features and only experience gained from practice 
within China could acheive good, fast and cheap objectives. 
Planning should be well done before commissioning 
designs abroad. The Technical and Economic Report had 
been too broad to act as a basis for designing the 
Sanmenxia reservoir, yet a contradiction had arisen, 
because the various departments' requests, for benefits 
from Sanmenxia, had only been brought up once the design 
work was already underway abroad, and to meet these 
requests would require a higher water level than had 
been envisaged in the Technical and Economic Report. 
To propose design criteria in such a scattered and 
biased way, without an overall plan which unified 
contradictions, was bound to lead to chaos. The lesson 
that good preparation is vital, should be learnt for 
the future. 
When design work is carried out abroad, it should be 
done simultaneously in China. The effect of this would 
be to raise the general standard of design work within 
Chinat'. (36) 
Thus, eventually, was the illusion of Soviet infallibility challenged 
on technical grounds. As is well known, it was also challenged on 
ideological grounds, but that is beyond the scope of this study. 
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Owing to poor harvests brought about principally by successive years 
of drought, the three years 1960 to 1962 have become known as the 
'Three Hard Years'. It is reasonable to suggest that the value of 
good arable land such as that being made unavailable by the 
Sanrnenxia reservoir, would thereby have been brought home to people's 
minds sufficiently vividly to influence their assessment of the 
contending reservoir designs. 
Thus we can see that, under the various influences of the times, the 
conditions ere slowly developing for the acceptance of different 
design concepts for the Sanrnenxia project. Perhaps,by 1960, when 
the reservoir came into operation, only a precipitating agent was 
needed to bring together the evidence, which could make a different 
design acceptable. Of course, by then, the dam had already been built 
and any change would amount to the admission of a very costly error. 
These themes will be addressed again but, first, what actually 
happened will be considered. 
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3) The Slow Progress of Soil and Water Conservation Work and Loess 
Plateau Development. 
The most conservative estimate of the effectiveness of soil and water 
conservation work, the Soviet estimate, predicted a 20 7. reduction in 
sediment yield by 1967 and a 50 7. reduction in fifty years. Yet, 
although it was claimed in 1980, that over 60,000. km 2 (21 7.) of. the 
area of soil and water loss had been "brought under control", 
there has still been no noticeable reduction at all in the silt content 
of the R. Huang. 
(37)  Some explanation of this can be drawn from the 
extreme variability of the figures themeselves (Table 3-1). The 
extent of erosion is highly dependent on the rainfall, not only on 
how much rain falls in any year, which is highly variable, but where 
it falls and with what intensity. Light rainfall over the fairly 
flat and well covered southern edge of the gullied plateau region, 
for example, would probably give rise to less silt in the R. Huang, 
than would an equivalent volume of rain falling in violent storms 
over the gullied hillock region of N. Shaanxi and N.W. Shanxi. Thus 
a reduction of 10 7. or even 20 7., in the average silt content of the 
R. Huang would be hardly discernable for many years from the figures 
and, in any case, it would be very difficult to attribute such 
changes solely to soil and water conservation work rather than climatic 
peculiarities. 
To have brought 21 7. of the area "under control" could not be 
expected to mean a 21 7. reduction in R. Huang silt load, despite 
the unity delivery ratio (all silt washed from the loess plateau 
enters the R. Huang), because of the ambiguity of the expression 
"under control". Leaving aside the exaggerated claims of the late 
fifties and sixties, it should still be mentioned that in some 
instances to "bring under control" simply meant that the said area of 
land had been treated in one way or other, and paid no attention to 
whether or not the treatment had been successful. More recently, 
the expression is taken to mean that somewhere between 60 7. and 70 7. 
of the area in question has successfully been treated, or that there 
has been a similar reduction in sediment yield from that area. (38) 
Local estimates refer, however, to bringing 30 7. of those catchment 
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TABLE 	SILT LOAD OF THE RIVER 




1954 146, (2610)* - 	 2514 
1955 260g. (1290) 960 
1956 81 (1670) 1589 
1957 78 (1030) 952 
1958 210 (2990) 2780 
1959 209 2600 2391 
1960 124 935 811 
1961 273 1200 927 
1962 110 938 828 
1963 162 1230 1068 
1964 299 2450 2151 
1965 80 454 374 
1966 184 2110 1926 
1967 316 2180 1864 
1968 219 1520 1301 
1969 22 1210. 1188 
1970 72 1900 1828 
1971 106 1340 1234 
1972 77 600 523 
1973 101 
1974 60 
190 L1 975 age 159 1592 1432 
- Source: QUSRL, personal communication, 1981. 
*Bracketed figures are from Shanzhou station, not Tongguan. 
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areas being treated under control within the next ten years, though 
with the addition of dams at the gully mouths it is hoped that silt 
will cease to be washed from them. Meanwhile, one recent estimate of 
the area of soiland water loss which has successfully been brought 
under 'comprehensive' control, was put at less than 1 %. (40) 
Whatever the extent of the work done successfully, even if it be on 
21 7 of the loess plateau, there would have had to have been no 
deterioration on the rest of the loess plateau if it were to have 
resulted in a significant reduction of the R. Huang silt load. Thus, 
the whole region must be taken into account. When this is done, we 
find that, for technical, social and political reasons, there has 
been very little improvement, and in some cases there has even been 
some retrogression. This has been seen as an apparent failure of 
soil and water conservation work. The most basic economic development 
in this region would be the stabilisation and increase of agricuItura1 
production. In turn, this would mean finding solutions to the joint 
problems of soil erosion and the practice of shifting cultivation. 
Thus, it has been recognised that economic development and soil and 
water conservation are so closely related that they must be 
considered together. Indeed, the terms are ofteM used interchangeably 
in reports on the loess plateau. 
i) Basic Approach. 
The approach adopted to tackle the development of the loess plateau 
was based upon the principle that the major part of the work would be 
done by the local peasants themselves, supported by mainly technical 
aid from the State. Substantially, this has remained unchanged. 
In the period immediately after the Civil War, a 'Northwest R. Huang 
Engineering Office' and a total of over thirty local soil and water 
conservation experimentation stations and popularisation stations 
were established. (41) 
 These were run by the government, through the 
RHWCC and were staffed by technicans headed by administrative officers 
under party groups. Their job was to create model areas where 
experiments could be carried outas examples which, with'the 
aid of propaganda teams, the masses could copy on their own land. 
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In Yan'an District, for example, seven teams of ten were sent out to 
guide work at county level and, in 1955, two one-month courses were 
held to explain the methods of conservation. Thus, in practice the 
methods were to be copied without awaiting the results of the 
experiments, which would require about ten years to complete. After 
1956, every county in Yan'an District had at least one model area. 
Meanwhile, large-scale preliminary surveys were organised by the 
Academy of Sciences, once in 1953 and again from 1955 to 1957. (42) 
This first period is referred to as the 'Experimental Period'. 
Following the establishment of agricultural co-operatives, in 1956, 
the second period extended from the fifties to the mid seventies. It 
was characterised by political chaos, and the use of the mass 
campaign in an attempt to increase the rate at which soiland water 
losses were being brought under control. In December 1956, the 
first Middle Reaches Soil and Water Conservation Conference was held. 
In 1957, a Central Soil and Water Conservation Committee was 
established, followed by another meeting later that year. In 1958 
and 1959, on the spot meetings were also organised. In 1959, the 
People's Communes were established and in Yan'an District, mentioned 
above, the seven propaganda teems were replaced, as each County set 
up its own Water Conservancy Office. 
The largest of the mass campaigns occured in 1958, during the period 
of the Great Leap Forward. Meanwhile, in 1957, a team from the 
Soviet Academy of Sciences had come to investigate the conditions 
obtaining on the loess plateau. This team included experts on 
Comprehensive Natural Geography, Soil and Water Conservancy, Pedobogy, 
Forestry, Sand Fixing, Hydrology, Geomorphology and Geology. The 
use of mass campaigns for conservation measures continued, on and 
off, throughout the Cultural Revolution, though their points of 
emphasis varied. 
The most recent period, since about 1973, has been one of drawing 
lessons from the past,.making economic and political changes, and 
drawing up new plans for development. These are discussed in Chapter 
5. Many of the organs of soil and water conservation work 
destroyed in the Cultural Revolution have been restored; the three - 
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experimentation stations of Xifeng, Suide and Tianshui, respectively, 
have once again been brought under RHWCC control, and other parts of 
the organisation have been upgraded. For example, 'Hydrology Points' 
have become 'Hydrology Bureaux'. 
(43)  Yet, progress has been slow. 
A central 'R. Huang Middle Reaches Bureau' has been set up but had 
not commenced work in July 1980. An impression of the pace of 
restoration is obtained from an article in the Cuangming Ribao of 
19 December 1978 9  
"There were 48 key soil and water loss counties in 
Shaanxi, but only 29 local and County soil and water 
conservation stations have been restored and most of 
those are on the Guanzhong Plain. Shanxi has four 
regions of serious soil and water loss, but only two 
regions have soil and water conservation institutes. 
Since 1976 the Ningxia Moslem Autonomous Region has 
established six water and soil conservation stations, 
but they are all mere skeletons. The one in Tongxin 
County has an authorised strength of 15 k , but at 
present it only has two, and one of those is the 
accountant.... (44) 
In the next two sections consideration is given to the development of 
the technical and political imbalances which together account for the 
slow progress of soil and water conservation work. This will be 
followed by a further analysis of the effects of that slow progress 
upon the Sanmenxia project. 
ii) Technical Imbalance. 
The first emphasis was on biological control. That is, the need for 
an increase in the plant cover index was to be satisfied by large-
scale tree planting and grass sowing. However, in many cases tree-
planting was poorly done; the commensurate water preservation 
measures (such as fishscale pits and reverse-slope terraces) were 
not undertaken, trees were neglected once they had been planted or 
were eaten by sheep before they could grow. Even where the work was 
done well, the survival rate for saplings was low, as it was hard to 
find suitably resilient species. The most common species used was, 
and still is, the Locust tree(Robinia pseudo-acacia), but its growth 
rate tends to slowdown or stop after several years; by way of example, 
some thirty year old trees at the soil and water conservation station 
in Suide have trunk perimete'rs of on1y 400 
119 
In view of the large amount of manpower required and the slow 
returns, there was also popular resistance :to afforestation 
campaigns. The masses called it a case of "Distant water cannot 
assuage nearby thirst". (45) As Liu Wanquan remarks, in the Renrnin 
Ribao of 13 February 1979, 
"Some places coerced the masses into withdrawing tillage 
from slopes and planting grass and trees. Yet since the 
unit grain yield was not raised, after withdrawing from 
tillage, the masses' food provision fell and, of their 
own volition, they reopened the forest and grassland to 
sow cereals, even to the extent that in some places trees 
were planted each year but the forest was never seen". (47) 
The idea of having special shock brigades for afforestation also got 
off to a bad start when resistance was met to the assumption that 
the shock brigades' food provision would be provided by the regional 
production brigades. (48) 
Seeding to grass met similar problems. Before the late seventies, 
only two types of grass were popular, the biennial Caomuxi (Sweet 
Clover) and the perennial Nuxu (Lucerne). Caomuxi is fast-growing 
and resistant to drought, alkali and cold, but for the best results, 
has to be used in grass-arable rotation. Muxu is difficult to grow, 
cannot form pastureland on its own, declines after five or six years 
and, after three years, its toots exhaust the soil moisture down to 
about three metres below the surface. In the mid seventies a new 
strain became popular, Shadawang, which is available in biennial and 
triennial forms. However, it cannot bear seeds in N. Shaanxi, and 
for many years seed had to be brought from Jiangsu province. 
Recently, however, it has been bred successfully on the fertile 
floodplains of the lower R. Huang. 
In sparcely populated areas where it was acknowledged that there is 
not the manpower to nurture trees and grass, aerial seed broadcasting 
was tried but, in the fifties, the survival rate was only 3 7 or 4 7 
and it was abandoned until the late seventies, when new species were 
available for experimentation, and the survival rate was increased to 
45 %. (50) 
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Thus, although by emphasising biological control the plant cover 
index would have increased in places, it proved incapable of 
facilitating the withdrawal of tillage from slopes. 
Meanwhile large-scale dams were built as silt traps in preparation 
to meet the requirements of the Sanmenxia reservoir, originally due 
for completion in 1961. For example, in the late fifties large 
tributary dams were built at Xinqiao (R. Hongliu), Dancheng (R. Lu), 
Bajiazui (R. Pu) and on the R. Fen, amonst other places. However, 
they were found to be too big, rather expensive and difficult to 
connect to the needs of productive labour. They also had a tendency 
to fill up with silt; the above mentioned four, for example, had lost 
75 7, 100 %,61.4 7 and 34.2 7. of their capacities by 1973, 1973, 1972 
and 1976 respectively. (51) As Luo Laixing commented in the Renmin 
Ribao as early as 1957, 
"There are also those who hold that building large dams can 
reduce gully floor erosion, hold back floods and, moreover, 
facilitate pisciculture, irrigation and electricity generation. 
It cannot be denied that large dams have such potential, but 
it can be realised only subject to avoiding damage to the 
dams by floodwaters or their being clogged up with silt. 
Taking a look at the large dams already in existence on the 
loess plateau and seeing how many of them rear fish or can 
generate electricity or can irrigate, and how much fish is 
being raised, or electricity produced, or fields irrigated 
in practice, etc., one would find it hard to be satisfied 
by the situation...." (52) 
In the late fifties, the emphasis shifted to terraces and small silt 
precipitation dams. To build terraces well, however, is very 
laborious and consumes, for example, between 750 A d ha 	and 
1650 ,&.. d ha- 
1 
 to construct level, 10 m wide terraces on slopes of 
about 20 ,, conserving the topsoil. In many cases, narrower terraces 
were built to save labour, but were then harder to maintain and were 
ill suited to mechanisation. Often the terracing work was shoddily 
done, with insufficient attention being paid to keeping them level, 
conserving the-topsoil, or making proper provision for drainage and 
access paths. 
(53)  When this happens, even the usually excellent 
conservation properties of terraces can be lost, as the Rerimin Ribao 
comments, 
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"Some peasants dig holes in the border ridges in order 
to walk through. However •.... water can then flow out 
through this gap and give rise to concentrated erosion." (54) 
The "level terraces" which were popularised in the early sixties as 
a new type of terrace, in fact just meant taking care to make a good 
job of it. 
Terraces do hold more water, it is true, but the border walls are 
prone to evaporation losses and percolation is severe on the loess 
plateau. Therefore, without irrigation, they could not provide 
stable yields throughout successive years of drought. Moreover, 
terraces alone do not necessarily provide a sufficiently substantial 
increase in crop yields for the peasants to consider them worthwhile. 
With appropriate and carefully applied agricultural measures, yields 
above 1125 kg ha 	can be obtained from tilled slopes, which is only 
slightly less than the 1500 kg ha 	usually obtained from terraces. If 
terraces are built on land whose organic content has already been 
depleted by years of erosion, then large amounts of manure or 
several years of leguminous crops will be needed before yields can 
be raised. Thus, much of the terracing work of the great campaigns 
subsequently fell into disuse. (55) 
Small precipitation dams, on the other hand, gained the immediate 
acceptance of the masses. They were cheap, easy to build, and easy 
to work. They were good at retaining moisture and, since the 
precipitated soil originated from topsoil, rich-in the organicmatter 
lost from the tilled slopes, they also showed very quick returns and 
produced high crop yields. Instances of yields exceeding 7500 kg ha -
are not uncommon, though the average is probably. about half this 
amount. At first a small dam would be built, which might well silt 
up in one Summer and provide its first crop the following year. The 
dam would then be raised annually, gradually increasing the area 
available for cropping. Adequate yields could also be guaranteed 
in drought years and there is a report of a popular ditty, "With 
three mu of dam about, no need to fear a drought." (58) 
There were problems though. The first, larger, dams had been 
designed with drainage systems and flood spillways capable of coping 
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with a storm of intensity whose annual probability was 5 7,, i.e. one 
which would be expected to occur once in twenty years. Small earth 
dams were supposed to have a 10 7 criterion but, as their popularity 
spread, many were built without proper technical aid and these 
criteria were not observed. Either the construction work would not 
follow the design, or the design work was poor or not done at all. (57) 
Owing to poor drainage, the use rate was low and the high yields of 
which this type of land is capable, often failed to materialise or 
were erratic. In 1963, for example, it was estimated that only one 
third of the total area of precipitated land was being used. (58) As 
for meeting the flood resistance criteria, even where an attempt 
was made to observe them, it was very difficult because in the 
fifties, with incomplete records, nobody knew just how big a once in 
twenty or ten year flood would be. In any case, those criteria are 
now considered to have been too low. (59) 
There are numerous reports of the large-scale damage done to these 
dams, each year, throughout the past 25 years and continuing today. 
To quote the Renmin Ribao of 10 January 1957, 
"According to incomplete statistics, during the flood 
season of 1956 a total of 3500 check dams and over 1000 
other dams were damaged in Gansu. Of the 36 dams built 
by Qingyang County, Gansu, in the Spring of 1956, only 
one remained at the end of July which had not been 
ruined by the waters..." (60) 
The same newspaper, this time of 28 March 1979, 
"Thm again, Yangjia Gully in Nizhi County has concentrated 
large amounts of manpower for several years on building 
precipitated land to grow grain ..... in the two years 
1977 and 1978 the great majority of their precipitated 
land was destroyed by storms and torrents." (61) 
Of course, the phenomenon of damage to dams also diminished their 
role in reducing the silt load of the R. Huang. The 1957 article 
continues, 
"Of the total number of 84 small earthen dams built in the 
Jiuyuan Gully (Suide, N. Shaanxi), 40 had been filled up 
by accumulated silt before 1956 and, in one violent 
storm which it encountered on 8 August 1956 and in which 
40.7 m fell in the gully catchment in 275 minutes, 48 
earthen dams were filled up ..... eleven suffered partial 
loss of silt originally deposited in the dam, reckoned to 
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amount to 14,667 m3 and seven suffered its complete 
loss, reckoned at 28,000 rr, whilst losing also. the 
dams themselves. Thus, even the efficiency of the 
earthen dams in holding back floods, accumulating silt 
and preventing gully bed erosion was completely lost 
It is a pity that at a time when construction of the 
Sanmenxia reservoir has not yet started, of the large 
numbers of earthen dams built on the loess plateau 
before 1956, some have been damaged by erosion, some 
clogged up, and the storage capacity of others has been 
reduced. Soon their silt-checking function will be 
lost." 
Jiuyuan Gully, furthermore, was one of the special control points set 
up by the Government. 
Despite these losses, precipitation dams took an even greater 
precedence over the other measures. Whatever the reasons for this, 
which will be summarised in section iv, it was not that the need for 
a more balanced approach was not recognised. At least as early as 
1957, the adoption of the two most fundamental principles advocated 
today as being necessary for the development of the region, and for 
the control of soil and water losses, was already being urged. 
The first principle is that the withdrawal of tillage from slopes, 
generally accepted as the aim of soil and water conservation work, 
should depend upon the provision of an equivalent, stable, productive 
capacity elsewhere (on terraces or precipitated land) in order to 
guarantee the peasant's livelihood. The following statement was made 
in an authorit:àtive ,report of 1958, 
"A contradiction has arisen between agriculture and 
conservation work: One. side needs to withdraw tillage 
from ill-suited land to conserve water and soil, and to 
obtain rational use of the land, whilst the other side, 
inorder to guarantee the resident's food provision, 
cannot permit the large-scale withdrawal of tillage. In 
order to resolve this contradiction, we will adopt the 
following pathway: 
First of all, stabilise foodgrain production and 
furthermore raise per unit yields on land suited to 
cultivation, thus guaranteeing the resident's self-
sufficiency in foodgrains. 
On land from which tillage is to be withdrawn, plant 
trees and sow grass, develop animal husbandry .... thus 
to-raise the residents' income," (62) 
In order to create the stàble and high-yielding land, referred to 
above, the constant threat of water damage had to be alleviated, and 
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this could be done by increasing slope protection measures (either 
by terracing or by increasing the plant cover index) so that the 
sudden Summer storms would not give rise to sudden floods, but the 
surface runoff would be reduced to a level with which the dam system 
could safely cope. Thus was born the second principle, that a whole 
small catchment area should be taken as the basic unit for control 
measures, and that gully and slope control should proceed simult-
aneously, 
"Some people consider that the carrying out of all types of 
conservation work will create a contradictory lack of man-
power. In reality it is a question of how to distribute it. 
If large amounts of manpower are expended uniquely on 
building dams, of course there will be none left to pursue 
other measures •.... There are also those who reckon that 
the cause of damage to earthen dams is the absence of a 
carefully considered choice of damsite or a correct design 
for the dam itself or observation of the quality of work, 
etc. Although there is some truth in this, a more important 
cause is that without the conservation measures in the large 
catchment area above the dams, it is impossible to retard 
the speed of, or reduce the amount of, runoff and its silt 
from the slopes •... To set biological and engineering 
methods against each other is incorrect. Each type of 
conservation measure has its own function and the building 
of dams in gully floors is no exception. However, if you 
emphasise any one kind of measure ......you are doomed to 
failure •...... This is not completely to negate the 
conservancy efficiency of dams, since they are one of the 
intergrated measures of soil and water conservation. What 
should be opposed are policies which do not consider the 
locality or ..... which take conservation work simply, to be 
the building of dams," (63) 
Yet these warnings went unheeded. The reasons are complicated, but 
as we have seen, in addition to technical problems, the principal 
factor in determining the extent to which a given measure was applied, 
turned out to be its appeal to the peasants, who had to apply it, 
maintain it and lose or gain by it, themselves. Proper comprehensive 
control, as represented by the above two principles, is capable of 
providing considerable benefit to the peasants, but owing to its long 
term and unfamiliar nature, it required good planning and organisation 
in order to gain their acceptance. Regrettably these were lacking, 
as this complaint in the Guangming Ribao of 11 January 1957 points 
out, 
"It seemed that the water conservancy department was fighting 
single-handedly; the agricultural and forestry departments 
helped little, if at all. The forestry department seemed to 
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be only concerned with large-scale afforestation and lost 
sight of the fact that for soil conservation, small patches 
of trees were needed. The agricultural department was 
behind in the co-ordination work on soil conservation and 
increasing production. Thus, the water conservancy depart-
ment, unable to do what properly was the onus of the 
agricultural department in the comprehensive policy, unleashed 
its energy on the aspect of water conservancy and built as 
many dams as it could. Peasants in the R. Huang region were 
right in saying, the Ministry of Water Conservancy works 
hard, the Ministry of Foresty works lukewarmly and the 
Ministry of Agriculture hardly works.,, (64) 
The same article goes on to report that, at the 1956 Soil and Water 
Conservation Conference, the matter of poor co-ordination amongst the 
various departments was not gone into deeply enough and no summary 
was made. Another conference was held in January 1957, and an 
investigation was conducted by the RHWCC. In June it reported, 
"Soil and Water conservation work in various provinces along 
the upper and middle reaches of the R. Huang has slowed down 
in many areas ....... As Spring is the best season for the 
development of the soil and water conservation work and, 
while the task for this year is only half that.of last year, 
the incomplete statistical survey prepared by April 20 shows 
that only 20 7 of the year's task ....... has been achieved 
and, in some areas, it was below 10 7. If this rate of 
progress is maintained the plan for the year will hardly be 
materialised." (65) 
In September 1957, it was reported, 
"Up to the present, water and soil conservation work in some 
areas has not been placed in an important position. More 
often than not, the task is put aside when some other tasks 
become imminent. (66) 
At the same time (September 1957) the State Council approved the 
Provisional Programme of soil and water conservation, which established 
new organs, called upon all levels of administration to draw up the 
conservation plans, and laid down various laws: Slopes exceeding 
427 might not be reclaimed; destruction of forests for land reclamation 
was prohibited; where slopes had already been reclaimed and could not 
be afforested because of the pressures of population, a limit was 
set by which time the land should be terraced, and others. (67) 
However, such laws were both impracticable and unenforceable under 
the conditions obtaining on the loess plateau and were ignored, or at 
least soon forgotton. 
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So, the trend towards building small precipitation dams to the 
neglect of other conservation measures continued to develop and 
although statistics from the time cannot be relied upon to show 
what was done, they do show at least what was hoped. The shift 
in emphasis is clear. The "1,707,621 check dams, earth dams and 
small reservoirs" 
(68)  claimed to have been built by 1958, represent 
a 2.38 fold increase over the total number of "check dams, silt 
precipitation dams and gully earth dams" proposed in the 1955 plan. (69) 
In the 1959 plan, 683,000 silt precipitation dams replace the 
79,000 of the 1955 plan, a 6.8 fold increase. By the time of the 
beginning of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution the emphasis 
on dams had become well established and to quote Li Fudu, Vice-
Chairman of the RHWCC, 
"We propose a policy of checking silt and accumulating 
water in the middle reaches whilst preventing floods 
and discharging silt in the lower reaches, with emphasis 
on the checking of silt. The method to be adopted ... 
apart from the active promotion of soil and water 
conservation in the serious loss areas ..... is vigorously 
to develop gully control work here, with the emphasis on 
the building of silt precipitation dams". (70) 
The same article goes on to praise silt precipitation dams, but does 
not mention their susceptibility to water damage wheri unaccompanied 
by other conservation measures, and even singles out Jiuyuan Gully 
as being exemplary, 
"Between 1953 and 1957, the RHWCC constructed five 
large-scale precipitation dams in Jitsyuan Gully 
After several years of successively raising their 
heights, these dams by 1964 had accumulated over 
5 x 10 m3 of silt and had created over 40 hectares of 
fertile precipitated land. The masses have grown crops 
there since 1959 and under the extraordinarily dry 
circumstances of 1962 and 1965 the crops still flourished, 
which shows the outstanding superiority of precipitated 
land." 
iii) Political Imbalance. 
By all accounts, in the anarchy of the Cultural Revolution and the 
subsequent period known as the time of the Gang of Four, matters 
became much worse. Yet inasmuch as these events are very complicated 
and still the subject of much debate, only three aspects bearing a 
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direct influence on conservation work will be presented here. 
They can be summarised by three slogans of the time: 
'Put Politics in Command'. 
'In Agriculture Learn from Dazhai'. 
'Make Grain the Key Link', 
'Put Politics in Command' meant, in practice, that party cadres gave 
orders and everyone else had to do as they were told. There was 
factional in-fighting and, as the Chinese people were blown hither 
and thither by shifting gusts of policy, 'Bigger' or 'More' were 
taken to mean 'Better', Statistics, -such as the number of dams or 
terraces built,or the area of land newly opened to cultivation, took 
on disproportionate importance as arbitary orders were issued by 
people who did not understand the problem. As it was described, 
with hindsight, in the Renxnin Ribao, 
"For a number of years we have done agriculture by 
relying on campaigns and 'Going all out'. Now we can 
see very clearly that the endless political campaigns 
seriously wounded the enthusiasm of the broad masses 
and basic level cadres, with such results as 'You check 
up on me, I check up on you, check here, check there, 
we all get a scolding; You're boss, I'm boss, change 
boss, no one's boss.' This kind of stupidity must not 
be repeated. As for 'Going all out' ....... the problem 
- is, 'all out' to do what? In recent years it has been 
'all out for farmland capital construction, all out for 
small man-made plains, all out for water conservancy.' 
Of course ...,,,,.., some were done well ...... suited to 
practice and deriving large benefit from small investment, 
but on the other hand, a very large part was done badly, 
even to the extent that they should never have been done 
at all," (71) 
An example, of what the last remark might indicate, may be taken from 
that part of Shanxi where several tens of hills have all been 
terraced, but remain unused because they are just too far from the 
villages for peasants, to commute, let alone to carry water and manure 
there. (72) 	- 
The corollary to such experiences was that experts of all kinds were 
discredited (or worse), their opinions were ignored and their units 
were disbanded. Jiuyuan Gully, for example, had been a small 
catchment experimental gully of the RHWCC since 1954 and, up to the 
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beginning of the Cultural Revolution, had received Y 460,000 
(L 131,000) and built 161 precipitation darns of various sizes, which 
controlled 57 % of the catchment area and had created about 130 ha 
of precipitated land whose average yield was 4500 kg ha 	During 
the Cultural Revolution it was singled out as a bad example, as 
representing, "the State forks out money whilst the peasants till 
the land," (73) 
In Shaanxi there used to be a central conservation office employing 
290 ,( , four experimental stations, one research institute and a 
subordinate organisation at the 'control point' of each County. In 
all, there was a technical staff of 2000 ,. • All but the central 
office and the Suide testing station were closed down and the 
technical workforce fell to 100 k • Thus, when it came to building 
dams, facilities such as spillways for the prevention of flood 
damage, for example, were considered expensive and anyway unnecessary, 
as the original capacity of the reservoir would be sufficient to 
absorb the flood. Techriicans' objections were overruled, and it is 
said that when, a few years later, the reservoir having silted full, 
the dam would succumb to flood, it would be the technicans 
would get the blame. (74) 
The Learn from Dazhai campaign began in 1964, when Chairman Mao 
Zedong called upon the nation to adopt the attitude of self-reliant 
hard struggle by which it was claimed the Dazhai brigade had acheived 
outstanding agricultural yields despite harsh conditions. 
(75) 
 Dazhai 
falls within the R. Hai catchment on a hilly part of the loess 
plateau in Xiyang County, Southeast Shanxi. 
What is not in dispute is that the Dazhai bri&ade claimed vigorously 
to oppose what at that time was called the 'Counter-revolutionary 
Revisionist Line' of 'the renegade, traitor and scab', 
Comrade Liu Shaoqi and especially those policies attributed to him 
and known as 'San Zi Yi Bao' (Plots for private use, free markets, 
129 
small enterprises with sole responsibility for their own profit or 
loss, and the fixing of output quotas based on individual 
households). 
(76) 
 Later, with the downfall of the Gang of Four, the 
'Learn from Dazhai' movement was held to have had 'ultra-leftist 
errors' such that, 
"In the past, Dazhai was elevated to an inappropriate 
status and the specific experience of Dazhai became an 
insurpassable oracle, and a lot of stupid things were 
done". 
Since then, the first three of the San Zi Yi Bao policies have been 
restored, the fourth has been declared justified 'under the 
particular circumstances and on the limited scale of the time' and 
responsibility for these policies has been reassumed by the Party 
Central Committee. Comrade Liu Shaoqi has been reinstated 
posthumously and the blame for his downfall has been put with 
Comrades Lin Biao and the Gang of Four who, it is claimed, 
"In order to push the ultra-leftist line, repeatedly 
critised San Zi Yi Bao, meddled with party policy, 
messed up people's ideology and seriously obstructed 
or ruined rural economic development". (78) 
The main outcome of all this was that the masses lost their enthusiasm. 
In order to 'cut off the tail of capitalism', private plots and 
private trees were collectivised and free markets were banned 
(although they continued secretly). Dazhai's egalitarian workpoints 
system was widely adopted (though in some cases it was just a 
pretence to avoid being criticised for 'opposing Dazhai') as was its 
grain ration distribution by 'self assessment and public discussion'. 
This was later criticised as being 'self assessment and no discussion' 
giving rise to, 
"the same results whether or not you work •... no matter 
how good other brigades' production was, they refused to 
exceed Dazhai with respect to the levels of payment in 
kind or in cash, so in quite a few brigades more work 
could not earn more remuneration". (79) 
The same article reports that there was also a discincentive against 
comprehensive development, in that doing better.than Dazhai at 
anything was as likely to bring criticism as would failing to learn 
from Dazhai, 
"Capitalism within the collective economy' was 
criticised. This exerted a heavy influence on all 
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production and basically strangled to death domestic 
sidelines. In Xiyang there was also the unwritten law 
that whatever the work, it must not outstrip Dazhai. 
Some brigades from Chengguan Commune originally had quite 
good material and technical preconditions for the 
development of industrial sidelines but, since they were 
afraid of 'crusMng Dazhai', they did not dare to get 
moving with such development •... We could only say, 
'learn from Dazhai', 'catch up with Dazhai', but never 
dared say 'surpass Dazhai' .....to 'grow maize and 
nothing else' was in fact a 'suicide policy' and had it 
continued, the •...... collective economy of the communes 
would have collapsed". 
During the course of the Cultural Revolution, Chairman Mao's call to 
"Make grain the key link and ensure comprehensive development" was 
popularised with great vigour. On the same theme, he had also 
called for China to develop with one third arable farmland, one third 
pasture and one third forest. 
(80) 
 As can be inferred from the above 
quotation, what actually happened was that grain production was 
over-emphasised at the expense of comprehensive development. As 
Yu Zheng, Vice-President of Shaanxi Sciences Commission, put it, 
"Make grain the key link' became 'Make grain the whole 
net' and pushed out the other links, namely forestry, 
husbandry and sidelines." (81) 
This happened in two ways, by the setting of unrealistically high 
state grain purchasing quotas and by direct opposition to other 
activities. 
Of the first trend, Chen Cuoliang, Vice-Principal of the Research 
Office of the North West Institute of Soil and Water Conservation, 
Biology and Pedology writes,, 
"Recently, owing to a lopsided understanding of making 
grain the key link, in several places in N. Shaanxi, 
the cadres resorted to coercion and commandism, issued 
arbitrary and confused orders and set indiscriminate 
planting and state purchasing targets. In order to 
fulfil the task stipulated by higher ranks, the peasants 
had no alternative but blindly to open up wasteland, 
have extensive sowing but meagre harvests, and open up 
for grain all the land suited to forestry or husbandrY". (82) 
In an earlier part of the same article, Shan Lun, Vice-President and 
Assistant Researcher at the Institute, is more specific, 
"In Yan'an they were asked, in 197 to increase grgin 
yields from the original 450 x 10 kg to 1500 x 10 kg 
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and in order so to do, step by step to complete the 
task, they promiscuously opened up wasteland to grow 
more grain". 
The outcome is described bleakly in both cases; by Chen, 
"Grain didn't rise, forestry and husbandry were both 
lost, the peasants' income fell and their livelihood 
became even poorer." 
and Shan, 
".... resulted in the destruction of forests and 
grassland and the intensification of soil and water 
losses." 
To this it may be added that the total grain yield acheived, in 1979, 
in Yen'an was 458 x 10 6  kg, but the area of wasteland newly opened, 
between 1977 and 1979, was 1200 	which prompted a letter to the 
Renmin Ribao, complaining, 
"Some cadres ..... do not cherish natural resources, 
they lopsidedly reckon, 'When grain yields reach the 
goal, then the party secretary's a good old sou l". (83) 
Opposition to activities, other than growing grain, ranged from 
general fears that afforestation would use up too much land and that 
husbandry would waste fodder, to direct incitement to "use the methods 
of dictatorship in agriculture" to chop down trees and build grain 
silos. 
(84)  More specifically, the idea that the demands made on 
forestry and stockrearing regions for grain production should be 
limited to self-sufficiency was dubbed the, "Enought to eat theory" 
and criticised as being insufficient. (85) According to the Renmin 
Ribao of 22 December 1978, 
"It was advocated quite absurdly that forest and pasture 
areas should make grain the key link. As a result, in 
forest areas, forests were destroyed, wasteland was 
opened up ....... and the phenomenon of grain squeezing 
out forests occurred continuously; in pastural areas 
some places eliminated investment in: husbandry and 
cancelled its leading organs and the various grassland 
administrative and vetertinary units, etc., Under such 
false slogans as 'Shepherds shouldn't eat ill-gotten 
grain' and 'Battle to turn the tables in agriculture', 
pastural areas were urged to become self-sufficient in 
- 	 foodgrains, seeds and fodder; then they were burdened 
with the responsibility of compulsory grain sales to the 
state", (86) 
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Thus, the picture emerges of a generally apathetic or war-weary 
peasantry continuing in the traditional way to crop hilltops and, 
when obliged so to do, opening up forests and pastures for grain, 
or building precipitation dams. These latter, being built without 
due technical competence and without other conservation measures to 
reduce runoff from above, were prone to collapse. The example of the 
luckless Jiuyuan Gully can be taken to show how these factors might 
combine to create disaster. The following is drawn from a report in 
the Renrnin Huanghe magazine of January l979.(67)  (Figure 3-1). 
Jiuyuan Gully catchment is 70.1 
km  
in area and the main Gully is 
about 11 km long. Notwithstanding the difficulties described in 
previous sections, by 1977 it contained in all 333 precipitation 
dams and reservoirs. Ten of them were in the main gully, and of these 
three were clear water reservoirs. Tributary gullies included, four 
kilometres from the main gully mouth, Linjiaxian Gully. At the 
mouth of Linjidan Gully was the Qingnian reservoir and, 500 in 
upstream, a precipitation dam where silt would be allowed to settle 
so that only clear water would enter the reservoir. 
On 6 July 1977, 109.9 rrnn of rain fell and the Liujiawan reservoir dam 
suffered piping, and collapsed. This reservoir had been added just 
downstream of the Jiuyuan Gully main dam, a precipitation dam, and 
was meant to receive clear water from it. However, owing to poor 
siting, its backwaters immersed two thirds of the Jiuyuan Gully main 
dam and, as the level suddenly dropped, a large portion of the main 
dam slumped. Meanwhile, a landslip in Linjiaxian Gully blocked that 
precipitation dam's flood spillway. 
During the night of 4/5 August, 117.4 mm of rain fell and the 
Linjiaxian precipitation darn, its spillway still uncleared, overflowed 
and collapsed, taking with it the Qingnian dam, the Malian front dam 
and the Jiuyuan main darn, which had not been repaired. A little 
later, the Hongqi reservoir, which had an insufficient spillway, 
overflowed and gave way, causing the successive collapse of all eight 
reservoirs and dams beneath it. In the gully catchment as a whole, 
234 tributary dams and 9 main gully dams were destroyed and 51.5 ha 
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Sketch plan, not to scale. 
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of precipitated land (27 7. of the total) were lost. The official 
verdict was that, "the main reasons ......... were inferior work 
quality, poor siting and slack managment." We have seen that there 
were general causes both for this, and for the slow development or 
actual decline, of the region as a whole. 
iv) Relevance to the Sanmenxia Project. 
Even if the conservation work had proceeded according to plan, and 
had fulfilled the hopes expressed in the Soviet estimates of the 
reduction in R. Huang silt load, it would not have been discernable, 
because of natural variation, from measurements of the silt load made 
in the late fifties and early sixties. Therefore, it cannot be said that 
the failure to reduce the silt load of the R. Huang noticeably, by 
1962, was a new factor in the decision to reconstruct the Sanrnenxia 
reservoir. The silt content of the river would have been,within the 
limits of accuracy of the measurements, as predicted. It must be 
concluded that, despite the exaggerated claims of the Great Leap 
Forward, the inaccuracy of the previous estimates wap realised, or 
the significance of such a heavy silt load was reassessed, or the 
decision had little to do with the oncoming silt load. 
There is evidence to suggest that all three factors played their part. 
The latter tw, combined, are inferred from the discussion of so 
many other factors (Section 4). As for the need for a general 
reassessment of the pace of conservation work, it would have become 
obvious, at least to those working on the loess plateau, that no 
quick solution had been found. Since their fears were publicised 
from time to time, it is reasonable to assume that, as with other 
aspects of the Sanmenxia project, there was a gradual accumulation 
of evidence which would eventually have given rise to change. 
Furthermore, when it was realised that the loess plateau was to develop 
more slowly than had at first been assumed, and that this region was 
to remain poor for longer, then the relative importance of the 
Guanzhong Plain, which for so long had supported it, would 
correspondingly have had to have been raised. 
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Thus, interestingly, one of the more important ways in which the slow 
pace, of both conservation and economic development, on the loess 
plateau, would have influenced the Sanxnenxia project, was its effect 
in placing emphasis on the loss of prime agricultural land from the 
Guangzhong Plain. It should be emphasised though, that, whereas the 
failure for there to have been a significant decrease in R. Huang 
silt might not be so significant to the original design of the 
Sanrnenxia reservoir, it is, nonetheless, still of importance to the 
long-term control of the river. (Chapter 5). 
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4) Sedimentation Problems Exposed. 
Impounding began at Sanmenxia on 15 September 1960 and, in 
accordance with the modified Soviet design, the top of the dam was 
at 353 m and the operational regime was a high head reservoir for 
the storage of water and silt. Under the modified plan, the maximum 
permissible water level in the first period would be 340 m. Actually 
it was above 330 m for a total of 200 days and the highest level, 
which occurred on 21 October 1961, was 332.58 m. At this point the 
reservoir backwater, along the R. Wei, extended 55 km beyond Tongguan 
to Chishuizhen in Hua county, 178 km from the dam, and the confluence 
of the rivers-Wei, Beiluo and Huang was flooded. This regime was 
continued until 19 March 1962, when the normal maximum water level 
was lowered by 10 m to 330 m as the first stage in its conversion to 
operate as a flood retardation and silt discharge reservoir. 
(88) 
 The 
sedimentation problems exposed in this first period, were a major 
factor in the decision to change the operational regime and, 
subsequently, to reconstruct the dam. They will be presented. in two 
groups; those contributing to what was seen as rapid loss of 
reservoir capacity, and those seen as posing a threat to the Cuanzhong 
Plain. 
i) Failure of Density Current and Loss of Reservoir Capacity. 
It was the design intention that silt, especially the coarser grains, 
should settle within the reservoir area to obviate turbine erosion 
and downstream aggradation. About 20 7. of the finer particles, 
though, were expected to be discharged by a density current which 
would establish itself in Summer. In fact, of the 1646 x 106  t of 
silt which entered the reservoir area before March 1962, only 
112 x 10  t (6.8 7.) were discharged and 1534 x 1o 6 t were deposited 
in the reservoir area, 1266 x 106 t below Tongguan. (89) 
In the clear water period, before the first flood of 1961, the bed 
was far from flat. This, and the submerged bar caused by bank 
collapses in the stretch just before the dam, increased flow 
resistance such that the density current could not reach the dam and y 
so silt was deposited. (90) 
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In the flood months July to October, 1310 x 
10  
t of silt entered 
the reservoir from which 780 x 10 6 3 m was deposited in a fairly 
typical delta morphology (Figure 3-2) subsequently extending both 
upstream and downstream. Since deposition had by then levelled out 
the bed to the top of the submerged bar, the density current was 
capable, on occassion, of reaching the dam, but it was still too 
weak to discharge a substantial quantity of silt. It deposited a 
further 140 x 106  m3 in the antedam area and only 88 x 
10  
m3 were 
discharged downstream. The dry bulk weight of the deposits was 
found to be 1.3 t m • 91 
How significant was the total deposition is a relative question. 
Much attention has been drawn, in recent years, to the fact that in 
this first period of eighteen months, which included only one flood 
season, the reservoir lost about 12 7 of the capacity under a water 
level of 335 m. 	However, under the modified Soviet plan, this 
would have been expected; the 1646 x 10 t which entered the reservoir 
in this period, would have been reduced, at best, by 10 % by soil 
'and water conservation work. Of the 1481 x 10 
6 t thus entering the 
reservoir, 20 7 would have been expected to have been discharged. 
The expected volume of the remaining 1184 x 106  t would have been 
987 x 106  m3 (Dry bulk weight assumed to be 1.2 t m' 3 ), or about 
10 7 of the capacity under 335 m. The extra 2 % found in practice 
is hardly an unreasonable degree of error and, when it is remembered 
that under the modified plan the total reservoir capacity was gradually 
to have been increased to about 64,000 X10 
6   m3 , it really does not 
appear significant. However, if for any reason the reservoir water 
level was not to be permitted to rise, or, indeed, was to be lowered, 
then even the predicted loss of 10 7e in just eighteen months would 
seem very serious indeed, for its significance would be that the 
reservoir would have a life of only 12 to 15 years. 
ii) Retrogressive Deposition and other R. Wei Problems. 
In the flood of 1961 the backwaters extended 7 km upstream from 
Tongguan along the R. Huang mainstream, and 178 km from the dam along 
the R. Wei, and covered much of the surrounding land; this was 
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I FIGURE 3-2 	SANMENXIA RESERVOIR SEDIMENTATION IN 1961 	SOURCE: Note 91 	 1 
in keeping with the design intention. However, deposition within 
this area raised the bed level at Tongguan by 1.7 m, and a sandbar 
appeared across both the main channel and floodplains at the mouth 
of the R. Wei. In the past, such sandbars had been known to occur 
when the confluence was flooded, but they had been confined to the 
main channel and had been easily washed away by the first R. Wei 
flood after the recession of the R. Huang water. Now, whilst the 
reservoir level. remained high, these obstructions would stay and, 
together, they had the effect of reducing the slope of the lower 
R. Wei from 0.021 7 to 0.0181 7. (93) 
The effects of the reduced slope of the lower R. Wei were extensive. 
In the first period, to March 1962,9.8 7 of the total deposition 
at Sanrnenxia occurred above the highest water level, that is, 
retrogressive deposition had begun, and, by November 1961, it extended 
223 kin from the dam, along the RWei, and showed no. sign of stopping. 
Both the normal and flood water levels of the R. Wei were thus raised 
by about 2 m. (Figure 3_3). (94) 
The rise in the normal water level brought about a corresponding rise 
in the ground water level alongside and caused difficulties for the 
riparian farmers of the great Guanzhong Plain, especially in the two 
counties, Hua and Huayin, of Weinan district. In this region, 
between the R. Wei and the Qin mountains to the South, lies the dry 
bed of a Western Han dynasty canal, called Caoqu ("Transport Canal"), 
which had been built to enable goods to be shipped from the R. Huang 
at Tongguan to the then Capital, Chang'an (present day Wan), 
because the R. Wei meandered too much and was too shallow, except 
in the flood season. This lowland has for many years suffered 
alkalisation problems, but the increase in the water level of the 
R. Wei raised the local underground water table and both extended and 
intensified them. One estimate gives the area spoilt above Tongguan 
as 330 
The rise in the flood water level made flood prevention work all the 
more critical. Although in the first eighteen months Xi'an' was not 
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extension of th R. Wei deposition, and subsequent rise in water level 
were not halted, then soon it would be. 
iii) The Decision to Abandon Sanmenxia as a High Head Storage Reservoir. 
On 19 March 1962, the reservoir water level was lowered and a new 
operational regime adopted. The new regime was that which had been 
proposed earlier, by such people as Comrades Ye and Wen, and covered 
using the reservoir to store only clear, Winter, water, and to hinder 
the Summer flood peaks as little as possible, using thett4at the same 
time, to scour out such sediment as had already been deposited. No 
detail of the process by which this decision was made was published 
outside China; indeed, it was not even acknowledged until 1971, after 
the completion of a two-stage reconstruction. It is interesting to 
note, however, that a conference of the Chinese Hydraulic Engineering 
Society was reported, in January 1962, to have been held 'recently', 
in order to discuss the effects of the release of clear water from 
the Sanmenxia reservoir, upon the lower reaches of the R. Huang, 
which would asume no change in the reservoir's operational regime. (97) 
Whilst in this instance it is not possible to go into how the decision 
was reached, it is nonetheless instructive to summarise the reasons 
why it was reached and, furthermore, why in 1962. 
In the course of operating the Sanmenxia reservoir, even at the 
reduced maximum water level of 340 m, many of the assumptions upon 
which the design had been based were tested. Some were found to 
have been correct, some were found to have been in error, and others 
were quantified for the first time. Some of the effects of the 
reservoir were largely beneficial; for example, although the erosive 
action of clear water destroyed some engineering structures for 
river training in the lower reaches, in general it brought about an 
improvement in channel morphology and flood carrying capacity 
(Section 6).(98) Furthermore, as we have seen in Sections 3,iv, and 
4,i, the increase in- reservoir deposition occasioned by the slow 
progress of soil and water conservation work and the failure of the 
density current, would not, of itself, have made a significant 
change to the original design intentions, whilst the effects in the 
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R. Wei valley gave genuine cause for deep concern which might well 
have been sufficient alone to bring about a change in policy. 
It was suggested at the end of Section 2,iv, that, owing to various 
political, social and economic changes, the conditions prevailing by 
the early sixties in China would have been conducive to the 
abandonment of the dream that had favoured the adoption of those 
assumptions upon which the Soviet design had been based, in favour 
of alternative assumptions leading to an approach more closely 
linked to the short term needs of a developing China. The dangerous 
situation developing in the lower R. Wei valley would have been the 
required catalyst and there, then, would have been an interrelated 
set of reasons for change. Firstly, the spoilage of so much land 
beyond the reservoir backwaters and the threat to Wan would have 
precluded the proposed increase in reservoir capacity to 64,000 x 10 6 
m3 . This would be true not only for its own sake, but also because 
the relative value of such prime land as is to be found on the 
Guanzhong Plain, would have been placed much higher in view of the 
strictures occasioned by the 'Three Hard Years' and of the failure 
of soil and water conservation work substantially to improve 
agricultural yields on the loess plateau. Since it had been found 
to be undesirable to raise the water level further, or even to allow 
it to remain at its current level, the extent of deposition within 
the reservoir area took on alarming new proportions', for 10 7 of the 
new, lower, maximum reservoir capacity had been lost in the first 
eighteen months. 
Not all the points of contention had been tested here though. The 
most notable amongst those which had not, were the questions of 
whether sediment already deposited in the reservoir, could be 
flushed out subsequently and whether or not the bed level at 
Tongguan, base level for the R. Wei, could be lowered successfully. 
Recent experiences elsewhere in China, and abroad, suggested that it 
would be possible, but, as will be seen, the lessons of over-optimism 
had been well learnt and subsequent changes were to be made with 
great caution. 
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5) The Reconstructions. 
In December 1964, a meeting was called by Comrade Zhou Enlai and held 
under the auspices of the State Council to discuss the regulation of 
the R. Huang. The point of emphasis was the proposed reconstruction 
of the Sanmenxia reservoir. Those attending the meeting included 
representatives of the Ministry of Hydroelectric Power, the Ministry 
of Forestry, the RHWCC and the Local Authorities of some of the 
regions through which the R. Huang flows. Also represented were 
various colleges and research bodies. (99) 
Although the reservoir water level had been lowered in March 1962, 
siltation had continued both within the reservoir area and as 
retrogressive deposition along the R. Wei, extending to 268 km above 
the dam by October 1962. Furthermore, it had become apparent that, 
despite the new mode of operation, in its present form the reservoir 
was still unable to discharge the greater part of its incoming silt 
load and even less to purge that already accumulated. When an 
exceptionally large flood was encountered in the Summer of 1964, 1294 x 
of sediment were deposited in the reservoir area as the waters 
were slowed by the retarding effect of insufficiently large sluices. 
In this way, in just over four years, the reservoir capacity 
corresponding to a water level of 335 m had been reduced from 
9600 x 106  m3 to 5700 x 106 
The shades of opinion expressed at the meeting ranged from the 
advocacy of no change, to the proposal that the dam be demolished. 
The majority, however, believed that some form of reconstruction 
should be carried out, and with urgency too, lest Wan be further 
endangered. 
Two main proposals were considered. Firstly, to construct two 
tunnels in the Northern (left) bank and to convert four of the eight 
generator penstocks into sediment discharge sluices, a plan which 
became known as the Two Tunnels and Four Tubes plan. Secondly, to 
re-open some or all of the twelve bottom sluices used for diversion 
during construction (Figure 3-4). In choosing an appropriate scheme, 
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the desire for increased sediment discharge capacity was the key 
point, but it had to be weighed against considerations of the 
structural integrity of the dam. The capacity to generate electricity 
had already been lost and, in any case, would have had to take 
second place to safety, be it of the darn itself, of the Guanzhong 
Plain, or of the reservoir'. role in flood prevention downstream. 
The total existing discharge capacity provided by the twelve deep 
sluices was 3080 m3 s, corresponding to a water level of 315 m. 
For the same water level each additional bottom sluice, if re-opened, 
could provide about 440 m 3 $ -1 additional discharge capacity, each 
3 -1 	 3 -1 tunnel 1040 in s and each tube 225 m s . Thus, opening all twelve 
bottom sluices could increase the discharge capacity by 170 7. and the 
Two Tunnels and Four Tubes plan would roughly double it, to 6060 m 3 
-1 
5 
The Two Tunnels and Four Tubes plan was considered insufficient to 
allow the reservoir to be operated without retarding floods and, 
thereby, becoming further silted, and so the additional re-opening 
of some of the bottom sluices was proposed. However, several comrades 
expressed fears for the structural integrity of the darn. The chief 
concern was that the tensile stress in the concrete surrounding the 
sluices might be too great and lead to cracking around the sluicing 
structures. A second concern was that since all but three of the 
bottom sluices are directly beneath the deep sluices and their 
outlets converge, cavitation might occur when both sets are used 
simultaneously, (Figure 3-5). These proposals were, therefore, 
shelved. 
In his closing address to the conference, Comrade Zhou Enlai noted 
that most comrades were in favour of at least the Two Tunnels and 
Four Tubes proposals and, accordingly, gave permission for that 
part of the work to proceed. However, it should be done with 'caution 
and conscientiousness', he said. It was acknowledged that the scope 
of this reconstruction would be insufficient to solve the problems, 
and indeed this was the case (Section 6), but it should be able to 
ameliorate them somewhat whilst further studies were carried out in 
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FIGURE 	SECTION THROUGH SLUICE SECTION OF THE 
3.5 SANMENXIA DAM 	SOURCE: QUSRL, Unpublished Drawings. 
order to determine a suitable advancedreconstruction plan, he 
thought. He remarked that the sedimentation problem had 'The 
urgency of singed eyebrows' and could not wait. Determination was 
needed to guarantee the safety of Wan, and he rejected, as 
undialectical, any suggestion that the Guanzhong Plain might become 
flooded in order to save the lOwer reaches. 
The terms of reference for research into an advanced reconstruction 
were also given at the conference, 
"For ordinary floods the greatest possible use is to be made 
of the flood carrying and silt discharging capacities of the 
lower reaches, so as to reduce deposition above Tongguan and 
to guarantee the safety of Wan. Only thus can the life of 
the reservoir be conserved so that when the lower reaches 
definitely require that it hold back the flood, it can be 
brought into action. Once the flood discharge capacity has 
been increased, then the rationality and possibility of low 
head electricity generation may also be considered." (102) 
In the meantime, calls were made for the strengthening of soil and 
water conservation work in the middle reaches and for improvements 
in flood prevention works in the lower reaches. The four tubes were 
completed in time for the flood season of 1966 and the tunnels were 
completed for the 1967 and 1969 floods respectively. Their dimensions 
and discharge capacities are given in Table 3-2 and Figure 3-6. 
The cautious approach seen here was again apparent in 1969, when 
another such meeting was held, this time to discuss an advanced 
reconstruction. Represented at this second meeting were the leaders 
of the four provinces He'nan, Shaanxi, Shanxi and Shandong and also 
various scientific and research organisations and colleges. It was 
decided, this time, to reopen a total of eight of the bottom sluices, 
but to do so in two stages, beginning with the three bottom sluices 
in the spillway section (Figure 3-3) of the dam and only later to 
move on to do five in the sluice section. This allowed the reconst-
rution design to be checked first on part of the dam which served 
no other purpose (the changes in mode of operation had rendered the 
spillways vestigial) and without disturbing the deep sluices or 
bringing up the problem of cavitation. The first three bottom 
sluices were brought into operation in 1970, followed by the other 
five in 1971. 	The dimensions and discharge capacities are 
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TABLE 	DETAILS OF SANMENXIA DAM 
3-2 DISCHARGE FACILITIES 
Type I Level of Lowest Part (m) Dimentlona (m) Discharge of Single Sluice Under Various Water _Levels (in' V) 3 1 0m 305m 1300m
, 
 2 a 
Deep Sluice 300 3 Wide x 8 High 150 45 
Upstream Section 11 
Dia., Open Section 
Tunnel 290 9 Wide x 12 High 910 655 360 100 
Arch, Radial Intake 
Gates 8 x 8. 
Tube 300 7.5 Dia., Outlet 910 2.6 Wide x 3.4 High 
Bottom Sluice 280 3 Wide x 8 High 420 370 310 240 
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shown in Table 3-2 and Figure 3-6. 
The overall reconstruction principal decided at the 1969 meeting was 
summarised thus, 
"Under the precondition of the two guarantees, there 
shall be rational flood prevention, silt discharge and 
purging, and run-of-river electricitygenertion." (104) 
The two guarantees referred to the safety of the lower reaches and of 
Wan respectively. Rational flood prevention meant that the 
reservoir would only be used to retard floods in emergencies and that 
its influence on the passage of ordinary floods would be minimised. 
The specific scope of the reconstruction was as follows: In order 
that deposition during ordinary floods should not extend beyond 
Tongguan, a discharge capacity of 10,000 m3 s 	for a water level of 
315 in would be provided (this corresponds to a flood of the size 
expected once every three years). In the flood season the normal. 
water level would be kept below 305 m and during the rest of the year 
it would not normally exceed 315 m, except for the prevention of 
ice-jam floods, when it might rise to about 328 in. Four 50 MW 
generating sets would be installed, which could be used whenever the 
water level exceeded 300 m. The four generator inlets were to be 
lowered to .287 m. Electricity so produced would be sent to Shaanxi 
and Shanxi so as to distribute more fairly, between upstream and 
downstream, the benefits as well- as the burdens of the reservoir. 
The first new generating set was installed in 1971 and, with the 
installation of the second one in 1973, the reconstruction period is 
considered to be completed. The one high head set to have been 
installed under the original scheme was dismantl( and was 
subsequently used in the Danjiang hydropower station on the R. Hanshui 
in Hubei, the others did not arrive from.theUSSR. (105) Although no 
further major reconstruction has taken place at Sanrnenxia, the dam 
has been modified so that oneof the four tubes was lowered to 287 m 
and reassumed its original role as penstock, for the addition of a 
fifth generator set (Figure 3-7). 
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FIGURE 3-7 THE SANMENXIA DAM 1979-80 
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FI1URE 3 - 7 Continued 
Figure 3-7 (c) Upstream view of the two tunnels 	 (PM) 
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Figure 3-7 (d) Upstream view of the two vestigial flood 	(PM) 
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Photos: Fure -7 (a), Sanmenxia, 29 December 1979. Figures 
(L) to 3-7 (f), Sanrnenxia, 3 August 1980. 
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6) The Effects of the Reconstructions and Some Wider Implications. 
The reservoir mode of operation was changed in 1962 to silt discharging 
and flood retardation, which meant that, except when the lower 
reaches so required for flood prevention, the reservoir discharged 
as much as possible of both incoming water and silt. Flood retardation 
was an unavoidable consequence of the inadequate discharge capacity, 
especially at low water levels. The reconstructions, which were 
aimed at resolving that shortcoming, brought into play as they 
proceeded, one by one, a total of six different discharge regimes, 
whose effects on the reservoir area and the river stretches above 
and below are discussed later in this section. 
First of all, it is necessary to consider the consequences of the 
grandiose scheme and its abandonment, on some of the problems of 
evacuation and relocation of the population. In order so to do, it 
will be necessary first to consider the arrangements which existed 
before the changes took place. 
i) Relocation of Peasants. 
As mentioned previously, it was not expected to be easy to relocate 
the 890,000 L displaced as a result of building the Sarixnenxia 
reservoir and this was one factor in the decision to operate it, in 
the first period, with a maximum water level of 340 m, which would 
necessitate the relocation of some 300,000 A. only. The official 
viewpoint was given by Deng Zihui in his 1955 report, 
"The Samenxia reservoir •..... will inundate over 
1330 km of arable land when the water in it reaches 
a height of 350 in. Therefore, 600,000 people will have 
to be resettled, Of course, there is no comparison 
between this and the damage brought about by floods or 
breaches of the dykes. The latter causes incalculable 
loss of life and property, whereas resettlement will be 
carried out in a well-planned way under the leadership - 
and with the help of the People's Government, which will 
see to it that, when they reach the places of resettlement, 
the evacuees are given whatever assistance they need to 
resume work and earn a living. That has always been our 
policy and, in the past, when building of reservoirs 
began or water detention basins or flood-retarding areas 
were created, the local people gladly fell in with public 
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needs and the Government's measures. As a result, plans 
for resettlement or temporary resettlement, went without 
a hitch ..,... These resettlers will assuredly earn the 
deepest gratitude of the 80 million people living under 
constant menace of the R. Huang, while the Government will 
play its part in seeing to it that they suffer no loss in 
the course of resettlement, and by helping them attain a 
secure and happy life as soon as possible after they reach 
their destination." 
The area to be affected included parts of Shan and Lingbao Counties 
in He'nan; Pinglu, Ruicheng and Yongji Counties in Shanxi; and 
Tongguan, Huayin, Hua, Weinan and Dali Counties in Shaanxi. In all 
970 villages would be covered, as would Shanzhou, the County Town of 
Shari County (Figure 3_8).(l08) 
The work both of persuading people in the reservoir area to move out 
and of persuading people in the resettlement area to accept the 
newcomers was organised by special Party committees at County and, 
later, at Commune levels. For example, in the region including 
Shan County, an "Evacuation Committee" was set up in 1956, and 
comprised about ten people. Evacuation from rural areas began the 
same year in Shan County and the majority moved in 1958 and 1959. 
Work proceeded away from the damsite such that the furthest areas, 
those in Shaanxi, were not evacuated until 1959.(109) 
The arrangements made for the evacuees in 1956 and 1957 are reported 
to have been as follows: The people and all their movable belongings, 
including farm animals, were transported at the Governernent's expense, 
and what could not be moved was paid for at agreed prices. In the 
resettlement districts, special 'Immigration Committees' were 
established to greet them and to organise the preparation of new 
houses for them. Groups of 'Pioneers', usually youths, went several 
months in advance to carry out the work, and their food, fuel and 
construction materials were provided free by the Government. Since 
all these evacuees were peasants, they were considered not to need 
work, which therefore was not provided, but land was made available 
gratis. All of them moved voluntarily, and the average budget was 
800 	to 	900 	equivalent then to about £ 130,& 	, which 
was paid to collectives, not individuals. (110) 
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According to various reports, the first group to move, 2000 J.. ., went 
to Dunhuang in Western Gansu and by the end of 1956 over 7000 ,& had 
left Shan and Linao Counties, and had gone to Zhangye, also in 
Western Gansu, and Yinchuan, Capital of Ningxia. By April 1957, over 
12,000 ,( are reported to have left for the Northwest. ( j 11) 
Despite these efforts, many evacuees subsequently returned, mainly 
in 1957 and 1958, complaining that they could not become used to the 
dry Northwestern climate. After some altercation they were allowed 
to stay and were relocated, along with those moving for the first 
time, as close as possible to their places of origin, just beyond 
the reservoir area. They are reported to have suffered no loss for 
this circumnavigation, being treated equally with -those yet to 
move. (112) 
Reports of the evacuation work in 1959, as the dam neared completion, 
give an insight into the problems which occurred as the rate of 
resettlement reached its peak. Some 78,000 i& from Dali County and 
69,000 A.. from Weinan County were to be moved between November 1959 
and the next Summer flood season. One reason for the delay was to 
reduce the effects on agricultural production before flooding began. 
The Chairman of an Agricultural Co-operative, of whose 280 members 
29 had left to be 'Pioneers', claimed, for example, in 1957, that the 
Government had promised to provide tractors to make up for subsequent 
loss of manpower. Similarly, whilst the majority of the above were 
to move before December 1959, 25,000 ,( would remain to gather the 
harvest on 267 km 2  of wheat and cereal crops the following Summer. 
In accordance with the new policy of disturbing people as little as 
possible, all were to remain within Shaanxi and village communities 
were to remain intact. Some 60,000 k would be settled in Pucheng 
County and at Caotan in Wan Municipal District, and some 80,000,& 
still within Dali and Weinan Counties. (113) 
Emphasis was placed on ideological preparation. In October 1959, a 
special conference was convened in Weinan by the secretary of the 
Shaanxi Provincial Party Committee of County Party Committee First 
Secretaries, and others, and this was followed by an enlarged 
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conference of the Weinan County Party Committee at which it was 
decided that responsibility for emigration or immigration work should 
be borne by one Commune Manager or Commune Party Committee Secretary 
at each Commune. Similar conferences were held subsequently at 
Commune level. Examples were reported of two Communes, Cushi and 
Guandao in Weinan which each assigned 12 cadres full time to take 
charge of the work and one, Huayang Commune, which trained 250 
propagandists for the purpose. Evacuees' representatives were also 
organised to make inspection tours of the resettlement areas. 
Nevertheless, a project of such large proportions would be expected 
to raise problems and, although their extent was not reported their 
nature can be inferred. Building materials for the evacuees' new 
houses were in short supply, and so were supplemented by the prompt 
demolition of the houses they had just left. 'Incomplete' statistics, 
quoted in the Shaanxi Ribao for the period preceding October 1957, 
report that 17,000 labourers had been assigned to demolish some 
20,000 houses, so far, and over 22,000 t of timber, bricks and tiles 
had been moved. In addition to building new houses, existing 
property was requisitioned for the newcomers. This was reported to 
have been done in the spirit of attaching equal importance to 
construction and requisition. The statistics quoted above 
refer, however, to 3300 new houses having been built and 6800 
requisitioned in Weinan County, and 13,000 built and 30,000 
requisitioned in Pucheng County. 
As for the acceptability of these houses to the evacuees, whereas 
officials are not slow to point out that, 
"... their design was the same as the originals, their 
quality was better and they were provided for all, even 
the 10 7. who originally had none," (114) 
it should be remembered that cave dwellings such as those inhabited 
by this 10 % "homeless" are very popular throughout the loess plateau 
region, and the people had been living in them from preference for 
centuries. For example, one contemporary report states, 
"Peasants hate to leave their land, even if it is poor. 
And some •.... were not too sure that the brick houses 
they will have on the nearby Communes would be as warm 
in Winter as the snug caves they were used to- " (115) 
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It may be added that Yaodong, as these caves are known, are also 
renowned for being pleasantly cool in Summer. In deference, perhaps, 
to these fears, the local Party and Government leadership are 
reported to have required that all requisitioned property should have 
doors, windows, the traditional warmed brick beds and the necessary 
fuel. As previously, all costs were borne by the state, including 
extra medical workers and veterinaries; in the end the budget came 
to about Y 400 A. . 
It is regrettable that no report has been found which gives more 
detail of the problems of evacuation, and their solution. It can be 
seen that considerable effort was made to satisfy all concerned, but 
it would be naive to accept without reservation the official 
conclusion, 
"Emphasis was placed on carrying out eduction in class 
fraternity and in taking the nation as a co-ordinated 
chess game amongst the masses. By virtue of such 
progaganda and education, and on the basis of raising 
everybody's ideological consciousness, people in the 
emigration area were happy to move out and the people 
in the area of resettlement were happy to accept the 
new settlers."(, 16) 
It is reported, however, that the policy emphasising ideological 
preparation and the relocation of evacuees within the locality was 
a consequence of the problems encountered in moving the first groups 
from the Sanmeaxia reservoir area to the Northwest. It would appear 
that this new policy acheived general acceptance in the leadership 
and, in 1962, a theoretical article in the magazine Jingji Yanjiu 
(Economic Research), concerning the problem of compensation for 
losses due to reservoir flooding, stated, 
"The regional scope of planning is limited to pertinent 
areas outside the reservoir, principally not beyond 
100-150 kin and generally within 30-50 kin. It is only 
for a few mammoth reservoirs where the migrants are 
numerous and it is difficult to accomodate them in 
nearby areas thatmigration will involve more distant 
areas. "(117) 
ii) Relocation of Workers: Shanzhou and Sanxnenxia City. 
Shanzhou, the County Town of Shan County and the nearest town to the 
Sanmenxia damsite, just 22 km upstream, was ituated within the 
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proposed reservoir area and would have to be annulled. Meanwhile, 
despite a high degree of mechanisation, the scale of the reservoir 
project would require a full-time construction force of some 
10,000,( for six or seven years, with others to run peripheral 
services such as banking, postal services and administration. Even 
more people would be needed during periods of peak activity. 
Accommodation would have to be found, therefore, both for those 
displaced from Shanzhou and for those arriving to work on the 
reservoir project. (118) 
The problem was aggravated by the local topography, in that the 
damsite was situated in a narrow gorge surrounded by severely 
dissected loess terrain. No suitable site for the proposed lodgings 
and support workshops could be found within 20 km and communications 
were difficult. Furthermore, a major source of aggregate had been 
found in Lingbao County, some 54 km upstream, and this site would 
also have to be serviced. 
Most of the workforce would leave the area once the project had been 
completed. Some would remain to run and maintain the reservoir's 
various functions and, ideally, live close to the damsite. Meanwhile, 
it was estimated that accommodation at the main site would have to 
support 30,000 A. , including dependants, and suddenly to remove 
many of them at the end of the construction period would .create new 
problems. 
The solution adopted is shown in Figure 3-9. Some 20 km upstream of 
the damsite was the small town of Huixingzhen, which was situated 
only 1 km from the nearest railway station, on the main Longhai line, 
and on the Luoyang - Tongguan road. At that time it had a population 
of about 4000,k , mainly peasants. The buildings were very simple 
adobe or brick and wood structures, some dilapidated, and it was 
considered that very few could be used in the new scheme. To the 
South-West of Huixingzhen there was, however, an area of fairly 
level cotton fields at 370 m to 410 m above sea level, of which 
7 km 2 to 8 km 
2
were thought to be useable. It was, therefore, decided 
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WORKSITES, SHANZHOU AND SANMENXIA CITY SOURCE: Note 116 
workshops and various grades of living quarters. The six support 
workshops planned are reported to have included a central repair and 
maintenance depot, a vehicle servicing shop, a timber processing 
shop, a concrete prefabrication shop, a reinforcing materials 
processing shop, and base workshops for the assembly of hydromechanical 
equipment, and for drilling, grouting, and blasting. Facilities for 
the residents, such as a comprehensive hospital, a club, a nursery, 
a kindergarten, a school and a canteen would also be provided. 
The local topography was such that when the reservoir water level 
rose, to its planned height, this site would lie along one side of a 
large peninsula and it was thought that such a scenic spot would 
make an excellent place for a small new town covering the whole 
peninsula. In this way, facilities of a more permanent nature could 
be provided for the construction workers and their families and, 
after the completion of the reservoir ,  project, some could stay to run 
the industries of the developing new town. Furthermore, the town 
could adopt the function of County Town, to replace Shanzhou, and 
absorb some of its population. As expansion developed, new industries 
could move to the area, which would then have abundant power supplies 
from the Sanmenxia hydropower station. This neat plan to "kill two 
birds with one stone", when first drawn up by the River Huang 
Sanmenxia Engineering Office and the He'nan Provincial City Construc-
tion Office, envisaged a small town not exceeding 60,000 ,& . In 
1956, the State Council sanctioned the establishment of Sanmenxia 
City. This occured in June, and by July it was reported that the 
main streets had already been lain out. Whilst it should be mentioned 
that the usual definition of 'City' in China requires the population 
to exceed 100,000 ,k , it is not clear whether at that stage a city 
meeting that criterion was planned. (119) 
The problem of transition was to be solved by providing less living 
space per capita during the construction period than in the long 
term. In this way, during the construction, people would be crowded 
together at a density of 2.5 m2 A... 1,  which would decrease, to the 
levels expected for permanent residence, later. Two types of building, 
typical of Chinese architecture, were provided for residence; three- 
G, 
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storey blocks and the more traditional one-storey type (Figure 3-10), 
which would provide, in the long therm, 5 m
2 
A,-I and 9 m2,-i , respectively. 
Since the new Sanrnenxia City is distant from the damsite it was 
decided to provide permanent accommodation, offices, shops, a clinic, 
college and kindergarten, for the 450 ,& who would run the dam 
facilities after construction, and their families, at the nearest 
permanent site to the dam, some 1.5 km from it. However, this site 
was only 7.5 ha in area, whilst, during construction, it was thought 
necessary to lodge some 8000 Is. to 10,000 & near to the damsite. It 
was decided, therefore, to erect temporary accommodation and services 
including clubs, shops, execerise grounds, canteens, an open-air 
stage, and washrooms, on the terraced fields around the village of 
Da'an, some 4 km West of the damsite. The land here was on deep and 
porous loess, at about 400 m above sea level. Since there would be 
a considerable risk that the whole area might collapse into the 
reservoir after impounding, the maximum life of those buildings and 
Da'an village was not expected to exceed eight years. 
Thus, the work was spread over four sites. Excavation at Lingbao, 
where only temporary accommodation would be provided, the main 
iiYing and support area at Huixingzhen, which was to develop into 
Sanmenxia City and was therefore provided with permanent structures, 
the damsite itself where some permanent facilities wouldbe provided, 
and a small, temporary, residential area at Da'an. Whilst road and 
rail links already existed between Lingbao and Huixingzhen, there was 
only a temporary road, due to be flooded during impounding, between 
Huixingzhen, Da'an and the damsite. So, a permanent road and rail 
spur, 30 km and 17 km long, respectively, were to be built. 
These plans were subsequently put into effect and, by April 1957, it 
was reported that 8 km of the rail spur and all but 4 km of the new 
road had been completed, as had a whole hospital, from Luda City in 
Liaoning, 100 shops, a club and a 100-seat theatre where regular 
performances were already being held, atHuixingzhen. 1 
	The six 
workshops, however, were still 'under preparation' and the 40,000 m 
of warehouse space was full and piles of machinery were collecting 
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in the railway sidings. By 1958, the city population had risen to 
88,000 ,(. , including construction workers, but not.including the 
peasants in the surrounding area. In October 1959, Shanzhou was 
annulled, Shan County was officially merged with Sarirnenxia City and 
the city population at that time exceeded 100,000 /.. . Shanzhou was 
duly demolished and the materials carefully taken away for use 
elsewhere. (121) 
iii) Some Social, Demographic and Heritary Effects of the Changes in 
Reservoir Design and Use. 
All the effects to be described here stem from two aspects of changes 
in the planning of the Sarnenxia scheme. These are, that the proposed 
gradual expansion of the scope of the scheme was cancelled, and that 
much of the area inundated in the first instance was subsequently 
uncovered. 
With regard to the relocation of peasants, these events would have 
meant that the problem was greatly reduced, for many people would no 
longer have had to move and, in some cases, others could reoccupy 
land previously evacuated. Whilst it should be pointed out that not 
all the land designated to be flooded in the first period actually 
was covered, yet, as we have seen, much land had been spoilt and many 
villages had been demolished. On the other hand, once the waters 
had receded, land which had become saline often could be recovered. 
In one instance, however, a new problem arose. In the area, surrounding 
the Tongguan confluence much land had, indeed, been inundated and 
was so severely damaged that it was beyond the scope of ordinary - 
peasants to undertake its recovery. Moreover, although under the new 
reservoir operational regime, the backwaters would not, as far as 
possible, extend beyond Tongguan, should an extraordinarily large 
flood peak occur some flooding wouldbe inevitable. This region had 
adopted ,therefore, a role similar to that of a flood retardation 
basin, and was not suitable for rehabit.ation. The solution adopted 
was to establish a large state farm where army units could undertake 
the work of farming and reclaiming the land, whilst remaining mobile 
enoughto evacuate at short notice if need be. (122) 
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Lamentable, indeed, is the fact that the new design and operational 
regime rendered much of the former destruction vain. The ruins of 
Shanzhou, for example, with just its pagoda and parts of the town 
walls Still standing (Figure 3-11), were never flooded and lie as 
a testament to the lost reservoir scheme. On the other hand, the 
village of Da'an still stands and is occupied, and the fertile 
floodplains of the new reservoir in certain areas may be farmed for 
their high yields, though officially the practice is discouraged 
owing to the danger from transient floods. 
Another loss which turned out to have been in vain was that of many 
architectural relics. In over 70 places along the cliffs, on both 
sides of the Sanmen Gorge, and on the farnour "midstream pillar" just 
below (Figure 3-12) were famous historical graffitti carved in large 
characters, some dating back to the Han dynasty. For example, the 
words "Come by me" ( 	 ), 	written on the midstream pillar 
to remind boatsmen of how to survive the passage through the Three 
Gates, had been there so long that their true origin had been lost 
amongst the myths of Da Yu. These writings, some by famous 
historical figures, were all lost during construction of the dam. 
Also lost were the remnants of a Tang dynasty attempt to bypass the 
dangerous gorges by cutting a canal through "Man's Gate Peninsula", 
which nonetheless had failed, reportedly partly because the rock-was 
too hard to be cut by hand, and partly because the flow of the river 
could not be controlled enough for the canal to be used. (123) Not 
least regrettable is the loss of such a historic and scenic set of 
gorges. (Figures 3-4, 3-12). 
Not only has the Sanmen Gorge been famous throughout Chinese history, 
but the region as a whole has always been important; this is 
reflected in abundant discoveries made during site preparations for 
Sanmenxia City. Relics were found from various times from the New 
Stone Age to the present, including 450 graves and pits in an area 
of 83,000 m2 , dating from Guoguo of the Warring States period 
(770 BC to 665 BC). Of particular interest is a pit 29 m x 4 m of 
which 8 m were opened up to reveal four chariots and eight horses. 
Shanzhou itself had been the Capital of various States in Chinese 
History. ( 4) 
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point B in Figure 3-9. 
 
Above: View from the remains of the city wall, 
point A in Figure 3-9, across the ruins, 
with the Frog Pagoda in the distance. 
FIGURE 3 - 11 THE RUINS OF SHANZHOU AND THE FROG PAGODA 	I 
Photo: Shanzhou, near Sanmenxia City, He'nan, 4 August 19 80 . 	 (PM) 
' 	• 	 : 	: 	.' 	 ' 	'1 	•... 	. 
k 	 -çr  r7%x-7  _ Ai i1 Ito R v 
Above Upstream view  
t 
Left: The 'Midstream Pillar' 
77- ImNWI 
— 	 Right. Downstream view 
oil 
_t 	 ___________________________________________ 
FIGURE 3-12 THE ORIGINAL SANMEN GORGE 	
kJLL, Eds, I) 	 1 
	
19, pp. 2./4. 
Inasmuch as these discoveries were occasioned by the construction of 
the Sanmenxia reservoir project, it could be claimed that archeology 
had gained from it all. However, only the 900 year-old 'Frog Pagoda', 
named after the characteristic sound of its echo, was left in 
Shanzhou, and that by chance since it was to have been flooded. The 
only evidence on display of the ancient graves is about 40 m 2 of the 
'Horse and Chariot Pit' mentioned above, in Sanmenxia City, much of 
which, sadly, was damaged during the Cultural Revolution. It is not 
known whether the rest of these graves are intact beneath the city. 
Despite repetition of these points, no word of regret is to be heard 
within China. The question appears simply not to have been considered 
important in relation to the assumed benefits of the proposed 
reservoir, with one exception, which is the Daoist monastery called 
Yonglegong, from the Yuan dynasty (1271 - 1368). This was moved, in 
1959, from the reservoir area and rebuilt, in 1966, on higher ground 
in Ruicheng County, in order to preserve its famous mural paintings. (125) 
It is not known whether the original site of Yonglegong was actually 
flooded but, perhaps, that removal, too, was in vain. Nevertheless, 
in view of the much reduced scale of the project, it would seem 
reasonable to suggest that had the tortuous route not been taken, 
many of these features, perhaps even the Three Gates, could have been 
saved. 
It is natural to suppose that the proposed development of Sanmenxia 
City was also affected by the unexpected curtailment of the 
reservoir project. Whilst this is indeed the case, the full story is 
more complicated. The expected abundance of electrical power, the 
lake, its fishing, and the scenic formation of a peninsular, all 
failed to materialise. Many construction workers left the city after 
the initial completion of the project and, although a workforce had 
to be found for the reconstructions of the late sixties, it could be 
expected that the scale of development of Sanmenxia City would have 
been less than planned. In fact, in the early sixties the city's 
economy was mainly built around handicraft industries. However, after 
1965, some factories moved to Sanmenxia City from other parts of the 
country, notably Shanghai. In 1980, the area of the city was given 
as 19 	2 and its population, only 65,000 A.. . Unless the rest of 
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Shan County, 185 km 2 in all, is included, thereby bringing the 
population to 133,-560,X, , Sarimenxia City should not qualify for its 
title. It remains the smallest city in China. (126) 
Some idea of the size of Sanmenxia City and the scale of its 
activities can be gained from the following figures. There is an 
industrial workforce of 35,000,( including 18,300 A.. who work in 
the 46 main factories. These are: nine large, provincially controlled, 
state owned factories each employing over 1000 	; eight locally 
controlled, state owned light engineering factories; eleven collectively 
owned and run handicraft workshops, each employing less than 100  ; 
and the two Commune run industries, coal and bauxite. In Shan County 
there are five Communes, divided into 31 Brigades and 310 Production 
Teams. The average per capita annual income in the town is V 691; 
in the countryside it is V 205. There are 149 schools and colleges 
including 5 Higher Middle Schools and 40 kindergartens. These 
employ 1766 teachers and 434 administrators, and there are 41,000 
students. In four large hospitals and 59 clinics there is a total of 
624 beds. Cultural facilities include 31 clubs, cinemas and roving 
cinema teams, one theatre group and three swimming pools. (127) 
iv) Result of the Reconstructions in Solving R. Wei Problems. 
Prior to March 1962 deposition in the lower R. Wei had taken the form 
of retrogressive extension of the reservoir deposits. Thereafter, 
when the reservoir water level was lowered, vigorous scouring took 
place in the reservoir area. It did not affect the R. Wei, where bed 
adjustments continued according to the reduced slope occasioned by 
the deposits remaining near the mouth, and caused deposition to 
continue upstream. By October 1962 it had extended a further 43 km, 
to 268 km above the dam. (Figure 3-3). When fluvial conditions 
within the R. Wei are suitable, and provided that the bed level of 
the R. Huang at Tongguan happened to be sufficiently low, scouring 
once again could take place. This scouring lowered the R. Wei main 
channel and brought back the deposition end point towards Tongguan. 
For example, in 1964, when hyperconcentrated flow from theR. Jing 
gave rise to very severe, erosion (a phenomenon common to hyperconcent-
rated flows and known as bed-ripping) in the R. Wei, the deposition 
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endpoint withdrew by 44 km. (Figure 3-13). (128) 
Yet it should be stressed that in the years between the change of 
reservoir operational regime, and the completion of the reconstructions 
at the commencement of the 'controlled operation' regime in 1973, there 
was still insufficient control over these events. Much depended upon 
the weather, for should a large floodpeak occur in the R. Huang, or 
in both the R. Huang and R. Wei, then the Tongguan confluence would be 
flooded, its bed level would be raised by deposition, and its 
attendant problems could recur in the lower R. Wei. By contrast, 
should a large floodpeak occur in the R. Wei only, then scouring 
would lower the Tongguan bed level and a general improvement of 
conditions would occur. The problems of the lower R. Wei were, in 
effect, a consequence of the failure as yet to bring the R. Huang 
bed level at Tongguan under control. Its variations are shown in 
Table 3-3, An example of the serious consequences of this lack of 
control occured in 1967 when a large floodpeak in the R. Huang 
flowed up the R. Wei and a serious mouth bar occured across the 
lower R. Wei, so that an 8.8 km stretch of the R. Wei was blocked and 
a new channel had to be dug by hand to prevent inundation upstream. 
This incident caused the deposition endpoint to move from 250 km above 
the dam in 1967 to 264 km by 1969.(l30)  (Figure 3-14). 
In common with the reservoir area below Tongguan and the lower 
R. Huang, deposition takes place uniformly on both floodplains and 
main channel, whilst erosion takes place uniquely in the main channel. 
In the cases of the lower R. Huang and the lower R. Wei this is 
beneficial as long as the net main channel effect is zero or controlled 
scouring. In the case of the lower R. Wei, this was acheived once the 
bed level at Torigguan had been brought under control, but the haphazard 
changes which occured during the reconstruction period were worthy of 
respect. The consequent changes in the position of the deposition 
endpoint during that period are given in Figure 3-15. 
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RIVER WEIBED ADJUSTMENTS, 1964 














TABLE 3 - 3 
	
TON GGUAN BED LEVEL, 1960 - 1978 
Before Advanced Contro- 
Lonstr- Water Storage Awaiting Reconstruction Preliminary Reconstruction tied Fd 
uction Reconstruction Opera-finn t o
ar 
Jul. Nov. Oct. I.rt Oct. Nov. Oct. Oct. Juri Oct. Oct. Oct. Oct. Junt Oct. 	Octt Oct' 
1960 1960 1961 1962 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1970 	1973 1978 
Level of Bed at 
320.5 322.8 322.2 321.5 320.5 327.0 326.0 321.6 323.1 320.4 325.4 324.1 Deepest Point (rn) 
Change From 
July 1960Level 	(m) +2.3 +1.7 +4-51+1-0  —0.2 +6.5 +5.5 +4.4 +11 +2.6 —0.1 +4.9 +5-0 1 +3.6 +3.1 +3.0 
Sources: Academia Sinica, Geographical Institute, Geomorphology Lab., R. Wei Group, Eds., 1975, page 52. 
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v) Effects in the Reservoir Area Below Tongguan. 
The predominating changes to occur as the reservoir was drawn down, 
in March 1962 and thereafter, concerned the morphology of the 
deposits. The delta morphology typical of deposits in deep reservoirs 
was rapidly eroded in the middle section whilst simultaneous 
deposition occured in the upper and lower sections. What happened 
may be thought of as a process in which backwater deposition 
continued as before, whilst the delta body was washed down to the 
antedam area. (133) This process was soon accomplished, for, by 
October 1963, a new reservoir morphology, comprising a simple wedge 
of sediment stretching back from the dam, had become established. 
Thereafter, deposition under deep water conditions, such as would 
occur in Winter in small amounts, still had a delta morphology, but 
this would similarly revert to a wedge shape whenever the reservoir 
was drawn down to the. Summer level. 
Subsequently, a clear main channel developed which wholly contained 
the flow during Low water seasons. Indeed, it was only during the 
two large floods of 1964 and 1967 respectively, details of which are 
given in Table 3-4, that the floodplains so formed unavoidably 
became covered and thereby raised further. It is worth mentioning 
that owing to the different relative depths and flow velocities 
which occur over the main channel and floodplains during' silt-laden 
overbank floods, simultaneous erosion of the main channel and 
deposition on the floodplains may occur. The longitudinal slope of 
the floodplains is the equilibrium slope for deposition and the 
longitudinal slope of the main channel is the equilibrium slope 
for erosion. The morphologies of different times are shown in 
Figure 3-16a, and the present main channel and floodplains are 'shown 
in Figures 3-16b and 3-16c. Since deposition upon floodplains is 
irreversible, it is to be avoided as far as possible in reservoirs, 
where it represents an irrecoverable loss 'of capacity. In the case 
of the Sanrneaxia reservoir, it was also desirable to limit main 
channel deposition to the area below Tongguan, so as to stabilise 
the bed level there. This was achieved in the long term but there 
remains some seasonal variation. 
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TABLE 	DATA FROM TONOGUAN FOR 
3-4 1964 AND. 1967 FL000PEAKS 
mum Discharge Date Silt Load. For Year 
(t x 106) 
Silt Load Jul/Aug. 
(tx 106) 
(in3 s1) F 12400 14 Aug. 2450 1548 9530 ill Aug. 2180 1318 
Source: QUSRL, Personal Communication, 1981. 
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The respective effects upon reservoir deposition of the six 
different discharge regimes, which came into play as the reconstruc-
tions proceeded, may be seen in Table 3-5. Apart from 1965, when 
unusually little water or silt entered the reservoir and erosion 
took place, it can be seen that in the reservoir area as a whole 
deposition continued until the second tunnel came into use in 1969. 
Figure 3-17 shows the changes in reservoir capacity, below Tongguan 
only, from 1960 to 1975, and clearly illustrates the restoration 
there of the main channel capacity, and the simultaneous loss of 
capacity above the floodplains. Figure 3-18 shows the present 
variation of main channel and floodplain reservoir capacities, 
respectively, with water level. 
vi) Direct Effects in the Lower Reaches of the R. Huang. 
The effects of the reservoir and its reconstructions in the lower 
reaches of the R. Huang arose for two reasons. Firstly, there was 
a sudden reduction in the silt concentration of the waters entering 
the lower reach, followed by a return to former levels, or higher, 
a few years later. Secondly, because flood peaks were attenuated 
whilst their duration was extended. 
In the first period, to March 1962, only 6.8 % of the silt entering 
the reservoir was passed through the dam to the lower reaches and 
the relatively clear water discharged eroded a total of about 
1 x 10 t of silt from the lower reaches. Of this, 91.3 7. was 
eroded from the reach above Aishan, a reach notable previously for 
silt deposition, where 104 % of the net deposition of the lower 
R. Huang between 1956 and 1960 occurred (137)  With the passage of 
successive floods, the extent of scouring downstream of Sanrnenxia, 
for a given discharge, lengthened as the upper sections developed an 
armoured bed. Scouring would extend to the estuary whenever 
Q 	2500 m3 s ' and Q2 at = 90 x 106 , where Q is the discharge (m 3 s) 
and at is the duration (days). Thus, the smallest discharge, 




would have to be maintained for about 14 days, 
requiring some 300 x 
10  
m3 of water. Throughout the whole lower 
reach a hydraulic exchange took place, between bed and suspended loads, 
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TABLE 	EFFECT OF RECONSTRUCTIONS ON SEDIMENT ACCUMULATION 
3-5 AND DISCHARGE, SANMENXIA 1961 - 1974 
Year 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 
Average Water Level 	(m) 32405 31015 31231 32027 3085/+ 31138 31451 31137 30282 29937 2975/+ 29723 2%96 30358 
Average 	Discharge 	(m 3~1 ) 2990 1910 239.0 4120 1310 2750 3800 2730 1010 1610 1260 1158 1710 1147 
Sediment 	Enterirji:j 
Reservoir 	(txlOb) 
1084 693 906 2125 302 1967 1837 1253 983 162 1081 395 1396 5516 
Sediment Leaving 
Reservoir 	(tx 106) 111 230 427 831 381 1851 1752 1206 1092 1794 1195 545 1610 6536 
Sediment Deposited 
or ( - ) 	Eroded 	(t x 10 6 )  973 463 479 1294 -79 116 85 47 -109 -174 -114 —150 —214 -102 
Sediment Discharge Ratio 	(%) 102 334 47 39 126 94 95 96 111 111 110 138 115 118 
Bed Slope at Reservoir Entrance No) 00062 00165 00130 001 00210 00202 00160 00191 00256 00300 0M350 00267 00270 00205 
Deep 
Sluices 	(300 in) 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
Tubes 	(300 m) 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Discharge 
Tunnels 	(290m) 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Facilities Bottom 
Sluices 	(280m)) 
. 3 B 8 8 8  
Turbines 	(287m) 1 1 2 2 
Operational Regime 3torage F 	1 	o 	o d 	A 	t 	f e 	n 	u 	a 	t i 	o 	n 
Controlled 
Opera 	ion 
Discharge Capacity Under 300 m 0 0 0 0 0 356 356 712 1522 3244 3244 3644 .3644 
Given Water Level (rn 3s1 ) 31 5m 3080 3080 3080 3080 3980 5020 5020 6060 7275 9260 9260 9660 9660 
SOURCE: SRIHEWL, et at., Eds., 1979 p. 300. 
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whereby the coarser grains of the latter were replaced with finer 
material from the former (Figure 3-19). Particles of diameter of 
less than 0.025 mm continued to be eroded over the whole of the 
lower reach. The armouring process at Huayuankou is shown in 
Figure 3-20, whence the proportion of coarse material (diameter 
0.1 mm to 0.5 mm) in the bed is found to have increased after a 
year of erosion and the suspended load is found to comprise coarser 
material than before, principally of diameter 0.025 mm to 0.1 mm. 
After armouring, d 50 at Huayuankou, Aishan and Luokou corresponded 
to what had been d 75-d90 a year earlier. (138) 
The effects of changes in channel morphology consequent upon these 
new processes depended upon the reach in question. In the wandering, 
upper stretch, it tended both to become deeper, and towards 
stability, with a single, broader, channel (Figure 3-21). Further 
downstream, though, in the absence of sufficient control works, the 
broadening of the stream caused serious collapse of the floodplains 
and the loss of some engineering structures thereupon. 
(140)  Lower 
still, control works exerted a strong restraint on the river and the 
basic meandering pattern was little affected. 
Without going into detail about local changes in slope, or the 
formation or otherwise of sand waves and their consequent effects 
upon the flow resistance of the lower R. Huang, it may, nevertheless, 
be ,noted that the flood-carrying capacity there increased markedly 
with the deepening and widening of the channel subsequent to 
erosion. (Table 3-6). 
Despite the water level having been lowered, in 1962, and the floods 
thereafter being allowed to pass through the reservoir with as 
little hinderance as possible, until the big flood of 1964, the 
proportion of incoming silt subsequently discharged in a given year 
remained at about 40 7. The ability of the dam to discharge silt 
still depended principally on the flow conditions inside the 
reservoir. Thus relatively clear water continued to be discharged 
and in all some 2311 x 
10  
t of silt were eroded from the lower 
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FIGURE 	CHANGES IN CHANNEL MORPHOLOGY 
3-21 IN THE UPPER SECTION OF THE 
LOWER R. HUANG, 1960 - 1%3 
Source: LI Baoru, et a].., 1980, P. 409. 
Tiexie is situated some 100 km upstream of Huayuankou. 
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CHANGES IN LOWER ItACHES' TABLE FLOOD CARRYING CAPACITY, 1960-4  
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unusual conditions in 1965, when only 302 x 106 t of silt entered 
the reservoir, and, thereafter to the gradual increase in the silt 
discharge capacity at the dam, deposition resumed in the lower 
reaches. A total of 3709 x 10  t were deposited between November 
1964, and December 1973, when 'controlled operation' began at the 
reservoir. Thus, accumulation resumed its original pattern 
(Figure 3-22) and the flood carrying capacity of the lower reaches, 
which had improved up to 1964, was again seriously reduced. By 1973, 
a water level slightly higher than that which in 1958 had carried 
22,300 m3 s 	(Table 3-7) at Huayuankou could only carry 5000 m 3 S.( 142 ) 
The effects of the reconstructions upon sedimentation in the 
reservoir area and the lower reaches may be summarised as in Table 
3-8. As the reconstructions proceeded, though, lower reach deposition 
took on seasonal characteristics (Table 3-9). The reason was that 
whereas in Summer the change in dam operation resulted in more silt 
being discharged, insufficient water accompanied it to carry it 
beyond Aishan or to raise the level to cover the floodplains. Thus, 
deposition took place within the main channel and led to its 
deterioration. In Winter the relatively clear water would pick up 
these deposits and carry them beyond Aishan but would have insufficient 
energy to carry them to the sea. The bed material also took on 
seasonal characteristics, being fine after Summer deposition and 
gradually becoming coarser in Winter as the clearer water took away 
the finer particles. In the long term, however, the bed material 
gradually returned to its original composition. (Figure 3-23) 
vii) Indirect Effects - The Expunction of Irrigation Projects. 
The Comprehensive Plan of 1955 identified nine sites for mainstream 
dams below Sanmenxia, of which six were in the gorges above Taohuayu, 
one at Taohuayu just between the Beijing-Guangzhou rail bridges and 
the confluence of the rivers Huang and Qin, and two were in the 
lower reaches in Shandong at Weishan, by Lake Dongping and at Luokou 
near Ji'nan. The plan was subsequently revised and expanded such 
that by 1959, it included six sites below Taohuayu, all of which were 
principally diversion weirs for irrigation, but including some 
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FIGURE 	DEPOSITION AND EROSION IN THE 
3-22 LOWER P. HUANG 	SOURCE: Note 161 
TABLE -7 LOSS OF Ft OOfl ITAPRYINfl CAPACITY 
1973 Flood 1958 Flood Differi- Water LeveL for Increase 	jn 
e Bet Disc harge(Q)=30O0n3 Q=3DOOm3 s' 










Water 1973 1958 1972 i?1 1973 
(m) (m3 s (m) (m 3 5 1) Lee[s&  ° -19 
Huayuankou 94.63 5000 94.42 2300 1:1120500 0.21 93.88 92.54  93.28 1.34 0.60 Jiahetan 74.89 4900 74.52 0.37 74,17 72.78 73.78 1.39 0,39 
Shitowhr >7,94 4030 67.61 20000 0,33 67.40 65.89 1.51 
Gaocun 62.29 4030 62.96 1 7900 -.0.67 61.82 60.80 61.55 1,02 0.27 
Sunkou 17.00 3940 48.85 15900 -1.85 46.52 44.99 46.22 1.53 0.30 
Aishan 10.17 3600 43.13 12600 -2.96 39.85 38.27 39,70 1.62 0.15 
Luokou 29,76 3360 32.09 11900 -2,33 29.48 27.22 29.07 2.26 0.41 
Lijin 13.32 3650 13.76 10400 -0.44 13.08 11.06 12.80 2.02 0.28 
Source: LIII Yuelan, ZHANG Yongchang, RAN Jianmin, LIN Xuxian, 1975, 
page 195. 
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TABLE 	DEPOSITION AND EROSION IN THE 
3-8 SANMENXIA RESERVOIR AND THE LOWER RIVER HUANG, 1960 - 1972 
- Long, Reservoir Area Reservoir San, Lower Reaches LowerFèothe 
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Total 	1 15.960  to Ocf7 
Source: RHHI, Eds., 1972, p. 138. 
Long, Hua, Be,, Zhuang, and San, Eel, Xiao, refer to oncoming 
conditions for the Saninenxia reservoir and the Lower Reaches, 
respectively. See note to Tables 1-4,  1-5. 
TABLE 	SEASONAL VARIATION IN THE WATER, 
3-9 
SILT, DEPOSITION AND EROSION OF THE 







 (t x 	i0) 
Deposition 	or(-) 
Erosion 
 I tx 106 ) __ 
Discharge 	Ratio 
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Flood 25500 1495 1080 1038' 349 24 373 72•3 96•0 69•4 
NotFlood 21100 346 306 237 18 59 77 885 774 685 
Whole 
Year 46600 j 1841 1386 	1 1275 	1 367 83 	1 450 751 1 	920 1 	692 
Source: REEl, Eds., 1972 9 p.  139. 
San, Eei, Xiao, refers to oncoming conditions for the Lower 
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FIGURE 	CHANGES IN THE COARSENESS OF THE BED MATERIAL 
3-23 AT HUAYUANKOU 	 SOURCE: Note 143 
additional power generation and, in the case of the largest project, 
at Weishan, a flood-prevention role. (144) 
By 1960, following further revision, four schemes were underway in 
the lower reaches: 
At Huayuankou, just below the two Beijing-Guangzhou Railway 
bridges, a weir was being built to control fluvial conditions around 
the bridge supports to prevent them being undermined by erosion 
consequent upon clear water being released from Sanmenxia, to divert 
water for the irrigation of some 2.5 x i06 ha and to generate 100 MW 
of electrical power. Work had begun in 1959.(145) 
At Weishan, a complicated multipurpose 'project was being built. 
Firstly, in the Northern bank of the R. Huang, a' set of 10 sluice 
gates each 10 m wide had been built, in 1956, for irrigation purposes. 
The main canal of the irrigation system later would form part of the 
Grand Canal, in a scheme to provide a permanent crossing of canal and 
river, which included the construction of a new Southern canal route 
to the West of Lake Dongping. In order 'to regulate the water level 
of the R. Huang for this purpose, and to store both Summer and Winter 
water for irrigation and flood control, especially the prevention of 
ice-jam floods, a perimeter dyke was built around Dongping Lake and 
some of the surrounding land. This work provided two linked 
reservoirs with a total capacity of 4000 x 10 6 3 m , and was provided 
with a diversion weir across the R. Huang made of earth-and stalks, 
capable of handling 6000 m 3  s-1and an exit sluice, lower down with 
a capacity of between 1500 m3 s 	ai id 3000 m3 	(Figure 3-24). 
Basic construction began in 1958 and was completed by 1960 but, at 
that date, did not include all the planned irrigation canals for 
3.5 x 106  ha nor the 8 MW hydropower station. It is reported that 
villages within the new, outer, lake district were rebuilt on 
earthen platforms one metre above the highest expected water level. 
Thus, the area could be farmed by the local peasants without 
endangering their lives. (146) 
At a point 10 km downstream of Luokou (previously called Lekou) 
work began in 1960 on 4 sluices, a diversion weir, locks and a 
hydropower station, in a project to join JiaozhouBay (better known 
as the site of Qingdao, famous for beer), S. Shandong, and Dezhou, 
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point, whilst providing 1.92 x 106  ha with irrigation and 8 MW of 
electrical power. (147) 
iv) At a point called Wangwangzhuang, just upstream of Lijin, 120 km 
from the mouth, a small reservoir project involving a dam, four 
sluice gates, two ship locks and a 2 MW hydropower station was begun, 
to guarantee water supplies to the estuary region and to irrigate 
some 700 ha. (148) 
These four schemes (Figure 2-1) all made use of low weirs across the 
river to raise the water level and, therefore, had in common their 
dependance upon, or allowance of, the expected reduction in the silt 
load of the lower R. Huang and the limitation of the maximum flood 
discharge to 6000 m s consequent upon the completion of the 
Sanmenxia reservoir. Furthermore, they shared, with the arguments 
for the original design at Sanmenxia, the assumption that large 
scale irrigation would be practical on the North China Plain. It 
should be noted that responsibiltiy for controlling Winter floods lay 
with the Weishan project, not Sanmenxia. 
Although, as mentioned previously, the silt load of the lower 
R. Huang prior to 1964, rose only moderately after the change of 
operational regime at Sanmenxia in 1962, it had sufficient effect to 
confirm that these projects would not be compatable with the new, 
restored, fluvial conditions. To take the Weishan project as an 
example, silt accurnrnulation behind the weir was so serious that the 
intake gates to the lake became blocked so that they could no longer 
handle large floods. Meanwhile the river itself could not pass more 
-1 
than 6000 m 
3 
 s since that was the maximum capacity of the diversion 
weir. Obviously this posed a serious threat to local flood prevention 
work. Reluctant to destroy the project completely, it was decided 
to divert the river around the weir so that should conditions again 
change, it could be resurrected. The lake intake sluices were also 
rebuilt to handle 8000 m 3 	s to 9000 m3s 
l 
 and this part of the 
work alone cost 	 6 
6 l5x 10 	(1 43 x 10 ). The work was done in 
1964 and 1965. 
(149) 
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In the rest of the lower reaches, it was also decided to restore the 
original fluvial conditions. In 1963, work began on large scale dyke 
raising and reparations, the demolition of the Huayuankou diversion 
weir, and the curtailment of works still in progress at Luokou and 
Wangwangzhuang. (150) 
The lcEses occasioned were not inconsiderable, but were offset by two 
new facts. Firstly, without any intervening structure along the 
lower reaches, Winter flood controloDuld be undertaken directly from 
the Sanmenxia reservoir, so this important activity was not lost. 
Secondly, it began to become apparant, at about that time, that the 
planned area of irrigation was imPracticablft. (151) 
Owing to the wandering characteristic of the lower R. Huang and fears 
of inducing floods, very little experience of irrigation was gained 
prior to the Great Leap Forward, about 1958, and the large scale 
schemes proposed then, in order to justify the costs of special river 
training works at the intakes, subsequently gave rise to serious and 
widespread alkalisation of the soil, which rendered much of the work 
useless. The reasons for this are as follow: ,,, 
Whilst it was relatively easy to dig the proposed canals to 
service a wide area, it involved a far greater expenditure of work to 
level off the land. Therefore, instead of the intricately balanced 
schemes seen in other parts of China,large areas were simply irrigated 
by flooding and this contributed to a rise in the underground water 
table. (152) 
The natural river drainage system on the North China Plain was 
very poor. This was due to frequent changes in course of the R. Huang 
which had blocked up many previous outlets. The investment needed to 
provide drainage was, therefore, very high and, partly for that 
reason, adequate drainage systems were not provided either locally 
or regionally. 
Whenirrigation is carried out over such a large area, there is 
always somewhere which needs water, so the main canals have to be 
kept full. Leakage from these main - canals further aggrevated 
alkalisation problems by raising the local water table. 
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In view of the above problems, the use of the water of the lower 
R. Huang for irrigation was temporarily forbidden, many irrigation 
projects were abandoned, and some canals were filled in whilst others 
just fell into disuse. Irrigation schemes on the North China Plain 
are now generally limited in scope to an area less than 200 km 
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7) Discussion. 
The suggestion has been made, by Wang Huayuan, 1979, and was reported 
at the beginning of this chapter, that the tortuous route taken had 
exacted 'study fees' in order that the correct role for a reservoir 
at Sanmenxia within the scheme to control and develop the lower 
R. Huang could be established. This section presents the new role 
of the Sanmenxia reservoir, compares it to that originally planned, 
and seeks to summarise the lessons learnt in the process of change, 
and to discuss the validity of the above suggestion. 
i) The Present Role of the Sanmenxia Reservoir. 
The present mode of operation at Sanmenxia is termed 'controlled 
operation'. During the reconstruction period the original channel 
improvements downstream had been lost, some of the reservoir capacity 
had been regained. Some factors, such as deposition morphology and the 
relative coarseness of the lower reaches' bedload, had taken on 
largely seasonal characteristics. Other factors, such as the 
retrogressive extension of sedimentation up the R. Wei, the bed level 
at Tongguan, the depletion of floodplain reservoir capacity and the 
extent of deposition in the lower reaches, had all depended upon the 
oncoming water and silt conditions. From 1973 onwards, after the 
reconstructions had freed the latter group of factors somewhat from 
their dependance upon the oncoming flood and silt conditions, an 
attempt was made to find the best compromise to satisfy the needs of 
the various reaches affected by the dam. This is what is meant by 
controlled operation and, in the following description, it is 
apparent that all other factors depend upon the successful disposal 
of the reservoir silt load. 
In Winter, the R. Huang silt content is small and comprises coarse 
material, so the water level may be raised safely so as to cover the 
floodplains and most of the deposition to arise therefrom will occur 
upstream of the part of the reservoir where the floodplains have been 
covered. (153)  Thus, floodplain losses will be extremely small. Spring 
freshets and the first small floods of the Summer can then be used to 
relower the bed at Tongguan and to purge out deposits from the main 
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channel, in readiness for the big floods, although, as explained 
below, in deference to conditions in the lower reaches, floods 
smaller than 2500 m3 s will be stored, not used. 
Water storage begins in early December in preparation for the ice-jam 
season. The role of Winter flood protection has been taken over 
from the Weishan project and, as the temperature falls later in 
December, the water previously stored is released. This increases 
the discharge in the lower reaches and delays the formation of an 
ice cover. Once such a cover has formed, however, the discharge from 
Sanmenxia is greatly reduced to ensure that in the lower reaches it 
does not exceed that which can safely pass beneath the ice, taking 
into account the water supplied when the ice itself begins to melt. 
(Figure 3_25).(154) 
Water so stored, for Winter flood protection, can be released during 
the Spring to supplement the supplies to irrigation areas along the 
lower R. Huang. (155) 
Under normal Winter conditions, about a quarter of the silt entering 
the lower reaches would be deposited there but, since the reservoir 
now catches this silt and clear water is discharged, the main channel 
above Aishan is eroded instead. At the same time the reaEhes further 
down receive its silt as deposition. Therefore, after the ice control 
period, the reservoir may be drawn down quickly to produce an 
artificial floodpeak, exceeding 2500 m 3 s, so that the whole of the 
lower reaches may be eroded and a good channel prepared to carry the 
forthcoming Summer floods. 
In the Summer, whenever a peak of the order of 3000 m 3 s 1 to 
4000 m3 s occurs, the lower reaches are eroded. If a flood larger 
than 6000 m3 s 	should occur, the level above Aishan rises above the 
floodplains. If the sediment coefficient (f)/Q)  is greater than 0.03, 
both the main channel and the floodplains will receive deposition; if 
it is less than 0.03, then the main channel will be scoured whilst the 
floodplains are accreted. In both cases the silt content below Aishan 
will fall and erosion will take place. In ordinary years, floods 
smaller that 2500 m 3 s- 
1 
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heavily silted small floods will be stored so that their silt may not 
affect the lower reaches. It would be discharged as part of 
some larger flood later in the season. 
Summer flood protection using the larger capacity above the reservoir 
flooplains is held as a reserve for floods greater than 12,000 m3s l, 
which are expected to occur, on average, once in ten years, (Figure 
3-26). The large discharge capacity at low water levels provided by 
the reconstructions (Figure 3-6) allows ordinary Summer floods 
below that level to be discharged without causing the reservoir 
floodplains to be covered. Should floodpeaks in the lower reaches in 
excess of 22,000 m3 s - 1 be predicted, it is generally agreed that the 
sluices atSanmenxia be closed or partially closed so that the flood 
crest from the R. Huang does not coincide with that from the rivers 
Yi, Luo and Qin; although this would give rise to deposition within 
the reservoir which may, or may not, be reversible, depending upon 
whether the reservoir floodplains were covered. Deposits in the main 
channel may be flushed out by subsequent floods of less than 
12,000 m3s _l 
Except when a particularly large flood is predicted, or in October, 
which is put aside for inspection and repair, electricity is produced 
the year round by five 50 MW generating sets. The opportunity may be 
taken in October to draw down the reservoir for a purge under free 
flow conditions, as this enhances the silt discharging capacity. 
(Figure 3-27). In October 1974 for example, 35 x 10 6 3 m capacity 
were recovered in just ten days by such means. 
Of the above reservoir uses, some have complementary requirements 
for silt regulation, whilst others are in mutual contradiction. For 
example, the control of retrogressive deposition is complementary with 
preserving the reservoir flood control capacity, whilst, at the same 
time it places restrictions on regulation of the lower reaches and is 
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To summarise the present reservoir operations, variations in water 
level, discharge, sedimentation, bed level at Tongguan and the volume 
of water stored, for 1974-5 are shown in Figure 3-28. A 'use year' 
is taken as from November to the following October. November to 
February or March is the period for ice-jam prevention; from then on 
until June the reservoir is used for Spring irrigation, regulation 
of the lower R. Wei, the bed level at Tongguan and preparation of 
the main channel of the lower reaches of the R. Huang; from July to 
October its use is silt discharge and flood prevention. In October 
electricity generation ceases, for inspection and repair, and the 
reservoir may be drawn down for silt discharging or. channel improve-
ment in the lower reaches. 
ii) Comparison with the Original Aims. 
The role of the Saninenxia reservoir was to provide flood control for 
the lower R. Huang for a period adequate to allow soil and water 
conservation, and further engineering works, together to bring the 
whole river under control. Meanwhile, it was to provide various 
multipurpose benefits including clear water for the irrigation of 
27,000 km2, a head of water for an installed power generation capacity 
of 1.16 GW, supplementary water for perennial navigation of the 
lower reaches, and the conditions for various multiple purpose 
projects to be built in the lower reaches. 
Flood prevention is limited at present, and it is not certain how long 
it will last. it is certain, however, that without the aid of some 
other measure it cannot be seen as a Long term solution to the 
R. Huang flood problem. The reasons for this are threefoird. Firstly, 
whereas since the initiation of controlled operation, the bed level 
at Tongguan has been stabilised (at an average of 3 rn above the 1960 
level), some 900 x 1o 6 m3 of reservoir main channel capacity below 
Tongguan have been recovered and only 20 x i0 6 m3 are now lost 
- annually, the reservoir's lifespan still cannot be guaranteed, 
or even accurately estimated. For example, it has been estimated that 
3 -1 should a flood discharge of 30,000 m s 	occur over 12 days and 
deposit 16 7. of its total silt load (i.e. 2250 x 10  t), then between 
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and flood carrying characteristics of the resttvoir would be 
altered whilst the passage of the flood peak was still th progress. 
Thereafter it would take a year before the channel capacity could 
be regained and even longer before the effect on the lower R. Wei 
could be overcome. Within the reservoir some 400 x 
10 
m of 
floodplain capacity (30 7.) would permanently be lost. (158) 
Secondly, although there is no record of simultaneous floods 
originating from above and below Sanmenxia, even without such an 
event it has been estimated that the flood discharge could reach 
about 45,000 m3 s- I at Huayuankou, and this could not necessarily 
be reduced to the safe carrying capacity of the lower reaches 
(22,000 m3 s' 1 ) by the Sanmenxia rescvoir. Thirdly, there still 
remains a net annual accretion of some 0.07 m over the whole of 
the lower reaches. The various proposals for future flood control 
are discussed in chapter 5. 
Irrigation has been provided for 10,000 kin2 along the lower reaches, 
but the failure to develop it further has not been so much a 
consequence of a failure to provide clear water in the Summer, 
indeed remarkable progress has been made in the technique of using 
silty water (Chapter 4), as a failure, in the first instance, to 
cater for the problem of alkalisation. It may be said, therefore, 
that if more clear water had been provided, it would have been 
wasted, and the present resvoiris adequate in this respect for 
present needs. 
The present installed electrical power generation capacity is 
250 MW and its use is subordinated to flood control. One example 
of the shortage of electricity, which causes an underuse of 
industrial capacity in China, and which may have been helped by a 
larger installed capaëity at Sanmenxia, existed in July 1979, when 
visitors were told that the tractor and ball-bearing factories 
could not with certainty be run at the same time. (159) The failure 
to make special provision for navigation, though undoubtedly 
regrettable, may be seen as the loss of a small bonus, and not 
particularly important. Again, such a suggestion may be supported 
from the discussions of the fifties, where the proposals of 
Comrades Ye and Wen left out navigation, but failed to draw serious 
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comment on the ornrnission, from their opponents. 
Though it is true to say that many of the benefits expected from 
the Sanmenxia reservoir failed fully to be forthcoming, it should 
also be pointed out that some 2000 km  of precious land has been 
saved which, even when it is acknowledged that a part of it might 
have been ruined in the process, and some may still be subject to 
periodic flooding, is considerable. Similarly, some 600,000,(.. 
fewer were evacuated than under the original plan, and some of 
those who did have to move, have been able to return. 
iii) Lessons. 
In their description of the current status and problems of river 
sedimentation in China, given as an introduction to the technical 
section of the Proceedings of the International Symposium on 
River Sedimentation, Beijing, 1980, Professor Qian Ning of Qinghua 
University and Comrade Dai Dingzhong of the Ministry of Water 
Conservancy echo the official view quoted from other sources at 
the beginning of this chapter and add their consideration of the 
consequences, 
"Lack of experience in the early days when the Sanmenxia 
reservoir was planned, resulted in inadequate attention 
being paid to the sediment problem and the goals for 
multipupose development being much too high....... 
Accordingly the normal high water level was set at 
360 rn. ... .. Even under the lower level of 350 m, 6 
isvoir deposition was so serious that 1500 x 10 t 
of sediment had accumulated by March 1962, one and a 
half years after the darn had been put into operation. 
By 1964 the amount of material depogited in the 
rvoir had increased to 4400 x 10 t and the backwater 
effect extended rapidly to the upstream direction, 
endangering the industrial and agricultural development 
of the Guanzhong plain and the city of Wan. Thereafter, 
we were forced to give up the impounding of the 
resevoir, dismantle the generating set just installed, 
and start a renovation programme. As a result, the 
original development goals had to be reduced greatly 
and the construction time extended by 10 years. This 
is indeed a lesson not lightly to be forgotten". (160) 
Although, as we have seen, this represents only part of the story 
and,it may be suggested, fails fully to point out which are the 
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lessons to be drawn, it is arguably the most succinctly telling 
comment to have been published on the affair; for it implies not 
that the knowledge had not been available, but that it had not been 
heeded. It also indicates that the goals for regional development 
being set to high had led to the adoption of an inappropriate 
scale of project, rather than that the reservoir simply had failed to 
fulfil real needs. Herein lie the most important lessons and it is 
worthwhile to consider them further. 
One lesson is the importance of assessing accurately the conditions 
obtaining in China at the time, which falls into two categories. 
Firstly, there is the extraordinary silt load of the R. Huang, 
unrivalled inquantity amongst the large rivers of the world, except 
the Ganges, and occuning in average concentrations over ten times 
those of all but the Colorado. In particular, there is no 
comparable river in the Soviet Union, whilst in Northern China 
there are very many heavily silted smaller rivers. In view of this, 
it would seem appropriate to lay emphasis on both domestic and 
foreign experience of heavily silted' rivers in designing for the 
R. Huang, and then to make special allowance for its extreme 
conditions. 
Yet, whereas in his submission to the special meetings of 1957, 
Comrade Ye,for example, drew upon two examples from Northern 
China and one from each of Egypt, India and Algeria to refute the 
Soviet claim that silt already depositéd in: a' reservoir 
substantially could not be flushed out, the adopted design made no 
provision so to do. Even lowering the deep sluices by 20 m was done 
with reference only to the suspended load of the river. (161) 
Similar arguments apply to the failure to account for retrogressive 
backwater deposition; to quote from Comrade Ye's submission, 
"Since the R. Huang mainstream is heavily silted and 
deposition occurs quickly, a sand bar could occur 
across the R. Wei, render its storage capacity useless 
and affect its drainage. This kind of phenomenon has 
already occurred at the mouth of the Guishui river in 
the Guanting resevoir and is worth attention...... Since 
the water level will be very high and the backwaters 
will extend far up the R. Wei, local deposition will be 
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detrimental to flood discharge in the R. Wei. It should 
be noted that the loess soil base will collapse due to the 
raised water table. The phenomenon of cave-ins and houses 
tumbling has already occurred beyond the evacuated areas 
around the Guanting reservoir". (162) 
Another comment made at the meeting was, 
"It has been pointed out that the scope of backwater 
deposition can be several times that of the reservoir itself. 
If that is so, then there is a danger that Wan will 
become surrounded by desert." (163) 
Even the official summary of the meetings, already quoted extensively, 
went as far as to point out that owing to backwater deposition, 
"The R. Wei would rise, possibly causing flooding or the 
saturation of the backwater district. This needs more 
detailed research to be done". (164) 
Since these most serious phenomena were all predicted and debated 
in the 1950's, yet were not particularly heeded and, since the 
R. Huang's silt load is almost unique in the world, should have 
warrented attention, it would seem that the fault did not lie so 
much with a failure to take technical advice as with the failure to 
give sufficient emphasis to Chinese conditions, and experience, as 
opposed to foreign expertise based upon different conditions. As 
we have seen, the choice was essentially between accepting sets of 
assumptions based upon local or distant conditions, respectively; 
that is, deciding which advice was appropriate. 
The second aspect in assessing China's particular characteristics 
concerns the speed and direction of future development. We have 
seen that in the first instance it was thought reasonable to 
exchange large amounts of fertile land upstream for electrical 
power (flood control was thought to be possible without flooding 
so much land, under the alternative scheme) and downstream irrigation. 
Perhaps this would not have been so unreasonable had the rate of 
development been as predicted but,as we have seen, the failure of 
the loess plateau region so to develop exaggerated the upstream losses 
of agricultural production, whilst downstream the increases expected 
to substitute for it also failed to materialise. The crux of the 
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matter lies, then, with the speed of agricultural progress, and there 
we have found that insufficient attention was paid to assessing the 
real needs of a given area. Thus, on the loess plateau soil and 
water conservation work failed to achieve widespread success 
because the approach was not suited to local conditions and the 
peasants could not adopt the measures suggested without 
threatening their own meagre food supply. At the same time,on the 
North China Plain,irrigation works failed to achieve the expected 
returns, partly because the scale was inappropriately large and the 
commensurate drainage and management work could not keep up. Given 
that agricultural development had yet to be assured, was It not 
inappropriate to exchange prime land such as the Guanzhong Plain, 
for electricity? 
The lesson from various localities, that local conditions were not 
sufficiently taken into account, applies equally well to the scheme 
as a whole. From its inception it was assumed to be a largescale 
multipurpose project and that this one pivotal construction would 
be capable of solving present and future, near and distant problems, 
and that this was desirable. Yet, the only real need was for some 
3 -1 
way to be found to attenuate floods exceeding 22,000 m $ 	at 
Huayuankou, which might be expected to occur once in 50 years, 
(The lower reaches could handle, or quite easily be made to handle, 
smaller floods) with sufficient longevity to allow soil and water 
conservation work to bring the runóff of the middle reaches under 
control. The rest maybe seen as much desired but secondary 
benefits. A more appropriate scheme would have contrived to meet 
these criteria first and, with the infallibility of hindsight, it 
may be said that stalling for time in this way would have enabled a 
more appropriate scheme to have been developed simply because the 
special characteristics of the problem could have been better 
understood. For example, an analysis of the sources of different 
grain-sizes of the R. Huang silt has revealed that 74 7, of the 
larger grains (>0.05 mm), which are the ones that settle in the 
lower reaches, come from an area of 110,000 1mi 2 , and 46.5 % from 
only 43,000 km2 , (Chapter 1, Section 3 iii) which greatly 
simplifies the problem. Meanwhile, had a more appropriately scaled 
LC C 
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scheme for flood control been devised, not only would much wastage 
have been saved, but, perhaps, more effort and resources would 
have been spent on finding more appropriate schemes for the other 
benefits. As it is, acceptance of the unrealistic demands for the 
various other benefits, led to a construction inappropriate to 
them and inappropriate to flood control on the world's most 
heavily silted river. 
It may be remembered that a number of points of contention were to 
have been tested, in the late fifties, simultaneously with the 
construction, but that, despite the discovery of various adverse 
phenomena, nothing was done until they were proven in practice. 
It was suggested that one reason was that the division of labour 
was too finely drawn. The lesson may, therefore, betaken of the 
extreme importance of good communications amongst scientists, 
engineers, politicians and others involved. The way in which work 
began whilst so much was in dispute, and continued despite the 
confirmation, by experimentation of many fears, right until disaster 
struck, illustrates that decisions should be open to review in the 
light of new evidence, and also the lesson best summed up by the 
old proverb common to English and Chinese, 'More haste, less speed' s , 
( ft A  
The above are some of the lessons to be drawn from the experience 
of 'walking a tortuous route'. Whether they have been drawn is 
another matter, which is addressed in Chapters 5 and 6. 
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The frequency of floods of 22,000 m 
3 
 s 	 at Shanzhou is 100 years. 
The frequency of floods of 22,000 m $ arising between Sanmenxia 
(Shanzhou) and Taohuayu is also 3lOo1years. Therefore, the 
frequency of floods of 22,000 m $ at Huayuankou is 50 years. 




In the previous chapter an attempt was made to describe some of the 
difficulties encountered in the last thirty-odd years of R. Huang 
control and to point out the more important lessons offered by the 
experience. It concentrated on what could be learnt from having 
made mistakes, and is noteworthy for its mainly social, political 
or economic, rather than purely technical, lessons. Yet, as might be 
expected of an undertaking on the scale of the whole of the R. Huang 
basin, many advances have been made as the result of deliberate 
scientific research and it is to these that attention is directed in 
this chapter. 
1) Scope of Research Related to the River Huang. 
The R. Huang shares with all the rivers across a large part of North 
China, other than those in the far North-east and North-west, the 
characteristic heavy silt load and seasonal water flow. It plays, 
therefore, a pivotal role in research, and what applies to the R. Huang 
is important over the larger area, and vice-versa. It is useful to 
consider separately the general, permanent data collection organisation, 
as it applies to the R. Huang, and the advances which have arisen 
out of such work and from the various related special projects within 
the R. Huang basin. 
i) General Surveying and Organisation. 
There are over 2910 hydrological gauging stations on the rivers of 
China of which 1230 carry out sediment measurement. (1) In the R. Huang 
basin there are 485 such stations, all of which include sediment 
measurement, and 2211 rainfall stations. Of these, 137 hydrological 
stations, 795 rainfall stations and an additional 51 water level 
stations are under the control of the RHWCC. The others come under 
various local authorities, depending upon their position. (2) The data 
which all collect are later collated and published together in bound 
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volumes, although, regrettably, under conditions of strictly 
restricted circulation. 
(3) 
 The development of this comprehensive 
network of gauging stations is shown in Figures 4-1, 4-2. 
Gauging began with the establishment in 1919 of the Shànzhou and 
L'uokou hydrological stations. Three tributary stations were added, 
between 1931 and 1933, on the rivers Wei, Jing and Beiluo respectively. 
In 1933, the RHWCC was established and in that Sumer a disastrous 
flood occurred in the R. Huang. In the following year 15 new 
stations were added and by 1949 there were 33 hydrological and 66 
rainfall stations. In the fifties both types of station increased 
rapidly in number but, thereafter, whilst the number of rainfall 
stations has continued to increase rapidly, the number of hydrological 
stations has remained in the 400s. Meanwhile the distribution of 
both types of station reflects the relative importance of the various 
conditions in different parts of the basin; in the middle reaches 
there are about 6 hydrological and 52 rainfall stations per 10,000 km 2 
but in the upper reaches there are 3 and 10 stations per 10,000 km 
respectively. (4) 
Under normal conditions the hydrological gauging stations measure 
water level, water temperature, water discharge, total silt load, 
silt transportation rates, bed and suspended loads, particle size 
distribution and chemical composition. These are supplemented where 
necessary as the following examples reveal. (5) 
A special testing station and gauging team has been set up at each 
of six reservoirs, where measurements are made of the sedimentation 
morphology, at least twice a year, before and after the flood 
season. From these stations, extra measurements are made, for 
special purposes, into such phenomena as density currents, bank 
collapses, underground water, the dry bulk weight of the deposits, 
the backwater effect, and the passage of sediment through the turbines 
in power stations. In.the case of the Sanrnenxia reservoir, for example, 
thereservoir area has been divided into 131 sedimentation sections 
of which 61 are on the R. Huang mainstream, 48 are along the R. Wei 
and 22 are up the R. Beiluo. 	( Figure 1-3 ). 	In addition to the 
special station at the damsite, there are 11 hydrological and 
FIGURE 	MAJOR TRIBUTARYAND MAINSTREAM 
4-1 	STATIONS IN THE RUNOFF AND 
SEDIMENT GAUGING NETWORK --FOR 
THE WHOLE RIVER HUANG BASIN 
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Source: LONG Yuqian, XIONG Cuishu, 1981, page 17. 
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Source: LONG Yuqian, XIONG Guishu, 1981, page 16. 
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14 water level gauging stations. Meteorological data are also 
gathered. It is usual for the normal range of measurements to be 
taken about five times a year but, in 1960, they were made eleven 
times and special density current tests in 1961 and 1962 numbered 
sixteen. Other extraordinary tests have also been carried out from 
time to time. 
A similar sub-system of stations has been set up to investigate 
other important questions. For example, in 1959, an experimentation 
station was set up in Chaba Gully, in Zizhou County, Shanxi, to 
investigate soil loss phenomena. This small gully catchment, of 
187 km in area now has 9 hydrological stations. One of its 
tributary gullies, Tuanshan gully, includes 14 runoff fields, in 
its 18 ha area, and an observation station at the mouth. Attention 
is also paid here to such phenomena as soil moisture and evaporation. 
Ten special silt particle analysis stations were set up under the 
Wubu main hydrological station (Shaanxi) following Professor Qian 
Ning's suggestion, of 1965, that the source of the coarse grains . 
within the R. Huang silt load be investigated. 
The lower reaches of the R. Huang have been divided into 101 sections 
relative to which normal and extraordinary measurements are made. 
Supplementary facilities, at Huayuankou in the fifties and sixties, 
included special teams to investigate the laws of riverbed changes 
in the upper, wandering, section. At Tuchengzi, below Luokou, in 
the fifties, special teams were set up to investigate the silt 
discharge capacity of the lower, meandering section. 
The above examples are not exhaustive, but they serve to illustrate 
the scale and the comprehensive nature of general field data 
collection throughout the R. Huang basin, which extends even to the 
coastline and sea beyond the estuary. The collection of series of 
such data provided the basis for organised research. (6) 
Sedimentation research in China is now carried out under three types 
of agency; Central Government, university and college; and local 
research units. The central co-ordinating body is the Bureau of 
Science and Technology of the Ministry of Water Conservancy, and the 
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main forum of academic exchange is the Chinese Society of Hydraulic 
Engineering. There are over 1000 college and technical school 
graduates working in this field. Table 4-1 gives the fifteen 
institutions whose work now bears a more direct relation to the 
R. Huang. It is taken from a list of 38 for all China appearing in 
the proceedings of the 1980 Beijing International Symposium on 
River Sedimentation. (7) 
The co-ordinating body for all work on the R. Huang is the RHWCC, 
and under them a "River Huang Sediment Research Co-ordinating Group" 
has been established in which eight provincial bureaux and universities 
or colleges participate. They have drawn up joint research programmes 
and have held various symposia from which four volumes of "Collected 
Works on R. Huang Sediment Research" have been published. Regrettably, 
these, too, like the volumes of basic hydrologic and meteorologic 
data of the R. Huang, are subject to very severe circulation 
restrictions. (8) 
ii) Advances Made Through Academic Research. 
Perhaps the discoveries with the most direct application are the two 
which concern the source of R. Huang sediment. Firstly, 74 7 of the 
coarse grains which give rise to the deposition in the lower reaches 
were found to come from one particular part of the loess .plateau, 
only 110,000 km in area (Chapter 1, Section 3(iii)). Secondly, it 
was discovered that, unlike the situation common in other countries, 
soil lost from the loess plateau is not stored permanently in the 
gullies, tributaries, orR. Huang middle reaches, but practically all 
enters the lower R. Huang. 
These two discoveries indicated that conservation work could benefit 
R. Huang control directly and the scale of the task was to be less 
daunting, since effort could be concentrated in the area from which 
coarse grains mostly come. On a more academic level, formulae have 
been developed and tested to predict the sediment yield of various 




TABLE 	SELECTED SEDIMENTATION RESEARCH ORGANISATIONS OF CHINA 
4-1 
Name Location Main Resarch Topics ?'in Facilities 
Agencies Under the Sediment Research Basic research and important Three experimental halls with 
Leadership of the 	Division, Water sediment problems arising from dimensions 18 x 60, 18 x 66, 
Central Government Conservancy and Beijing practice. (Awaiting reestablish-and 7 x 42 m, respectively. 
Hydroelectric Po- merit. To be the centre of Chin- 0.5 x 0.5 x 32 and 0.5 x 0.5 
wer Research Inst ese sediment research). x 14 m flumes with adjustable 
slopes. 
Sediment Research R.Huang sediment problems 25 x 88 and 10 x 107 m exper- 
Division, Inst.of 
e 	h OU including putting sediment to itnental halls. Two sediment Hydraulic Resear- use as a natural resource, mixing basins to concentrati- 
ch, RHWCC. ons of 800 kg nr3. Two large 
flumes, one with adjustable 
slope. 
River and Canal Sediment problems relating to 24 x 60 and 21 x 75 m experi- 
Division, North- N .W. China, including canals, mental halls • 1000--m2 outdoor 
west Inst. of Hy- Wugong intakes, hyperconcentrated experimental area. 
drotechnical Res- flow, siltation of small to 
earch. medium sized reservoirs. 
Division of Hydr- Scour around bridge piers. Experimental areas of 1160 m 2 
ology and Hydrau- Local river regulation, indoors and 1500 m2 outdoors. 
lie Structures, Beijing Three fixed and one tilting 
Chinese Academy flume. 
of Railway Scierxs 
Division of Geom- Fluvial processes in Experimental area of 600 in2 . 
orphology, Inst. Beijing geomorphology. Part of the floor may be of Geography, Ac. raised or lowered to simulate 
ademia Sinica, tectonic movement, 
Continued 
TABLE 6-1 	Continued 
Name Location Main Research Topics Main Facilities 
Northwest Inst. R.Huang soil and water 
of Soil and Water conservation problems. 
Conservation, Ac- 
ademia Sinica. 
Division of Debr-. Debris flow in Northwest China. Experimental area of 500 m 2 . 
is flow, Lanzhou 0.5 x 0.78 x 14 m adjustable 
Inst. of Glacial Lanzhou flume with maximum slope of and Frozen Soil 17%. 
Research, Academ- 
ia Sinica. 
Inst. of Desert Movement of wind blown sand. 700 m2 experimental area. 
Research, Academ- Lanzhou Desert regulation. Wind tunnel with maximum 
Ia Sinica, cross-sectional area of 3 m 
Colleges and 	Sediment Research Basic research and important 24 x 90 m experimental hall. 
Universities Lab., Dept. of sediment problems arising from 1 x 1 x 60 m flume with 
Hydraulic Engine- Beijing practice. Emphasis on rivers of adjustable slope. (under 
ering, Qinghua North China, construction). 
University. 
Wan Experiment- N.W. China's sedimentation 250 m 	experimental hall. 
al Station in Hy- problems including the exclus-. 350 m outdoor model basin. 
draulics, N.W. Wan ion of sediment from turbines 0.4 x 0.6 x 22 m flume with 
College of Agric- and canal intakes, adjustable slope. 
ulture. 
Provincial 	Division of Sedi- Shanxi province's reservoir 18 x 60 m experimental hall. 
Agencies ment Research, 
Taiyuan and canal sedimentation. 0.5 x 0.6 x 26 m flume with Shanxi Provincial adjustable slope. 





TABLE 4-1 	Continued 
Name Location Main Research Topics Main Facilities 
Shanxi Provincial Shanxi province's soil and 
Research Inst. of Lishi water conservation. 
Soil Conservation 
Shandong Provinc- Sediment problems arising 
ial Inst. of Hyd- Ji'nan from the diversion of R. Huang 
raulic Research, for irrigation and reclamation 
purposes. 
Gansu Provincial Turbine erosion and the exclus- 
Research Inst. of 
Lanzhou ion of sediment from turbine the Electric Pow- intakes. 
er Centre. 
Soil and Water Various Effects of collective soil and Conservation ' Nation - water conservation methods. Experimentation 
Stations. wide  
Source: QIAN Ning, DAl Dingzhong, 1980, pages 28 to 31. 
Extremely high silt loads common to the rivers of such a large area 
have necessitated extensive research into reservoir sedimentation 
problems and this has not been restricted to large-scale projects 
such as at Sanmenxia. Much work has been directed to the investigation 
of the laws governing deposition morphology and backwater extension, 
and preliminary methods to predict them have been developed. Methods 
have been found to reduce or discharge deposition and these are 
adapted to the locality, the determining factors often. being situated 
downstream. For example, the main concern of the Sanmenxia reservoir 
is for flood control downstream. In arid regions, however, to divert 
even the water discharged for reservoir purging to productive use is 
the overriding factor, and so special operational regimes are needed 
which are united with warping. There are now more than ten reservoirs 
where silt discharging through syphons is being tried to reduce water 
loss. In the case of medium and small reservoirs it has been found 
that near the dam, under the clean water layer, a very deep layer of 
muddy water remains unconsolidated for a long time. This is due to 
the reduced settling velocities within a struc-ture comprising many 
flocculated particles, and can be used to enhance density turrent 
purges 
1(9)  The use of heavily silted water is discussed separately 
in Section 4-2(1). 
The fluvial processes found in heavily silted streams are in many 
respects different from those of ordinary ones. The channel 
morphology of the upper part of the lower R. Huang, for example, is 
sufficiently unusual to have warranted a special name, 'wandering 
stream'. The main difference would appear to be related to the 
discovery that, for heavily silted streams, the sediment carrying 
capacity varies with the oncoming sediment load. The channel may 
rapidly undergo large changes in section and bed composition, and isin 
an unstable state. When hyperconcentrated flows occur with a 
sufficient proportion of fine particles severe erosion (bed-ripping) 
occurs and this, together with other characteristics of such flows, 
has been studied with a view to bringing greater accuracy to river 
control. 
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The above three aspects involve several different academic disciplines 
and both theoretical and empirical work. The methodology itself also 
forms an interesting branch of study where, for example, advances 
have been made with modelling and instrumentation. Other complementary 
fields of study must be covered in order to solve the problems of 
engineering in a silty environment. Here methods have been sought 
to prevent the more heavily silted parts of the flow from entering 
turbines, and special erosion resistant coatings have been found for 
turbine blades. The special problems of erosion around bridge piers 
is another example which has been studied. 
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2) Silt and Water Resources Put to Use. 
It has long been realised that to allow the soil of the loess 
plateau to be washed away, eventually to the sea, is a huge waste of 
a valuable resource, as is also the case with water. Yet the early 
concept of putting these resources to use had dealt more with 
preventing them from leaving the hilltops, than with their recovery 
and use further downstream. Whilst it would seem very desirable to 
stop all soil and water loss in one go, that is not practicable, and 
consequently ways have been sought to promote the latter aspect. This 
section seeks to describe the advances that have been made in 
drawing off heavily silted water for use, both in spite of, and 
because of, its high sediment content. 
i) Irrigation Projects Along Heavily Silted Tributaries. 
For many years the heavy silt load of the rivers of Northern China 
was a nuisance which was capable at times of putting irrigation schemes 
out of action. Taking as an example the -three major irrigation 
schemes on the Guangzhong plain, the Jinghui, Luohui and Weihui 
(rivers Jing, Beiluo and Wei, respectively) schemes, it is possible 
to illustrate how this inhibiting attitude was abandoned and 
replaced by the view that, properly treated, sediment can be a 
blessing. 
All three schemes have been renovated and extended in recent times. 
The Jinghui scheme for example now serves 2.65 times the area it 
served in the early fifties, although it is still about a third 
smaller than it was in ancient times (Qin dynasty) because the 
R. Sing has Cut into its sandstone bed by several metres. (10) There 
are now a number of sets of intake and return gates, for returning 
water to the river because it is too silty to be allowed to enter 
the canal system, from various historic times, which were abandoned 
as the river level fell too low to be used. The present scheme uses 
a diversion weir across the stream to overcome this problem. 
Total yields still exceed those of the Qin dynasty. This is because 
although the area is smaller the per unit yields are five times 
higher, owing to better management. 
The basic situation of the three schemes is given in Table 4-2. The 
Summer floods of these rivers contain very high concentrations of 
silt (Table 4-3), and it had long been the practice to prohibit the 
use of water whose silt concentration exceeded 15 7. (166 kg 
even though, in the Zhaolaoyu area of Fuping County, Shaanxi, water 
with higher concentrations has been drawn on and off without 
trouble for over 2300 years. Nobody is very sure whence came the 
interdiction, but it has been suggested that it might have originated 
when the Jinghui canal was reconstructed in 1938 and suffered serious 
deposition. (11) 
Nevertheless, the restriction has had severe consequences. It has 
meant that during the sixty or so days of crop ripening and swelling, 
when water needs are greatest and, unfortunately, local droughts are 
most common, there would be between 360 and 480 hours when the limit 
was surpassed. Furthermore, owing to the scattered nature of local 
storms and the difficulties of handling the consequent transient 
changes of river water level and silt content, about 40 days' supply 
would be affected. Whereas the total. requirement of the three regions 
was 2540 x 10 6 3 m yr-1 	 6 3 	-1 , only some 1330 x 10 m yr could be 
provided. If, in any extreme case, the greatest part .of.the rainfall 
occurred in one big storm and gave rise to high silt concentrations, 
the major part of the annual water supply would have had to have 
been allowed to flow away unused. (12) 
Beginning in 1954, the trunk canal of the Luohui scheme (Figure 4-3) 
was used to transport heavily silted water, reaching 59.8 7 
(959 kg m 3 ), for filling in a gully by deposition, and it was found 
that there was no sediment deposited in the canal itself. Throughout 
the fifties, the problem of alkalisation became more widespread 
within the region and, in 1964, water of concentration 47.7 % 
(682 kg m-3 ) was led to some fields to counter this problem by 
warping, and again there was no deposition in the trunk canal. From 
1969 onwards, this was extended to the whole irrigation district, but 
it then ran into trouble. In 1973, when the silt peak lasted an 
unusually long time, serious and widespread silting occurred. Some 
10001.. had to be organised to jump about in the water so as to stir 
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TABLE BASIL DATA FOR THREE IRRIGATION 
4-2 	DISTRICTS ON THE GUANZHONG PLAIN 
Irrigation Headiorh Intake Irrigated ogroptry Land Soil Groundwater 
District Capacity Area Surface 
(m 3s 1 ) (kin 2 ) Slope (%  
Northwest Clay loam Water table high, 
Jinghui &axjashar so 860 high. 017th 03 rather water quality good. Southeast 
Low  plentiful 
suited to well irrigation 
North Sand 	Loam, High mineral 
Luohui Thuongtou 185 493 high, 02 to 05 loam 
content, not suited 
South 	t o 
Low  
welt irrigation 
p Jnjiociin 50 1293 
Northwest 
high, 02 to 20 
Medium Loan Water table at 
e Southeast Light Loam 
depth of 15 to 80 in 
Vk-ihu 
L 





niijiubu 50 707 high, 02 to 20 light Loam of 3 to 	O m, water 
r Southeast qualityood, suited 
- - 
Itow __________ to 	weil irrigation 
Source: YANG Tingrui, et al., 1980, page 93. 
TABLE 	ONCOMING WATER AND SEDIMENT 
4-3 CONDITIONS FOR THE THREE SCHEMES 
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Flood 
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Diameter  
(m 3§1) (m 31 ) 10 6 ) t  	106) (%) (kg m(kg m (mm)  
92-6 
Jing hongjiasha 9200 344 1910 265 Julyto 112. 312 0-038 Fairly even 
October  
- 90 0-035 
leiLuo Zhuangfoi 4420 1-20 840 95 July to 1093 345 to Fairly even 
Sept.  0042 
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Main Drainage Charnel 	 - - - - 
Branch Drainage Channel 	- - -- 
Approximate ScaLe 	 1: 3 000 000 
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is 
FIGURE 4- 3 SKETCH OF THE LUOHUI SCHEME 
Source: YANG Tingrui, et al., 1980, page 94, 
TABLE THE THREE DISTRICTS' TRANSPORWI1ON 
4 - 4 AND USE OF HEAVILY SILTED WATER 
Lower Upper 
Jinghui Luohui Weihul Weihui 
(kg m 3 542 964 498 466 
Normd maximum Concentration to be drawn 
(%) 404 600 379 360 
Volume of water drawn,. in the flood season, 
whose concentration exceeds 	166kgr63 (m 3 x 10 6 ) 1500 2493 3243 
(15%) 
Sediment drawn in flood season 	(t 	x 106) 8-80 1505 2255 
Distance 	 (km) 67 50 200 
Sediment Transportation 
(kg m 3 ) 542 818 466 
Maximum concentration 
(%) 404 540 360  
(kg r63 ) 565 964 562 578 
Maximum concentration ever drawn 	 (%) 41-7 60-0 61-5 42-37 
(year) 1978 1977 1974 	1 1979 
Source: YANG Tingrui, et al., 1980 1, page 94. 
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up the silt and thus facilitate the purging of the system. In 1974 
part of the system was in danger of becoming choked up again. 	The 
banks had to be raised and the flow concentrated by raking in order 
to restore the original discharge capacity. Therefore, between 1974 
and 1976 the canals were lined, broadened and straightened, using 
2 9 687,000 ,1%d, V 1,985,000 (1 567,000) state investment and a 
contribution of Y 710 (L 203) from the masses. (13) 
Meanwhile, research into the characteristics of hyperconcentrated 
flow had been promoted and empirical formulae had been derived. With 
the aid of this increased understanding, it became possible to 
transport silt over long distances without deposition. 
(14) 
 (Table 4-4). 
The principles of canal design and use which have been developed in 
this way all seek to maintain the hydraulic intensity of the flow,  
the channel design, for example, should include a sufficiently large 
slope and a deep and narr section is preferred. Channels should be 
lined, and straightened, yet whilst bridge piers should be avoided, 
it has been found that inverted syphons may be used without loss. 
The modes of operation have to maintain a large continuous discharge 
to prevent deposition, whilst the needs of various parts of the 
irrigation district at different times are very variable. This 
apparant contradiction is resolved in the Luohui scheme by the 
adoption of the fairly complicated regime described below. (15) 
Before the flood season, or between flood peaks, water is supplied to 
those parts of the system Lking the facilities to cope with very 
silty flows. This is because the flood peaks have much higher silt 
concentrations than the basic flow. As successive flood peaks arrive 
each one is led to one part only of the system, so as to maintain 
discharge in the trunk canal. Different parts of the system are served 
on a rotation basis. Silt peaks rise sharply and fall gently and 
deposition is less likely as the silt content is declining. So, as 
a given silt peak approaches, it is used for irrigation until the 
concentration reaches 25 7 (297 kg rn 3 ) and then it is used for 
warping; whereas, as the silt peak recedes, it is used for warping 
only at concentrations exceeding 35 7 (449 kg m 3 ), below which 
point it is once more used for irrigation. Furthermore, once the silt 
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- content has dropped below 25 70, the area irrigated is increased so 
as to increase the discharge of relatively clear water in the main 
canals and flush out any previous deposition. Small branch ditches 
still suffer deposition, but this is not serious and can be cleared 
by jumping around in the water, or by digging. 
The combined effects of enlarging the capacity of the system as a 
whole by 84 7. and of making use of water with a silt content in 
excess of 166 kg m- 3  are, together, claimed to have resolved the 
water shortage problem of the Luohui irrigation district. Further-
more, soil structure can be improved by choosing to draw water from 
small flood peaks, which contain fine grain silt, or large flood 
peaks, which contain coarser grains, respectively. Figures for the 
three irrigation districts show that alkalinity in the top 300 rrn of 
soil can be suppressed by 48.6 % on average, reaching 75.9 7. in 
some places. Topsoil fertility is also improved, there being 
71.4 70, 19.7 % and 40 7. increases in the content of Nitrogen, 
Phosphorus and Organic Matter, respectively. Crops grown on land 
after warping in the irrigation district show 22.8 % to 39 7. 
increases over the yields of unirrigated land in the same region. (16) 
The Jinghui and Luohui schemes successfully adopted these measures 
only in the mid-seventies. In the case of the Jinghui scheme, good 
conditions for well irrigation had meant that there had not been the 
urgency to manage the silt discharge as in the Luohui district, and 
thiswu1d explain the late adoption there of these new techniques. 
In the case of the Weihui scheme, where the trunk canal is some 
200 km long, it was thought unlikely for many years that the 
principles used on the Luohui scheme could successfully be 
transferred. However, they were found, in practice, indeed to be 
transferrable,and have in recent times been popularised all over 
the loess plateau. 
These techniques are notable for their joint use of theoretical and 
empirical advances. With respect to the latter it is also notable 
that although the first steps were taken previously, the extension 
of the technique to the whole area occurred primarily in the periods 
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of the Cultural Revolution and shortly thereafter. Therefore, it may 
be surmised that the general mistrust of experts and established 
rules, which characterised that period, would have been instrumental 
in the overthrow of the 166 kg m- 3  upper limit. (17) These 
improvements have brought about, in addition to technical and 
agricultural advances, a reduction of some 46 x 1o 6 t (9.5 7) of 
these three irrigation districts' contribution to the silt of the 
R. Huang in the flood season, probably amounting to over 10 7 for the 
whole year. Although useful, this is not very significant to 
R. Huang control, being a reduction of only about 3 7, in its annual 
silt load, and predominantly of the less troublesome fine particles. 
But, in terms of regional development, it would be very important. 
ii) Drawing River Huang Silt for Land Reclamation and Dyke 
Consolidation. 
The rapid expansion of irrigation along the lower R. Huang, which 
was attempted in the late fifties and was subsequently curtailed 
owing to alkalisation problems, as described in Chapter 3, 
Section 6, vii, gave rise to some interesting developments, which 
benefitted from the silt, in flood control and in agricultural 
production. A fairly complete picture may be drawn by bringing 
together what information is available. 
It may be remembered that, in the first instance, the emphasis was 
on drawing water for irrigation. Nevertheless, in some areas 
large-scale works, requiring headgates and diversion weirs, were 
being built. In several parts of Shandong, use was made instead 
of the river's elevation, by drawing off water through syphons. 
These were easy to construct, as each system would comprise only a 
few 0.9 m diameter steel pipes to a total length of 100 m to 150 m, 
well within the financial means of the Production Brigades. (18) It 
was here too, that syphons had been tried before the revolution, 
for warping. 
Syphoning was as susceptible as any other irrigation method to the 
problems of alkalisation,ithilst being more sensitive to changes in 
river water level or channel position. For example, in 1958, an 
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early experiment was undertaken in Licheng County, near Ji'nan, to 
use the crude flood irrigation from the syphon projects built, since 
1955, in a better way. This involved changing from the usual dry 
cultivation of wheat, to rice paddies, as had been done successfully 
in Linyi County, South-East Shandong. Yet the experimental crop 
failed when the R. Huang water receded just at the time 'br 
transplantation of the seedlings. (19) For all these reasons their use 
was suspended in the early sixties along with other irrigation 
measures which used R. Huang water. 
Yet the higher per unit yield obtained on the smaller area where rice 
crops had succeeded, and the consistently good wheat yields from land 
previously dressed with silt from the syphons, led to further 
experimentation, especially important in the light of the failure of 
the Sanmenxia reservoir permanently to reduce the river's downstream 
silt content. In 1965, it was reported that by supplementing the 
syphons with pumps and by complementing the system with proper 
drainage ditches, yields of 2.25 t ha had been obtained the previous 
year on 1200 ha at Licheng. A conference was held, under the auspices 
of the Shandong provincial authorities, and it was decided that other 
Counties along the R. Huang should continue the experiment on a 
small scale, of 700 ha to 1400 ha each, to a total of 13,000 ha for 
the whole Province. (20) 
Owing to seepage from the elevated river and to the previous use of 
much soil for dyke building, the strip of land just outside the 
dykes was low and the most prone to alkalisation. It was here that 
conversions to rice paddies proved most beneficial. Rice has a 
relatively strong tolerance of alkali and the flooding, provided that 
there was adequate drainage, tended to wash out the salts. Further-
more, with successive deposition the low land was gradually built 
higher, which assisted drainage. 
These developments were undertaken independently of the dry cultivation 
which continued further from the river and care was taken to prevent 
the spread of alkalisation by separating the different cultures with 
drainage ditches. Furthermore, water drawn for wet cultivation was 
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not necessarily done through syphons, but special culverts were also 
built. By 1972, there was a total of over 50 culverts and 100 syphon 
tubes along the lower R. Huang, which were reported to have been 
treating 267,000 ha of productive land. (21) 
The practices adopted led to the land immediately beyond the dykes 
being raised. It was realised that therein lay a good method for 
consolidating them and, accordingly, the use of settling ponds for 
this purpose, and to provide clear water for both wet and dry 
cultivation, became popular. It was found that this method effectively 
prevented seepage from the R. Huang. From about 1970 it has been 
popularised, along the whole of the lower river, in its own right 




At about the same time the Ji 4 nan Dyke Maintenance Office began to 
use simple sediment suction boats to provide, the silt for dyke 
strengthening and consolidation. Owing to the unreliable supply of 
materials, there was much variation in the detail of the design of 
such boats. They were made from wood, steel or cement, used a 
variety of pumps and motors or engines, and not all of them were 
self-propelled, but the principle upon which they worked was constant. 
Each boat had a captain and three crews of four, who would use 
water cannon to agitate the river bed, and when the concentration of 
the mixture so created was sufficiently high (over 200 kg m-3), it 
would be sucked up and pumped over the dykes to the settling Ponds. (23) 
This method is difficult to use where the main channel is a long way 
from the dykes, but at the perilous section where the flow acts 
directly against them, it is particularly effective. It has been 
estimated to use only one tenth of the labour needed to reinforce the 
dykes by hand and, despite the cost of some V 100,000 to V 150,000 
(L 35,000) per boat, to save 60 , of the cost. Although not suited 
to the type of rapid mass campaign, by which the whole length of the 
dykes may be worked in a few years, the use of such boats provides 
advantages with respect to agriculture; in particular it conserves the 





FIGURE 4-4 DThf BUILDING METHODS OLD AND NEW 
Fhoto: R. Huang Exhibition, RHWCC, Zhengzhou, 7 July 
	
(PM) 
1980. The first large scale dyke raising effort of 
the fifties. 
I 
Photo: View from the main dykes near Huayuankou, 	(PM) 
looking away from the river. In the left foreground a 
pipe delivers R. Huang silt and water over the dyke. In the 
background is a small embankment, and the area in between is 
where the silt is allowed to settle for dyke consolidation. 
An impromtu wheat crop is grown during the process. 
Continued 
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FIGURE 4-4 (Continued) 
- 
- 	 - 
*---_"'t 	-- 
(o) 	 for dykeconsolidation ty warping. 
Source: RHWCC, Eds., 1979, p. 255. 
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By careful use of silty water deposited when the river discharge is 
high or low, respectively, and by good management of the settling 
process, silts of various sizes may be drawn selectively either for 
engineering reasons (such as lining the dykes with clays to prevent 
seepage, whilst filling the centres with coarser silts), or for 
agricultural reasons (such as drawing the fertile Summer silts for 
the top metre of the consolidation, so that it might be cropped, which 
in turn protects it from wind erosion). Meanwhile, the silt load of 
the river is reduced 
6 3 	-1 	 1 
thereby. (24\ Since the mid seventies about 
50 x 10 m yr of sediment has been 'deposited, principally by 
using boats, of which there are now 240. Along ordinary sections of 
the dykes, the consolidation is some 50 m wide, whilst at the danger 
points it is made 100 m wide. In both cases it is brought up to the 
level of the dyke tops. Since, during construction, the settling 
ponds are usually 4 m to 5 m above the level of the surrounding plain, 
extra drainage has to be provided to obviate their spoiling agricultural 
land. (25) 
These methods have proven to be very effective in stopping the kind 
of small seepage which historically has been the usual cause of dyke 
breaches, as opposed to overflowing or erosion. At Huayuankou, for 
example, traditional methods which had been used to repair the large 
breach of 1938, gave rise to constant leakages as the materials 
(mainly willow stalks) rotted. In 1975, this section was, consolidated 
by deposition and no leak has been found since. Also, in the 
stretches in Shandong where leakages occurred during the flood of 
1958, the water level has twice exceeded that level since consolidation, 
once in Summer and once in Winter, both without incident. As for 
reduction in main channel deposition of the lower R. Huang, although 
the silt drawn off is only some 3 7. of the river's annual load, it is 
about 15 7. of the annual deposition in the whole of the lower reaches. 
Furthermore, in the Shandong stretch, deposition usually occurs during 
Winter, whilst in the Summer floods scouring takes place. Whilst this 
method may not be able to make any significant impact above Aishan 
(i.e. in the He'nan stretch) where, on average, some 400 x 10  t are 
deposited annually, in Shandong the average deposition of 
39 x 
10  
t yr could be completely removed by fewer than 150 
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boa ts. (26)  However, as the following quotation shows, there has 
already been some financial restriction, 
"Consolidation by warping is an effective method to 
eliminate hidden dangers from the dykes and prevent: them 
bursting. It should be vigorously carried out. At 
present the two Province have only 200 or so boats and 
can deposit only 40 x l0' m 3 yr or 50 x 106 in3 yr4 
Yet, owing to 'serious financial shortages forcing many 
boats to cease to work', the pace of consolidation is 
very slow. Calculating for the planned required water 
level for 1983, there is still a task of 400 x 10 in 3 to 
be done, so this work needs greatly to be strengthened." (27) 
iii) Improvements in Dam Building Methods. 
A similar use of sediment is made in the gullies of the loess plateau 
where silty water is used in the constructicn of earthen' dams. The 
basic method came from the Soviet Union, and involves leading silt 
laden water to the top of the dam, where deposition takes place, and 
then draining off the clear water. The resulting dam is termed a 
'Hydraulic Fill Dam'. In China new techniques were developed, in 
the late sixties, which make use of the natural conditions on the 
loess plateau. The gullies are deep and the surrounding soil is 
loose and often uncovered. Conditions are good for transporting silt 
by the use of water. In the new technique, soil is first loosened, 
sometimes by hand or explosives, but more usually by water cannon. 
These are used in the next stage, which is to create a dense mix and 
to transport it by gravity to the dam surface for settlement and 
subsequent drainage. It is the use of water cannon to mix and 
transport the silts which enables a stronger dam to be built with a 
smaller section and a more homogenous texture. In comparison with 
earthen dams made by ramming or rolling, it is quióker, requires 
fewer people and less equipment. This can reduce the total cost by 
60 7.. (28) 
This type of construction has been widely popularised, and in Shanxi 
and Shaanxi, for example, applications number over 8000, of which 
over 5000 Are more than 35 in high and the largest reservoir so 
formed has a capacity of 69 x 10 6 m. (29) Yet, it should be emphasised 
that, s with any dam construction on the less plateau, there has to be 
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the proper complement of spillways, drainage system and gully side 
conservation measures if the dams are not to becwashed away in storms. 
They are most successful as part of comprehensive whole catchment 
control and development schemes, such as are described below. 
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3) Comprehensive Control and Development. 
This section is concerned with the technical aspects of the methods 
by which soil and water conservation measures have been applied 
successfully on various parts of the loess plateau. The reasons for 
failure of less well balanced approaches and the delay in applying 
over a wide area the present techniques, which were first suggested 
in the fifties, have been discussed in Chapter 3. The new policies, 
proposed to redress the balance, are discussed in Chapter 5. Three 
examples are given here, and it is hoped both to illustrate the 
methods available, and to emphasise the necessity of adapting them to 
the particular local circumstances. 
i) Gullied Plateau Region. 
In the smaller, Southern part of the loess plateau, where the topography 
comprises a level plateau surface cut by deep gullies whose steep 
sides are not usually cultivated, there is little need to withdraw 
tillage. Thus, the apparant contradiction between soil conservation 
and local farming methods does not arise. The two are complementary, 
and the principal aims of conservation work are to prevent the 
formation of new gullies or the extension or widening of existing 
ones, whilst doing as much as possible to reduce runoff and promote 
agriculture. (30) 
Chunhua County, an administrative area of 965 km  on the Southern 
edge of the gullied plateau region in Shaanxi, is one such area. The 
19 Communes of this County have 219 Brigades, divided into 981 
Production Teams, and the total population is 145,000k • In the 
Southern part is a small hilly region, but the rest is mainly level 
land cut by six large, clearly defined, steep sided gullies, several 
kilometres in length; and 228 smaller ones, each still over 1 km 
long. Precipitation is about 550 mm yr 	and the sediment yield 
modulus is about 2500 t kin 
2 
 yr, principally from gully sides and 
from where runoff collects on the gently sloping plateau surface, 
whose average slope is 8 7. to 14 7., becomes concentrated and gives 
rise to sink holes or gully extension. 
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Work began relatively late,. in 1970, with improvement works on the 
plateau surface. From 1974, afforestation was also undertaken. Mass 
campaigns and the sharing of the demands for manpower amongst various 
Brigades are used extensively here, especially in the agricultural 
slack season, of about 100 days, when 507. to 60% of the county's 
workforce may be brought together for conservation work, including 
some ten days devoted to afforestation. For example, in 1974, four 
Communes together pooled 10,000 ( and planted 1.3 km  of trees in 
1½ days. Emphasis is placed on planning, and a whole catchment or 
water system is taken as the planning unit. In order, it is said, 
to safeguard the masses' enthusiasm, 70 7. of any benefit to accrue 
from this work may be kept by the Communes and Brigades. 
Plateau Surface Protection: The plateau surface is the county's 
agricultural production base. Its management and use relies on land 
levelling and soil amelioration. Cultivated land which has a surface 
slope of less than 12 7., is made up into broad levelled bands 50 m to 
70 m wide, and attention is paid to keep the original top soil layers 
uppermost during the levelling process, so-as to keep the organic 
matter where it is needed. This is called 'Niandi' 	 or 
Bench Terracing (Figure 4-5). On uncultivated plateau land above 
gully heads, a series of large, low, earthen embankments may be built 
across the contour lines to collect the Summer storm water, which 
may reach 58 mm d- 1 , and its silt. The depressions behind these 
barriers gradually silt flat, whereupon the new land can be used 
for agriculture. The gully below is thus fixed and prior to completion 
of the entire works the land above may be used for grazing. Attention 
is also paid to the prevention of new gullies forming from roads; 
they are widened, straightened, metalled, lined with trees and, 
wherever possible, built up proud of the plateau surface. Runoff 
from roads is led back to the fields. 
Gully Edge Protection: Along gully edges, where the land slope is 
greater than 12 "L, terraces are constructed. Where the slope 
exceeds 26 7,, narrow, reverse-slope terraces are built and 
consolidated by being planted with shrubs and trees (Figure 4-6). 
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Photo: Chunhua County, Shaanxi, 20 July 1980. 	 (PM) 
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Photo: Chunhua County, Shaanxi, 20 July 1980. 	 (PM) 
FIGURE 4-5 BENCH TERRACES UNDER 
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Photo: Chunhua County, Shaanxi, 19 July 1980 	 () 
I FIGURE 6-6 REVERSE-SLOPE TERRACES 	I 
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Gully Floor Control: Larger gullies rely on reservoirs as a means of 
trapping silt and storing water. The small alluvial plains at bends 
in the rivers are often cultivated. As an experiment one smaller 
tributary gully floor has been completely forested. It now holds 
back all the silt and 60 % of the water. 
Extent of the Work: Since work began and up to the end of 1979, some 
228 km2 have been afforested, including 6.7 km 2 in reverse-slope 
terraces, 182 km  on what had been barren land and 64 kin 2 of economic 
forest, mainly orchards, of which one third already bears fruit. 
There are 16 km  put aside as nurseries, 85 % of saplings and seeds 
are self supplied, and transplanted saplings have a survival rate of 
50 70. 116 km  of plateau surface have been levelled, 160 km  of 
reverse-slope terraces have been built and 32 km  of grass has been 
sown. This work means that in the County as a whole, there are now 
387 
Ian  
of tilled land, 229 km  of forest, 105 km  of grass and 
233 km  of barren land. There are 24 small reservoirs and 35 silt 
precipitation dams which together collect the silt from catchments 
totalling 375 km2 . In a total reservoir capacity of 28.3 x 106  m3, 
with an effective capacity of 14 x 106 m 3 , 12.7 x 
10  
t of silt have 
already been deposited. Only one of the small reservoirs uses a 
silt-purging operational regime. There are also 94 pumping stations 
and 109 wells. The total irrigated area is 68.7 km 2 . 
It is interesting to look at the types of problem to have been 
encountered in the course of undertaking this silt-control work. In 
one of the six large gullies, Qingzhuang Gully, a reservoir was built 
in 1958 to control 76 km  of the catchment. However, commensurate 
soil conservation works were not done adequately and the sediment 
yield modulus did not fall below 3020 t kin 2 yr 1 , and by 1970, 
2.1 x 10 6  m3 of its 2.9 x 106  m3 capacity had been filled with silt. 
Thereafter, another reservoir was built upstream, which controlled 
some 20 km2  of the catchment and the following conservation measures 
were taken: 120 ha of plainland were levelled, ten small precipitation 
dams were built in tributary gullies, and 533 ha of slopes were 
afforested. The sediment yield modulus fell to 1860 t km- 2 vr and 
63 	 63 
in nine years only 0.22 x 10 m of its original 2.84 x 10 m capacity 
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were lost. Silt purging is not carried out there. In the course of 
afforestation several unsuccessful attempts were made to use new 
species of tree, but only locust species were found to be suitable. 
The other major problem, still not satisfactorily resolved, is that 
of retaining the plateau's soil moisture. 
Effects of the Work: Estimates for the reduction in soil loss were 
available only for levelled land, where it was claimed that water and 
silt runoff had both been eliminated. For the whole County, 
4120 x 10 t yr of silt were estimated to have been lost between 
1972 and 1977, compared with 7010 x 10 t yr. for the previous ten 
years. However, it is not indicated as to what extent this has been 
due to agricultural conservation measures as compared with the 
retarding effect of reservoirs. One brigade reported a four-fold 
increase in the organic content of the soil of levelled fields between 
1973 and 1978. The average unit grain yields for the whole County 
between 1971 and 1978 were 68.4 7 higher than for 1970. However, the 
average yield in 1980 was only 1.35 t ha- I  to 1.5 t ha 1 , a figure 
comparable to yields on unirrig.ated land in the poorer gullied hillock 
region to the North. Despite the many successes made in Chunhua 
County, essentially in the, short space often years, the relatively 
slow development of water conservancy, and especially the small 
area-irrigated, still do not permit agricultural production there to 
be free from the threat of drought. 
ii) Gullied Hillock Region. 
The greater part, some 250,000 km 2 of the loess plateau is so severely 
eroded that it no longer has any level surface, but-is cut into many 
small, rounded, barren hillocks, criss-crossed by gullies. The general 
topography is shown in Figure 1-11. Most of the hilltops are barren, 
some are cultivated and very few have been terraced. It is throughout 
this region that the apparent contradiction arises between withdrawing 
tillage from the hilltops, so that it may be replaced with grass or 
trees to reduce soil and water losses, and providing sufficient food 
to support the local population. One solution, which has been developed 
successfully in small catchment areas, is to make the catchment area 
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the basic unit. The first task is to provide an area of stable and 
high yields on precipitated or other "basic land" along the gully 
floor, or elsewhere, suitably protected against the Summer torrent; 
This is followed by the withdrawal of tillage from a larger area of 
hilltops, equivalent in total yield to the new land, and then, 
gradually, to extend the process until the whole catchment has been 
treated. Not only should runoff be greatly reduced, whilst guaranteeing 
the supply of staple foods, but extra income should also accrue from 
economic activities on the new forest or pasture land. (31) 
The above process is slow and needs careful planning with special 
attention being paid to local conditions. Nianzhuang Gully, a small 
tributary of the Yan river, 14 km Northeast of Yan'an City, in the 
gullied hillock region, is a good example of one of the few such 
catchments where these principles have been adopted continually since 
their inception in the early fifties and, therefore, may be used 
to illustrate the available techniques. 
The Nianzhuang Commune comprises 52 1m 2 of the gully's 54.2 km  
catchment area (the former figure is used in all subsequent data). The 
main gully is 14.6 km long, running Northwest to Southeast with a 
slope of 0.2 7. There are 203 tributary gullies of which only nine 
are longer than 2 km and 139 are between 0.3 km and 1 km long. The 
total population is 3446)... 	(66 A. km 2 ) and the ori2inal area of 
tilled slopes was 8.76 Ian  (Table 4-5). The most serious type of 
erosion is caused here by water, the next is by gravity (landslips), 
wind erosion is slight. The long term runoff coefficient is 
33,000 m3 km- 
2 
 yr 	and the sediment yield modulus was 6000 t km yr 1 . 
Thus, before control, 312 x lO t yr 	of silt were contributed, 
through the R. Yan, to the R. Huang. Originally this region was one 
of broad-leaved deciduous forest but now agriculture leans heavily 
towards cereals and even after 25 years of erosion control, vegetables, 
oil crops and medicinal herbs together account for only 10 7 of the 
agricultural production. Production is usually from one crop per 
year as the area has not proved suitable for multicropping. 
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Provision of "Basic Land": Work began in 1955 and, by the end of 
1979, 189 earthen dams had been built, mainly as silt precipitation 
dams, ten of which were in the main gully. The area of land so far 
created behind these dams is 107.3 ha, and this is expected to 
increase to 132.6 ha. In 1980, a stone dam was added to store clear 
water. In addition, 4.3 ha have been reclaimed by straightening the 
river course, irrigation has been provided elsewhere on 70.2 ha, 
167.9 ha has been terraced and 1.2 ha of broad level fields (Niandi) 
have been created. Thus 376.2 ha have been made into basic fields 
by the engineering measures taken so far (using 132.6 ha as the area 
of precipitated land), which is about 0.1 ha 
New Plant Cover: Between 1965 and 1979, two tree belts, totalling 
617 ha have been planted, one along each side of the main gully. 
Timber trees are grown along the shadier side, and along the sunnier 
side there is 120 ha of fruit trees, one third of which have begun 
to bear fruit. These trees are grown in bands on reverse-slope 
terraces interspaced with bands of shrubs, notably cannabis (Figure 
4-7c). A further 7.3 ha has been put aside as a nursery for saplings, 
and 167 ha has been sown to grass. 
Thus, excluding the nursery land, 11,6 km 2 , or 22.31 7. of the catchment 
has been treated in one way or another. Including other works, such 
as road improvement and a 22 km electric main, a total Y 550,000 
(Z 157,000) has been expended. That is investments of V 10,600 km- 2 
-2 for virgin land and 	47,000 km 	for controlled land. 
The Effects of the Work: The effectiveness of the work so far in 
reducing runoff and soil erosion, and the contribution of each 
respective method, may be judged from Table 4-5. The plan for 1985 
provides for the gradual withdrawal of all tillage from slopes and 
the creation of three mu 	of grass, five mu 	of forest and 
two mu 	of basic fields. One mu JT of this will be precipitated 
• 	land, (0.2 ha 	0.33 ha k 	0.13 ha ,&.l  and 0.07 ha,& -1 
respectively). The criterion used in the plan for the withdrawal of 
tillage from slopes is that, elsewhere, there should be 0.07 ha 
of land which has a stable annual yield of 7.5 t ha'A,. . 
	
The 
sediment yield modulus is expected to be reduced to 
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TABLE 45 EFFECTS OF VARIOUS CONSERVATION MEASURES IN NIANZHUANG GULLY 
General Characteristics Original 	Conditionftiorto 1955 Condition in 	1979  Planned Condition for 	1985 
Specific Specific Specific 
lArp-a 
Estrnated Estimated Estimated 
Runoff Erosion Yield Runoff Erosion Total Area Runoff Erosion Total Area Runoff Erosion Total 
(rn3kni2) (t krrr2) (kg h1) (km  2) (m3x106) (t x1) 
Yield 
 (km2) (m3x 1 (t x .106) 
Yield 
(km2) (m 3x 106) (t x 106 ) 
Yield 
Natural Wasteand 31476 4170 0 4324 136 018 0 3597 113 015 0 2870 090 012 0 
Titled 	Slopes 40350 15000 750 876 035 013 657 443 018 007 332 0 0 0 0 
Irrigated Land (Ocimland 0 0 4500 0 0 0 0 207 0 0 931 233 0 0 1048 
and River Berms) 
Level Terraces and Bench 2180 620 1125 0 0 0 0 169 0005 .0001 190 233 0006 0001 262 
Terraces 
Afforested 	Land 9280 62 0 0 0 0 0 617 006 0 0 1167 012 0001 0 
Grasstand 31470 7350 0 0 0 0 0 167 005 001 0 697 022 005 0 
Yield' 
Total 
32800 5900 5to 52 171 031 657 52 1425 0231 14.53 52 1246 0172 1310 grain 
Long term aver= c.ros c -itv 
Source: Fieldtrip notes made at Nianzhuang Gully on 28 July, 1980. 
Note: Economic benefit accruing from forests and grasslands is not shown, 
3332 	-2 yr 1 	Since 1974, all silt not held by the slope control 
measures has been trapped by the dam system. However, in 1979, its 
unused retention capacity was only 1 x i0 6 m3 (1.3 x 106 t) and, even 
using the estimated 1985 erosion coefficient, it would last but 
seven years. Thereafter, the gully will resume the supply of silt 
to the R. Yan at about half its previous rate. 
The average unit grain yield for tilled slopes is 0.750 t ha- 
f for 
terraced land 1.125 t ha 1 , and for irrigated land 4.5 t ha* 
Calculating from the 1979 figures of Table 4-5, these figures would 
give an annual grain yield of some 1450 t and the official figure is 
1200 t, or about 0.350 t ),, 	 . To this must be added the income 
from fruit and sideline production and together they would constitute 
a considerable improvement in yield over the simple 657 t yr 
(0.191 t ) -1 ) estimated from the original 876 ha of tilled slopes. 
Thus, it may be seen that whilst there are excellant prospects for 
regional development, those for reducing the silt content of the 
R. Huang are somewhat more distant, since the dam system is nearly 
full and many years will be needed to reduce significantly further 
slope losses. It should be emphasised that this prognosis applies 
only to the gully in question and that its predicted erosion 
coefficient is really quite low in comparison to other parts of the 
loess plateau. If this kind of result could be acheived on the 
110,000 km 
2 
 which contribute 74 7. of the R. Huang's silt load and 
where the average sediment yield modulus is nearly 14000t km- 2 yr1. 
it would constitute a very significant improvement. 
The types of problem encountered at Nianzhuang Gully include alkalisa-
tion where poor dam layout and drainage has caused 4.7 ha to be 
affected, two ha of which are incapable of growing any crop (Figure 
4-7d). Some of this land had extra drainage facilities added in 1980 
and the results are awaited before proceeding further. Although the 
main gully dam system has proper drainage facilities and flood spill-
ways, (Figures 4-7a, 4-7b), it was designed to resist a storm of the 
intensity expected once in twenty years (5 7. criterion), and it is 
now thought that this is too low. It is hoped that in future, terraces 
will yield 1.5 t ha 	and irrigated land at least 6 t ha • Only then, 
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FIGURE 4-7 NIANZHUANG GULLY 1980 
- ¼ 
— 
Photo: View from the top of No. 4 precipitation darn, 	(PM) 
Nianzhuang Gully, Yan'ari, Shaanxi, 28 July 1980, showing the 
proper drainage facility, the newly precipitated silt, and an 
impromptu crop of maize. 
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Photo: The flood spillway provided for NO. 	 - :•••......: 






 oto: Slcpe control measures on the sunny side of 	(') 
ianzhuang Gully, Yan'an, Shaanxi, 28 July 1980, showing apple 
trees in reverse-slope terraces interspaced with cannabis. The 
terrace edges are further protected with melon plants. elow, 
o. 5 precipitation dam is visible. 
, 
Photo: View acros the back of o. 5, precipitation dan, 	(PM) 
Nianzhuang Gully, Yan'an, Shaanxi, 28 July 1980, showing crop 
damage owing to alkalisation. A tributary gully which has been 
treated in a similar way may also be seen. The predominant 
continued use of tilled slopes in the catchmcnt is visible. 
2 J 
when the average per capita grain income will be 0.5 t yr 	, can 
economic sideline production be developed. A guaging station and 
experimental station are also planned. 
iii) Desert Border Region. 
The most severe erosion from the loess plateau occurs in N. Shaanxi 
and N.W. Shanxi, and the coarsest soil is to be found along the 
Western border of N. Shaanxi where, to the Northwest of a line drawn 
approximately along the Great Wall, d 50 is greater than 0.1 mm 
(Figure 1-13). The Maowusu desert has encroached upon much of this 
area and has covered the loess hills with sand dunes. The basic 
principles used in control of the gullied hillock region may still be 
applied here. It is interesting to observe how they are adapted so 
that emphasis might be placed upon protection against the wind and 
sand from the desert. 32 
The work done by the Longzhou Brigade of Jingbian County, N. Shaanxi 
is notable for the application of a variety of techniques in a new 
combination which suits the stringent local circumstances. This 
brigade has a population of 3600 ,( , a labour force of 1100 ,& 
divided into 19 production teams, and is situated in the upper 
reaches of a tributary of the R. Wuding. 	Its total area of 90 km 2 
includes the catchments of three large gullies, in all 88.7 
whose confluence is known as Guimenguan (Figure 4-8). There are 
three types of topography in this region; 59 km 2  of gullied hillocks, 
13.3 km 
2 
 of low,level land, between hillocks, and 17.7 km 2  of gullied 
remnants of such level land. The sediment yield modulus is 20,000 t 
-2 yr, although the annual rainfall, concentrated in Summer 
storms, is only 400 mm. Some 733 ha of the 1330 ha level land is 
covered with windblown sand. 
The work so far may be divided into three stages. From 1955 to 
1965, 34 silt precipitation dams were built, creating 20 ha of land, 
and a canal was dug to lead flood waters on to the lo level land. 
The work was begun in the branch tributaries of the Tuqiao Gully, 
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FIGURE 4-8 LONGZHOU BRTGADE COMPREHENSIVE CONTROL SCHEME SOURCE: Note 33 
built in 1956. Five more were added above the point where underground 
water issued into the gully, and the remaining 23 were in various 
branch tributaries to the other gullies. 
These first precipitation dams rapidly became silted and, in 1965, as 
the second stage, the canal was extended by 7 kin and became the trunk 
canal of a warping scheme, on part of 560 ha of sandy level land, 
which was undergoing silvicultural measures for protection against 
the further encroachment of windblown sands. Trees were planted four 
deep in rows, running East to West, separated by 200 m, and two deep 
in rows running North and South, separated by 400 m • Some 200 ha was 
in need of treatment with the finer and more fertile silts brought 
from the hills by the canal, and where this was to be done, each 
200 m x 400 m field formed by the trees was further divided into 
eight 50 m x 200 m deposition units, and filled according to the 
available floods. On average, 13 ha yr 	could be treated, and with 
this scheme to absorb the silt laden flood peaks, the second stage 
was complemented by a clear water reservoir built in Tuqiao Gully, 
without any serious sedimentation problem. This reservoir was the 
first in N. Shaanxi to be built to such a height, (52 m), using the 
new method described in Section 2,iii, and had a total capacity of 
20 x 106 rn3. 
Yet, although the muddy floodwaters had been put to use, the programme 
so far had been a little lacking in balance and in the rest of the 
catchment there were sill unstable yields and a general lack of 
water. Therefore, in the third stage, since 1970, four more reservoirs 
3 
with a total capacity of 15 x 10 6 m, and four more precipitation 
dams, have been built. In addition 12 pumping stations have been 
added, to raise the stored water for irrigation. 
The Effects of the Work: By 1975 there was a total of 733. ha of 
tilled land, which comprised 28 ha of precipitation dam land, 67 ha 
of warped sandy land, 440 ha of irrigated land and 137 ha of tilled 
slopes. There were also 1337 ha of forest. Since 1965, all silt 
lost from the slopes has been intercepted either by the precipitation 
dams or by the warping scheme. This has reduced the silt content 
of the R. Huang by some 1.8 x 106 t yr, whilst guaranteeing water 
supplies by ensuring that sedimentation of the reservoirs is very 
slow. In the Tuqiao reservoir, for example, only 5 x 10  m 3 had 
accumulated in ten years, and this was mainly due to bank collapses 
in the early period. It is particularly interesting to note that 
no drainage facility is provided for the floodwaters after warping. 
They are left to soak into the ground, which usually takes about a 
month. This is reported to be beneficial in conserving the soil 
moisture during the extemely hot Summer and in preventing the problem 
of land becoming stiff when too dry. No mention is made of any 
alkalisation problem and it is to be assumed that the water table is 
low enough in the sandy soil for waterlogging not to occur. A 
special team has been charged with the duty of building 'basic fields' 
and it is they who have the responsibility for warping and for 
management and maintenance of the engineering structures. 
Warping has been used for improvement of the soil structure and for 
increasing the fertility of existing cultivable land, as well as for 
creating new such land in sandy areas. Fresh water irrigation has 
also improved yields anthe land further upstream. Earlier unit 
yields of 0.3 t ha 	have increased on irrigated land to about 
2.6 t ha 	and on precipitated land to about 6.7 t ha- 1. Double 
cropping has also become possible for the first time. Whereas 
between 1956 and 1970 total yields varied between 300 t yr -1  and 
600 t yr 	(av. 0.15 t 	and grain often had to be bought 
from the state, by 1975 the yield had reached 1500 t (0.42 t ,k _l), 
had stabilised, and 320 t was sold to the state. In addition the 
necessary conditions were achsved for biological erosion control 
measures to be taken on the hills, although 75 7. of the catchment 
is still untreated. It is interesting to note, however, that in order 
that the silt washed from the hillsides, and thus made available for 
warping, should not diminish too drastically, it has been decided to 
built fewer tributary precipitation dams than originally planned. 
Some 80 agricultural machines have been bought, and willow weaving, 
brick and tile manufacture, pig rearing, medicinal herb growing and 
beekeeping activities have begun. The brigade's income in 1975 was 
150,000 (L 43,000), or Y 42 	(1 12 ) 	
1 ) 
2S9 
The latter two examples both depend upon sediment deposition in the 
gully floor, to provide the necessary 'basic land', Another, similar, 
method, is to straighten rivers. The land regained in this way is 
built up each year by allowing the Summer floods to cover it and to 
dress it with fertile silts. 'Basic land' is not, however, confined 
to the gully floors. Terraces, for example, may be used, as long as 
an adequate water supply can be provided. Figure 4-9 shows a model 
of a scheme where 'basic land' is provided by both river straightening 
and terracing measures. The important point about comprehensive control, 
is that the general principles should be adapted to the particular 
circumstances of each locality, 
t Fwu 4 
6rJ2 /-jp 
Photo: R. Huang exhibition, RE'tJCC, Zhengzhou, 7 July 	(PM) 
1980. Ybdel showing the comprehensive control scheme 
adopted by Quyu Brigade, Northwest Shanxi. 
- ---4 
FIGURE 4-9 COMPREHENSIVE CONTROL SCHEME 
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Chapter Five 
Present Situation and Future Plans. 	
ID 
The descriptions presented in the previous two chapters, concerning 
both the lessons and the experiences which have come from the past 
thirty years of R. Huang control and development, contain a number 
of examples of the work done so far in various parts of the basin. 
It is the intention to use this chapter to take an overall view of 
the state of the basin to-day and the prospects for its future 
control and development and, in doing so, it is necessary first to 
bring together, complement, and summarise the accounts of these 
aspects. 
1) Extent and Outcome of Work to Date. 
The work of regulating the R. Huang has cost China an estimated 
5.6 x 1O9 (E 1.6 x los ) in the last thirty years. Let us see what 
it has bought. (1) 
i) Organisation, Planning and Research. 
The RHWCC co-ordinates many different specialisations, all related, 
in one way or another, to the R. Huang basin. These include dyke 
maintenance, surveying, planning and design, soil and water 
conservation, research, water quality control, hydrology and 
communications. It is estimated that the corps of specialists so 
created is now over 20,000 A... strong. 
The RHWCC employs over 1700 k in the c,gingstations under its 
control and over 2000 A. in a special planning and surveying staff. 
In the period in question these have completed 289,000 m of 
drilling, made geological maps to various scales of 20,800 km 2 , 
carried out triangulation on 500,000 km  and. level surveying on 
36,000 km2 . Maps to various scales, including many aerial maps, 
have been drawn up to cover 90,000 km2 Plant surveys and socio-
economic investigations have also been carried out. Like the work, 
described in the previous chapter, of China's 1000 sediment 
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researchers, these must be seen as ongoing, regular tasks. 
The R. Huang Technical and Economic Report of 1954 still forms the 
conceptual basis of the work of the R. Huang basin. However, the 
details are subject to further research and some debate (Section 3), 
whilst modifications are to be expected to have arisen as the 
consequence of the Sarimenxia reservoir failure, and as a result of 
new knowledge gained through research. 
ii) Flood Control. 
The most important flood control undertakings occur in the lower 
reaches of the river. The main method of control lies in the 
application of the concept, "Broad river and strong dykes", which 
requires the dykes to be supplemented by the Beijin and Dongping 
retardation works (Chapter 2). Two widening schemes, for the 
R. Huang, but known as the R. Wen and Kenli schemes respectively, 
have been carried out in Shandong and the dykes have been raised 
three times; once just after the Civil War, 1950 to 1954, again from 
1963 to 1965, when the failure of the Sanrnenxia reservoir was 
realised, and again, beginning in 1973 and continuing at present. 
In all, work on the dykes to 1979 had involved 480 x 10  in 3 of 
earthworks, 280 x 10  
m  
of consolidation by warping and over 
3 
10 x 10 6 in of stonework. Some 5300 spur dykes at dangerous points 
along the dykes were built, as were over 3000 buttresses for main 
channel training at 172 places. Dyke maintenance has included the 
drilling of 70 x 106  exploratory holes and the discovery and 
elimination of 240,000 hidden faults. Control of the oncoming 
flood waters mainly comprises the Sanmenxia, reservoir (Chapter 3) 
and the Luhun reservoir on the R. Yi, although some adjustment of 
the basic flow would result from the various reservoirs in the upper 
reaches (Section iii). (2) Their overall effect will now be 
considered. 
Whilst the upper reaches provide a basic flow of some 2000 m 3  s- 
 1 
 
to 3000 m3 s- I , the large transient flood peaks come either from 
the tributaries of the loess plateau, between Hekouzhen and 
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Sanrnenxia, or from those, principally the Yi, Luo and Qin, between 
Sanmenxia and Huayuankou. 
(3)  They have never been known to arise in 
both regions simultaneously, and are called 'Upper Big' (k,k) and 
'Lower Big' (Fj, respectively. The criterion for future flood 
control work, is to protect the lower reaches against the combination 
of a flood peak of 0.1'% annual probability (a 1000 yr flood), from 
one of the above regions, together with an 'ordinary' flood from the 
other. At present this criterion is not being met. Flood frequencies 
for Shanz.hou, from the fifties, are shown in Figure 3-26, but the value 
of a 1000 yr 'Upper Big' flood peak is now thought to be somewhat 
higher than is shown. When combined with an ordinary flood from below 
Sanmenxia, the total peak discharge at Huayuankou is estimated to be 
of the order of 46,000 rn 3 s. The same peak flood discharge at 
Huayuankou is estimated for the combination of a 1000 yr flood 
arising below Sanmenxia, together with an ordinary flood from above. (4) 
Neither of these estimates takes into account possible attenuation of 
flood peaks by the Sanmenxia reservoir. 
The total flood volume of the 'Upper Big' type of extraordinary flood 
is greater than that of the 'Lower Big' type, and the 'Upper Big' type 
carries a heavy silt load, whereas the 'Lower Big' type is comparatively 
clear. Less severe flood peaks of the 'Upper Big' type occur more 
frequently than corresponding 'Lower Big' types. There were 17 
instances of large flood peaks in the lower reaches between 1950 and 
1977. Of these there were 10 occasions during which water from above 
Sanmenxia accounted for over 80 7. of the total volume of five days' 
flood, 14 occasions during which it accounted for over 60 7. During 
the big flood of 1958, moreover, whilst 71 7. of the flood peak 
originated below Sanmenxia, 57 7. of the five day flood volume still 
came from above. Flood peaks lasting more than five days are reported 
to be even more predominantly originated upstream of Sanmenxia. It 
would appear therefore, that whilst the control of the more rare, 
especially large floods might be concentrated upon the tributaries 
below Sanrnenxia, a more immediately important role would be played 
in channel regulation and the proper disposal of silt, by control of 
the more frequent, less severe, but nevertheless potentially 
catastrophic floods which originate above Santnenxia. (5) 
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The criterion achieved in the lower reaches at present is that floods 
which do not exceed 22,000 Tn 3 s 	at Huayuankou may be conducted 
safely to the sea. In the narrower section below Aishan, the 
corresponding safe carrying capacity is 10,000 m 3 s, the difference 
being made up by the upstream channel and floodplain storage capacities. 
The Sanmenxia resevoir has brought Winter ice-jam floods successfully 
under control, but has a very limited role in controlling Summer 
floods. The Luhun reservoir offers no regulation of the rivers Luo 
and Qin, and the Sanmenxia reservoir has no direct influence upon 
floods originating in any of the rivers below, although it may help 
by reducing any contribution from the R. Huang upstream. Furthermore, 
any part it plays in regulating large floods from above is either at 
the cost of some of its own capacity, or is subject to restrictions 
necessary to safeguard the future flood carrying capacity downstream. 
(Chapter 3). 
Under low flow conditions, in the lower R. Huang, deposition will occur 
in the main channel. Even in Winter when it is clean water that is 
-1 	 3 discharged, at between 600 m 3  s and 800 m s - ]., from the Sanmenxia 
hydropower station, the effect is to move silt from the wide, He'nan, 
stretch and deposit it in the narrow, Shandong, stretch downstream. (6) 
-1 Moderate and large flood peaks from about 4000 m 3 s 	to near the 
safe limit for the lower reaches (22,000 rn 3 s- 
I 
 at Huayuankou) 
generally scour the bed in the Shandong stretch, and often in the 
upper part as well (Chapter 3, Section 7, i), whilst those which 
cover the floodplains (over 6000 in 3 s 	at Huayuankou) cause beneficial 
deposition thereupon. However, the net outcome is still a rise of 
about 0.07 m yr 	of the whole lower reach, including both the main 
channel and the floodplains, which makes dyke maintenance more 
difficult, increases through. seepage the alkalisation problems 
outwith the dykes, and reduces the slope of the stream, thereby 
facilitating a further increase in the rate of deposition. Furthermore, 
any part of these flood peaks, from above Sanrnenxia, which exceeds 
12,000 m3 s 1 , will cause the reservoir water level to rise and 
deposition to take place there which would be detrimental. 
Qvi 
The very large flood peaks which could arise from above Sanmenxia 
pose a double problem. Firstly, there would be the threat to the 
Guanzhong Plain and Wan (Chapter 3, Section 7, ii), as a result 
of the hindrance caused by the restricted discharge capacity of the 
dam. Secondly, when the silts deposited in the resevoir during the 
course of the flood are subsequently worked out of the reservoir 
by smaller floods, they would pose another problem in the lower reaches. 
Even together, therefore, the Sanrnenxia and Luhun reservoirs are at 
present incapable of ensuring that the flood discharge at Huayuankou 
3 -1 
shall not exceed 22,000 m s . Meanwhile, the problem of deposition 
in the lower reaches continues. As a result of the three dyke 
raising efforts since the Civil War, the dykes along both sides of 
the river have been raised by between 2 iii and 3 m in the upstream 
part between 4 m and 5 m in the lower part. Above Aishan they are 
some 2.5 m to 3 m above the water level corresponding to 22,000 m 3 s 1 , 
and below Aishan they are some 2.1 m higher than the level corresponding 
3 -1 
to 10,000 m s •(7) In the upper stretch this is the same safe 
carrying capacity as after the first major dyke overhaul in the early 
fifties, whilst in the lower stretch, it has fallen to its present 
level from 13,000 m3 s 	. Thus, it may be seen that although 
several advantages have come from careful use of the Sanmenxia 
resçyoir in maintaining a good channel morphology, (Chapter 3 ), and 
despite the effectiveness of the silt-suction boat in Shandong, the 
silt problem really has not been solved, and the extensive dyke works 
have been necessary just to maintain the status quo. Whilst the 
estuary continues to extend and the bed continues to rise, it is 
arguable, furthermore, that the status quo is not being maintained. 
Figure 5-1 gives the example of the change in water level corresponding 
to a discharge of 1000 m3 s 	at Luokou, Shandong. Silt is the 
fundamental problem of the lower R. Huang, and whilst it remains 
present in unchanged quantities, the flood menace has not been and 
can not be eliminated. 
There is one further line of defence, namely the Beijin flood 
detention area (the use of the Doigping Lake flood diversion 
reservoir is assumed in the 22,000 m 3 S 1 criterion). Yet there is 
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FIGURE 	CHANGES IN THE FLOOD SEASON 
5-1 WATER LEVEL FOR DISCHARGE 
Q=1000 m3 sl AT LUOKOU 
Source: FANG Chongdai, 1980 9 page 62. 
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considerable opposition to the use of such areas. Firstly, there 
would be considerable losses within the area, and it is arguable 
that the problem is only being moved, not solved. At present the 
2500 km  area contains nearly 1500 kin 2 of cultivated land and houses 
1.3 x 10 
6,k. 
 It is estimated that to flood it once would incur 
losses amounting to Y 570 x 10  (1 163 x 106 ). (8) Secondly, the 
perimeter dykes of such areas on plain land would be subject to the 
same maintenance problems as the R. Huang main dykes, which would 
put extreme pressure upon repair and maintenance staff who at that 
time would be needed on the main dykes. In the thirty years since 
its construction, the Beijin detention area, for those reasons, 
has never been used and, under the present arrangements for flood 
control, would not be used for a flood smaller than 22,000 m S- I ; 
that is, a once in 50 years flood. Meanwhile, the people who live 
in the area still have to make preparations every year and clearly 
this disturbance to their lives would not be welcome. Work is in 
progress to construct the Guxian (Cu County) reservoir on the R. Luo, 
and design work has begun for the Hekoucun reservoir on the R. Qin. 
These are attempts to bring a measure of control to these 
tributaries, but it will be some time before they are complete and, 
even then, their contribution to flood control between Sanmenxia and 
Huayuankou will be limited. (9) 
None of the above is intended to deny the generally good flood 
prevention record since the Civil War. Floods of less than 
22,000 m3 s at Huayuankou have been brought under control and 
there is provision, albeit provided with reluctance, for greater 
floods, by way of the Beijin diversion area or, under certain 
circumstances, the use of the Sanmenxia reservoir. Winter floods 
have now been eliminated, although two such events did occur in the 
early fifties, and no Summer inundation has occurred for over thirty 
years. (10) Advances have been made in the attempts to dispose of 
the silt and maintain the present flood carrying capacity. Whilst 
it must be said that this good record also owes a debt to good luck, 
in that no extraordinarily large flood peak has arisen in this period, 
it should also be pointed out that the shortcomings have been 
recognised and work is in progress to rectify them (Section 3). 
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There remains one further problem in controlling the lower R. Huang, 
which is the ancient practice of tilling the river's floodplains 
within the main dykes. The main channel is often controlled by 
special river course training embankments built on the floodplains 
and usually following a wandering or meandering pattern. The 
training embankments are an attempt to stabilise the channel so as 
to reduce the instances of floodplain collapse, which not only 
increase the silt content of the river, but also reduce the main 
channel flood carrying capacity. These works are kept to a minimum 
so as to reduce their influence on the flow conditions on the 
floodplains on the occasions that overbank floods occur. However, 
quite contrarily to this principle, the local peasantry build 
villages on the floodplains, till the land, and protect these 
activities by the construction of 'production dykes' along large 
stretches of the edge of the main channel, so as to reduce the 
instances of overbank flooding. (Figure 5-2). (11) 
These practices increase deposition within the main channel, whilst 
reducing it on the floodplains and are clearly detrimental to flood 
control work, as the following quotation shows, 
"At presnt, 1 small. and medium sized floods (5000 m 3 s 	to 
15,000 m s -  cause tension in flood prevention, mainly 
below Dongbatou. In this stretch, because of the construction 
of production dykes, the main channel is higher than the 
floodplains, creating a second level suspended river. If 
the production-dykes should burst, a flood peak could travel 
along the main dykes,causing a danger." 
Despite such considerations, there are now some 2000 km of tilled 
floodplains and a population of over a million there, and finding a 
suitable alternative would be difficult. According to the RHWCC, 
early attempts to remove these people met stubborn refusal, despite 
various offers of money. Now, although the practice is not 
encouraged, it is tolerated. These people's production is not 
taxed, and when they suffer losses due to overbank floods, they 
receive State aid. 
iii) The Use of Water Resources. 
Seven reservoirs have been completed on the R. Huang mainstream, as 
have 136 large and medium-sized ones on the various tributaries. 
I 
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Their total capacity is 29.4 x 1O 9 m3 , they provide 2.51 GW of 
electrical power, and water to irrigate 33,000 km 2 . The combined 
capacity of the hydroelectric power stations installed at six of the 
mainstream reservoirs is 2.4 GW and the seven reservoirs have added 
some 6700 km  of irrigated land (1 As was envisaged in the 'Technical 
and Economic Report' of 1954, electricity production is concentrated 
in the gorges of the upper reaches. An eighth reservoir is at 
present under construction on the mainstream at Longyangxia, 
furthest upstream of all projects so far. All eight will now be 
considered in detail. 
The Longyang Gorge (Figure 5-3) is situated in Gonghe County, 
Qinghai, above the town of Guide. It is at 2500 m above sea level, 
some 40 kin long, over 150 in deep, only 30 m wide, and has an average 
discharge of 640 m3 s. The proposed concrete dam will be 172 m 
high and will create a reservoir of 24.7 x 1O 9 m3 capacity, 
necessitating the evacuation of 26,000 k . Its installed generating 
capacity will be 1.5 GW and the annual energy output will be 
6.0 TW 
Work began in 1977 with the construction of a diversion tunnel 661 m 
in length and with a maximum discharge of 3100 in3 	The tunnel 
was completed in November 1979, and a 54m high cofferdam capable of 
retaining 1.1 x 1O 9 m3 of water was reported to be in place in 1981. 
The project is planned for completion by 1985. 
The Liujiaxia hydroelectric power station is situated some 100 kin 
above Lanzhou, Capital of Gansu, in a deep and narrow gorge, just 
1,5 km downstream of the confluence with the R. Tao. (Figure 2-1). 
The reservoir had an original capacity of 5.72 x l0tn3 and its 
duties include flood control, irrigation and ice-jam control in 
the upper reaches, although it is primarily intended for electrical. 
generation and,with an installed generating capacity of 1.225 GW, 
it is China's largest completed hydro-power station. It has a 
complicated layout in which part of the power station and some of 
the water and silt discharging sluices are built into the cliff of 
the right bank, and the 147 m high dam is extended beyond the gorge 
proper, such that the flood spillways are 700 m long and pass behind 
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FIGURE 5-3 THE LONGYANG GORGE 
Source: RRWCC, Eds., 1979 9 p. 39. 
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the highest point of the cliff. (Figure 5-4). Work began in 1964, 
the dam was completed in 1968 and the last generator set began 
operation in 1974.(l5) 
Although only 2.97 of the effective capacity of 4.15 x 1O9 rn3 had 
been lost in ten years' operation, sediment, nevertheless, is a 
problem, mainly because of the relative position of the silty R. Tao. 
Whilst in wet years, when the water level is high, sediment entering 
the reservoir from the river Tao forms a density current and is 
discharged quite easily, in dry years no such density current may 
form and sediment from the upper R. Tao is deposited in front of the 
dam. Between 1974 and 1976, when water was plentiful, only 
0.57 x 10  t yr 1 of silt passed through the turbines. Then in 1977 
and 1978 when the water level was low, the level in front of the dam 
rose 5.5 m and in 1978 about 10 x 10  t passed through the turbines, 
causing serious erosion. (16) 
The dam of the Yangguoxia reservoir is only some 30 km downstream 
of Liujiaxia. Its original capacity was 220 x 10 6m3 and its purpose 
is for run of the river electricity generation. Work on the 57 rn high 
dam began in 1958 and the first generator set went into operation in 
1962, making it the first hydropower station to produce electricity 
from the R. Huang. The installed capacity is 352 MW. There is no 
specific facility for sediment discharge, and, in the period prior 
to the completion of the Liujiaxia reservoir, some serious 
sedimentation problems were encountered. (17) 
The dam comprises two distinct parts. On the left-hand side is the 
power station and on the right, separated by a low wall, is a 
spillway section. Under favourable flow conditions, since the 
discharge capacity of the spillways is considerably higher than that 
of the turbines, the main flow should pass through the spillways 
and both the silt concentration and the total sediment discharge 
there should be higher than in the water passing through the turbines. 
(Figure 5-5). However, since the coarse silts and grassy debris 
could not pass over the spillway weir when the flow was relatively 
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1964, the trash racks collapsed after becoming blocked in this way, 
and in the first ten years of their operation the turbines had to 
undergo extensive repairs on five occasions, of which some 807 of 
the work was to deal with turbine blade erosion. The cost of the 
trash rack collapse has been estimated at Y 30 x 106  (s. 8.6 x 106). 
Meanwhile by October 1968, some 167 x 
10  
rn3 of sediment had settled 
in the reservoir, filling 767.of its retention capacity. 
Since the completion of the Liujiaxia reservoir these problems have 
been alleviated somewhat as the flow is now controlled by the upper 
darn. The amount and concentration of sediment entering the lower 
reservoir, however, depends upon density current discharge of the 
R. Tao silt load. Over the past ten years, some 7 x 10 6 3 m of 
reservoir capacity has been regained and the remaining 50 x 106  m3 
or so can be maintained, although there is slight annual variation (18) 
The Bapanxia reservoir, just 17 kin downstream of the Yanguoxia 
reservoir is another run of the river hydropower station, and 
clearly also comes under the influence of the two above. Its dam is 
only 43 m high and its reservoir capacity is 49 x 10 6  m3 . it has a 
low-head and an elaborate system of weirs to cope with the river's 
silt load. Construction began in 1969, electricity production began 
in 1975, and the final generator was installed in 1979. The 
installed capacity is 180 MW. (Figure 5_6).(l9) 
Like the Yanguoxia dam, the Bapanxia power station is separated from 
its accompanying sluices by a low wall. In this case the power 
station is on the right-hand side of the river, and the longitudinal 
part of the coffer dam has been converted to form a wall some 8 m 
higher than the turbine intakes. In this way the lower water layers, 
whose silt concentration is higher, are kept from the turbines and 
are led to the sluices. Thus, only the clearer, upper, layers may 
proceed towards the turbines. Within the area so formed, 90 m 
upstream of the dam, a transverse barrier, also built on to the 
coffer dam remains, forms a pond for silts which get over the outer 
walls. These measures are supplemented by silt discharging channels 
below the turbine intakes which lead away any silt carried beyond 
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FIGURE 5-6 	THE BAPANXIA POWER STATION 
Source: SRIHEWL, et al., Eds., 1 979, P. 322. 
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the pond and keep a clear space just in front of them, even when the 
turbines are not in use. (20) 
Some 40 kin upstream (South) of Yinchuan, Capital of Ningxia, the 
Qingtongxia reservoir performs multipurpose functions with emphasis 
on irrigation of the two halves of the Ningxia Plain. The dam in 
the Qingtong Gorge is 42.7 m high and the water collected in its 
reservoir of capacity 620 x 106 m  can be drawn for irrigation of 
39,000 ha of the upstream Ningwei Plain, as well as providing 272 MW 
of electrical power. After passing through the turbines, some of 
the water is led to irrigate about 151,000 ha downstream, on the 
Yinwu Plain. Work began on 26 August 1958 and was completed in 1967. 
It is claimed that since the completion of the Liujiaxia reservoir 
upstream to guarantee the water supply, 70 GW h more electricity can 
be generated in Winter at Qingtongxia. The quantity of sediment 
passing through the turbines is reduced by the provision of sluices, 
with the same dimensions as the turbine intakes, some 6.15 m lower. 
(Figure 5-7). Measurements have shown that the sediment concentra-
tions and absolute quantities in these sluices are between 7 and 8 
times those passing through the turbines. (21) 
The diversion weir, for the Hetao irrigation project, forms what is 
otherwise known as the Sanshenggong reservoir, which has a capacity 
of 80 x 10 6 3. It is not equiped with a power station. This 
barrage, was begun in the late fifties and completed in 1961 
(Figure 5-8), is 2 kin long and has 18 electrically controlled sluice 
-1 gates capable of diverting over 500 m 3  s 	of R. Huang water, for 
the irrigation of 387,000 ha. (22) 
The middle reaches of the R. Huang mainstream contain only two 
reservoirs, situated at Tianqiao and Sanrnenxia. The function of the 
Tianqiao reservoir is to provide a head for run of the river power 
generation. Construction was begun in April 1970, the first power 
was generated in February 1977, and the fourth set was installed in 
July 1978. However, owing to incompleted chemical grouting, the 
maximum water level by 1979 was still being held 2 in below the 
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282 
' ç r 	11 7v; 
r F 	F 
.IFFU.L 
N.) 
SO!JRIES: HUANG Wei, 1978, pp. 88 to 891 FIGURE 5-8 	THE SANSHENGGONG DIVERSION HEAD -GATE 	wcc,[ds.,1979,p. 	I 
retention capacity is 68 x 10  m 3 and the installed power generating 
capacity is 128 MW. 
The dam of the Tianqiao reservoir is situated at a point some 10 km 
upstream of Baode, Shanxi, at the end of the 20 kin Tianqiao Gorge, 
where the river contains, in midstream, the Shuizhai Islet. Just 
within the loess area, this project suffers extemely sharp flood 
peaks and a heavy silt load. The average runoff of 26.7 x 10 m 3 yr 
gives an average discharge of 848 in3 s- 1 . but the largest recorded 
flood peak reached 10,700 in3 s. The silt discharge here is 
351 x 10 6 t yr' 1 with an average concentration of 13.1 kg rn" 3 . 
In the flood season silt can come at the rate of 100 x 106  t 
in concentrations up to 1.19 t m' 3. Furthermore, in Winter, ice 
flows of up to 292 m3 s may occur and, on average, some
ml 100 x 106  m3 yr of ice must be dealt with. The dam design comprised, 
on the right-hand half of the river, from the islet to the bank, an 
earthen barrage, and on the left-hand side, a double layer sluice 
section for ice and water regulation, the power station with special 
sediment discharge channels below the intakes, and a set of three 
separate silt discharging sluices. (Figure 
The function and design of the Sanmenxia reservoir has been described 
in some detail in Chapter 3 and, whilst it is clear that the problems 
of sediment control there are most acute, it may also be seen that 
consideration of such problems is an important factor in the design 
of any structure along the R. Huang; and the same may be said for the 
tributary reservoirs, whose losses have been described earlier 
(Chapter 1, Section 7, iii). Yet, reservoirs are not the only means by 
which the waters of the R. Huang and its tributaries are put to use, 
and it is useful, therefore, to take a more general look at the water 
resources of the basin and their use. (24) 
The R. Huang basin lies in an arid and semi-arid region; together 
with the Huai and Hal river basins it accounts for a seventh of the 
national area, but only one twentieth of its total surface runoff. 
The R. Huang mainstream has a total fall of over 4300 in, which is 
estimated to be capable of generating some 20 GW of electricity, and 
of which some 10 7. is being used; the water therein available for 
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agriculture amounts to 48 x 10  m3 yr, and if the silt is 
considered to be a useful resource, it is also an abundant one, 
1.6 x 1O9 t yr'. 
There has been a moderately rapid increase in the irrigated area of 
the R. Huang basin in recent years. In the 20 years from 1949 to 
1969, for example, the world expansion of irrigated area was 150 7, 
the US and the USSR increased 70 ,, Spain and Italy between 100 7 and 
200 7, and Romania over 600 7. In the R. Huang basin, over 30 years 
between 1949 and 1979, it has increased from 8000 kin 2 , none of which 
was along the lower reaches, to 33,000 kin 2 (400 7). Furthermore, 
silty water is now drawn in the lower reaches through 72 take-off 
sluices, 55 syphon stations comprising 153 syphon tubes, and 240 
suction boats, to irrigate 10,000 km 2 , warp 1930 km 
2
, suppress 
alkalisation by the use of wet rice culture on 870 km  and 
63 	-1 consolidate the dykes at the rate of 50 x 10 m yr •(25) 
Thus, in terms of the speed of development so far, this area could 
be thought to be doing quite well. Indeed, whereas the ratio of 
irrigated area to cultivated area worldwide is between 15 7 and 20 7, 
in China it is about 30 7, and in the R. Huang basin it is between 
25 7 and 30 7. Yet the stringent local conditions bring problems 
which leave no room for complacency. The pressure of population 
for example may be illustrated by a comparison of the o.Oq ha )l 
of irrigated land in the US to theo5ha 	in the R. Huang basin. 
Moreover, owing to the uneven distribution of rainfall and the 
generally arid nature of the area, these cprnparisons can only be 
regarded as qualitative; as in many places when there is no 
irrigation crops may not successfully be grown, whilst some places 
where there is irrigation may only be able to draw water once or 
twice a year. For these reasons alone, it is important that more 
of the 30 x 1O 9 m3 yr of water that flows each year unused into 
3 	-1 the sea from the R. Huang, be used, or that the 20 x 10 9  in yr or 
so which is drawn for irrigation each year, be used more effectively. 
The ratio of water drawn to water used, in irrigation schemes 
worldwide is 30 70. In the R. Huang basin above Huayuankou it is 
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also 30 7,. Even though this is not an unfavourable comparison, 
the wastage of water, and its attendant problems of alkalisation, 
are still seen as causes for some considerable concern. The practice 
of irrigation by swamping continues despite the fact that it can 
actually reduce yields as well as give rise to secondary 
alkalisation. If, for example, a certain irrigation district can 
increase its yields from 0.75 t ha- 
1 
 without irrigation, to 
1.88 t ha 	by using 1500 m3 ha', it does not follow that further 
increases in yield will accrue in direct proportion to further 
increases in water. A five-fold increase in water supply would 
typically bring about an increase to only 4.50 t hafl , not the 
expected 6.38 t ha- 1. Yet in the Hetao district of Inner Mongolia, 
dry crops generally are given 12,000 m 3 ha - 1 and there have been 
instances there where it has reached 30,000 m 3 ha- 1  
The RHWCC gave the following data, in August 1980, on the use of 
R. Huang water in irrigation schemes along the lower reaches: 
Of the 90 irrigation districts, 12 are quite good, with proper 
auxiliaries such as drainage facilities, 64 are mediocre and 14 are 
a little lacking. On average between 9 x 10 9 3 
	-1 
m yr and 
10 x 10 9 3 	
-1 	 6 
m yr of water and 200 x 10 t of silt are drawn each 
year. The total yield from an area of 16,000 km ' has risen from 
10 x 10  t in 1965 to 37 x 106  t at present, though owing to wastage 
and indefinite water supplies, only 10,700 km 2 can be regarded as 
being irrigated and only 4300 km as being irrigated well. The rest 
is unstable but sometimes may receive irrigation. Sixteen irrigation 
districts have yields exceeding 3.75 t ha 1 , and only the People's 
Victory Canal district achieves over 7.5 t ha- 
1. 
 In the good 
districts water use is about 2300 m3 ha - 1 to 3000 m3 ha- 
1 
 but in 
wasteful ones it can reach 12,000 m3 ha- 
1. 
 The water requirement of 
wet rice paddy is variable, depending on the type, but it is much 
higher than for dry culture, and along the lower R. Huang, is about 
-1 
22,500 m 3 ha • Percolation losses account for half the water 
intake and the overall use ratio is about 30 7.. Each year some 
500 9 000 A. d must be used to remove silt from irrigation canals, 
where water cannot be used to flush it out because of poor drainage. (26) 
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In considering water use, it is important also to take into account 
water quality. Over 10,000 variously sized industrial sources of 
pollution have been identified which together contribute nearly 
4 x 106  t of polluted water per day to the R. Huang. Of these, 
there are 176 major sources which together discharge nearly 
2 x 10  t d- 1.  From Table 5-1 it can be seen that 76.8 7, of the 
pollution from these 176 major sources comes from a group of 100 in 
Gansu, Shanxi, Nei Menggu and He'nan, and it has been suggested 
that they should form the point of emphasis in future plans to reduce 
pollution. (27) 
Table 5-2 shows the concentration of five pollutants in various 
sections of the river and, where applicable, the factor by which 
the highest level of each exceeds the criterion laid down by the 
State. One interesting fact to have emerged, though, concerns the 
arsenic content, where it has been found that the high levels 
occur mainly as compounds in the solid suspended load and follows 
closely the variations in the R. Huang's silt load. (Figure 5-10). (28) 
The arsenic content of water whose silt has been allowed to settle, 
nowhere exceeds the State's criterion. Whilst this is to be 
expected, since arsenic compounds are insoluble in water, it would 
seem advisable that some investigation be done into the rate of 
absorption of the various pollutants into the crops which benefit 
from warping or irrigation with turbid water. 
The pollution problem, then, is very serious; but awareness of it 
is still quite new, monitoring is limited, and no concerted effort 
has yet been possible towards its resolution. Meanwhile, the rate 
of increase of pollution in recent years is quite alarming. 
Whereas in 1976, the average daily input of polluted water is given 
as having been 3 x 10  t, three years later in 1979 it was almost 
4 x 
10  
t d- 1. 
iv) Development of the Loess Plateau. 
Chinese news reports over the last thirty years are littered with 
success stories concerning soil and water conservation, and yet 
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TABLE 5-1 SOURCES OF POIIIJTTON 
Qinghai Gansu JirXIQ 
Inner 
icrotic Shonxi 1jflXt H'flh1fl 1flfldOfl 
Whole 
Basin 
lluted water 	(t dx 10) 230 890 150 520 600 1013 321 232 3956 
oportion of total 	(%) 
[NL 
5-8 5 3-8 13-1 15-2 256 8-1 5-9 100 
mber of major sources 18 24 18 12 41 29 23 11 176 
Polluted 	ter from mcorsotjrces 71 555 63 222 522 145 204 176 1 958 
portion of rrnjor source toltU4  3-6 28-4 3-2 11-31 26-7 7-4 10-41 9.01 100 
Source: WANG Zhimin, 1980, page 65. 
*units: t d. 
Note: The figures for Gansu and Shanxi are incomplete. They refer 
only to Lanzhou and Taiyuan, respectively. 'Polluted water' refers 
both to industrial pollutants and to household waste. The latter 
accounts for some 30% generally. 	 - 
Source: LI Pacheng, 1980, page 69. 
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TABLE 5-2 MAINSTREAM AND TRIBUTARY POLLUTION I FVFI S 
PHENOL 
Average 	Maximum Max. as 
CYANOGEN ARSENIC MERCURY CHROMIUM 
Average Maximum Max. c Average Maximum Max. a Average Maximum Max. c Average Maximum 
River Station. Content 	Content 	Muttipli 
if St ah 
Content Content Multiple 
f State 
Content Content Multiple Content Content luttipl Content Content Multiçie 
(ni1 ) 	(mg CI) (mg [1 ) (mg (mgi1 ) (mg i1 ) 
f State 










Xunhua 00017 0-005 - 0-0003 0-002 - 0-021 010 2-5 0-0003 00013 13 0 0 lHuang Datong Xiartttn 0-009 0-122 122 0-0012 0-004 0.009 005 1-3 00003 0'001 1-0 0-0001 0002 Huangshui Minhe 0-005 0. 0% 14 0003 0012 0015 009 2-3 00019 002 20-0 0-007 0-02 
Huang Lanzhou 0-0065 0016 16 0-0146 0025 0-031 005 1-3 0001 00045 4-5 0 0 
Huang Anningdu 0-005 0034 3-4 0006 0-024 0-02 0087 2-2 0-0004 00013 1-3 0-0001 0002 
Huang Qirtongxia 0003 0-007 00005 0-002 0.011 004 10 0012 0043 43-0 0 0 
Huang Shizuishan 00017 0-004 0-0006 0002 0013 002 00006 0-0011 11 0 0 
Huang Deriykou 00503 0145 145 00031 0-005 0-01 0.011 00024 0.004 40 0 0 
Huang Wubu 0.002 0-013 1-3 00007 0-003 003 0-12 3-0 0-002 0-0069 6-9 00175 0-044 
Max.n- 
Huang Longmen 0-001 0004 00006 0.007 0056 0.217 5-400005 0-002 20 0 0 
Fen Hejin 0-013 0-156 15-6 0002 001 003 02 5-0 00003 0-0012 1-2 00007 0014 
We  Huaxicin 0015 0.093 9-3 0-0002 0005 0117 0733 18-20-0004 0-0023 2-3 0003 0-02 
Huang Sunmenxia 0001 0-005 00003 0-007 0-069 0-567 14 - 20-0004 0-001 10 00002 0005 
Yiluo Shihuiwu 0.011 0-041 4-1 0-002 0012 006 0455 .11-40-003 0013 130 0-098 0-635 127 
Qin Wuzhi 0-002 0-008 0-002 0-008 0057 0-259 6-00061 0-018 18-00-003 0-007 
Huang Huayucinkou 00057 0-034 3-40-0037 0.014 0069 0.269 6-7 0-004 0025 25-00-0024 0-013 
Huang Gciocun 0-0005 0001 00008 0002 0207 0899 225 00002 00007 0008 0022 
Huang Aishan 0-001 0-002 0-0005 0.002 0.199 0.786 19-6 0-0004 0-0015 1-50-006 0-012 
Huang Luokou 00006 0002 0-0003 0001 0-215 0707 177 0-0004 0-0022 2-10-005 0-012 
Hiang 	1 Lijin 00006 0001 	1 10 - 0004 0001 	1 10 - 192 - 1-054 	1 26-10-0003 10-002 	1 2 - 010-00S 0011 - 
Source: WANG Zhimin, 1980, pages 64 and 65. 
there has been no noticeable reduction in the silt load of the 
R. Huang. Whilst this discrepancy may be accounted for in part by 
exaggerated reporting, there are also more legitimate reasons. 
For example, the effect of conservation in one region may be masked 
by deterioration in another region, as is explained here by 
Comrade Gao Bowen, 
"Some people say that soil and water conservation is 
ineffective, 'See, after thirty years there still has been 
no noticeable reduction in the R. Huang's silt'. The actual 
situation really isn't like that. Soil and water conservation 
has a history of thirty years, but for various reasons the 
work has been discontinuous and actual development has only 
had ten years; For a while in the past, since undue emphasis 
was placed on grain, quite a few districts destroyed forest 
and grassland and opened up wasteland, and there was serious 
opening of wasteland on steep slopes. Places which 
originally had no loss became serious loss areas, control and 
destruction went on side by side, and some destruction was 
greater than control; Add to that, that in carrying out 
basic road, railway, mining and water conservancy construction 
etc., attention was not paid to erosion control, so large 
amounts of silt were added to rivers. That is to say, it 
would not be equitable to blame soil and water conservation 
for those aspects. (29) 
Other reasons, as explained in Chapter 3, would be the extreme 
variability of the R. Huang silt load, which would make even quite 
large changes difficult to discern in the short term, and the 
failure of the early methods, once they had been applied. 
Statistics for the loess plateau in the period to the end of 1978 
give, 
"Terraces, stripfields, damland and watrland, 38,000 kni, 
afforestation and grass sown, 28,000 km , over 60,000 kin 
brought under control ," (30) 
and to the end of 1980, from a different source, 
"People living along the upper and middle sections of the 
river have over th past three decades planted trees and 
grass to 35,300 kin ..... meanwhile people have built 	2 
terraced, raised and irrigated fields totalling 31,800 km 
soil erosion has .... been brought under control in 
areas toa11ing 75,000 km .... this helps prevent about 
100 x 10 t of top soil from being washed away. "(31) 
These two are not entirely consistent, but the order of magnitude 
of the work so far is illustrated. The figure for the reduction of 
the silt load of the R. Huang contained therein is in good general 
-1 
agreement with that of 50 x 10 6  t yr estimated by other sources 
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to be held back in the precipitation dams of N. Shaanxi alone. (32) 
It should be pointed out that the above quotations refer to an area 
of some 430,000 km of the middle and upper reaches, loosely termed 
the 'loess plateau' in many Chinese sources, not to the smaller area 
of 280,000 
km  
as described in Chapter 1, and that they do not take 
into account any land newly opened. In the very few outstanding 
places where comprehensive control has been carried out successfully, 
the so-called 'model districts', much better results have been 
achieved. This is taken to illustrate good future prospects. As an 
example, details pertaining to several small catchments are given in 
Table 5-3. Table 5-4 shows that larger catchments have also begun 
to obtain good results. 
The problem, then, is no longer just a technical one, but also one 
of economics and politics: How to ensure that the correct measures 
can be adopted on a larger scale, and how to determine just what 
those measures should be. This was the subject of much debate in the 
late seventies, which is described in the next section. But it is 
necessary first to consider the other important aspect of this work, 
apart from reducing the sediment load of the R. Huang, which may be 
used as a criterion by which to judge its success or otherwise so 
far, namely, the living standards of the local people. 
Here again it may be said that in most of the area little or no 
improvement has occurred; in some areas there has been moderate 
improvement but it is offset by retrogression in other areas. Only 
very few areas, where the work has been done especially well, have 
shown an outstanding improvement. Before attempting to assess the 
overall changes, it is of interest to take an example of each of 
the two extremes; first, of an area where incorrect policies have 
been reported to have caused some deterioration, and then of the 
well publicised 'model districts'. 
Cuyuan County is situated in the headwaters of the R. Qingshui in 
'Southern Ningxia. 	It has an overall sediment yield modulus of 
about 5000 t km yr and 86.1 7. of its area is considered to suffer 
soil and water loss. There are 4500 gullies and 20 7. of the land is 
occupied by riverbeds. From the Civil lkbr to 1977, the population 
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TABLE 	EFFECTIVENESS OF COMPREHENSIVE 
5.3 CONTROL IN REDUCING SOIL AND 







Loss Modulus Reduction 
Runoff Erosion Runoff Erosion 
Fcm 2 ) (~ ) (m3 km2 xó 
F 
Lishi, Shanxi 
(F knr2 xio 
 019 88 13-8 74 599 63-0 
Lishi, Shonxi 91 575 28-5 15-9 43-5 576 
hongyng,nxi 14-1 414 28-8 15-8 >95 >95 
Nanqu Hequ, Shanxi 26-9 692 63-0 
Nanxiche aingyang, Gansu 36-3 58 15 to 20 4 to  55-6 97-2 
Jiuyuan Suide, Shaanxi 70-7 35-7 24-3 180 24-2 551 
Lihong Youyu, 	Shanxi 36-0 70 93 60 61-7 
Source: GAO Bowen, 1 980, page 12. 
TABLE 	EFFECTIVENESS OF SOIL AND WATER 
5...4 CONSEPs/ATION IN REDUCING FLOODS 








Notes Floods Sediment 
(km 2 ) (%) (% (%)  
R.Nanchuan, 	Shanxi 810 22-8 41-4 26-5 
11 R.Huang 	tributaries 
in Western 	Shanxi 5858 26-3 345 38-4 
After '970 conpo.red 
to before 	1969 
Rivers Jing, Wei, and Beiluo, Shaanxi 110372 221 1970-78 	compared to 1950-59 
RWuding, 	Northern 	Shaanxi 30217  52-3 
1970-78 	compared 1 to 1950-59 
Source: GAO Bowen, 1980, page 13. 
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increased from about 193,000 J to 473,000 Is. , the tilled area 
increased by 820 kin 2 , and the total grain yield increased from 
80,000 t to 90,000 t, but the forested area shrank between 1968 and 
1978 9 by some 20 7o, and 13 Communes lost all their pastureland. As 
a consequence, it is reported, the climate became more extreme, 
becoming more arid and more prone to violent storms. In the 16 years 
to 1965 only four storms affected more than 67 km and the largest 
affected 140 km 2  but in the 13 years thereafter, nine such storms 
occurred and the largest affected an area of some 400 km 2 	Since 
the Civil War, 227 km 2  has been lost by the extension of gullies 
and this continues at a rate of some 12 km 2  yr. 88 reservoirs 
built in the same period, in total have already lost 110 x 106  m3 of 
their original 286 x 10  m3 storage capacity. Meanwhile, this 
region, which was renowned in the late fifties for its abundance, 
has become a supplicant for State aid. The grain yield fell from 
414 kg 	in 1944 to 190 kg 	in 1977. In 1956 over 4340 t of 
cooking oil and 23,000 pigs were sold to the State, but in 1976 the 
amounts sold had fallen to 425 t and 20,000 head respectively. 
Similarly, in 1977 only 890 cattle were sold, whereas in 1958 some 
3000 had been sold. The total number of domestic animals in 1979 
was only one fifth of the number in 1957. Between 1970 and 1979 
total grain sales to the State amounted to 60,000 t, but purchases 
were 85,000 t, the average annual food provision is now only 
100 kg 	and the average annual income now is only Y 29 
( 8.3 ,k..1  yr) whilst the collective received State aid of 
13 x 10  between 1970 and 1976, and ran up a further debt of 
26 x 106  with the People's Bank, making a total debt of 
i-i 26 x 10 6 , ( 	
6 7.4 x 10 ) or 	55 A. 
At the other extreme is Gaoxi Gully of Mizhi County, N. Shaanxi, 
a small tributary catchment to the R. Wuding, only 400 ha in area, 
with a population of 3484(in 1962), and which has received much 
attention in the press as a model district. 	In the fifties 
there were 207 ha, (or about 0.74 ha ,( ) of tilled land distributed 
over the 40 hilltops and 21 gullies, but no forest or grassland. 
-1 	 -1 Yields were between 225 kg ha and 375 kg ha , and there was no 
money income. In 1958 the RHWCC launched a pilot project with 
terraces on the hills, some gully dams and some grassland for the 
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rearing of horses. In 1961 (during the 'three hard years'), there 
was a lack of pasture, and nine head of cattle and 100 sheep were 
sold, which reduced the available manure. Despite this setback 
the tilled area had been reduced, by 1971, to 71.3 ha, 70 ha had 
been forested and 67 ha put to grass. In 1974 a high lift pump 
(120 m) was added which could stabilise agricultural production on 
the terraces, of which there are at present 43.3 ha and there are 
112 productive gully dams. Although half the catchment has yet to 
be treated, the Brigade is already far more prosperous than in the 
fifties. The total grain yield for example has risen from a little 
over 48 t to 280 t despite a reduction in tilled area (including 
terraces) of over 50 7. Furthermore, the annual production of every 
labourer in husbandry is worth V 1140 (E 326) and of each one in 
forestry, k 917 (1 262). This arrangement, whereby agriculture, 
forestry and husbandry occupy equal areas has become known as 
'3-3 Control'. (35) 
Similar results have been obtained in other model districts, as is 
shown in Table 5-5. It is necessary, however, to consider the 
extent to which they represent the development of the region and the 
overall balance between such advances, and the various retreats. 
One fairly complete published summary of the current overall situation 
reads thus, 
"Thisregion has 123 Counties in Shaanxi, Gansu,Ningxia, 
• 	•
'
Nei Menggu ianj Shanxi, covers an area somewhere in gxcess 
of 200,000 km and supports.apopulatibn of 24x 10 A; 
At present, agriculture is given precedence,.but the unit 
production of cereals is only 1.25 t ha -1 and in quite a fey 
places it is only 0.225 t ha-, 0.300 tha 	or 0.375 t ha 
Food provisions and levels of income for peasants are very 
low. According to statistics from 121 Counties,there are 
45 (i.e. 3 7.) where the average provision is less than 
0.150 t ,& ; and 65ounties (i.e. 57k) where the income 
is less than V 50,& yr 	. (L 14.3 A. 	(36) 
Another writer, referring to the same 123 Counties and the same 
population of 24 x 10 6,k, gives the area as "about 300,000 1cm2 , of 
which 66,000 km2 are tilled". (37) The discrepancy is probably due to 
the fact that these articles are written in general terms, yet both 
approximate to the 280,000 km  area of severe erosion ( k>5000 t km-2 
yr 1 ) described in Chapter 1, and may serve to indicate that, for the 
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TABLE 	ECONOMIC DATA FOR VARIOUS 
5 - 5 MODEL SMALL CATCHMENTS 




























Quyu Brigade, 	Hequ, 
Shanxi 12-6 820-0 55 2798 647 546 1979 
Gully, 	Hequ, 27-0 1560-0 58 195 580 416 1979 
Shanxi 
Wongjia Gully, 	Lishi, 
91 213-9 230 23-5 1978 Shanxi 
ErLang 	GulLy, 
Jingchuan, 	Gansu 34-2 11750 127 341 1979 
Xiaogaoting, 
Huangyuun, Qinghai 13-2 599-5 417 352 45-4 629 1979 
Guanduoliang, 	Lishi, 
Shanxi 0-28 24-3 676 478 862 1979 
Gaoxi 	Gully, 	Mizhi, 
Shaanxi 
40 130-0 84-4 295• 4 32-5 534 1978 
Xiaosi 	GuLly, Yan'an, 
Shaanxi 1-8 37-0 	1 500 266-2 20-0 650 1978 
Source: GAO Bowen, 1980, page 14. 
TABLE 	TOTAL GRAIN YIELDS OF EIGHTEEN 
5 - 6 COUNTIES IN GANSU 
Year 1953 1956 1960 1967 1973 1975 
Yield 	(tx10 ) 0-622 1-182 0-573 1-260 0934 1462 
Source: GAO Bowen, 19809 page 2. 
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most part, life on the loess plateau is still very difficult. 
Another aspect to be considered is the stability of production. 
In the model districts a good level of stability is a contributing 
factor to their prosperity but, as the total yields over 18 Counties 
in Gansu indicate, the loess plateau as a whole has yet to achieve 
such good results. (Table 5-6). The total possessions of each of 
90 7. of the families from one of these Counties (Huining County) 
is reported to have a value of less than Y 30 (L 8.6)0(38)  The 
loess plateau remains one of the poorest regions of China. 
More details are available for that part of Shaanxi which falls 
within the R. Huang basin, and these are presented in Table 5-7. 
The area involved is some 124,000 km 2 , of which 101,400 ic 2 (82 7.) 
is considered to be an area of soil and water loss, and 30,813 km  
(24.8 7.) is cultivated. From the table it may be seen that there 
has been rapid progress in all the aspects of development shown. 
The areas given over to agriculture by the new methods, and to 
forestry and husbandry, have all increased markedly and, with 
improvements in water storage and in irrigation, there has been 
an approximate threefold increase in both per unit and total grain 
yields. Yet there are also some disturbing signs, for this 
threefold increase in grain yields has been accompanied by a 
doubling of the population and a near 14-fold increase in the number 
of pigs. (Some of the coarse grains or sweet potatoes grown as pig 
feed are usually included in the grain yield). (39) 
 Thus on average 
the people's diet will now contain less lamb and more pork and the 
improvement in cereals will not have been spectacular. Whilst the 
dietary balance may have improved, it is unlikely that there has 
been a significant improvement in the per capita food consumption 
and, as mentioned above, it has not yet become stable. It is also 
apparant from the table that only about 5 % of the power used in 
pumped irrigation could come from hydroelectric power stations in 
the locality. 
As has been shown above, the region is capable of supporting a far 
greater and more varied plant cover than at present, and that it is, 
thereby, able to become a markedly more prosperous region. 
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TABLE 	SHAANXI PROVINCE RIVER HUANCi 
5..7 CATCHMENT* SOIL AND WATER 
CONSERVATION DATA  
1949 1956 1965 1979 
Area sown to grass 	 1km2 ) 26 519 2407 
Conservation forest 	 (km 2 ) 466 3117 9020 
Area closed for 	natural 	
(km 2 ) 1549 forest recovery 
Total area 	of 	'Basic Fields' 	(km 2 ) 59 1050 6152 
Level terraces 	 (km 2) 26 690 3424 
Bench 	terraces 	 (km 2 ) 23 392 2183 
Gully 	darntand 	 ()2 
) 10 67 419 
Land formed by 
(km 2 ) 126 river 	straightening 
Total water 	storage capacity 	(m3 x106 ) 0033 0- 676 3824 
Number of reservoirs 1497 
Capacity of reservoirs 	(in3 x106 ) 3621 
Number of ponds 43500 
Capacity of ponds 	(m3 x 106) 203 
Number of 	hydropower stations 4 163 1325 
Hydropower 	station total 	(MW) 0412 9358 84'832 installed 	capacity 
Powered 	irrigation total 	(MW) 1642 installed 	capacity 
Number of pumping stations 22000 
Pumping station 
(MW) installed capacity 718 
Number of powered wells 147000 
Powered well 
installed capacity 	(MW) 1124 
Coritiniiri 
TABLE 5-7 	Continued 
1949 1956 1965 1979 
Effective 	irrigated area 	(km 2 ) 1367 3174 5570 11212 
Number of silt precipitation dams 0 33244 
Grain yield per unit area 	(kg hcr1 ) 848 1643 2730 
Total grain 	yie.td 	 (F x 106)  2- 365 4500 6625 
Population 	 (1x 106) 9301 20 358 
Large domestic 	animals 	( 	 x 106) 1227 1690 1723 
Pigs 	 (jk 	106) 0366 1975 5063 
Sheep 	 (g x 106) 3662 3662 S-711 
Area under preliminary 	control 	(krn 2 ) 1296 9258 23052 
1tote investment in soi l and water (1,, X  106 ) 7.7 5•4 105 onservaton in given year 
Silt lost to 	R. Huang 	 (%) 100 74 
Source: Shaanxi Province Bureau of Hydropower, personal notes 
taken during fieldtrip, July 1980. 	
2 *Area of Shaanxi within R. Huang catchment, 124P00  km ; Area of 
severe soil and water losses within the catchment, 1014O0 kin 2 ; 
Area under cultivation (1979), 30,813 kni2 . 
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Furthermore, a significant reduction in the silt load of the R. Huang 
would be expected to result from the more widespread introduction of 
the same conservation practices. Progress has been shown to be very 
rapid on a small scale, but there have been problems in 
co-ordination which have prevented similar success over larger areas. 
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2) The Debate and Future Prospects for Loess Plateau Development. 
By the late seventies it was clear that new policies would be needed 
to promote the widespread successful development of the loess plateau; 
but there was some contention over what they should be. The debate 
was reported in the press and continued for well over a year before, 
at a special conference held in March and April 1980, a general 
consensus was obtained and a policy was decided. In this section 
some of the principal issues will be presented and the outcome 
described. 
The debate opened with the publication, on 26 November 1978, in the. 
Renrnin Ribao, of two articles under the overall heading, 'On the 
Construction Policy Question of the N.W. Loess Plateau.' (40) The 
first article, by Comrades Tong Dalin and Bao Tong, called for a 
policy in which predominance would be given to both silviculture and 
animal husbandry, whilst the second article, by Comrade Shi Shan, 
favoured placing the emphasis on husbandry alone. The two articles 
used very similar arguments, and even quoted each other extensively, 
to support the idea that agriculture should give way, respectively, 
to forestry and husbandry, or forestry alone. Since these articles 
form the point of reference for the debate as a whole, it is 
worthwhile to describe their contents in some detail. 
Comrades Tong Dalin and Bao Tong begin by giving examples, including 
that of Guyuan County (See above), of the decline of agricultural 
yield in some parts of the loess plateau and held that the reason 
for such decline is, 
the flouting of natural laws by opening wasteland to 
tilling, ruining forests and grasslands, thus wrecking the 
plant cover and destroying ecological conditions." 
The outcome of such activity has been, they claim, not only to 
reduce the area given over to forestry and husbandry, but also both 
to destroy the ecological basis for agriculture in the region, and 
to send silt to the lower R. Huang. Without the protection of 
forests and grasslands, the desert has encroached upon N. Shaanxi, 
the rainfall has declined, the weather has become uncertain and the 
frost-free period has become changeable. Furthermore, without the 
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same protection, engineering measures cannot provide the kind of 
improvement of which they should be capable. They draw upon 
historical data to support their contention that restoring the 
vegetation cover would solve the problem of the R. Huang, 
"According to historical records, in the 2100 or so years 
from the Qin dynasty to just before liberation, the R. Huang 
broke the dykes along its lower reaches in a fairly large 
way, 973 times. Yet in the 580 years from Wang Mang to the 
Sui, it only did so twice. At that time, this region had 
very little cultivation, nomadic grazing was predominant 
and so the situation on the lower R. Huang was much better." 
Reporting on a recent (unspecified) symposium, they assert that there 
was unanimity on the viewpoints that in the long run it is 
inappropriate for agriculture to predominate on the loess plateau, 
that animal husbandry, or forestry and animal husbandry should be 
given precedence, and that agriculture and the capital construction 
of fields can only be done well once forestry and husbandry are 
under way. Yet, they also report a divergence of views over the 
process by which such a withdrawal of tillage might be achieved. 
On the one hand there was the opinion that the construction of 
0.1 ha ,&.. 	to 0.2 ha A. 	of 'basic fields' capable of stable 
yields of between 400 kg and 500 kg ,], should be a precondi-: 
tion for replacing tillage with forestry and husbandry. On the other 
hand, the view of Comrades Tong and Bao was that the regiOn should 
be divided into parts best suited for agriculture, forestry and 
husbandry respectively, and the appropriate measure for each 
locality should then be undertaken with vigour. In justification of 
their viewpoint, Comrades Tong and Bao write, 
"In the short term we might lose a few thousand million 
iin of grain (if we work well we might not lose any grain), 
but what we'll gain is a few thousand million .j 	of meat 
and other pastoral and silvicultural products •.... The 
basic cause of the failure ofagricultureto get going in 
this region is none other than the destruction of the plant 
cover and the ecological environment, so if we were to wait 
until after grain is under way and only then get down to 
solving the problems of plant cover and the ecological 
environment, in practice it would be but procrastination. (41) 
These two different viewpoints were to form the main point of 
contention in th& ensuing debate. 
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Comrades Tong and Bao put forward four proposals: 
The necessary investigations be expedited so that 
proper regional plans might quickly be drawn up, 
showing clearly the activities to which each area is 
best suited. 
In a few 'rather well understood' places (such as Mizhi 
County, Shaanxi) bases should be established for the 
study and development of comprehensive control involving 
agriculture, forestry and husbandry. 
In those areas where the suitability of forestry and 
husbandry has already been established,a policy of 
support and encouragement of the.:deveiopment of 
silvicultural or pastoral production should be carried 
out. 
Research into the modernisation of forestry and husbandry 
should strenuously be promoted and public debate 
encouraged. 
The third proposal is the most controversial, since it amounts to a 
call for political and economic changes, including changes to 
agricultural taxation in the area, 
"Under the precondition that the rights to self rule of the 
production teams be respected, authorise them to replace 
tillage with forestry and husbandry. Simultaneously, 
establish various economic systems to serve forestry and 
husbandry; authorise the production teams to sell the 
products of forestry and husbandry to the State; guarantee 
that the level of the commune member's provision for those 
teams who fulfil their quota of silvicultural and pastoral 
products will not fall below the level of their grain-
producing neighbours; commend those teams which over-fulfil 
their pastoral and silvicultural quotas in the same way that 
we do those who over-fulfil their agricultural quotas." 
In his article, Comrade Shi Shan repeats the arguments for increasing 
the plant cover index, from the points of view of the local ecology 
and economy, and the control of the lower R. Huang. In this respect 
it is compatible with the application of the former article's 
suggestions for those areas better suited to animal husbandry. 
Yet for bringing about a general increase in plant cover, he 
mentions only husbandry. His reasons are that husbandry is stable 
and that grass is cheap and grows quickly. Moreover, he sees animal 
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husbandry as the key to agriculture and silviculture, 
"Develop animal husbandry first and then develop cultivation 
and forestry ....... fix the proper ratios between artificial 
fodder and pastures, forests and tilled land, to achLQve an 
overall develppment of agriculture, silviculture and husbandry. 
Over twenty years' experience has proved that if you demand 
animal products you also get grain; but if you demand grain 
directly, then you lose both grain and meat." 
Comrade Shi makes some estimation of the income likely to accrue from 
changing to animal husbandry. He writes that each hectare may be 
sown with 7.5 kg of seed, costing about V 15 (1 4.3) and from the 
-1 	-1 	 -1 	-1 third year, 18.75 t ha yr of fresh grass or 7.5 t ha yr 	of 
dry grass will be gained. He claims that 15 sheep or between 600 and 
750 rabbits may be fed on the 18.75 t of fresh grass. 
He also calls for political and economic changes, but is careful to 
emphasise that his is a regional plan and must be adapted to each 
locality, 
"The State would demand only livestock produce and oils and 
gradual self-sufficiency in grain. Moreover, it would 
allow a period of adjustment (this applies to the region 
as a whole. With specific reference to individual Counties, 
Communes, Brigades or Production Teams, whether husbandry 
is given preedence and just how agriculture, forestry and 
husbandry are combined, definitely must be decided in 
accordance with local conditions)." 
In the ensuing debate there emerged two important areas of discussion.. 
The main one, as already mentioned, concerns the relative importance 
of agriculture, silviculture and husbandry to the region as a whole, 
with special emphasis on the role of grain production. The second 
one, the lesser question, is about how to handle the relationship 
between silviculture and husbandry. Whilst there is no call for a 
continuance of the extensive hilltop til,lage which has proven so 
destructive in the recent past, a number of Comrades believe that 
agriculture should still form the basis of loess plateau development. 
As was mentioned by Comrades Tong and Bao in their article, this 
would be done, in the view of the protagonists of agriculture, by 
providing about 0.1 ha 	of 'basic fields' as a precondition to 
the withdrawal of tillage from the hilltops. These agricultural 
protagonists are obliged, therefore, to draw the distinction clearly. 
Here are two examples, 
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"I consider that the problem arising in construction of the 
loess plateau is not that the policy of making grain the key 
link itself has problems but that this policy was unable 
properly to be grasped, so that wasteland was freely opened. 
It was not united with forestry and husbandry, and thus 
created serious soil and water losses. (42) 
and, 
"Agriculture on the loess plateau is not done ideally enough, 
not altogether because the production policy doesn't tally 
with the natural characteristics of the region, or violates 
natural laws, but because of adherance to old practices; 
advanced agricultural science has not really entered this 
region. For example, methods which reduce or avoid tillage 
have an outstanding significance to soil and water 
conservation, but it seems that nobody is advocating them. 
As long as we do well scientific tests, a dfinite degree of 
soil improvement and reduction in soil and water losses can 
be had." (43) 
Most of the agricultural protagonists, however, see the construction 
of basic fields restricted to its role as a means to promote 
silviculture and husbandry in the kind of comprehensive control 
scheme used in 'model' districts, such as those of N. Shaanxi. 
Others see it as an end in itself which, in order to be successful, 
needs to be united with the other activities and, thereby, has 
their promotion as one of its beneficial side effects. However, the 
reasoning of both groups of agricultural protagonists stems from 
consideration of the food needs of the area and the poor 
communications which,in their view, make self sufficiency in grain 
imperative. One example of the extreme difficulty of the problem of 
guaranteeing food supplies is given by Comrade Li Erzhong in support 
of his view that agriculture is necessary for a transitional period, 
"Some Comrades suggest that we concentrate our efforts on 
silvicultural and pastoral production and leave the. food 
problem to be solved by the State. Couldn't construction 
then be done more quickly? This is impossible and in practice 
wouldn't work. In 1972, Yulin was troubled by drought and 
over two million people were short of grain. The whole 
country mobilised 1400 lorries to 3move grain and it took a 
whole year to move about 100 x 10 t. As a result, the price 
of the_train, plus the cost of transportation, came to about 
Y 2 kg . Moreover, the amount of grain was still 
insufficient. (44) 
To which it may be added that the normal price of grain in Wan is 
0.3 kg, and that transported to Yan'an, it costs Y 1.6 kg. 
In Beijing it is about V 0.3 kg - . depending on the quality. (45) 
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Whilst Comrade Li is criticising the more extreme antagonists of 
agriculture, its more extreme protagonists do not stop at self 
sufficiency in grain, but would press for the region to become a net 
exporter. 
Those in favour of agriculture point to the suitability of loess 
soil, it having, for example, much calcium carbonate. They also claim that 
the climate is not generally unfavourable. Thus, high yields may be 
obtained as long as the work is well done, and this need not 
necessarily lead to greater soil and water loss. They take issue, 
particularly, with the protagonists of animal husbandry over the 
relative merits of crops and grass. Comrade Zhang Qinwen, for 
example, points out that engineering measures do conserve both 
water and soil, whilst overgrazing has been responsible for the 
destruction of many good pastures, bringing about serious soil and 
water losses to the detriment of soil fertility. He calls for the 
use of fallow rotations, an agricultural method, to restore these 
lands to their pastoral use. (46) 
A more common point of contention, though, concerns Comrade Shi's 
estimates for the income likely to accrue from husbandry. Comrade 
Yang Wenzhi, for example, reports that at the experimental centre 
at Ansai, Shaanxi, only 7.5 	ha may be grazed, and Comrades 
Cui Qiwu and Wen Dazhong point to a flaw in Comrade Shi's argument, 
"A comparison of grain and fresh grass yields produced 
under differing conditions has no significace whatsoever. 
Plots with grain yields of only 0.225 t ha 	are of course 
barren plots with poor management. If no other measure is 
taken on this kind of land, then we're afraid there's no 
way that 18.75 t ha 	of fresh grass can be obtained 
On the other hand, if we 1were to create conditions capable 
of producing 18.75 t ha 	of fresh grass and then chang1 to 
grain, its 1yield probably would not be only 0.225 t ha 	to 
0.30 t ha 
They continue by suggesting that the dry matter yields of grass and 
grain crops in areas where the work is done well, are about the same, 
but that grass has further to be converted to meat before it is of 
use to man, with associated losses in energy. 
The latter point is not specifically answered by the other 
contributors to the debate. Neither is the objection, of Comrades 
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Cul and Wen, to the assertion, by Comrades Tong,' Bao and Shi, that 
the absence of many recorded instances of serious flood on the lower 
R. Huang in the 580 year period, from Wang Mang to the beginning 
of the Sui, may be interpreted as the result of animal husbandry 
predominating on the loess plateau. On the .contrary, 	they argue, 
that was the period following the large-scale efforts of Wang Jing 
and Wang 'Wu in controlling the lower R. Huang (Chapter 2)' and, on 
the other hand, many records of the time were destroyed in war; 
whilst there exists other historical evidence to suggest that floods 
continued to occur not infrequently. 
The case given for 'agriculture tobe brought tá predominance, may be 
summarised thus: The apparent failure to' bring soil and water loss 
under control, to raise yields, and to put an end to the practice of 
shifting cultivation, has not been the result of'over-emphasising 
grain production, but of not emphasising it in the right way. 
Provided that the work be properly done, then high and stable grain 
yields will result, and soil and water will be retained. Meanwhile, 
the necessary conditions will be provided for husbandry and forestry 
to develop gradually. The evidence put forward to suggest that 
emphasising agriculture, or failing to emphasise forestry and 
husbandry, cannot but cause a continuing deterioration along the 
lower R. Huang is fallacious. It is clear that only by giving 
emphasis to agriculture can the region feed itself. Should the 
other activities gain predominance they would fail to provide 
sufficient food for the local population, who would be obliged to 
continue the practice of shifting cultivation. 
At the end of his article emphasising the role of agriculture in the 
transitional period, Comrade Liu Wanquan puts forward five proposals 
which, he writes, are supplementary to the four already put forward 
by Comrades Tong and Bao (483'hey are: 
Extensive areas with a sparce population should emphasise 
husbandry or forestry and husbandry. - 
The majority of areas should emphasise farmland capital 
construction and strive for one man one mu (0.067 ha) of 
'basic fields'. When the food provision is thus guaranteed, 
tillage on the slopes should be replaced by husbandry and 
forestry. 
In building 'basic fields', work should start on the 
slopes, usually by terracing. The building of gully dams 
should proceed with great caution. 
The State should help by providing tractors and bulldozers. 
The State should adopt new policies to encourage the 
construction of 'basic fields'. For example, on building 
one mu of level terraces, award some fertilizer; when grain 
yields then rise, do not raise the State purchasing quota. 
Both the protagonists of agriculture, and those of some combination 
of husbandry and forestry, thus support the idea of comprehensive 
development, provided it be done well, in the areas where the 
necessary conditions obtain. Yet, as far as the techniques to be 
adopted in this respect are concerned, there is nothing new. 
As Comrade Yang Wenzhi remarks, 
"Concerning the question of regulation policy. Whether slopes 
should be regulated or gullies is an old question which 
received heated debate in the fifties. It seems it should be 
'slopes and gullies together regulate' with emphasis on the 
slopes ..... Daquanshui of YanggaoCounty(Shanxi), back in 
the fifties summarised their experience by coining a doggerel: 
'Water is a dragon, from its head start to restrain, 
If you only cure the bottom, all will be in vain.' 
Herein is wrapped a profound scientific principle. Some of 
us have forgotten this experience and as a result have 
suffered great loss." (49) 
Thus, it may be deduced that the debate is not so much about what is 
most suited to the loess plateau, since all are acknowledged to be 
suitable at different places and under different circumstances, or 
about the general techniques to be used, but about the political and 
economic changes which should be made in order to stimulate various 
activities in different areas. This may explain why Comrades Tong 
and Bao appear happy to accept 'Comprehensive Development' in 'a few 
rather well understood places' while urging the establishment of new 
economic systems to serve forestry and husbandry; and, at the same 
time, Comrade Liu is happy to accept forestry and husbandry in 
'extensive areas with a sparce population' while urging material 
incentives for the construction of 'basic fields'. 
It has already been seen (Chapter 3) how the national policy, 
"Make grain the key link and ensure comprehensive development", 
did not lead to the widespread and varied development of the loess 
plateau which was intended. Several reasons were given for its 
failure, which principally amounted to an overemphasis having been 
placed upon grain production at the expense of the other activities. 
Comrades Tong, Baa and Shi are, now, concerned to see that in those 
areas where agriculture is least suited there are policies which 
allow for its substitution by the other activities. Meanwhile, the 
protagonists of agriculture are concerned that in areas where it is 
best suited, tillage should not suffer because of its mistaken 
application in other regions. They also wish to safeguard its 
proper use in the transitional period in circumstances such as 
obtain in the various 'model' small catchments of N. Shaanxi. 
Therefore, if the various arguments are viewed in terms of an attempt 
to redress the balance, by placing emphasis on previously neglected 
activities, whilst being careful not to allow a greater attack on 
agriculture than really is justified, then the apparent contradiction, 
between the protagonists of silviculture or husbandry and the 
protagonists of agriculture, disappears. 
The unity of purpose behind the rhetoric may be illustrated by the 
frequent calls, amongst contributors representing all the various 
allegiances, for policies which allow the necessary degree of 
variety. Three examples are given below, beginning with one from 
the original article by Comrades Tong and Baa, 
"If you act according to objective laws you can't have any 
dangerous incident, and if you respect the right of the 
production team to self rule, you can't create great 
confusion." 
Secondly, from Comrade Yu Zheng, 
"Is giving priority to forestry and husbandry in contradiction 
with making grain the key link? I think not. Giving 
priority to forestry and husbandry certainly is not to 
reject agriculture and certainly does not mean not sowing 
grain, but means using land rationally, having forestry 
where forestry is suited, husbandry where husbandry is 
suited and agriculture where agriculture is suited. If no 
grain were sown at all, but reliance were put on other 
provinces to provide it, then it would be inviting chaos and 
is not feasible." (50) 
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Thirdly, Comrade Song Chaoshu, 
"I am in accord with the construction policy for the 
N.W. loess plateau indicated by Comrade Tong Dalin, but when 
executing specific measures one must still consider their 
adaptation to local conditions and guard against cutting 
everything from the same template." (51) 
It would be incorrect, however, to suggest that the unity was 
apparent at once to many contenders; it is rather the case that the 
points of agreement were initially treated as coincidental, and only 
later recognised as holding for, and allowing for, all aspects of 
control. The attitudes of some of the protagonists of forestry 
alone or husbandry alone may illustrate that what initially appears 
to be a rather one-sided emphasis on the benefits of the chosen 
measure, eventually gives way to the acceptance of wider and more 
general principles. Comrade Shi, for example, seems quite determined 
when he says, 
"Why should precedence not be given to silviculture? The 
reason is that the results of growing grass are seen more 
quickly, it can grow longer, faster, and be first to bring 
the economy alive and begin to make the people prosperous." 
but he goes on to add the caveat, 
"Of course, this is not to reject that regions which can be 
afforested should be afforested at the same time, and also 
does not obstruct the process of other farmland capital 
construction works." (52) 
Similarly, Comrade Liu Jiasheng writing in favour of silviculture 
begins in stern tone, 
"I personally consider that to adopt a policy giving 
precedence to husbandry would be inappropriate. I shall 
bring it up here for discussion with Comrade Shi Shan. 
Since a place such as this which has lost the basic conditions 
for developing agriculture suffers both drought and serious 
soil and water losses, it doesn't appear that you can grow 
grazing grass everywhere, and even if it can survive, the 
grass yield cannot be very great. More importantly, only by 
relying on the development of forestry can the natural 
conditions of the region basically be changed and soil and 
water losses completely controlled. According to scientific 
determination, only once the forest cover index of the 
- 
	
	region has reached about 50 7, can you talk of sowing grass 
and greatly developing husbandry. "(53) 
but in his next paragraph writes that, provided overgrazing be 
avoided, 
"In this region unite the development of forestry and 
agriculture, act according to local conditions and where 
appropriate sow fodder grass. It is possible to develop a 
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few sheep and cattle with pen raising predominant. It is 
also completely what should be done." 
It may be seen that most of the arguments for any particular measure 
hold in specific areas, but would fall down if any attempt were made 
to extend them to the whole of the loess plateau. Also, it may be 
seen that much of the original confusion arose because of the 
ambiguity of the term 'loess plateau' (Chapter 1). In the gullied 
plateau region to the South, for example, the plateau surface is 
flat and whilst attention must be paid to the prevention of gully 
formation and extension, the region as a whole is well suited to 
agriculture. Some people include in the term, this, and even the 
Guanzhong Plain and other parts further afield. In such a way, it 
would appear that the region as a whole is best suited to agriculture. 
Yet of the loess plateau proper, as described in Chapter 1, the 
gullied plateau region occupies only some 17 7, the rest largely 
comprising the gullied hillocks region; and, since the larger part is 
suited best to some combination of forestry and husbandry, albeit to be 
achieved to a greater or lesser degree by carefully uniting them with 
the construction of 'basic fields', it is arguable that the loess 
plateau as a whole is not suited to agriculture but to forestry and 
husbandry. This ambiguity was finally cleared up at a 'Scientific 
Research Work Symposium on Soil and Water Conservation, Agriculture, 
Silviculture, Animal Husbandry and the Comprehensive Development of 
the N.W. Loess Plateau' held at Xi'ari in March 1979. 
The participants were over 130 leading cadres, specialists, 
scientists and technologists from 80 or so units, from various 
educational institutions and from provincial governments. Although 
they confirmed a general policy of 'Comprehensive development of 
agriculture, silviculture and husbandry with overall regulation', 
they agreed that it should be carried out with various emphases, 
according to local conditions. (54) They also drew up four broad 
categories for regional planning, 
"Firstly, agricultural regions, including places South of 
Yan'an such as N. Wei, E. Gansu and Central Shanxi, which 
belong to the category semihumid, temperate and cold climate, 
with annual precipitation above 500 mm to 600 m, where the 
average annual temperature is over 10 C, there is quite a 
lot of plateau surface, and quite large potential strength. 
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"This region should pay attention to the development of 
agriculture so as to achieve a surplus in grain, and some 
Counties should become base areas for grain, cotton and oil 
products. Field protection forest belts and slope-protection 
forests should vigorously be built and fodder grass should 
be sown for husbandry on appropriate parts of the plateau 
surface and some gentle hills. 
"Secondly, forest and pasture areas, including the belt of 
gullied hillocks in S. Gansu, S. Ningxia, N.W. Shanxi and to 
the North of Yan'an •  This comprises forest, grassland and 
the transitional land belt in between, has a semi-arid, dry 
and cold climate with 400 mm or 500 mm annual precipitation. 
Soil and water losses here are 100 7. serious; the Eastern 
regions and the critical sand-blown places already suffer 
the threat of wind erosion; a large area has been opened to 
cultivation and the plant cover has suffered destruction; 
agriculture is influenced by topography and climate and 
yields are low and unstable. This region should emphasise 
afforestation, the sowing of grass, and the development of 
silviculture and husbandry. On stream berms and gentle 
slopes, where appropriate, basic fields should be built and. 
we should struggle for self-sufficiency in grain under the 
conditions which obtain in normal years. 
"Thirdly, pastoral regions, including several places in 
Central Gansu, S. Ningxia, N.W. Shanxi, N. Yulin and 
N. Nei Menggu. This is the grassbelt and belt of desert 
scrubland with a semi-arid cold climate and less than 400 mm 
of annual precipitation. The Winters are long and cold and 
Spring and Summer have much drought and wind. The soils 
are very sandy and both wind and water erosion are serious. 
The crop growing period is short and there are quite a 
number of conditions adverse to the development of 
agriculture. In this region stockbreeding should be developed, 
windbreak forests and grazing forests vigorously sho -uld be 
built and where appropriate agriculture should be developed 
to struggle for basic self-sufficiency in grain. 
"Fourthly, silvicultural regions, including various counties 
in the Ziwu, Huanglong, Lao, Qiao, Liupan and Long mountains 
and part of the LUliang mountain district. The terrain is 
quite high and the rainfall quite plentiful, with thin soil 
layers, mainly stony hills and a few remnants of secondary 
forest. These regions should, with emphasis on silviculture, 
protect existing forests, actively develop water retention 
forests and guarantee these regions' agricultural and 
pastoral development." 
These regions are shown in Figure 5-11. It is interesting to note 
the extremely cautious tone of the above report, care having been 
taken to emphasise its general nature and, it seems, also to avoid 
too severe an iconoclastic approach towards the once incontrovertible 
self-sufficiency in grain. 
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Yet although this decision greatly clarifies the debate, it does not 
resolve the main problems, which concern the political and economic 
changes required to bring about the necessarily flexible initiatives. 
Before going into detail of these, however, it is worthwhile to 
mention, briefly, the question of nomenclature. In view of the over-
literal interpretation of such policies as 'Make Grain the Key Link' 
and 'In Agriculture Learn from Dazhai', and given the apparent 
Chinese propensity for giving whole sets of policies a single name, 
it might have been thought desirable to invent a new name for the 
policies to be adopted on the loess plateau, and the debate around 
them, even though they had not yet been fully determined. On the 
other hand, it would not appear wise to announce a policy which 
could easily be misinterpreted. In the event, no special name was 
announced but, instead, constant reference was made to the call of 
Comrade Deng Xiaoping that, 
"The loess plateau should be built into a pastoral and 
silvicultural base." (56) 
In late March and early April 1980, in Xi'an, the same conclusion 
was reached by one 'Scientific Symposium on the Comprehensive Control 
of the Soil and Water Losses of the Loess Plateau'. It was, therefore, 
to be the outcome of the debate, which Comrades Tong, Bao and SM had 
begun with their articles of 1978, that the area was to become a 
'pastoral and silvicultural base'. During the course of the debate a 
number of calls had been made for political and economic changes and 
it is essential to consider the predominant issue and what changes to 
it were adopted. 
The most common calls concerned compulsory sales of grain to the 
State, in effect a grain tax. Depending upon the locality in question, 
calls were made for such sales to be reduced, suspended, or replaced 
by sales of other produce. In areas where agriculture is well suited, 
the argument goes, the result of the State demanding too much grain 
has been to inhibit the integration of the other activities into the 
local economy. Thus, yields from the monoculture cropping practices 
so caused become unstable or fall. Not only then is there not enough 
to eat. *but, also, there is no other economic activity and the 
peasants' basic condition may not be changed. If the State 
purchasing burden were to be lightened, more land and effort could 
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be devoted to the other activities. One example of such a demand is 
that made by Comrade Yang Wenzhi, 
"If the obligatory sale of grain to the State were reduced 
slightly, then in normal years there would be enough grain 
to eat. However, if as soon as harvests increase, State 
purchases also increase, and become too great, then there 
is not enough grain and this affects the masses' enthusiasm. 
This is a political problem." (57) 
Indeed it is, for it would appear that much of the grain bought in 
this way must be sold back for food. This was to become an important 
factor. But, first, the calls for changes-to the grain tax in areas 
where agriculture is not so well suited should also be considered. 
The specific proposals of Comrades Tong, Bao and Shi have already 
been quoted. Their concern would seem to be twofold: to end 
compulsory grain sales in certain regions so as to reduce to a 
minimum the factors promoting agriculture - where it is ecologically 
unsound; and to provide support and incentive to stimulate the 
development of pastoral and silvicultural activities. 
The various calls for a temporary suspension of compulsory sales 
apply principally to the areas suited to 'Comprehensive Control', 
and is a sign of optimism that it was believed that within a few 
years the economy will have improved sufficiently for them to 
recommence. The arguments which apply to the other regions apply also 
here; namely, that such a move would free resources so that other 
economic activities may be pursued, and that, thereafter, if the tax 
could be paid in a variety of ways, the local economy would become 
better suited to the local ecology. Furthermore, as mentioned 
previously, owing to the instability of yields at present, much of 
the grain sold to the State, subsequently must be repurchased. 
Thus the demands for high compulsory grain sales turned out to be 
but accountancy. This was often used to support calls for 
compulsory grain sales tobe abolished, either temporarily or 
permanently, so that in normal years self sufficiency may be 
achieved and, in abundant years, grain could be stored for use in 
years of crop failure. The State would intervene only in cases of 
severe hardship. 
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In view of the observations of some comrades, on the need for local 
self-sufficiency (the comment of Comrade Li Erzhong, for example, 
has already been quoted), one might wonder whether such a scheme 
could really provide sufficient food. According to Comrade Zhang 
Tianzeng, of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, although it is said 
that hilltops are needed for food production, in fact, whilst it is 
true that so many hilltops have been opened to cultivation, only 
about a third are used in practice. Comrade Li Kaiming, also of the 
Chinese Academy of Sciences, points out that through careful work 
yields may be raised by as much as 70 7 in one year and may, on 
slopes, be within 0.375 t ha 	(Chapter 3, Section 3, ii), that is, 
25 7., of the yields normally obtained from terraces. (58) 
A further perspective on the question of grain self-sufficiency is 
given by Comrade Yang Tingxiu, of the Research Commission on 
Agricultural Modernisation, by his remark, that in the said 123 
Counties, in the agricultural year 1977 to 1978, there was an 
agricultural yield some 350 x 1O 3 t surplus to the requirement of the 
agricultural population, and it is only when it is assumed that the 
same agricultural production should also provide for the other 
sectors of the community (towns), that it becomes a deficit of some 
250 x 10 3 t. (59) To provide foodgrains as such is not so great a 
problem, then, but growing grain does not increase income and has not 
been stable. This is the reason why other ecotiomic activities such 
as the growing of fruit should be promoted. 
According to Comrade Shi, a five year moratorium was subsequently 
granted on State grain purchases in some areas, although it is not 
clear to which ones this applies. Fourteen Counties have been 
declared 'Control Experiment Counties' and receive special temporary 
(unspecified) aid. Meanwhile aerial seed broadcasting is to be 
carried out in a big way for from 3 years to 5 years. (60) No report 
has been found in the press which gives confirmation or details for 
the region as a whole, but a Xinhua News Agency report appearing in 
the Remnin Ribao in June 1980, shows the beginnings of a move in the 
same direction, by the Shaanxi Provincial Party Committee, 
"Dealing with stockrearing, the Provincial Committee has 
decided to abolish all unreasonable restrictions 
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"collective cattle may be owned and reared publicly, or 
owned publicly and reared privately; investment support will 
be given to collectives, Commune members and individuals who 
experience difficulty in rearing large domestic animals, pigs 
and sheep; no restriction shall be placed upon the numbers of 
large domestic animals, pigs and sheep fed and reared by 
Commune members or individuals. For each large domestic 
animal raised by Commune members, where there are the 
conditions, 0.067 ha of land for the growing of fodder should 
be given, or the brigade should collectively do the planting 
and provide fodder grass to the Commune member. 
"Dealing with accelerating afforestation 
..... State owned 
forests which the State cannot manage in the short term, may 
be given to local Commune Brigades for afforestation. The 
woods so created will belong to whoever creates them; they 
may also be managed jointly by State and Collective, according 
to contract, the benefits being divided proportionally; 
scattered fragments of State owned forest or natural secondary 
forest which the State cannot manage may, under the precondi-
tion that ownership be not altered, be entrusted for nurture 
and management to Commune Brigades, the benefits being divided 
according to a signed contract 
..... Barren mountains, land 
and deserts, belonging to collectives, may in part be 
distributed to Commune members for afforestation or sowing to 
grass, who plants it owns it, supported by issuing a Forest 
Rights Certificate. 
"The development of forestry and husbandry both require 
resolution of the foodgrain problem 
..... self-sufficiency in 
foodgrains may be carried out under present conditions, 
whilst constructing a pastoral and silvicultural base 
whether they be collective or individual, field management 
or diversified enterprises, all require the establishment of 
a strict production task system with payments calculated 
according to output. With regard to those Brigades which are 
scattered, have low levels of management, where production has 
not got going over a long period, the Commune members' income 
is small and life is hard, a production task system comprising 
payment partly in kind may be carried out, based upon work 
groups; certain individual households may be permitted fixed 
output quotas. Commune Brigades with high proportions of 
forestry, husbandry and oils, may substitute these products 
for grain in their State purchasing quotas. 
"Furthermore ..••• agricultural sidelines processed by the 
County, may be given over to the Commune Brigades to do, or 
may be done jointly, dividing the benefits; the State will 
put aside some money as a floating fund-to support Commune 
Brigade enterprises and diversified activities; all 
unreasonable prohibitions on household sidelines shall be 
lifted and support will be given with investment, seedlings 
and techniques. The Provincial Committee also decided to 
smash the demarkation - of administrative districts. Within and 
outwith the Province several large towns will open distributive 
departments for the special produce of North Shaanxi." (61) 
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It is possible to conclude that in the important area of local 
economic policy, at least, the lessons of the past have been learnt 
and changes are under way to attempt to redress the balance and bring 
about a more varied economy. This should be more stable and 
eventually, it is hoped, will lead to a more prosperous region as 
well as to a reduction in the problems of the R. Huang. It should be 
remembered, though, that only one aspect of the new policies has been 
discussed here. Other aspects include the level and use of State aid, 
the relationship between technical experts and party officials, new 
legal restrictions, and the slow progress of the restoration of 
various technical organs. One example of the latter point has already 
been quoted (Chapter 3, Section 3,i) and, although it would appear 
from other sources that work has been particularly slow in 
establishing new administrative organs, the following quotation from 
Comrade Tong Dalin may serve to illustrate that the scientific 
contingent at least, is making a healthy comeback, 
"At present there are here, nine scientific research and 
teaching units, i.e.; the Northst Agricultural Institute, 
the Northwest Silvicultural Institute, the Soil and Water 
Conservation Institute of the Academy of Sciences, and the 
Agricultural and Silvicultural Scientific Institute, Plant 
Institute, Water Conservancy Institute, Agricultural and 
Silvicultura]. College, Water Conservancy College and Wugong 
Agricultural Research Centre, under Shaanxi Province. 
Researchers and teachers number over 2000 ,& and students, 
I 	
i 	
I,, over 3O0O,.&,. What a valuable strength this s. (62) 
3) Prospects and Diverse Opinions on the Future of the Lower River 
Huang. 
As was shown earlier (Section 1,11, of this chapter), the ability to 
control R. Huang floods is at present limited and the condition of 
the lower reaches is continuing to deteriorate. The construction of 
a new tributary reservoir is already in progress to improve the 
situation and in addition, advanced plans have been drawn up as a 
basis for further development stages. There are several alternatives, 
however, from amongst which the final choice has yet to be made. In 
this section some of the alternative strategies are presented with 
tentative observations on how well each is being accepted. 
1) The Northward Transfer of Southern Waters. 
The general aridity of Northern China and the relative abundance of 
water, both South of the Changjiang, and flowing in it (its annual 
discharge is twenty times that of the R. Huang), formed, in the 1950s, 
the basis for the concept of Northward Transfer of Southern Waters. 
Recently, such transfer of water has been suggested as a method for 
resolving the sediment problem of the lower R. Huang. 
According to Comrade Wang Huayun, research into various possible 
routs for such a transfer began shortly after the Civil War and, in 
1958, formal 'scientific investigation and surveying work' began with 
the organisation of a team to prospect from the upper Changjiang to 
the R. Huang. Over fifteen different possibilities, some not 
restricted to the two rivers' upper reaches, were suggested, from 
which Comrade Wang chose four generally representative routes 
for further description in his article. (63) The following synopsis 
is illustrated by Figure 5-12. 
In route No. 1, water would first be diverted, by means of a 250 m 
- high dam from the R. Tongtian (middle part of the upper Changjiang 
above Yushu), in Qinghai, across the grasslands to Mt. Que'er, and 
thence through a 6.5 km tunnel to join the R. Yalong, a sub-tributary 
of the Changjiang. At Ganzi another dam would be used to divert the 
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Common meeting point of Qinghai, Sichuan and Gansu Provinces. Some 
22.1 x 109 m3 yr of water would be diverted along this 1680 km 
route, of which 405 km comprises the R. Yalong, and 1283 km would be 
canals. Eight dams between 150 m and 250 m high, 20 tunnels 
totalling 51 kin (longest single tunnel, 7 km), and 2.5 x 1O 9 m3 of 
earthworks would be required. 
Route No. 2 is more ambitious and apparently more speculative, since 
several alternatives are given for the method by which water would 
be diverted at the Southern end, some involving unprecedentedly high 
dams made by using explosives to topple cliffs and block gorges. 
The more conventional alternative, though, would use a 150 rn high 
dam to divert the R. Jinsha (lower part of the upper Changjiang) at 
Zhongdian County, just within Yunnan Province, and then would use 
5 dams each between 150 m and 250 m high, 15 tunnels totalling 57 kin, 
and several tens of milliards of cubic metres of earthworks to form 
a 6800 km route, crossing four large rivers and skirting the Sichuan 
basin, to Dingxi in Gansu Province. 
Route No. 3 would divert water from the Changjiang at the Three 
Gorges reservoir and lead it 400 km to the Danjiangkou reservoir on 
the R. Hanshui. From there, it would be led for 500 km through the 
Fangcheng Pass to cross the R. Huang at Taohuayu, and then a further 
700 kin following the Guangzhou - Beijing railway line to the Capital. 
The middle section would require 	 9 3 some 0.56 x 10 m of earthworks, 
but no other estimate is given. 
Route No. 4 would involve modification of the Grand Canal for the 
purpose of raising Changjiang waters, from Yangzhou, 60 m to 70 m 
and transferring them 650 km to join the R. Huang via Lake Dongping. 
Ten pumping stations were envisaged to supply some ten milliard cubic 
metres per year (about 320 m3 _]) 	Under the planned Weishan project, 
the waters just below the lake, could be diverted into the Northern 
half of the Grand Canal where they would flow by gravity to Beijing. 
Discussion of these grandiose schemes reached its climax 'towards the 
end of the Great Leap Forward, and provides another illuminating 
insight into the psychological climate of the time, during which, 
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it will be remembered, the dam at Sanxnenxia was nearing completion. 
Whilst planning was on a conceptual level only and it was 
acknowledged to be but a long term solution, such emphasis was 
placed on these schemes' merits as to cause one to wonder at their 
failure to have been implemented. The Northward transfer of 
Southern waters would be capable, it was claimed, of resolving the 
fundamental cause of China's agricultural and industrial problems, 
namely the uneven distribution of the country's water resources, 
and, thus, would be an unprecedented achievement of enormous value, 
"The Northward transfer of Southern waters is not only 
an effective measure to balance Northern and Southern waters, 
to guarantee stable bumper yields in the agriculture and 
husbandry of the North China Plain, the loess plateau, the 
deserts and the grasslands, and to guarantee water supplies 
to industry, mines, towns, navigation and for going green, 
but it is also a great and magnificent project for the 
transformation of nature and deserts to the service of 
Communist construction." (64) 
However, a great deal of research work would still, under the best 
of conditions, have had to have been carried out before specific 
proposals could have been made, and it is not surprising that after 
the initial interest not much was heard on the subject for some 
twenty years. It is even less surprising in view of some of the 
changes which took place in that period. For example, the general 
discrediting of large scale projects by such failures as at 
Sanmenxia, the temporary ban on the use of R. Huang waters for 
irrigation of the North China Plain which followed serious 
alkalisation there, and the political turmoil which wreaked havoc 
for the decade thereafter, would all have worked against any rapid 
development of the schemes for interbasin transfer. 
So after the first rush of interest it would seem that the plans 
were shelved, and this is confirmed by Greer, who reports statements 
made in 1974 by R. Huang officials, that no water was being 
transferred into the R. Huang basin and that no plan for such 
transfer was under consideration. (65) 
Then, at the Fifth National People's Congress in February 1978, in 
his report on the work of the government, Chairman Hua Cuofeng 
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announced as one of the tasks to be completed before 1985, 
"Projects to divert water from the Changjiang to areas 
North of the R. Huang". (66) 
and three of the four general routes later re-emerged for 
consideration, the exception being route No. 2, which received no 
further attention. First to be made public was the Eastern route 
(previously No. 4). A team of 100 cadres, engineers, and technicians 
under the State Planning Commission, the Ministry of Water 
Conservancy and Power, 4 Provinces and 1 Municipality, had made a 
survey from May until July 1978 and had declared the route 
'Economical, rational and feasible'. Yet, following its announcement 
in August 1978, a number of dissentions and alternative proposals 
were raised, notably with the re-publication in February 1979, of 
the middle route (formerly route No. 	
'(67) 
Subsequently, from 29 March until 11 April, 1979, a forum, held in 
Tianjin to discuss the three routes, is reported to have agreed that 
whilst all three are in general practical, each plan needs some 
improvement. Furthermore, they considered the construction of the 
Western route (No. 1), to be beyond China's capability for the time 
being, though surveys should continue. (68) 
Research work continued, and a further symposium and field study 
were held jointly by the United Nations University and the Institute 
of Geography of the Chinese Academy of Sciences in 1980. This 
concentrated upon the many environmental questions to have emerged. 
Papers from the symposium are expected to be published soon. (69) 
The three routes will now be discussed in their new forms. 
From July to October 1978, the Northward Transfer of Southern Waters 
Prospecting Team under the RHWCC, partly in collaboration with the 
Jiangsu Provincial Institute of Geography, carried out surveys of a 
number of possible versions of the Western route. In their very 
brief synopsis, published in Renmin Huanghe magazine, they give 
examples of the possible routes from two tributaries of the 
R. Tongtian to various points on the R. Huang or its tributaries. 
(Figure 5_13).(70) Two of the eleven examples, S-Z and D-H, rely on 
gravity, whilst the others would require some form of pumping. 
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Rough data for four of the routes are shown in Table 5-8, and 
illustrate the more moderate nature of these proposals. Between 
9 3 	-1 	 9 3 	-1 7.85 x 10 m yr and 10.35 x 10 m yr of water may be transferred 
by these schemes, which would involve dams, between 1.55 m and 379 m 
high, across the R. Tongtian. None of the routes exceeds 200 km. 
The pumped schemes would raise water some 120 m to 380 m and consume 
between 3.5 TW h yr and 14 TW h yr 1 of electrical power. 
In a preceding article in the same issue of Rerirnin Huanghe, the 
Prospecting Team suggest modifying the existing outlet of the lower 
of the R. Huang's two largest freshwater lakes, Lake Zhaling and 
Lake Eling, or adding a new outlet, so as to augment their natural  
regulative capacities. (71) In dry years the two lakes' water level 
could be lowered by up to 8 m and 12 m, respectively, which would 
increase the water supply by 9.5 x 10 m3 (62 % of the stored volume), 
whilst reducing their area by 354.5 km  (31 70). In abundant years 
the water level could be raised by 9 m, which would increase the two 
lakes 	 9 capacity by 6 x 10 m 3 whilst increasing their area by a total 
of 50 Since the annual runoff here is about 500 x 1o 6 m3 , the 
regulation afforded by these modifications would be significant and, 
moreover, the scale of the engineering works required, would be very 
modest; one scheme for example would need 33 kri of canals, 1.6 km of 
tunnels and total earthworks of 7.65 x 10 6  m3 . This is presented as 
a short-term plan. 
In the long term this scheme would be combined with the foregoing 
water transfer scheme, whereby some 7.85 x 1O9 m3 yr would enter 
the lakes from the R. Tongtian. There are two possible new outlets 
which allow for 140 MW tol501VW of electrical generating capacity. 
(Figure 5-13). One route would require 28 km of canals, 1.6 km of 
63 
tunnels and 15 x 10 m of earthworks to lead the water back to the 
R. Huang via two smaller lakes, whilst the other route would require 
21 km of canals, 6 km of tunnels and 6 x 106  m3 of earthworks to lead 
the waters into a R. Huang tributary, the R. Hei. 
Although these new route 1 type transfer schemes are still 
speculative, and should be regarded as long term possibilities, the 
modest scale of the lake modification scheme and its relatively large 
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TABLE BASIC DATA FOR FOUR OF THE 
5-8 SUGGESTED TRANSFER SCHEMES 
ROUTE 	(see figure 	5-13 	) S-M 	4500 S-K 	4500 0-0 4400 0-H 	4250 
Total 	length 	 (kin) 123-5 142-5 63-7 176-8 
Tunnels 	 (km ) 499 559 235 1750 
Earth 	and stone to be removed (m 3x106) 47-4 500 18-2 557 
Concrete 	 (rn 3x106) 47 54 26 16-4 
Net 	water lift 	 (rn) 219-8 2240 3057 
Gravity 
6 Annual energy consumption 	(kw hrx 10 6) 6410 6540 11270 
scheme 
Source: RHWCC, Northward Transfer of Southern Waters prospecting 
group, Ed,, 1 79a, P. 51. 
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effect make it quite an attractive proposition. This would be even 
more so in view of the critical situation which developed at the 
construction site of the Longyangxa hydropower station in the Summer 
of 1981, when unexpectedly large flood peaks occurred and threatened 
the coffer dam (Section 4). In addition to the more moderate scale 
of these new proposals, it is interesting to note that one of the 
principal benefits is seen to be their ability to regulate the water 
for electricity generation in the upper R. Huang, 
"In comparison with some of the interbasin water regulation 
works in this country and abroad, the amount of work is not 
large. This scheme plays quite a sizeable role in resolving 
the water supply problem of the arid Northwestern region and 
in raising the guaranteed output of the R. Huang mainstream 
power stations. With regard to the scale of the project, 
building this type of works is also possible." (72) 
However, no announcement has been made to confirm that any such 
scheme will go ahead in the near future. 
The middle route, diverting water from the Danjiangkou reservoir on 
the R. Hanshui, re-emerged almost unchanged. Its great advantage 
was held to be that it would rely only upon gravity, which would 
save running costs. One advocate of this route, Comrade Xiao Bingjun, 
proposed short-term and long-term versions. In the short-term, the 
dam of the Danjiangkou reservoir would be raised by 13 m, to 175 m, to 
give a capacity of 34 x 10 m3 under a normal high water level of 
170 m. However, water would have to be stored which at present is 
used to generate power, and the output of the Danjiangkou hydropower 
station would be reduced by between 700 GW h yr 1 and 1.7 TW h yr'. 
Nevertheless, Comrade Xiao suggests that this can be supplemented 
from the Gezhouba project under construction in the Changjiang Gorges 
or by fossil fuel power stations. The water diverted from the 
Changjiang would amount to 30 x 10 9 3 	 9 3 m , some 17 x 10 m of which 
would be distributed North of the R. Huang. Since the trunk canal 
would connect ultimately with the Bo Sea at Qinhuangdao (Hebei) and 
Tianjin, it would become both a major source of water and a principal 
drainage channel for the North China Plain. (73) 
In the long term, water would be diverted from the Yangtse tributaries, 
the rivers Bailong and Jialing into the upper reaches of the R. Hanshui 
near Yangpingquan, S.W. Shaanxi. This would have the added advantage 
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of providing extra potential for two existing hydropower stations on 
the R. Hanshui. Furthermore, water could eventually be diverted 
from the proposed Changjiang Gorges reservoir, and would flow to the 
Danjiangkou reservoir by gravity. One report even suggests that in 
the very long term, this canal might be extended Southwards to 
Guangzhou. (74) 
The suggested use of the middle •route, or part of it, has found 
favour with some of the champions of the Taohuayu project on the 
R. Huang (Section 3,iii). They see the use of that reservoir to 
facilitate the crossing of the R. Huang by the diverted R. Hanshui 
waters, as - affording an opportunity to regulate the sediment 
concentration of the lower R. Huang and scour the bed. At the same 
time it would obviate R. Huang silt entering the canal (Section 3,5VJ. (75) 
When interest in the schemes for water transfer had re-emerged in 
1978 with the emphasis on the Eastern route, there were few changes 
of detail, but the most important two concerned the scale of the 
project and the method of crossing the R. Huang. Since the river had 
not become clear after the construction of the Sanmeaxia reservoir, 
and the Weishan diversion weir had been bypassed, it was considered 
best for the water transfer canal to pass under the R. Huang's 
elevated bed in tunnels. The annual water volume to be transferred 
had risen to 30 x lO m3  and to raise this water 40 m to the level at 
which it would pass under the R. Huang, thirty pumping stations in 
fifteen stages would consume one gigawatt of electrical power. Under 
this scheme, 1120 kin of the original canal would have to be dredged 
and widened, whilst 250 km would be newly excavated. The Northern 
half of the system, as before, would rely on gravity. (76) 
The middle and Eastern routes were both proposed as ways to overcome 
a perceived water shortage on the North China Plain, particularly 
North of the R. Huang, and in the industrial cities to be found there. 
However, they met with environmental objections which applied,to 
different extents, to both. For example, although the Changjiang has 
abundant water supplies which are less extreme in their variation 
than those of the R. Huang, seasonal changes still occur and, in 
1978, when the river was low, encroachment of sea water was so serious 
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in the vicinity of Shanghai that for a period the drinking water was 
unpalatably salty. Fears were raised that to remove Changjiang 
waters, especially by the Eastern route, could cause Changjiang 
sediment to be deposited higher in the estuary, that the power 
generation potential of the Changjiang would be reduced, that 
schistosomiasis might spread Northwards, and that any South-North 
canal would' block, or raise the level of, the already poor West-East 
drainage system of the North China Plain, bringing further 
alkalisation problems. (77) 
Discussion at the various forums also centered around the joint 
questions of whether the apparant water shortage was real and could 
economically be resolved by interbasin transfers, and secondly, if 
so, which route should be chosen. The Eastern route involves large 
running costs, would not reduce sedimentation in the R. Huang and 
seems to create more severe environmental problems. In contrast, 
the middle route uses gravity 'as the motive force and may be used to 
scour the lower R. Huang. This route includes some, albeit meagre, 
consideration of drainage, but it would require engineering on a 
somewhat larger scale and is therefore of a longer term nature. The 
frequent shortage of ready water is not disputed, and emergency 
transfers have had to be made fromthe R. Huang, via' the People's 
Victory Canal, the R. Wei (B ) and the Grand Canal, to the Tianjin 
area. 
(78)  Yet there is a strong body of opinion that theway to 
resolve this problem is not to transfer water but to make better use 
of existing resources. 
Professor Huang Wanli, of Qinghua University, for example, proposes 
a threefold solution to the shortages. One aspect of his plan is 
for the control and use of the lower R. Huang by distributing 
20 x 10 9  m 3 yr-1 of silt and water over the Northern part of the 
North China Plain. (Section 3,ii). The other two aspects are 
increased storage and use of present surface runoff, and the develop-
ment of underground water resources, including their in situ 
storage. (79) 
Professor Huang considers the main water sources which at present 
contribute to the runoff of the Northern part of the North China Plain, 
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to be as follow: Precipitation over the R. Hai catchment, estimated 
9 3 	-1 	 9 3 	-1 at 68.7 x 10 m yr , of which only 6.8 x 10  yr 	becomes surface 
runoff; Runoff entering from outwith the cãtchment, of which some 
15.8 x lO m3 yr 	enter from the Taihang mountains to the West, and 
-1 5.8 x 10 9 m 3 yr 	in smaller rivers such as the R. Luan. (80) Thus a 
total of some 28.4 x 10 m yr 	is available as surface runoff. 
However, most of it occurs in July, August and September, whilst it 
is needed for agriculture principally in May and June. At present 
-1 only 10.8 x 10 9 m 3 yr 	of this is stored for use at the end of 
the following Spring and Professor Huang proposes that it be increased 
to an average of 14 x 10 m3 yr, by providing more storage for both 
the runoff of normal years and the rarer, larger floods. It should be 
pointed out though, that in his two articles (in the Guangming 
Ribao and the Gongcheng Kancha magazine), he does not address the 
problem of reservoir sedimentation. 
-1 Of the above 68.7 x 10 9 m 3 yr 	precipitation in the R. Hai catchment, 
Professor Huang estimates 34.4 x 1O 9 m3 yr 1 escapes as evaporation or 
transpiration, and some 27.5 x lO m3 yr ' seeps into the deeper 
layers and becomes underground flow. If the underground water is 
used extensively in May and June, it will be replenished in July, 
August and September, he argues, and if it were kept deeper than 
4 m below the surface, it would no longer be lost through evapo- 
transpiration. Furthermore, the underground remains of past riverbeds 
may be regarded as ready made reservoirs. At present some 10 x 1O 9 
m3 yr 1 of underground water is used, but by reducing evapotrans-
piration losses in such a way, Professor Huang estimates that a 
-1 	 9 3 	-1 further 10 x 10 9 3 m yr to 15 x 10 m yr 	could be made available. 
Together these two schemes would provide an extra 29 x lO m 3 yr 1 , 
to which may be added 	9 3 20 x 10 m yr
- l
from his R. Huang scheme, and 
20.8 x.10 m yr 	aleady being med. Of the total 70 x 1O 9 m3 yr, 
he argues that 50 x lO m3 yr 	is available in the short term and 
so the Northward transfer of Southern waters is unnecessary. As for 
lands South of the R. Huang, he suggests smaller scale irrigation 
schemes based on the R. Hanshui. 
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It would seem most likely then, that the whole question of the North-
ward transfer of Southern waters, whilst being the subject of much 
continuing research, will not be resolved for some time. However, 
although no such work is foreseen for the near future, it seems 
almost certain that this is not the end of the matter. 
ii) Large-scale Dispersal of Silty Water. 
In September 1979, Professor Huang Wanli published his own, 
controversial, "General Plan for the Control of the R. Huang", and 
the following is taken largely from his synopsis, which appeared in 
the February 1980, edition of Renmin Huanghe. (81) He begins by 
identifying five erroneous prejudices in the concepts of R. Huang 
control held commonly (including by himself) hitherto. They are, in 
a translation of his own words, 
"I) Making Soil and Water Conservation the basis of R. Huang 
Control. 
ii) Doing the utmost,as the principle of river control, to 
'carry silt to the sea. 
iii)Considering that water and silt flows should be concent-
rated instead of dispersed. 
Turning the elevated channel system into an engineering 
method for warping lowlands along the two banks. 
Failing to summarise clearly the points of error in the 
Sanmenxia dam plan, and therefore being unable to make a 
proper reconstruction." 
The professor then points out that above Mengjin the river flows in 
a concave catchment some 700,000 km 2 in area, of which some 
133,000 km2 is cultivated, whereas the whole of the North China 
Plain, 250,000 km  in area, of which 167,000 km  is cultivated, is a 
large conical delta created by the past wanderings of the R. Huang. 
We should, he writes, respect this natural regime and, therefore, not 
block up silt, by such methods as precipitation dams, once it has 
entered the gullies. Soil and water conservation, likewise, should 
vigorously be undertaken only to develop the locality, as any benefit 
it may have towards the R. Huang Is purely coincidental. This approach 
counters error No. 1, above. Meanwhile, to counter error No. 2, the 
dykes should not be used to flush all the silt to the sea. Instead, 
the entrances to all the original, interconnecting, low lying, river 
channels should, in a controlled way, be completely opened. The 
main channel and floodplainrcross-sections-hou1d.a1l be fixed so that 
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as the water flows, it will scour the main channel and deposit upon 
the floodplains. This will then, also, counter errors No. 3 and 
No. 4, since it will not be scattered deposition by warping, but 
orderly, dispersed sediment transportation. 
On the question of the proper use of the Sanmenxia reservoir, 
Professor Huang advocates full purgation of the 5.5 x 10 9 t of 
accumulated silt so as to provide sufficient capacity fully to 
regulate both water and silt in the lower R. Huang and, until this 
has been done, he would postpone the construction of the proposed 
Xiaolangdi reservoir downstream (Section 3,iii). 	In order so to do, 
he would make use of the 16 m drop downstream of the dam, by re-opening 
the bed of the old Ghosts' Gate, at a level of 260 m, and thereby 
flush out the deposits. At the same time, he claims, some one gigawatt 
of power could be generated as before, and water could still be stored 
without giving rise to retrogressive backwater deposition. During 
the Spring drought, large amounts of silty water would be released 
and would flow steadily through 20 or more distribution channels along 
the banks of the river for warping over 33,000 km of low lying fields 
on the North China Plain. The R. Huang main channel would still be 
the principal flood discharge route, but it would become scoured 
successively deeper and thus effect its ultimate control. 
In other words, only floods of sufficient size to scour the whole of 
the lower reach would be allowed to enter it. Smaller floods would 
be stored and released periodically into other channels, of the 
appropriate design to carry both water and silt long distances to 
where they may be used in orderly warping. These distribution channels 
themselves would not suffer deposition and, because of their proper 
design, would maintain deep main channels and high floodplains. In 
time, the flood carrying capacity of the lower R. Huang, through 
constant scouring of its main channel and deposition on its floodplains, 
would increase sufficiently to end permanently the threat of diluvium. 
In times of extraodinarily large floods, all the various distribution 
channels could be opened at once, for, as Professor Huang claims, when 
spread over the whole North China Plain, even a 1000 year flood would 
be only 0.024 m deep. 
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Much interest has been aroused by this scheme, but it would be fair 
to.say that it has not gained general acceptance, as many doubts 
remain as to whether it could be made to work in practice. One 
point which immediately springs to mind, is the question of drainage. 
Since sufficient drainage could not be provided for earlier large-
scale irrigation schemes, should not that question be addressed 
specifically by the author of this one? Also, one might expect 
considerable practical problems in matching the fluvial and alluvial 
conditions, required for the proper operation of the distribution 
canals without deposition, to those obtaining in the supply system, 
if the reservoir at Sanmenxia, for example, is to be kept clear. 
All this is not to say that such an idea indeed would not work but, 
in view of its large-scale and radical nature (although the invest-
ment would be quite low), it would seem that Professor Huang will 
need a lot more campaigning for his colleagues to be convinced in 
sufficient number to realise his scheme. This is how he puts his 
case, 
"How can it be said that the present type of general 
plan, to intercept upstream and discharge downstream, 
to regard water and silt as frightful beasts of prey, 
the R. Huang as an evil river and to raise the dykes 
every few years, makes rational use of water and silt 
resources? Could the two guarantees proposed by Premier 
Zhou while he lived - to guarantee the lower reaches 
and to guarantee Wan, be ac1ii€.ved In the long run, 
could we, with complete confidence, control the R. Huang? 
Unless water and silt are distributed for irrigation 
and fertilisation along the two banks, how are we to 
answer the masses' censure, 'Only manage a line, don't 
care about the two large strips'?" (82) 
iii) Intercept, Discharge and Deposit. 
Inasmuch as all the other major proposals for control of the R. Huang 
are based upon the widely supported general plan known as 'Intercept, 
Discharge and Deposit', 	 k ), it may be considered to be 
the orthodox view. As is described below, however, there are 
different shades of opinion as to the point of emphasis, and the 
specific engineering structures to be built for its realisation. 
The example of the opinion of the Sediment Research Laboratory of 
the Hydraulic Engineering Department of Qinghua University is fairly 
typical, and has been published in full in a magazine enjoying 
international circulation. Here this, and others, are discussed 
together. (83) 
The cornerstone of the orthodox views is that the long term solution 
to the R. Huang problem lies in soil and water conservation on the 
loess plateau. The points at variance concern what short and medium 
term measures should be applied in the meantime. The term 'intercept' 
has two meanings; one being in situ interception by soil and water 
conservation, and the other referring to storage reservoirs on the 
tributaries and downstream. It is claimed that the two proposed 
reservoirs described below, at Longmen and Xiaolangdi, respectively, 
could together trap some 20 x 1O 9 t of silt and significantly reduce 
sedimentation in the lower R. Huang for 30 or 40 years. Four 
deliberate types of 'deposition' are identified; deposition by 
natural or artificial fboodpeaks on the floodplains between Longinen 
and Tongguan, in Meng and Wen Counties between Mengjin and Taohuayu, 
and in the lower reaches; deposition to consolidate the dykes, 
possibly using sediment suction boats; deposition of low-lying land 
just outwith the dykes, using syphons, for example; and deposition 
some distance away in schemes to transport sediment in high 
concentrations for warping. Finally, there are two methods of 
'discharge'; one by regulation of the river channel to increase its 
flood and sediment discharge capacities, and the other by using 
reservoirs to regulate both water and silt so as to reduce deposition 
and send as much of the silt as possible to the sea. None of these 
methods is exclusive of the others. 
The analyses described in Chapter 1, Section 3, iii, have shown that 
the floods which give rise to serious deposition in the lower R. Huang 
are those which originate in the coarse sediment source area comprising 
some 110,000 km 2  of the loess plateau. Since, unlike in other 
semi-arid areas, virtually all the soil eroded from the slopes of 
smaller tributary catchments is transported out of the local watershed.. 
and into the mainstream, it would appear that any reduction in 
erosion would directly reduce the silt content of the R. Huang. 
However, in order to satisfy themselves that this would have a 
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beneficial effect in the distant lower reaches, the Qinghua 
University Sediment Research Laboratory (QUSRL) went a stage 
further. They considered whether the reduction in oncoming water, 
commensurate with the reduction in oncoming silt load due 
to conservation work would seriously affect the silt carrying 
capacity of the lower reaches. They also considered whether any 
reduction in the oncoming silt load of the larger tributaries would 
be negated, there and in the mainstream, by clearer water leading to 
increased erosion of the riverbed. 
Their findings are as follow: Most of the tributaries of the middle 
reaches contain silt concentrations over 100 kg in 3 , and those with 
over 400 kg m 3 are not uncommon. Upon joining the mainstream, these 
concentrations are greatly reduced by mixing with clearer water from 
the upper reaches, the average annual mainstream concentration, for 
example, being 37 kg rn 3 at Longmen and 30 kg m- 3  at Huayuankou. 
Since the tributary and mainstream concentrations are not of the same 
magnitude, a large reduction in both the water and silt of the 
tributaries would have a much greater relative effect on the silt 
content of the mainstream than on its water content. For example, 
if both the silt and water of the tributary rivers Huangpu, Kuye 
and Wuding were completely stopped, the average annual silt 
concentration at Longmen would fall by 27 I. to 27 kg in-3 , which 
would clearly be beneficial in the lower R. Huang. 
For an answer to the second point, the QUSRL turn to the example 
afforded when clear water was discharged continuously from 
Sanmenxia in the early sixties (Chapter 3, Section 6,vi). In that 
instance, after one year d 50' at Huayuankou had increased by 30 7. 
and the capacity to pick up bed silts had fallen by two-thirds. 
Once an armoured bed had, thereby, 	become established, the amount 
of sediment picked up therefrom remained low. From this example 
QUSRL draw the following conclusion, 
"This explains that after control of the coarse sediment 
source area has been achieved and fairly clear water is 
discharged, whilst at-first the river channel may 
supplement the amount of sediment in the flow to a 
certain extent, after armouring and slope adjustments 
of the bed, the ability to pick up silt will quickly 
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fall to a relatively low level and the amount of 
supplementary silt from the bed will be greatly 
restricted. it
(84) 
Whilst the principle of relying on soil and water conservation work, 
concentrated in the coarse sediment source area, for the long term 
solution to the R. Huang problem is, thereby, established, and has 
been generally accepted, it is conceded that it would be unwise to 
underestimate how much time such a process will require. Indeed, the 
R.HWCC 	prefer to base their plans on the assumption that there 
will be no reduction in the sediment load of the lower reaches. (85) 
That is to say, that any reduction which might be expected cannot 
be measured on the same time-scale as normal planning for river 
control. Thus, the various propositions for shorter term solutions 
to the problem assume a semi-permanent nature. 
From 18 to 29 October 1979, the Chinese Society of Hydraulic 
Engineering held, at Zhengzhou, a symposium on plans to control the 
lower R. Huang. Some 220 delegates attended, representing various 
units within the Ministry of Water Conservancy, the Chinese Academy 
of Sciences, and relevant universities and colleges. Wide ranging 
discussion was held on various proposals for the control of the 
river including a number which illustrate various points of 
emphasis within the orthodox view. In the following description of 
some of the engineering measures discussed at the symposium, it 
should be borne in mind that they are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive. First of all, opinions on improving the ability of the 
lower reaches to discharge flood peaks using exising facilities will 
be discussed. 
Some comrades question the concept of guarding against the 'greatest 
possible flood', put at 46,000 m3 s 	at I-Iuayuankou. (86) They point 
out that the criterion on the Changjiang, and for the cities of 
Beijing and Tianjin is only a 100 year flood, whilst even the 
advanced nations could not afford much more, the Mississippi, for 
example, being protected to a criterion of once in somewhere between 
100 years and 500 years. 
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Comrade Zhaø 	n considered the present flood carrying capacity to 
be sufficient for all but the rarest of floods and, owing to the 
high silt content of flood peaks on the R. Huang, dams or flood 
retardation areas have only restricted roles, since once used, they 
become filled with sediment. Conversely, he argued, 
"Every extra 1000 m 3 s 	of flood carrying capacity is 
equivalent to the construction of a reservoir or flood 
retardation area with a capacity of one milliard cubic 
metres."
(87) 
Therefore, he advocated putting emphasis, with due regard to the 
special characteristics of deposition in the lower R. Huang, on 
consolidating the dykes so that all but the rarest floods (those 
which would overflow them rather than break through them) would 
be contained; on restricting such deposition as is unavoidable to 
the floodplains and to the broad upper part of the lower reaches; on 
increasing the ability to regulate the fluvial conditions of the 
lower river; and, unusually, on sending all water not used in 
Shandong in Winter (the period when the Shandong stretch of the 
lower reaches suffers deposition) either Northwards to irrigate 
the R. Hal basin, or Southwards to the R. Huai basin. 
Amongst suggestions as to how to increase the flood carrying 
capacity of the lower reaches, a number deal with ways which involve 
deposition as well as discharge. The use of sediment suction boats 
and syphons for dyke consolidation, as already described, continues 
to have its advocates. But, it is also emphasised that at a cost of 
several tens of millions of Yuan each year, it cannot be regarded as 
a long term solution. (88) The QUSRL points out that, unlike in the 
middle reaches, there is no difference in the order of magnitude 
between the silt concentrations in the mainstream and that in the 
stream from which silt and water is being removed since in the lower 
reaches they are the same stream. Therefore, they argue, after 
deposition, the water should be returned to the river. (89) They 
consider two specific proposals, one on the floodplains and the 
other outwith the dykes, but they are on very different scales and 
are not directly comparable. Nevertheless, it may be said that 
schemes which use the floodplains have the advantage that, after 
settling the silt, the water returns to the river by gravity. 
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Some comrades called for a further round of reconstruction at 
Sanmenxia, both to provide a more lively response to changes in 
oncoming water and silt loads, and because the present discharge 
capacity is thought still to be too small. (90) They point out that, 
under the present operational regime, guaranteeing Spring irrigation 
downstream has meant that the bed level at Tongguan which had fallen 
1.8 m in 1973, has since risen again by about 1 m. Furthermore, in the 
event of extraordinary floods occurring in successive years, as 
happened between 1841 and 1843, Wan could not be safeguarded and, 
after the flood peak would have passed, huge amounts of sediment would 
be worked by smaller flows into the lower reaches and cause serious 
deposition there. The least to be done, now, should be to reopen the 
four remaining bed sluices. 
The QUSRL propose a set of general guidelines for the use of 
reservoirs on the middle and lower R. Huang. (91) In order to promote 
'discharge', they draw on the fact that the sediment discharge in 
the lower R. Huang is proportional to the square of the water discharge, 
and propose the creation of artificial flood .peaks to scour the whole 
lower reach. In order to promote 'deposition', they propose that, as 
long as the dykes are not endangered, reservoirs should not restrain 
waters from covering the river floodplains as such inundations, and 
their subsequent deposition on the floodplains, are beneficial to 
channel and floodplain morphology. As for 'interception', by reservoirs, 
they point out that deposition in the lower R. Huang is predominantly 
composed of coarse silts (>0.05 mm). Thus, to intercept fine silts in 
reservoirs would have a smaller effect on deposition downstream than 
would interception of coarse silts. 
Some comrades consider that the R. Huang has already risen to the 
extent that demands a change in course and have put forward various 
opinions. These include, building a third dyke to one side of the 
existing system, thereby creating three dykes and' two rivers, or build- 
ing the third dyke and then allowing the river to abandon its old course. 
However, this type of proposal has met with considerable opposition, 
not only because it would inundate agricultural land such as that at 
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present cultivated in the Beijin detention area alongside the 
Northern dyke, but also on the grounds that this proposal's protagonists 
were mistaken, and that the present course of the lower R. Huang can 
still be regarded as quite young. (92) 
The main proposals for new reservoirs as part of the Intercept, 
Discharge and Deposit viewpoint will now be described. The three 
contenders would be situated, respectively, at Taohuayu, Xiaolangdi 
and Longmen (Figure 2-1), and would work alone or in conjunction with 
each other or the Sanrnenxia reservoir according to various proposals. 
When proposed as part of the 1955 Comprehensive Plan, the reservoir 
at Taohuayu was to have served the multiple purposes of reducing all 
floods to 6000 m3 s, generating 220 MW of electricity and, by 
removing any silt entering the waters below Sanrnenxia, providing 
clear water for the Gangli or Huayuankou irrigation project and a 
clear crossing for the proposed Beijing to Guangzhou canal. 
(93) 
 Under 
the present proposals its only purpose is to substitute for the 
Beijin retardation area, as a reserve measure against the largest 
of floods, which it would reduce to 22,000 m 3 s 1 , though investigation 
for its future integration with the Northward transfer of Southern 
waters middle route (Section 3,i) has also been proposed. (94) 
Situated just above the crossing of the R. Huang by the Beijing to 
Guangzhou railway line, the right bank would comprise the low loess 
bluffs of Mangshan but for the left bank there would be just a 
large expanse of R. Huang floodplain and the dykes thereupon. The 
proposal is for a dam, 30 m high, across the mainstream, and a 59 kin 
perimeter dyke. to enclose a large area of the Northern floodplain, 
together to provide a storage capacity of some 6 x 10 9 m3 . A very 




 s 	would raise the water level by only 0.1 m. Since it 
would be below the major tributaries, it could control 68.5 7 of the 
drainage area between Sanmenxia and Huayuankou, and since it is so 
near to Huayuankou, its control would be very responsive, as it 
would not have to rely upon predictions to know the water level 
thereat. It is estimated that despite deposition when not in use, 
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after 35 years 3.2,x 1O 9 m3 of capacity would remain. It would take 
5 years to build, and cost some k 750 x 
10  
(f 214 x 106),  which makes 
it the cheapest of the options under consideration, and the quickest 
to show results. (95) The area to be flooded is desolate and sparsely 
populated. 
The disadvantages seen of this scheme, include the difficulty of 
maintaining the perimeter dyke, its effect on the R. Yiluo, whose 
water level in the lower reaches would be raised, the poor 
geological conditions (the site is on alluvial silt), and its 
failure to provide any benefit other than as a standby for the 
control of extraordinary floods. 
The proposed reservoir at Xiaólangdi is conceptually more conventional, 
being of a gorge type, similar to the Balihutong reservoir proposed 
by Reybold, Growden and Savage (Chapter 2, Section 2), in the Civil 
War period. However, one of the proposals for a reservoir here would 
put it to use in a most unconventional way, to creat hyperconcentrated 
flows artificially. The two approaches will be considered separately. 
The Xiaolangdi site is above the rivers Yi, Luo and Qin, and a 
reservoir there could control only 13..7.% of the drainage area 
between Sanmenxia and Huayuankou. Other measures would have to be 
found to protect the lower reaches from flood peaks up to 30 	
3 
,000 m s -1  
which is the estimated maximum discharge at Huayuankou, taking into 
account use of the Xiaolangdi reservoir. 
(96)  However, according to 
the advocates of this scheme, it would not be as grave a situation 
as it seems. They claim that since the total water volume of a 
twelve day extraordinary flood is 20 x 1O 9 m3 and the narrow Shandong 
reach can safely handle half this amount, only,  10 x lO m3 remains to 
be overcome. The Sanmenxia reservoir may store 3 x 1O 9 m3 , which is 
less than the total contribution from above Sanmenxia irrespective of 
the major source area and is, therefore, constant. 	The Beijin 
and Dongping retardation areas together may take 4 x 10 m , and the 
task of the Xiaolangdi reservoir would be limited to the remaining 
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3 x 10 m • It should be recognised, though, that such an analysis 
is based on unstated assumptions about the shape of the flood; peaks 
and if these were to include that the flow be steady, for example, 
30 
they would be dubious. The use of the Beijin and Dongping retardation 
areas is also most undesirable, as mentioned previously (Section l,ii). 
The specific proposal is for a dam 151 m high forming a reservoir 
of capacity 12.65 x 10 9 3 	 9 3 m , of which some 8 x 10 m would be used to 
collect silt so that the lower R. Huang would run clear for 10 years; 
and about 4 x 1O9 m3 would be permanent flood regulation capacity. 
It would provide irrigation for 13,000 km  of land and produce between 
1.5 GW and 1.8 GW of electrical power. There would be considerable 
technical problems in building the darn, since alluvial deposits at 
the site are over 70 rn thick, of which the top 14 m to 20 m comprise 
fine silts, and the geological layers are uneven and faulted. This 
project would inundate 80 km  of cultivated land, necessitate the 
evacuation of 120,000 k , and cost V 1800 x 1o 6 (L 514 x 106). 
Owing to its larger capacity, the use of Xiaolangdi reservoir, instead 
of that at Sanrnenxia, to store Winter waters, would obviate the 
contradiction between Winter flood control and Spring irrigation. 
Furthermore, unlike the Taohuayu reservoir, one at Xiaolangdi would 
provide a lively response to small, medium and large floods, as well 
as extraordinarily large ones. 
The proposal by Comrade Fang Chongdai to use the Xiaolangdi reservoir 
tocreatehigh concentration flows will n%4 be described. 
(98) To 
form 
hyperconcentrated flows which do not give rise to deposition, requires 
not only a high silt content, but also a sufficient proportion of very 
fine ( <0.01 trim) particles. Comrade Fang proposes that two tubes 
each 7 m in diameter be installed to pass through the dam, with their 
outlets higher than their inlets, the latter being at 135 m, the bed 
level. This would create, he suggests, a concentrating funnel from 
which to draw highly concentrated waters. In order to provide a 
high proportion of fine silts, explosives may be used within the 
reservoir area. In such a way, he claims, silt may be transported 
over 1000 km without deposition. It may then be used without fear 
of alkalisation, owing to its relatively low water content. Further-
more, only clear water would be passed into the lower R. Huang, 
which would thereby become deeper and more stable. 
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Comrade Fang's is only one of several such propositions, and whilst 
it is very unlikely that this type of plan will be adapted in the 
near future, it is nevertheless considered to be a subject for 
serious research. One problem is to adapt experience gained in the 
irrigation canals of Shaanxi and indoor test facilities, to river 
channels. (99)  Although hyperconcentrated flows have been used to 
transport sediment over - long distances in the former situation, on the 
rare occassions that they,have occurred in the lower R. Huang, they 
have subsequently dispersed, and resulted in deposition downstram. 
The Longmen site has many points of similarity with Xiaolangdi site, 
but also significant differences. The reservoir, formed by a 
206 m high dam, would have an initial capacity of 12.5 x 10 m 3 of 
which some 8 x 10 9 3 m would be used to collect silt over a 10 year 
period, and about 4 x 1O9 m3 would remain as permanent regulation 
capacity, very similar to the proposed Xiaolangdi reservoir. (100) 
Flood prevention by the Longmen reservoir also would have to depend 
upon improvements downstream, and provision could not be made here to 
deal with floods arising below Saninenxia. Protagonists of this 
proposal, however, claim that the extra control, of 13.7 7 of the 
area between Sanmenxia and Huayuankou, afforded by the Xiaolangdi 
reservoir, is not significant, and point out that the proposed 
reservoir would, owing to its position, selectively trap silts from 
the coarse silt source area. It would, therefore, have a relatively 
greater beneficial effect on the lower R. Huang than would a 
reservoir at Xiaolangdi which trapped silts from both fine and coarse 
source areas. The proposed LongmenTeservoir would also provide the 
first effective control of the Tongguan confluence, to the benefit 
of protecting Wan and the Guanzhong Plain. 
Although there is not much to choose between the two with regard to 
flood control, there are significant differences in their benefits 
and environmental impacts. The money cost, 'of the Longmen reservoir, 
2000 x 106 (L 571 x 106), is very slightly higher, but only 18.7 km 2 
of cultivated land would be lost and only 8000 ,A, would have to be 
evacuated. The total installed generating capacity is the same, 
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1.5 GW, but the total annual energy supply is greater (6.7 TW h yr -1  
as opposed to 4.7 TW h yr), as is the guaranteed output 
(520 MW as opposed to between 180 MW and 290 MW). Furthermore, it 
is claimed that some 600 MW used in pumped irrigation at present, 
would be saved. The area to be irrigated by the Longrnen reservoir, 
some 10,700 km 
2 
comprises Southern parts of the loess plateau in 
Shaanxi and Shanxi where water shortage is very severe and where the 
thick and porous loess would not be as susceptible to alkalisation 
as is the North China Plain. Geological conditions at the Longmen 
site are good, the alluvial cover being only between 10 m and 17 m 
thick and there being no fault. The R. Huang and its tributaries 
here flow in deep gorges and no serious effect is to be expected 
from retrogressive backwater deposition. 
The curious reader would perhaps welcome some speculative comment 
on which measures are most likely to be adopted, and such an attempt 
shall here be made. But, it is made difficult because the survey 
and preliminary design for the various proposals is not yet complete. 
This problem was well recognised at the 1979 meeting in Zhengzhou, 
"Survey and design work for the key projects should be 
grasped. At Xiaolangdi it is underway, but a schedule 
has yet to be arranged for that at Taohuayu and we 
propose that it be done soon .... so that a deep analysis 
and comparison may be made with regard to these two 
projects on the basis of equal amounts of work, and a 
policy quickly decided. The design force for Longmen 
is insufficient and needs to be strengthened .... The 
data provided at this symposium is uneven with regard to 
the three projects, and a number of comrades have 
complained ...... from now on, every scheme should be 
based on an equal footing." (101) 
In his article, written on 27 January 1980, Wang Huayun discloses 
that to carry out design work for the Longmen and Xiaolangdi reservoirs, 
and some tributary reservoirs, has already been sanctioned, whilst 
he lists as a 'task for this year' the completion of a comparison 
between the Xiaolangdi and Taohuayu schemes. 
(102) 
On the basis of the above descriptions only, it would seem that the 
cheapest, most effective measure for flood control, and the one with 
the least adverse environmental impact is that proposed for Taohuayu. 
Yet, just as with the Sarniienxia project before, the leadership is 
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confronted by further demands which mean that any decision is, at 
least in part, political, 
"In 1978 when reporting the flood prevention symposium 
to the State Council, the two provinces, Shanxi and 
Shaanxi, requested the Longmen project, and He'nan and 
Shandong requested the Xiaolangdi project." (103) 
Now, both these projects fail to provide a very convincing response 
to the flood control problem and both would require continued 
maintenance of the Beijin flood retardation area. Meanwhile, according 
to one estimate, the Beijin area would need an additional investment 
of Y 200 x 10  (Z 57 x 106) to give the required standard of protection, 
and, if even used once losses would amount to Y 570 x 10  (E 163 
106); which two items together exceed the investment for the 
construction of the Taohuayu project. (104) 
Again based on the above, sparse, descriptions, it would seem that 
if one of the large projects is to proceed, then it should just be 
that at Longmen, as, whereas the costs are similar, the benefits 
of the Longmen project are considerably greater than those of the 
Xiaolangdi project and the adverse environmental effects are fewer. 
The political effects constitute another question, but one which 
shall not be addressed here. 
The above is by no means all embracing, but it covers the major 
proposals. In view of its unchallenged popularity, and its relative 
simplicity, a further programme to reopen the remaining four bed 
sluices at Sanmenxia is to be expected. The project at Taohuayu, 
should it, after further research, turn out to be feasible, would 
also seem very desirable for R. Huang control, whilst for direct 
economic benefits it would best be combined with the Longmen project. 
For the actual outcome we are obliged to wait and see. 
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Chapter Six 
Summary. Conclusions and Prognosis 
1) Summary. 
Two parallel and interrelated themes have dominated this thesis, 
namely, the regulation of the lower R. Huang and the development of 
the loess plateau. They are linked most strongly by the extreme 
sediment load of the river, which is unrivalled in any other large 
river of the world, since over 90 7 of the 1.6 x 1O 9 t yr 	of 
sediment in the lower reaches has its origin on the loess plateau. 
Deposition of this sediment has, since before historical times, 
raised the bed of the lower river until it exceeded the level of its 
surroundings and found a new course, forming, by repetition, the 
great North China Plain. Today this process continues but, although 
the bed has risen above the level of the surrounding plain, the river 
is prevented from changing course by over 1300 km of dykes. 
Protection of these dykes, and the continued need to raise them every 
decade or so, are major burdens to flood control. Meanwhile, the loss 
of this fertile topsoil is an important factor in the continuing 
poverty of the loess plateau region, where hundreds of years of 
erosion has so dissected the terrain as to make communications 
difficult and to destroy the delicate, former, ecological balance. 
Silt is not the only factor linking the loess plateau and the R. Huang. 
Both are affected by the unequal distribution of rainfall over the 
less plateau area. Since this is generally confined to heavy 
Summer storms of limited area and duration, most places on the loess 
plateau suffer a severe lack of water. During the storms, on the 
other hand, an excess of surface runoff gives rise to the severe 
erosion whose sediment yield so troubles the R. Huang. Furthermore, 
this type of rainfall distribution gives rise to sudden flood peaks, 
in the lower river, which are a threat to the dykes. 
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Yet, the relationship between the loess plateau and the R. Huang is 
not altogether direct, and is subject to certain limitations. Whereas 
it seems clear that a reduction in soil and water losses from the 
loess plateau will be of benefit to both areas of concern, it is not 
immediately apparent what benefit the loess plateau might gain from 
hydraulic peace along the lower R. Huang. The missing factor, the 
plant cover of the area will, if increased, improve local conditions, 
reduce the silt load of the river, and attenuate its flood peaks, but 
if the main concern is the R. Huang, then only some 110.000 1m 2 of 
the loess plateau's 280,000 1m2 area need be treated. It can be seen 
therefore, that there is considerable room for political choice in 
what is essentially a question of the allocation of resources. 
When the construction of reservoirs is considered, this becomes even 
more apparent. Reservoirs are one means by which the loess plateau 
may make use of the R. Huang, to facilitate irrigation and for the 
provision of electrical power. However, exploitation of the river 
in its middle reaches has only a limited benefit towards flood control 
in the lower reaches, as in the case, for example, of the proposed 
Longmen and Xiaolangdi reservoirs. Conversely, there was the case of the 
original Sanmenxia scheme, where upstream areas were to lose prime 
arable land for the sake of flood control and irrigation downstream. 
The relationship between the development of the loess plateau and 
flood control along the lower R. Huang is very close and, of itself, 
warrants a comprehensive approach. The difficulty in deciding how 
best to allocate resources within the basin further adds to this 
need. Yet, it may be remembered that there is nothing new in this 
for, as this study has shown, such a point of view was already being 
expressed in general terms in the first half of the Twentieth 
Century. Also, the 1955 Multiple Purpose Plan which, it is claimed, 
still forms the basis of all work in the R. Huang basin, purports to 
take a whole-basin approach to the problems it addresses. It is, 
therefore, of some interest to consider what this study has revealed 
about the extent to which basin-wide planning has been implemented. 
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Since the organisational structure is centred upon the RHWCC and has 
a strongly comprehensive character, conflicts between the local 
authorities in different parts of the basin are considerably 
ameliorated. Yet, it is open to question whether the approach has 
been as fully integrated - as might have been hoped at the time of 
the establishment of the RHWCC. The key role given to the Saninenxia 
reservoir within the multipurpose plan, for example, seems to have 
been out of balance with a truly comprehensive view. This would not 
apply to its ostensible, and very long term, role as one of a series 
which formed the 'staircase' to control the whole river. Yet, in 
practice, where resources were limited, it was the one structure upon 
which the whole of the lower reaches was to have depended. It is 
true that other structures were to be built downstream, but the 
point is that these, together with the Sanmenxia reservoir, formed 
a comprehensive plan for the lower reaches, not for the whole basin. 
It may be argued that this is a consequence of its position within 
the basin, but that does not take into account the disproportionately 
large investment it required, which took away resources from work in 
other parts of the basin. Of course, the Sanmenxia reservoir, in its 
original form, Was to rely upon soil and water conservation in the 
middle reaches. However, as this study has revealed, the failure of 
soil and water conservation work to make any significant reduction 
in the silt load of the lower R. -Huang, was not an important factor 
in the decision to abandon the original design of the dam and to 
change the operational regime of the reservoir. Thus, the Sanmenxia 
reservoir represented a plan to control the lower R. Huang and 
develop its resources to the neglect of the need to develop the 
loess plateau or to exploit the river or its tributaries elsewhere. 
Surely, a comprehensive approach would have sought to control the 
river downstream as economically as possible, so that there would be 
more left to invest in the loess plateau region. 
This does not apply only to money, but to the degree of emphasis 
placed on the various parts of the basin, in general. This study 
has shown, for example, that the technical means for comprehensive 
development of the gullied hillock region were known in the fifties. 
The same is true of the social and economic constraints of the 
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problem. For example, it was known that in order to withdraw tillage 
from the hilltops, another reliable and local source of food must be 
found for the peasants. However, these matters did not enjoy 
sufficient attention in the implementation of the overall plan for 
the R. Huang basin, and all but a handful of individual places in the 
gullied hillock region of the loess plateau remain as barren and as 
poverty-stricken as before. 
One of the points which this thesis has revealed is that, in the 
short term, regulation of the R. Huang did not proceed along a 
comprehensive, basin-wide path as was claimed, but put a dispropor-
tionate emphasis on the large-scale capital-intensive projects', of 
which the Sanmenxia reservoir is the most notorious example. The 
reasons for this imbalanced approach in the fifties, have been 
shown to have closely related to the ideological and psychological 
climate of the time. The experts and the RHWCC debated the various 
options, but the decisions were made by the politicians who brought 
upon themselves the unenviable task of choosing amongst sets of 
assumptions, many of which were unchecked. At that time, it appears 
that sight had been lost of questions of scale, including the time 
scale, since it was supposed that the problem of the lower R. Huang 
could not afford to await the results of further research. The 
choice between indiginous and imported technology, and the relative 
importance of experience gained at home or abroad, was influenced in 
a similar way. However, the failure of the Sanmenxia reservoir, in 
its original form, shows up this imbalance only inasmuch as these 
questions of the timescale and the effects of the ideological and 
psychological climate are concerned, since only these aspects are 
reasons for the adoption of an inappropriate design for the reservoir 
itself. The subsequent failure does not prove the point, which is 
nevertheless valid and important, that the scale of project at 
Sanmenxia was not commensurate with whole basin planning. What 
proves that point, is that, even if the Sanmenxia reservoir had 
functioned according to the original plans, including the improvement 
of so much land downstream, the provision of electrical power, 
navigation and, of course, flood prevention, it would still have 
provided only a local solution, whilst taking a disproportionate 
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share of the available resources of all kinds, to the detriment of 
other needy areas within the basin. 
In the late sixties and early seventies, there was a failure once 
again to implement a rational comprehensive plan but, as has been 
shown, the reasons were more strictly political. A mixture of 
political chaos and dogmatism led to the destruction of too much of 
the infrastructure for any such plan to have been followed, and to 
the adoption of all sorts of inappropriate policies, especially with 
regard to the development of the loess plateau. 
Nevertheless, throughout the past thirty-odd years, significant 
advances have been made in response to specific problems. It has 
been suggested that some of these even owe a debt to the anarchy of 
the Cultural Revolution in that it allowed existing practices to be 
challenged. In other respects, it is apparent that the basin-wide 
organisation of the RHWCC, afforded the opportunity for experimentation 
and improvements in a well coordinated manner, and the rapid 
propagation of new ideas and techniques. What could be seen as 
failure of large scale projects, accompanied by success with small 
scale ones, is better understood in terms of the need for a whole-
basin approach to the many problems of the R. Huang basin. For, 
those schemes which have failed, have been shown to be those which 
were out of line with the declared comprehensive approach, whereas 
the remarkable successes, which at first seem isolated, have in 
common that they are integrated into an appropriate place within 
the basin-wide overall plan. This is not to claim that any advance 
necessarily has application all over the basin, but that the research 
towards such advances has been facilitated by a basin-wide approach. 
At the same time, the proportion of total resources taken by these 
items, is in general agreement with their role within the basin 
scheme. It is not the small scale of the successful projects, as 
such, which is important, but the appropriateness of whatever scale 
is chosen, for its application. An example of this is the 
development of an understanding of how to deal with sediment problems 
in hydropower stations. The complicated design of the Tianqiao 
hydropower station owes much to the experience accumulated gradually 
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throughout the basin, and it Cannot be said that this project is on 
a particularly small scale. 
Similarly, to call for a comprehensive approach for the whole basin 
is not meant to imply that every project should be of multiple 
purpose kind. One of the reasons for the adoption of an out of 
proportion scheme at Sanmenxia was that it was thought desirable to 
solve as many different problems as possible with one intervention. 
The present debate, about the next stage in the implementation of a 
general whole-basin plan, is also directed to this problem, since 
there is a considerable body of opinion advocating the Xiaolangdi 
reservoir simply because it may have multiple purpose uses 	The 
question which should be addressed is, rather, which of the various 
alternatives serves the whole basin better? An expensive one with 
multiple uses at one place, or a cheaper one with limited uses, but 
integrated with other projects made possible elsewhere by the 
savings? 
This thesis has been used to record details of an investigation into 
the implemenation of the basin-wide approach to the problems of the 
R. Huang and both advances and deviations have been identified. The 
various problems have been the topic of much debate in China and it 
is to be hoped that in the future more advances and fewer deviations 
will be made. Some problems, such as pollution, are only just 
beginning to be recognised, whilst others, such as the development 
of the loess plateau, are old problems, but ones whose solution 
needs to be developed over a long time. Inasmuch as all this varied 
work is proceeding under a body with basin-wide responsibility, the 
RHWCC, and the deviations of the recent past are now being corrected, 
it may be said that even if, in the short term, the implemenation of 
a basin-wide approach was only an illusion, in the long term it will 
probably be a reality. 
This study has revealed, in particular, the wide range and extreme 
nature of the problems of the R. Huang. In the search for solutions 
to these problems, advances have been made as the result of positive 
experience, both theoretical and empirical, and as lessons learnt the 
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hard way. Whilst it is one thing to gain knowledge, it is quite 
another to apply it. The foregoing Chapters have included mention 
of a number of contentious issues to which such an observation would 
be relevant. It may be useful, therefore, to draw a distinction 
between the advances made, by whatever process, and the extent to 
which the less tangible aspect, their application, has been grasped. 
In casting a critical eye over China, perhaps some application will 
also be found elsewhere in the world for what is seen, or seen to be 
absent. 
The most readily assimilated knowledge to have emerged from work 
relating to the R. Huang over the last thirty years, would be direct 
technical advances such as those described in Chapter 4. Examples 
come as a result of observation, whence we now know that only a 
relatively small area of the loess plateau acts as the source of 
most of the coarse grains of R. Huang silt; as a result of laboratory 
experiments, whence new insights have been gained into the properties 
of hyperconcentrated flows; and as a result of a conscious trial 
and error process whereby new ways to use the silt of heavily laden 
streams have been found. 
Knowledge of this type was also gained as a beneficial side effect 
of occurances which in ' other respects were none too welcome. For 
example, the Sanmenxia debacle promoted the study of the conditions 
necessary to flush out reservoir deposits and this led to the 
development of the techniques for operating reservoirs in such a way 
as to maintain a long term useful storage capacity. Meanwhile, the 
extent and effects of the armouring of the bed of the lower R. Huang 
under clear water conditions were also derived. 
Such knowledge, which could be called factual knowledge, has also 
been gained in the political and economic spheres, though it may 
be somewhat less tangible. The example w1Cch springs to mind is 
the confirmation of the principle that on the loess plateau, the 
peasants food provision must be guaranteed before they can withdraw 
tillage from hilltops. More narrowly economic rules, such as the 
economic value to be expected of various crops, or the suitability 
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of any given region to agriculture, silviculture or husbandry, have 
also been established. 
Such knowledge gained from work on the R. Huang is very extensive 
and is often referred to in Chinese literature. It surely must 
represent a significant contribution to Chinese science and 
technology and must justify the pride of those responsible. Its 
extent may be estimated from the examples in the foregoing Chapters 
or from other sources, but, in any case, is not in doubt. 
Far less tangible is knowledge which may be called procedural 
knowledge, or how to avoid mistakes. And it is with some consideration 
of the extent to which this type of knowledge has been made available, 
and grasped, in the work on the R. Huang over the last thirty years, 
that this summary will be concluded. Inasmuch as the Sanmenxia 
reservoir has been discussed extensively, it will provide a good 
basis for a consideration of whether lessons which could have 
been learned have indeed been learned. Certainly, as the following 
quotation shows, there is considerable recognition that there are 
lessons which should be learned, 
Within China's water conservancy construction, instances 
of inappropriate planning, violation of objective laws 
and the incurrance of nature's punishment, can't be 
reckoned to be few, and these lessons, learnt at an 
exhorbitant price, should be thoroughly assimilated." (1) 
It is very difficult to comment upon the extent to which the 
Sanxnenxia affair led to any change in Chinese attitudes towards 
foreign experience and expertise because, for political reasons, China 
until recently has had very limited involvement of that kind. Another 
study has shown that China, all along, was anxious to avoid any 
political obligation resulting from foreign technical aid. (2) So 
much was this so, indeed, that for nearly twenty years following the 
Sino-Soviet split, all foreign involvement in China was severely 
restricted. 
Yet, it would be an exaggeration to claim that this political act was 
a result of the Sanmenxia affair. Although the usefulness of the 
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Soviet experts has been brought into question by Klochko, 1964, this 
study has made it clear (Chapter 3, Section 2, iv), that the 
Chinese were, in general, happy with the work of the Soviet experts 
and, furthermore, acknowledge responsibility for accepting an 
erroneous design for the Sanmenxia project. The severe isolation of 
China, therefore, was a political phenomenon of much wider dimensions 
than any one, albeit major, project currently benefitting from 
Soviet assistance. 
The Sanrnenxia affair is, nevertheless, very illustrative of the 
pitfalls associated with technology transfer. A number of Chinese 
comments were made to this effect in the fifties, as was reported 
in Chapter 3. It is to be expected that errors so expensively and 
extensively apparent would have increased the general awareness of 
the importance of finding solutions well suited to the locality in 
which they are to be applied and the importance, therefore, of 
local experience within these considerations. 
Other aspects of the Sanmenxia experience may be considered quite 
readily and, as the examples of previous chapters show, there is a 
good general awareness of the possible problems of large engineering 
projects. Furthermore, there would appear to be a growing concern 
for the conservation of the plant cover in many different parts of 
China, to which the disastrous effects of the denudation of the 
loess plateau, both on the locality and along the faraway lower 
reaches of the R. Huang, are often referred as pertinent negative 
examples. 
In the Summer of 1981 heavy rainfall, occurring over parts of 
Qinghai, Sichuan and Southern Shaanxi, gave rise to serious flooding 
in the basins of the rivers Huang, Jialing, Hanshui and Wei. (3) 
What is interesting about the flood peaks of those of the above 
which are Changjiang tributaries, is that they have been attributed 
to denudation of the hills in their upper reaches. This, in turn 
has been blamed on 'leftist thinking'. 
358 
The ways in which 'leftist thinking' are held to have manifested 
itself here, are just the same as those which this study has 
investigated with respect to the loess plateau. They are summarised 
in the China Daily as the two errors, 
"Concern for short-term interests only, at the expense 
of the future", 
and, 
"the policy of 'taking grain as the key link in agriculture' 
—which entailed land on river banks and opening up 
wasteland indiscriminately to grow grain". (4) 
It is reported that in the early fifties, 19 7. of Sichuan was 
covered in forest, which subsequently fell to 9 7. It is also 
reported that damage has occurred to water conservancy projects with 
insufficient flood resistance, just as has been the case on the 
loess plateau. In the floods of 1981 for example, 14,000 weirs and 
dams were washed away in Sichuan. (5) 
The increased awareness of ecological problems is to be welcomed 
as a step in the right direction. Nevertheless, it should be 
remembered that although the link between the denudation of the 
loess plateau and the problems of the-lower R. Huang was well known, 
this awareness alone was insufficient to effect a change. In the 
report of the Sichuan floods, we find a similar example of the 
failure of the real lessons of the loess plateau t have been 
learned, 
"It is of particular concern that protection of forests 
and prohibition of tree felling is still not on the agend. 
For instance, in 104 State-run tree farms, only 760,000 m 
of wood should be felled yearly 6 bt the State annual 
target is set as high as 2 x 10 m 
On the other hand, ecological questions did play an important role 
in the discussions over the Northward Transfer of Southern Waters, 
as described earlier. In particular it is noticeable how lessons 
have been drawn from the attempts of the early sixties to irrigate 
large areas of the North China Plain with clear water from the 
Sarirnenxia resevoir. (7) Whereas, in view of the extensive debates 
of the fifties and their failure to avert the adoption of the 
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modified Soviet design for the Sanmenxia reservoir, one might regard 
with scepticism the statement, 
"The Chinese Society of Hydraulic Engineering, in accordance 
with the opinion of leading comrades of the Central 
Committee that in order to accept the past lessons of the 
Saninenxia project and avoid possible harm, people with 
different points of view should be called together for a 
meeting and do an even better job of the Northward 
transfer of Southern waters, ..... held a symposium," (8) 
Yet, it would appear that in this instance a very careful approach is 
indeed being made to the subject and it is unlikely that any plan of 
this kind will be undertaken in a rush. 
Another example of caution is offered by the complaints about the 
lack of data, from some Comrades at the 1979 Symposium, on the control 
of the lower R. Huang, which may be taken as an indication that at 
least the scientific community will not again be satisfied to proceed 
with an engineering project based largely upon guesswork. Or so it 
would seem but, from the following quotation, it would appear that 
at least one other large project was recently begun before a proper 
understanding of the sedimentation problems of the locality had been 
gained, 
"Work on the first key installation to be built on the 
mainstream of the Changjiang - Gezhouba, was forced, also 
because of scientific problems, to a halt for two years 
whilst experiments were done and the design revised, 
causing a several fold increase in' the investment. The 
warning of the front cart provides food for thought. If, 
in the project to be undertaken in the Three Gorges, the 
sedimentation problem is not resolved very early on, 
especially if appropriate soil and water conservation 
measures are not adopted in Sichuan ..... then there is 
bound to be the danger of falling again into the 
Sanmenxja rut" 
(9) 
The same article also complained of a general lack of emphasis on 
the part of some officials towards the constraints imposed by sediment, 
"In 1978 when the water level was abnormally low in the 
Liujiaxia resevoir, the leaders still lop-sidedly 
emphasised electricity generation, which brought large 
amounts of silt into the ante-dam area. In just three 
months, May to July, deposits in front of the turbine 
intakes rose greatly and there was a sharp increase in 
the amount of sediment passing through them. In these 
three months the amount of sediment to pass through the 
turbines was equivalent to 2.6 times that of the previous 
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three and a half years, causing serious damage to those 
parts in contact with the water. Now no.4 machine is 
out of action awaiting large-scale repairs." 
Those concerned with appropriate technology probably would welcome 
some comments on the scale of modern Chinese waterworks and whether 
any discernable change may be attributed to the experiences of the 
last thirty years in R. Huang control. As revealed, (Chapter 5, 
Section 3 1 iii), there still exist many pressures on the government 
to mount further large-scale projects for the provision of 
hydroelectricity and irrigation from the R. Huang, and it is 
interesting to note that even though the flood control problem could 
be solved readily and cheaply by the Taohuayu project, discussion of 
the other two, whose main advantages are not in flood control at all, 
but in the provision of other benefits, took place at meetings 
ostensibly to discuss flood control. This is precisely the type of 
confusion which was apparent at the meetings of the fifties where the 
Sannienxia project was discussed. Furthermore, the reports of the 1979 
Symposium do not address the question of what measures have to be 
taken on the North China Plain in order to make use of the proposed 
storage at Xiaolangdi. But, rather as in the fifties when the Sanmenxia 
reservoir was under discussion, it is assumed that one large project 
to provide electricity and irrigation is necessarily a good thing, 
even, in the case of the Xiaolangdi reservoir, where 80 km  of 
cultivated land would be lost and 120,000,( would have to be moved. 
It is assumed that electricity and water thus provided downstream 
could be put to use without serious problem. 
The decision as to new engineering projects on the lower R. Huang 
has yet to be announced, and it may well be that these fears turn out 
to be unfounded, and.a cautious approach, such as that found with 
regard to the Northward transfer of Southern waters, will prevail. 
The QUSRL are quite, explicit in their warning, 
"There is still the need to construct some key projects, 
with a control function, on the mainstream of the R. Huang. 
The design. and use of these projects cannot pay regard only 
to the requirement for irrigation and electricity, but at 
the same time must take into consideration the urgent 
necessity and the possibility for a reduction of deposition 
in the river channel" (10) 
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Yet,whether or not it will be heeded, we are obliged to wait and 
see. Meanwhile on the Changjiang, the first stage of the Three 
Gorges project, the Gezhou dam, is under construction. Insufficient 
information is at hand to speculate upon when the next stage will 
proceed, if at all, or on how large it would be, but there is 
potential there for a scheme several times larger than any on the 
R. Huang. It is to this proposed project which one should look in the 
future for clues as to whether the lessons of the R. Huang have 
indeed been learned. 
For a more succinct admonition, the opinion which some comrades 
expressed at the 1979 Symposium will more than suffice, not only 
with regard to the R. Huang, but in water conservancy construction 
everywhere, 
"When constructing the Sanmenxia project in 1958, our 
knowledge of the R. Huang problem was insufficient, we 
made some mistakes and did some foolish things. So much 
so, that even today, 21 years on, we are still obliged to 
discuss these lessons; It is exactly 21 years to the turn 
of the Century, let us hope that when people then talk of 
today's affairs, it won't again be talk of lessons, but 
of experience". (11) 
2) Conclusions. 
In conclusion, the main weaknesses and strengths shown by the work 
of the Chinese in managing the problems of the R. Huang basin will 
be listed. Firstly, the weaknesses which have been found, include: 
i) Trying to run before being able to walk. 
A number of the other weaknesses listed below are related, to a 
greater or lesser extent, with this. Whilst it may be desirable to 
control the river, exploit its resources, and promote the development 
of the region and the country as rapidly as possible, the Chinese 
experience of the late fifties has provided a good example of more 
haste resulting in less speed. 
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Predisposition towards foreign experience and expertise. 
The Chinese experience includes a good example of a case where 
foreign experience and expertise proved to be disastrously 
inappropriate, despite being based upon a generally higher 
technological level. The choice of the foreign before the domestic, 
furthermore, shows that the value of the higher foreign technological 
level, as perceived by the Chinese in the late fifties, was allowed 
to mask the question of its appropriateness to domestic circumstances. 
Lack of coordination and communication. 
An important factor, in the slow progress of much of the work, has 
been shown to be due to poor delegation of responsibility amongst 
the various bodies concerned. This lack of coordination has been 
enhanced by poor communications in general and even, at times, 
obsessive secrecy. 
Political interference. 
As must be the case when allocating scarce resources over a large 
area and amongst divergent groups of interest, there is an important 
role for the exercise of political choice. Yet, the work in the 
R. Huang basin fell victim, from the late fifties to the early 
seventies, to various degrees of excessive emphasis being given to 
political ideals, at the expense of technical and other considerations. 
These political ideals themselves, were often arbitrary, being 
based upon dogma and, misunderstood or taken out of context, were 
applied blindly, with disastrous result. A number of the other 
weaknesses identified in this list are also related to this problem. 
An imbalanced approach. 
Despite being based upon a commendable policy of whole-basin 
development, there have been a number of departures from that policy, 
in its implementation. These have given rise to instances of 
imbalance sufficiently severe to hinder seriously the progress of the 
work. 
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On the other hand, the strengths which have been found, include: 
Whole-basin organisation. 
Even if not used as effectively as might have been hoped, the 
RHWCC's whole-basin scope of operations subsists, giving a 
comprehensive structure to the work. 
Thorough data collection. 
A major contribution to the understanding of the problems involved 
has been made by the thorough, large-scale and systematic data 
collection activities and, albeit somewhat hindered by the weaknesses 
in coordination and communication (iii, above), the spread of the 
knowledge so gained amongst the various organisations concerned. 
Thorough discussion. 
Even though subsequent decisions have been, at times, in error, 
there has been a useful airing of views at extensive symposia on 
most of the major issues within the basin. This continues to be the 
case. 
Political independence. 
China has steadfastly avoided the common pitfall of allowing foreign 
aid to result in foreign domination. Furthermore, in later years 
there has been a strong trend towards self reliance and self help, 
which increases the degree of emphasis placed upon domestic 
experience and expertise. 	 - 
Flexibility. 
Not only has China shown a willingness to acknowledge and to learn 
from mistakes, but the experience thus absorbed has led to the 
disussion of less simplistic solutions than those tried previously. 
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Empirical advances, often based upon traditional methods, have been 
incorporated into the work, as have some of the experience and more 
modern techniques available from abroad. There has been a good 
general willingness to adapt broad principles to specific local 
needs. It should be pointed out furthermore, that in this way 
many of the shortcomings identified above have since been rectified. 
3) Prognosis 
The formal writing of any thesis is a lengthy process, and by the 
time it is ready for submission there is often new information to be 
considered. This is especially so when dealing with China, where 
rapid change is taking place as new policies are sought to promote 
recovery from the chaos of the past decade or so. Furthermore, some 
informal comment on the direction of these changes may be useful 
despite its necessarily speculative nature. Since completion of the 
main text the author has had the opportunity to return briefly to 
China, and this section is intended to introduce some supplementary 
comment, mainly based upon the discussions there. 
The debate about what to construct as the next stage in the plan to 
control the lower R. Huang is still continuing, but it would appear 
that the trend is for the Xiaolangdi reservoir project to take 
precedence over the Longmen and Taohuayu projects. No further 
information is available with respect to the Longmen project, but it 
is said that one major reason for the apparent lack of interest is 
that its useful life, so far as its effect on the lower reaches is 
concerned, would only be about ten years. The Taohuayu project is 
still under consideration, but does not seem as popular as before. 
It is interesting to note, however, that the reasons given are severely 
practical, and do not make reference to its failure to provide multi-
purpose uses. 
Three Major problems have been identified with respect to the Taohuayu 
project, they are all related to the fact that apart from the cliffs 
along the right (Southern) bank, it would have to rely upon a long 
earthern dyke built onto the river floodplains. Firstly, under 
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normal circumstances deposition would occur whenever any but the 
largest type of flood peak occured. The useful capacity would 
therefore diminish rapidly. Secondly, at present the land around 
the confluence of the rivers Qin and Huang is highly productive and 
wheat yields in Wen and Wushe Counties are of the order of 3 t ha' 
to 3.75 t ha- 1. This would presumably apply to the floodplains as 
well as the surrounding land. However, the floodplains here are between 
6 rn and 7 m above the level of the surrounding land, and it is 
thought that if water were to be stored in a reservoir built onto 
the floodplains, then seepage would cause alkalisation problems 
in the wheat fields outwith the dykes. Thirdly, whereas success has 
been had in using dykes to contain the transient Summer flood peaks 
of the lower R. Huang, it is feared that earthern dykes would prove 
impossible to maintain, if used in the proposed way, because they 
then would be permanently under water and prone to collapse through 
seepage. The Xiaolangdi reservoir is preferred because, although, 
7 x 1O 9 m3 of capacity will be lost in the first ten to twelve years, 
thereafter a long term storage capacity of some 5 x 10 m3 can be 
maintained. Moreover, by careful choice of reservoir operational 
regime, including the creation of downstream artificial flood peaks, 
selectively trapping silts, and using the clearer Autumn flood peaks 
to discharge silt deposited during the turbid early Summer flood peaks, 
it is estimated that the lower reaches would nof suffer any serious 
aggradation for thirty years. It also has multipurpose uses. 
It is reported that preliminary solutions have been found to the 
problems of earthquake resistance, construction of a 70 m deep anti-
seepage wall, prevention of floods caused by landslides into the 
reservoir area, and choosing the correct material for the centre 
of the rock fill dam. (12) However, and despite the benefits mentioned 
above, the author is still not convinced that this is the best choice 
to meet the immediate needs for the control and exploitation of the 
river. The reasons are as outlined in Chapter 5, Section 3, iii: The 
Xiaolangdi reservoir would still rely upon the Beijin retardation 
area, but the cost of bringing it up to the required standard and 
of using it once, according to one estimate, could already exceed 
the cost of the Taohuayu project. Furthermore, it should be 
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remembered that this would be in addition to the cost of the 
Xiaolangdi reservoir itself. Much is now being made of the technical 
problems associated with the Taohuayu project, but most of these 
problems would only arise if it were to be used to store water, 
whereas under the operational regime described in Chapter 5, in which 
it acts only as a standby, this clearly would not be the case in 
normal years. Meanwhile, the 151 m high rock fill dam proposed for 
Xiaolangdi, for example, would be much higher than any existing 
such dam in China, and, as the above list of problems already being 
tackled there indicates, this project is far from straightforward. 
Furthermore, it is said that the Xiaolangdi project would be 
complemented by large pumping stations ir Shanxi and Shaanxi to help 
overcome the shortage of water on the loess plateau. Of course, the 
view of an outsider is based upon scanty information, and has to be 
speculative. Nevertheless, having taken a good look at some of the 
lessons of the Sanmenxia reservoir, one is bound to have reservations 
about another project apparently chosen for its multipurpose uses, 
but where much agricultural land is to be lost. In addition many 
people will have to be moved, the technical problems are many, the 
technological scale is, in one respect, larger than has hitherto 
been the case in China, and which in any case may not resolve the 
flood problem of the lower R. Huang as effectively as a less costly 
alternative, 
In May this year (1982), the State Council established a coordinating 
group, for soil and water conservation, consisting of representatives 
from the State Planning Committee, the State Economic Committee, the 
Ministry of Water Resources (the new name for the Ministry of Water 
Conservancy and Electrical Power), the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Animal Husbandry and Pisciculture, and the Ministry of Silviculture. 
The head of the group is Comrade Qian Zhengying, concurrently head of 
the Ministry of Water Resources. In August, the fourth National Soil 
and Water Conservation Conference was held in Beijing, and it was 
decided, inter alia, to create eight points of emphasis in soil and 
water conservation. They are: the R. Wuding catchment; the R. Huangpu 
catchment; the R. Sanchuan catchment; all in the R. Huang basin; 
Dingxi County in Gansu; the R. Liu catchment in the R. Liao basin; 
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the upper reaches of the R. Yongding in the R. Hai basin; Xingguo 
County in Jiangxi; and the reservoir area of the Gezhouba project 
on the Changjiang. (13)  That noticeable progress has already been 
made in the development of the loess plateau is witnessed by the 
remark, made to the author recently in China, to the effect that 
it is being said in Shaanxi that the peasants once again may now 
eat their fill. 
It is very difficult to assess the extent to which the lessons of 
the past have been assimilated. As was mentioned in the Summary, the 
technical lessons appear to have been studied and grasped well, but 
for the organisational ones the situation is not so clear. Caution 
has -been shown in dealing with the question of the Northward transfer 
of Southern waters, but doubt still remains over the choice of 
technological scale elsewhere. The enormous Gezhouba project on the 
Changjiang was cited in the Summary as an example of a large project 
being begun before all the relevant facts were known, and it would 
appear that the choice of the Xiaolangdi reservoir as the next stage 
on the R. Huang, may be yet another such case. It would seem that, 
although specific problems are tackled and resolved satisfactorily, 
there remains the need to pay more attention to the overall view. 
This may be particularly difficult in China, where specialisations 
tend to be narrow. 
The educational system has been thoroughly restored in the past few 
years. Entrance to university is no longer dependent upon political 
or ideological purity, but is strictly according to examination 
results. Competition is fierce and the standards are high. The 
diligence of Chinese students is outstanding and if one were to 
accept the implied premise that study is all there is to university 
life, that of Western students would not bear comparison. However, 
this system seems conducive to the rigidly segmented style of work 
from which the above lack of overall view stems. Of course, academic 
exchange is not stifled. On the contrary, it is encouraged, but 
students tend to concentrate and become specialised in a narrow field 
and then, as would seem logical, to be assigned a post within their 
speciality. They do not have much to say, however, in the selection 
of their specific work post and, once accepted, it may not be 
changed freely. Thus, once a young person has begun his or her 
career, and to some extent even before, there will be little 
opportunity to gain a broad spectrum of practical experience. 
The problem of making more people aware of the lessons of the past 
is, however, taken very seriously in high places and the importance 
of assimilating such experience into the normal school sylla.bus is 
also recognised. For example, at the Fourth National Soil and Water 
Conservation Conference, mentioned above, Vice Premier Wan Li, of the 
State Council, called for materials on the protection of resources 
and the environment to be included into middle and junior school 
textbooks. (14) 
Another factor of importance in the past, was direct political 
interference in everyday academic affairs. 	Although steps have 
been taken to eliminate this problem, people still seem somewhat 
reluctant to depart from the norm and take on broader responsibilities. 
Decisions are often made only after consideration by large 
committees or large conferences. But why should many people necessarily 
produce more realistic results than fetq? This would be a difficult 
question to answer in China where the ideas of broad consultation 
and expertise lie uneasily together. If the answer is to be found in 
the establishment of a corps of experts, then they would have to have 
broad experience and be receptive to the new, often imprecise, ideas 
which arise in the interdiciplinary meetings. If committees or 
conferences were to remain paramount, the value of expertise might be 
lost, unless the experts amongst the members present, happen also to 
be persuasive orators. This appears to have been the case in the 
meetings of 1957, to discuss the design of the Sanmenxia reservoir, 
where the experts were overpowered by the intensity of feeling of 
others who, with the best of intentions, were trying to force the 
pace of China's development. 
Despite past history and the particular difficulties in China, it 
should be pointed out that both professionalism and the wider 
acceptance of personal responsbility are on the increase. For the 
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sake of the Chinese people, who have many development problems to 
overcome, it is to be hoped that this trend will continue, away from 
the corservatism of over reliance on narrow collectivism. 
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